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Grand Strategy for India
2020 and Beyond

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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES & ANALYSES

Grand Strategy for India 2020 and Beyond

Venkatshamy & George

Editors

Krishnappa Venkatshamy
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
This volume presents perspectives on issues of importance to India's grand strategy. Number of Experts discuss wide ranging security concerns: socio-economic challenges; regional and internal security challenges; emerging challenges in foreign policy domain etc. The volume also addresses recent and emerging security threats such as left wing extremism, international terrorism, climate change and energy security, and the role of these for framing a national security strategy for India. The authors in the volume offer insightful answers to questions such as: What might India do to build a cohesive and peaceful domestic order in the in the next decades? How could India foster a global consensus on the global commons that serve India's interests and values? What strategic framework will optimise India's efforts to foster a stable and peaceful neighbourhood?

Grand Strategy
for India
2020 and Beyond

To
Late Shri K. Subrahmanyam

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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES & ANALYSES
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Foreword

This volume is the product of a four-day international conference on *India's National Security Strategy* held on 20-23 December, 2010 at the IDSA. The conference launched the IDSA National Strategy Project (INSP), an initiative to provide a forum for interdisciplinary dialogue among specialists in international studies, economists, strategic experts and other groups with an interest in India's strategic affairs. The key mission of the one-year long project was to strengthen the tools of strategic analysis through a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach instead of relying primarily on regional studies, bilateral relations and military issues.

The National Strategy Project Team has had the opportunity interact with a large number of intellectuals from varied backgrounds in the past two years. These interactions provided us with an opportunity to identify deep drivers of change both at the domestic and international level. Five key themes emerged from these interactions and the papers in this volume.

First, we are witnessing a dramatic shift in the locus of global power with the relative decline of the United States and the spectacular rise of China. The rise of China and India will alter the geopolitical landscape and the nature of the global system in the coming two decades. We are in a time of great geopolitical transformation. Our assumptions, theories, paradigms need to be revaluated in light of the technological, social, economic and political developments in the emerging world. Despite growing economic interdependency between China and the United States, trends suggest a potential for great power conflict in the Asia-Pacific region which will have consequences for our security. India should carefully watch security developments in the region, especially the China-United States axis, identify important currents, anticipate the consequences for India's security and develop resources that will ensure our security under various contingencies. In the coming years, we should enhance our intellectual and intelligence capacities for long term strategic analysis beyond South Asia. We should build up our hard and soft power resources to meet plausible contingencies that will flow from great power competition in the region. Our enhancement of power and influence should continue to be for the defence of our sovereignty, territorial integrity and promotion of global good. We should eschew offensive doctrines or diplomatic postures while at the same time strengthening our

capacity to defend our core interests in the world. Historically, Indian leaders have demonstrated competence in combining strength with humility, and power with purpose. Our strengths are derived from history, culture, people and our democratic institutions. The Indian defence forces and our diplomatic apparatus are manifestations of our national purpose of defence and development. Also, historically our defence and security policies have sought to combine strength with restraint. We should continue the policy of restraint while bolstering our military capabilities.

The complexity of the emerging world order, our historical experience and aspirations for the future of the world require that we continue to pursue a multi-polar world order. This is desirable both from the point of view of our enlightened national interests and reducing the potential for great power conflicts. Moving forward, we should insist on ensuring autonomy in our foreign policy and resist temptations for too close an alignment with any one of the great powers. We should judge each issue in the international arena in light of our enlightened national interest. This disposition of prudential distance from the antagonisms and the militarism of great powers has served us well in the past and is our best bet in the emerging world order.

Our strategy of building our core strengths should be accompanied by an enhanced quest for increasing our participation in the regional and global forums. India should enhance its footprint in multilateral forums such as the United Nations, institutions of global financial governance and technical bodies working towards fostering global norms. Our rich experience, reputation and resources should be leveraged to expand and deepen democratisation of global governance processes.

Second, the intensification of globalisation marked by the movement of capital, ideas and people presents both opportunities and challenges to India. India has largely benefited from the current phase of globalisation and economic liberalisation. However, the benefits are not evenly distributed and this is fuelling social and political anxieties with enormous consequences for India's long-term stability and prosperity. It is in our interest to further the globalisation process in the coming decades while at the same time addressing the domestic inequities with commitment of resources for social welfare of the disadvantaged. Growth and social equity are not necessarily contradictory. They are interdependent. Growth is necessary for social upliftment but in itself not sufficient. Social welfare is desirable but our experience suggests that the economic democracy desired by our founding fathers could not be achieved due to lack of growth. Also, we should foster global cooperation to contain the undesirable aspects of globalisation at the international level - global pandemics, international terrorism, trafficking, money laundering, loss of traditional livelihoods etc. The recent financial crisis has demonstrated the imperatives of global governance.

Third, the recent development in the Arab world suggest that certain

technologies especially in communications will be increasingly harnessed by social and political groups to affect change both in domestic societies and the international system. Harnessing technologies to promote better understanding between peoples and governments is an imperative. States that are better at technology adaptation for fostering political and social change will have a better chance of survival and promoting economic success in the future. India should develop capacities for interdisciplinary long-term assessments of social, political and economic implications of key technologies. Strategic studies should pay more attention to the technological dimension than is the case currently.

Fourth, India's ability to secure itself from both internal and external threats will depend on the progress it makes on the economic front. It is essential that we foster a sustainable economic development model that takes into account objective conditions of our society, environment concerns, and ongoing changes in the world economic system. Besides other factors, our growth prospects are heavily dependent on our ability to ensure energy security and a peaceful neighbourhood. Our foreign policy instruments should be harnessed to maximise opportunities for economic growth and wellbeing of our citizens and minimise threats to our security.

Finally, our security will depend on our capacity to meet the democratic aspirations of our people especially the growing percentage of young people. The ongoing transformations in the political, technological, social and economic dimensions are fuelling expectations for better governance and as a corollary, increasing disaffection with our political institutions. India's leaders should speed up the governance reform process, promote greater accountability and promote innovative approaches to conflict resolution.

In the coming decade, India's capabilities need to be geared towards maximising opportunities and minimising risks particularly in the domestic and regional spheres. The most significant challenges for the country arise from the need to address socio-economic concerns such as education and health; the threat from left wing extremism; issues such as climate change and energy security that necessitate cooperation with our neighbours; and, increased engagement particularly with Pakistan and China on outstanding issues. This volume offers some insightful recommendations for important aspects of India's policy planning for the coming decade.

The late K. Subrahmanyam noted that in the coming 'knowledge century', the hierarchy of nations is likely to be determined by the knowledge they generate rather than the number of nuclear missiles and warheads they wield. For India to establish itself as a 'trusted voice of reason and lead in measure by its own example', its national security strategy should focus on areas such as education that not only disseminate measurable and economic returns such as labour productivity but also lead to non-economic yields such as reduction in infant mortality, fertility rates, and crimes. This can further create a renewed

sense of optimism and confidence among people about the country's future. Innovation is the key to India's economic growth and it must invest in building capacities in science and technology, and promoting scientific and development cooperation with neighbouring countries. Higher institutions of learning must be oriented to train and skill the young population in high technology and in disciplines relevant for balanced economic growth. A strategy that aims to create an educated and motivated populace is also one that determinedly addresses food security, water and sanitation issues, and primary health care.

We are presenting this volume in this spirit of interdisciplinary dialogue. We hope that this effort will stimulate debate and discussion in the coming months and will be of use in fostering consensus on important elements of our national security strategy. Keeping in view the dynamic nature of the security environment, it will be necessary for us to revisit some of the assumptions and prescriptions in the coming years. We hope that this volume and the succeeding project report on *Towards a National Security Strategy for India* will offer strategic perspectives on bilateral relations with key countries and other issues of significance for India.

We dedicate this volume to late Shri K. Subrahmanyam, who is the principal inspiration behind this project.

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Introduction

Six and a half decades ago, a remarkable experiment in democracy and nation building was launched in India that has fundamentally altered the world as we know it today. India, an economically impoverished, continent-sized, vastly diverse nation, resolved to meet its tryst with destiny on the basis of democratic values, secularism, inclusive nationalism and internationalism. Despite possessing limited material resources in the early decades of its independence, India played a key role in redefining the nature of international relations in the aftermath of the Second World War. It emerged as a significant player in global struggles against imperialism, colonialism and racism. In the first decades of independence, India also emerged as a third pillar in the international system—a pillar that stood for principled opposition to military blocs, while simultaneously demonstrating its willingness to contribute to the maintenance and expansion of world peace and security. The imagination and commitment of the national leadership ensured that India's freedom from oppressive colonial rule was translated into an opportunity to build a world without imperialism and war.

In the past two decades, India has undergone dramatic transformations in the economic, social and political spheres. The country has radically transformed its economy and is now projected to be on course to become the third largest economy in the world by 2030. Besides this spectacular economic growth, Indian democracy has steadily consolidated and expanded its scope and remit in the post-independence era. The recent successes of civil society groups in mobilising public support for various causes are testimony to the power and resilience of democratic India's ability to negotiate conflicts within the society through peaceful methods. However, despite its numerous successes, India faces enormous challenges at the domestic, regional and global levels.

India's economic growth has not been matched by the evolution of its governance structures and institutional competence resulting in higher expectations of political institutions to bridge the gap between promise and performance. India's growth story has not yet translated into the economic democracy envisioned by the country's leaders. This may cause greater social and political stresses than those that India has had to contend with during the first six decades after its independence. The rise in Maoist violence in large areas of India is one such challenge, and tackling it would require 'a concerted

effort to bridge the development deficit.' Besides radical left movements, India also has to manage manifestations of violent political dissent in some states, including the Naga insurgency in northeast India and the Kashmir issue in north. A number of insurgent groups that are involved in such conflicts are at times aided and abetted by institutions in neighbouring countries, as is the case with some groups in Kashmir. India is also home to a number of terrorist groups that are motivated by religious or ethnic grievances. Addressing these and other related domestic security concerns will preoccupy India's leaders in the coming decade.

India's security in next decades will also depend on how the broader regional situation evolves. Much of the world is wary of China's rise. India, in particular, is concerned about China's continuing support to Pakistan and its growing footprint in regions that are of strategic interest to India. Many of India's neighbours face instability. Experts are increasingly questioning Pakistan's ability to craft a policy for a stable and functioning polity. The instability in Afghanistan and adjoining areas of Pakistan make that region one of the most volatile in the world. Moreover, the presence of nuclear weapons in the region makes it an area of particular concern for global security planners. This situation is unlikely to change in the coming decade. In addition, it is unlikely that India will achieve significant breakthroughs in border negotiations with China or Pakistan in the next decade. However, India could make progress on other less contentious issues with both of these states. India will have increasing opportunities to reinforce and expand existing confidence building measures (CBMs) thereby greatly enhancing crisis management and war-avoidance mechanisms. While India's security planners will need to strengthen defence capabilities to counter challenges to territorial integrity and internal cohesion, India, in its enhanced role as a global player, will also be expected to contribute to global public goods such as protection of global commons, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and environmental mitigation.

The contemporary strategic environment is marked by several systemic transformations—the emergence of India, China, Brazil and Turkey among others; the relative decline of the United States and Europe; the relative shift of economic power to emerging economies; instability in West Asia and North Africa; the increasing agency of non-state actors; an expanding population and pressing demands for food, water and energy; growing concerns about planetary safety due to climate change; revolution in military affairs and technology diffusion; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and dispersed terrorism. The leaders from government, society, business and the military will face the challenges that emerge from complex interactions between economic, technological, social and ideological forces that may be difficult to disaggregate.

Given the complex policy environment of the coming decade, rife with challenges that emerge out of the interface of crosscutting and dynamically

interacting domains, a renewed focus on rethinking India's security strategy is imperative. Such an exercise should be geared towards bridging the gap between traditional disciplinary approaches of strategic analysis and the contemporary need to go beyond disciplinary silos to capture a comprehensive view of the world. As no single institution, discipline or profession is singularly sufficient to carry out the dynamic exercise of framing a security strategy for India that is forward-looking and illuminates the whole range of policy options available to our policymakers in the coming decade, there is a need to supplement the current framework of disciplinary research with insights from a range of academic disciplines and experience streams at different levels in think tanks and government agencies.

To this effect, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) initiated the IDSA National Strategy Project (INSP) with the purpose of fostering consensus on India's grand strategy. The project aimed to achieve this by facilitating a sustained and comprehensive dialogue among members of the academia, policy makers, media, business, economy, and civil society on critical dimensions of India's grand strategy in a 2020 perspective. In December 2010, an international conference was held to deal with the subject at a conceptual as well as prescriptive level. Internationally reputed scholars were invited to present their ideas on this based on their field of expertise, along with policy prescriptions for the coming decade. In this volume, contains the revised papers presented during the conference. Together these papers cover a large number of topics of contemporary value. We hope the issues raised by the authors will to stimulate further debate among scholars and practitioners on India's security strategy.

India's security in the coming decades will be influenced largely by its economic growth, and the benefits derived from this to remove poverty, improve educational and health services for the country's growing population. Rapid economic growth would require radical and unprecedented structural reforms. Ajay Shah argues that India's growth rate requires the political system to reinvent government every nine years to deal with the new world that this change would represent. Besides, India needs to adopt a framework of prudent public finance whereby it allows itself headroom for borrowing in catastrophic situations. Shah's interventions call for extensive engagement between India and the world economy. Shah evaluates the possibility of Mumbai's emergence as a global financial centre on the basis of eight necessary elements for such centres—a large local economy; high skill-low cost labour; democracy, rule of law and the legal system; the English language; strength of financial system; mindshare; a multi-ethnic and multi-national workforce; and high quality of urban governance.

In 'Strategic Implications of Human Capital Today,' G. Balatchandirane draws attention to the strategic importance of education in enabling India's ascendancy. Given the critical role that higher education can play in a globalising world where the knowledge economy is occupying an increasingly large space, there exists a direct correlation between important national

objectives such as rapid poverty reduction and exploitation of India's demographic advantages, and the role of education. Human capital leads to a build up of the labour force of a country that can result in an increase in labour productivity, subsequently impacting economic development. Education also has a large number of non-measurable, non-economic returns such as reduction of infant mortality, fertility rates, and crimes. Its role is vital in the promotion of democracy, human rights and political stability. Even though India has the world's third largest scientific and technical manpower pool, the figure is quite low in relation to the country's total population. In the context of the serious shortage of technically trained personnel and non-technical skilled personnel in the country, India could borrow from recent developments in the United States and East Asia.

Health care services will be essential for India social and economic wellbeing. Rajib Dasgupta brings into sharp focus the unfinished agenda of food security, water-sanitation and responsive primary health care that are out of the reach of millions due to geographical, economic and social barriers to access, and puts forward a case for the country to prioritise urban health. The largest causes of deaths in the country are preventable, thus deeming indispensable the role of secondary and tertiary institutions that are endowed with appropriate technology and skilled human resources in the treatment of chronic diseases. Dasgupta underlines the need to address the issue of disparity in capacities across states, particularly those with inadequate geographical and social access to services; stresses on the necessity to infuse technology in public systems.

Framing a grand strategy necessitates a holistic view of security and a forward-looking vision for the country that accounts for both threats and opportunities. K. Subrahmanyam outlines the broad contours of India's grand strategy in the 21st century and explores the strategic environment and security challenges in this century, and the future world order. India is a country that began its life as an independent nation with a comprehensive grand strategy of its own. This grand strategy was a 'package of nonalignment to deal with external security challenges ... and partially centrally planned development strategy to accelerate its growth'. This strategy served India well in the 20th century but India in the 21st century needs a different framework toward the world.

In the strategic environment of the 21st century, there are several reasons for the absence of war among major world powers—the existence of nuclear weapons is the primary reason; the establishment of the United Nations (with veto power for the most war-prone nations), and the counter-productivity and high cost associated with foreign powers occupying populations are other key reasons for this. In this 'knowledge century', Subrahmanyam writes, the hierarchy of nations is likely to be determined, not by the number of nuclear missiles and warheads they wield but by the knowledge they generate.

In the next two decades, the US will still be the most predominant power,

China the second power, trying to close its gap with the US, and India as the third 'swing' power. Three options are identified for India to deal with the challenges of such a new world order. The Indo-US partnership will be the key to India's strategy in the coming years.

Kanti Bajpai, in 'The Global Commons and India's National Security Strategy', India cannot afford to ignore 'global issues which affect the prospects of territorial integrity, the sanctity of national political and social life, the increase of economic well-being, and a balance of power relative to other major actors'. Global public goods that are considered most vital include safety of the planet from natural disasters; the prevention of deadly epidemics; stability of the world economy; and, control of weapons of mass destruction.

Notions of the nature and use of international politics, power and influence are commanding aspects in the formation of a grand strategy. In the essay, "Grand Ideology, Bland Strategy", Rahul Sagar argues that Indians believe that they are best served by an international order marked by peace, stability and liberal norms that will allow India to focus on economic development and political consolidation; however, if it encounters aggression or humiliation in this quest for prosperity and status, then calls to enhance India's military power are likely to grow louder. Four competing visions of India's place in the international system are advanced: *moralists* wish for India to serve as an exemplar of principled action; *Hindu nationalists* want Indians to act as muscular defenders of Hindu civilisation; *strategists* advocate cultivating state power by developing strategic capabilities; and *liberals* seek prosperity and peace through increasing trade and interdependence. Discussing the competing ideologies that instruct Indians on what their interests are—morality, pride, power, and wealth—Sagar debates which one of the visions outlined will monopolise the world-view of Indians in the 21st century.

An effective grand strategy must address not only external challenges or foreign policy considerations but pressing internal concerns as well. Among India's primary domestic security challenges are tackling left wing extremism (LWE) and transnational terrorism. In devising an effective approach to LWE, the primary reasons for its spread across large swathes of the country requires examination. Vivek Chadha, in the volume's seventh chapter, 'Left Wing Extremism—Challenges and Approach' takes note of the geographic and demographic spread of the threat and discusses the support base of the movement. Given that deprivation, land alienation and exploitation of the weaker sections of the society have been the primary reasons for the instigation of popular uprisings such as LWE, even as the earlier fragmented approaches of these movements have given way to a more integrated cohesive approach, at the state level, lack of integration and interoperability between the central and state police forces has diluted the effectiveness of counter-insurgency operations.

Most states have had to rethink their national security strategies following

the September 2001 attacks in the United States. Several states including the US, UK and France that have comparable stakes in international security as India have revamped their national security strategies. International terrorism in the next decade will be of mixed and partial relevance for India. India's national security strategy response should be attentive not just to areas of convergence with the international community on terrorism but also areas of dissonance, stemming from India's own experience, context, identity and strategic environment. Prakash asks: how do trends in the evolution of terrorism relate to Indian interests and experience? and, how can India balance a global role in combating international terrorism with the unique domestic challenges to national security? Prakash identifies Al Qaeda as the primary threat to India, emanating from its base in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, and compounded by its growing affiliations with Pakistan-based groups such as the JeM, LeT and LiJ. Furthermore, India's growing ties with the United States figure increasingly in both states' national security strategies and will continue to do so. At the multilateral level, cooperation in intelligence sharing and in shaping the agenda for international counter terrorism is vital. India's long experience with terrorism as an integral part of national security should make it relatively easy to formulate a national security strategy that incorporates the issue of international terrorism. India's interests with regard to international terrorism can be viewed through a threefold framework— Firstly, securing India against Pakistan based groups and Al Qaeda affiliates that represent the primary international threat to India; secondly, avoiding getting involved in long-drawn counter-terrorism campaigns that will detract India from other strategic concerns as well as domestic threats; and, assuming a leadership role in the emerging counter-terrorism regime in cooperation with major players while being mindful of the perspective afforded by its own experience.

In 'Thinking about Counter Terrorism in India's National Strategy,' S. Kalyanaraman identifies three aspects crucial to present and future Indian security strategy. Firstly, in support of the argument that periodic net assessment is an essential prerequisite for designing a counter terrorism strategy, it becomes necessary to carry out a comprehensive and periodic net assessment of the threat of terrorism facing India. Kalyanaraman stresses the need for regularity of such assessments so as to be informed about new terror groups, and changing tactics and weapons acquisition, among others. Secondly, identity is the root cause of terrorism in India's northeast, in Jammu and Kashmir and in the Indian hinterland comprising several states in northern and western India. Based on findings, Kalyanaraman proposes a framework for thinking about a counter terrorism strategy for India in the long term, medium term and short term.

Meeting emerging domestic and regional security challenges also calls for military institutions that are agile and adaptive to the dynamic environments in which they exist. Rumel Dahiya argues that India's military institutions are sub-optimally organised to meet existing and emerging threats

in a cost effective manner. Current threats and challenges for India include possible border tensions between India and China, increasing Chinese footprint in India's immediate neighbourhood and the Indian Ocean Region, cyber and space threats, and; internal threats in the form of insurgencies in the Northeast and Jammu and Kashmir. Medium and long-term threats are identified to include threat of a negative change in Chinese posture and the possibility of conflict between India and China; energy security; and, militarisation of space.

Dahiya identifies two key areas of institutional reforms essential for achieving military effectiveness in India at two levels: (a) at the governmental level where reforms can include focus on civil-military relations, formulation of clear military doctrines, and the issue of integration and jointness between the service headquarters and the MoD, as amongst the services; and, (b) at the services level where suggested reforms include prevention of wasteful expenditure, military education with a focus on intellectual development, and leadership development.

Another area of significance in securing national boundaries is India's maritime dimension. Apart from the threat of terrorism that was highlighted following the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, several other maritime threats advance analysis. In, 'The Maritime Dimension in India's National Strategy,' Sarabjeet Singh Parmar identifies prevailing maritime threats and objectives that impinge on India's maritime strategy. Several unique features characterise the Indian Ocean Region with respect to demography; wealth of natural and mineral resources; economic divide and differing modes of governance in the region that have resulted in increasing cases of piracy, terrorism, and proliferation of nuclear issues; and, the geopolitics of the region. Given these, the potential for future conflict in the region could undermine maritime security and have severe implications for regional stability.

Global commons issues such as energy and climate change require engagement at both the domestic and foreign policy levels. In 'Energy in India's National Security Strategy,' Devika Sharma highlights the fundamental characteristics that make energy a peculiar policy arena for states and locates India's strategy to ensure its energy security. At the outset, the author notes that energy is a 'common but differentiated' concern, therefore, although it is a concern for all countries in the international system, the extent to which energy is a security concern depends on assured supplies to meet demand or the financial capability to look for alternative sources, if not seek energy independence. This is suggestive of a crucial link between energy security and power. The study of energy is seen as a useful arena to analyse whether the emergence of new powers in the international system can upset the prevailing balance of power and/or create potential conflict.

Sharma identifies the priorities for India's energy security strategy based on an analysis of various government documents, policy pronouncements and the country's energy diplomacy. At the domestic level, Sharma makes two observations: firstly, strategy and vision documents over the last decade

pertaining to the energy sector signal the rising importance of energy in the country, and; secondly, the range of ministries and departments that are simultaneously involved in the energy sector demonstrates the often disjointed and overlapping nature of the Indian government's efforts to set the agenda and devise a strategy on energy.

On climate change, Sandeep Sengupta, examines some of the key challenges that this issue poses to India both domestically and in its foreign policy engagement. Sengupta identifies some of the key threats that climate change poses to India at three levels: at the domestic level (including declining crop yields, reduced fresh water supplies, rising sea levels, increased frequency of floods and droughts, greater risk of spread of diseases, negative impact on livestock due to increased temperature and humidity stresses, and likely increase in morbidity and mortality with warming temperatures and variable precipitation); at the regional level (including impact of sea-level rise on Maldives and Bangladesh and in both cases the risk of trans-boundary migration to India; threat of tensions that may be generated with Pakistan, China and Nepal over the management and sharing of Himalayan river resources), and at the international level (India's international position and foreign policy on the issue of climate change). Negotiating an effective, fair and equitable international treaty on climate change has thrown up a set of important competing arguments and priorities for India. The risks and costs of making mistakes can be significantly reduced if there is a systemic institutional process in place that requires policymakers to strategically analyse and assess the various choices and options available to them, using the best evidence and talent available.

India's security in the next decades will be closely interlinked with that of its neighbours in the South Asian region. Arvind Gupta observes this aspect and notes that despite these commonalities, there is some extent of mistrust between India and its South Asian neighbours. Gupta analyses the emerging global and regional security environment, and examines the main characteristics of South Asia (along the lines of diversity, asymmetry, poverty, democracy, integration of the region, security issues, and influence of external powers) and key features of India's relations with its neighbours (with a focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Myanmar and China). The paper draws three scenarios for the global and regional environment. First, a deteriorating security scenario, China will have emerged as an assertive superpower by 2050 vying for influence in South Asia and in its neighbourhood. This could lead to a sharpening of the rivalry between India and China. Second, in a more positive security scenario, China's rise may prove to be beneficial. It may become a partner in the rise of a new international order based on economic integration and cooperation and may engage with India in a spirit of mutual accommodation. Third, faltering economic growth would create a great deal of uncertainty in the global order. An unstable China will affect South Asia directly as the India-China competition may become more acute.

Several options are recommended for India to manage its relations with South Asia and account for the rise of China, along the tracks of governance, analytical capabilities, a new version of the Gujral doctrine, regional cooperation, border management, external powers, focus on Pakistan, counter-terrorism, maritime security, nuclear deterrence, science and technology, and human resources.

Shared water resources are an important element of India's relationship with at least four of its neighbours—Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Pakistan. In her essay on 'Water Diplomacy and India's National Strategy', Medha Bisht deals with framing a national security strategy for India to engage these countries on shared water resources. The study adopts a backward-upward approach and arrives at a national strategy for India's water diplomacy by assessing the key factors that have so far governed India's regional cooperation. Bisht identifies three structural factors that govern state responses as they take water policy decisions—geography, economics and climate change—and analyses how these factors have impacted states in the past and how concerned states responded to these factors within existing negotiated agreements. Given the changing national priorities of the neighbouring countries and the needs and interests of the South Asian countries, the study lays out how India should formulate its national strategy in response to the perceptions and priorities of its neighbours.

Tanvi Madan in her essay on the China-India-US triangle, argues that the manner in which India deals with these challenges and opportunities will not just affect India's relations with China and the US, but its foreign relations across the entire spectrum, including the internal dimension of India's strategy. India can choose from several options to manage this strategic triangle: Trust No One (keep both China and the US at arm's length and engaging when appropriate, while minimising their impact on India); Yankee Go Home (India should work with China to limit the role and influence of the US in their relationship, in Asia and more broadly in the world); The Dynamic Democratic Duo (India should seek a *de facto* or *de jure* alliance with the US to counter China); Why Can't We All Just Get Along (China, India and the US cooperate to maintain stability and prosperity in the region and beyond), and; Hedgemony (India should hedge its bet and even strive to play a key part in Beijing and Washington's hedging strategies).

With respect to threats in its immediate neighbourhood, Afghanistan and Pakistan present the most worrisome scenarios for India. Rudra Chaudhuri in his essay, 'Dealing with the Endgame: India and the AfPak Puzzle', explores India's current approach to Afghanistan, the impact of this on its political and security interests and the potential benefits of expanding its engagement in Afghanistan. India's policy needs to be studied against the context of the dissipation in Western political will and argues for consolidating India's role as a 'political-development actor' in Afghanistan.

India's role in Afghanistan has been centred on its efforts in the country's

reconstruction efforts. Shanthie D'Souza discusses the significance of this in ensuring the long-term stability of the Afghanistan. In addition to drawing much local appreciation, India's efforts have hinged on local and community ownership and participation, contrasting with most other international efforts that rely on alternate delivery mechanisms. India's own experience in nation building processes (such as local governance, developing electoral processes and a political party system) and in the security sector can prove invaluable in building an inclusive political order and developing security institutions in Afghanistan. Supporting local entrepreneurship in agriculture and crafts, and the expansion thereby of an indigenous economic base is likely to deplete support for insurgent groups in the country. India has multiple areas of opportunities to deepen its level of engagement in Afghanistan including in reconciliation and reintegration, employment generation and establishing an indigenous industrial base, furthering its social and cultural capital, media and strategic communications and in promoting the role of women as long-term stakeholders. The expansion of India's economic footprint in Afghanistan is, in D'Souza's view, in India's long-term strategic interests.

In an increasingly complex and globalised scenario, India's relations with countries such as Russia in their own regional spheres as well as in multilateral forums, take on global significance. Smita Purushottam outlines a strategy for Indo-Russian relations in the medium-term and observing that geography and balance of power are the constants of the international relations. India and Russia have undergone enormous changes since the past days of Indo-Soviet partnership, with India diversifying its relationships and Russia faced with new challenges in its domestic and international environments. Yet, both countries will have to deal with the increasing domination of China in Eurasia; this makes it imperative for India to consolidate ties with Russia—a reliable partner in the region. An increasingly close China-Russia entente in this region is not seen to be in India's interests.

The role of Europe in India's strategic thinking has diminished in recent years owing in part to differences on critical international issues such as world trade, climate change and global governance structures; this has taken place despite India's strong relations with individual European countries such as Britain, France and Germany. Dhruva Jaishankar sees the weak India-Europe link as unusual given that Europe as a single entity mirrors India's federal structure and commitment to liberal democratic values and multiculturalism. This is primarily attributed to the absence of strong socio-cultural relations with Europe at large, that have formed the basis of warmer relations with the United States.

Jaishankar urges that India's strategic planners to recognise Europe's potential as an important partner for India in the areas of investment and high technology, complementary economies, as a political partner with shared values, and leverage for building India's relations with other countries, particularly China, Russia and the United States. Europe can also be a

significant target for India's multi-polar engagement strategy—one that does not bring with it the complications associated with India's other bilateral relations, such as with the United States and China.

Manu Bhagavan argues that reforming the United Nations is inescapable necessity to meet the challenges in the new century. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's plan for avoiding future wars and maintaining world security and progress involved the establishment of a global government to which all the world's states would cede some of their sovereignty. This 'federated union of humankind' was to be built on the concept of human rights. India led by example during this time by embedding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into the Indian Constitution. Nehru saw global government as the solution to multitudes of complicated local and global issues including minorities, refugees, warring states, domestic integrity, poverty and public health. Meaningfully addressing the problems of the world would require an understanding of the complex interconnectedness between the local and the global.

In a related intervention on the UN, "India and United Nations Peacekeeping: A 2020 Perspective", Satish Nambiar traces the history of UN peacekeeping operations from its early years of deployment as small groups of unarmed military observers. India's "spontaneous and unreserved" participation in UN peacekeeping is not only a reflection of its commitment to the objectives of the UN Charter, but also related to its national security interests. This is evidenced in India's participation in the Korean and Cambodian operations, and in peacekeeping operations in West Asia. India's geo-strategic interests in the stability of newly emerged African countries are highlighted by the participation of Indian uniformed personnel in every UN peacekeeping operation undertaken in Africa. Nambiar also explores challenges for the UN system in the 21st century; restructuring and institutional reform of the UN machinery and changes focused on the organisation's character and ethos will be crucial to meet new challenges. Prevention of wars between states will be in the collective interest of the international community, thus necessitating improvements in the UN's capacity for preventive diplomacy, mediation and conflict management. The challenges for India will be defined by its growing regional and global role, imposed on it by a number of factors including its geo-strategic location, size and population, established democratic credentials and proven military capabilities. National consensus on developing appropriate military capability to support such a role will be the key to meeting these challenges. To this extent, Nambiar suggests the setting up of a Rapid Reaction Task Force to meet demands placed on India to provide troops for UN peacekeeping.

In an increasingly militarised global environment, the role of nuclear weapons in ensuring a state's national security is a highly debated one. Rajesh Basrur, writing on India's approach to nuclear weapons, notes that though the minimum deterrence strategy is optimal for national security, there is a

growing tension between its political (how political decision makers think about nuclear weapons) and technical components (professionals who think about strategy and/or operate the weapons, and represent the possible use of the weapons) resulting from too much reliance on concepts developed elsewhere and in different strategic environments, particularly in the United States. India's approach to nuclear weapons has the potential to become the benchmark for the world's nuclear powers; however, this would require that India develop a stable nuclear-strategic framework formed around an integrated set of ideas and practices as the basis of national security. In the absence of such a framework, it would be difficult for India's minimalist approach to resist drifting towards an expansive and open-ended approach, thus resulting in rising costs arising out of the unrestrained quest for more and better weapons, and the potential risk of arms race. Given the key components of India's minimalist strategic culture, while India has retained much of its minimalism, the seeds of a Cold War approach are discernible in the technical language used by its experts who draw from an American vocabulary. The study suggests that India's strategic thinking should reflect the historical reality of its political leadership showing strong preference for war avoidance in confrontations involving nuclear armed states. Pointing to the American approach to deterrence, which Basrur views as 'irrelevant, risky and waste-inducing', he urges India to develop a "thought style" of its own focused on deterrence at a minimal level.

Ali Ahmed, in his essay 'Nuclear Doctrine and Conflict', proposes a movement of conventional military doctrine towards an explicit limited war formulation and suggests that the nuclear doctrine reflect the Sundarji doctrine of conflict termination at the lowest possible level of nuclear use. In the context of India's strategic orientation towards two of its potential adversaries—Pakistan and China—the author notes that while deterrence should continue to be the primary military option, it can be improved for the worst-case scenario of conflict outbreak by a two-step buffer to the nuclear level.

We are of the view that sustainable national security will emerge as a result of India's defence preparedness, the competence of its diplomatic institutions, and the social, economic and cultural well being of the society. We believe it is crucial that a grand strategy for India be formulated keeping in view the mutually reinforcing relationship between defence, diplomacy and development. The grand strategy should also be integrative given an interconnected regional and global environment. In such an environment, keeping in view its enlightened national interests, India should focus on promoting stability and security in its neighbourhood and in the world community. We hope that this volume of work along with efforts undertaken elsewhere will provide a basis for future debate and discussion on important elements of India's grand strategy.

Grand Strategy for the First Half of the 21ˢᵗ Century

K. Subrahmanyam

It is a great irony that today as we embark on a project for a grand strategy for India in the 21ˢᵗ century, it is hardly remembered that this is one country which started with a comprehensive grand strategy at the dawn of its independence, to meet both external and internal challenges towards becoming a major actor in the international community. At the midnight hour of August 15, 1947, members of the Indian Constituent Assembly took this solemn oath:

> At this solemn moment when people of India, through suffering and sacrifice have secured freedom, I, a member of the Constituent Assembly of India, do dedicate myself in all humility to the service of India and all her people to the end that this ancient land attain her righteous place in the world and make her full and willing contribution to the promotion of world peace and welfare of mankind.

This oath implied that India would work for the promotion of world peace not for its own glory and aggrandisement. India would work for the welfare of mankind, including the welfare of its own population and it would attempt to take its rightful place in the world by developing itself to the standards of the advanced countries of the rest of the world. This was the strategic goal. This goal had to be achieved in a world which was entering into a Cold War confrontation and recovering from an unprecedented war-ravaged global economy. The Indian grand strategy was a package of non-alignment to deal with external security challenges, adoption of the Indian Constitution to address the problems of the governance and development of an exploited colony of three hundred and fifty million people and a partially centrally planned development strategy to accelerate its growth. Non-alignment was solely Jawaharlal Nehru's strategic contribution. B.R. Ambedkar ably supported by the senior leaders of the Congress party wrote the Indian Constitution. Planning had its origins in the thirties when the

Congress president, Subhash Chandra Bose, set up a committee to determine India's future path. Even our industrialists came out with a Bombay plan in the mid forties. It finally was given shape under the leadership of Professor Mahalnobis. Even at that stage there were dissenters. Dr John Mathai resigned from the cabinet on the issue. Rajaji came out against the licence-permit-quota Raj. That grand strategy served India for the second half of 20th century.

India as a Pluralistic, Secular and Industrialising Democracy

At the end of the century, India is pluralistic and secular, and the largest democracy of the world. From a downtrodden colony with some 80 per cent of its people living below the poverty line, with age of expectation of 28 at birth, ever afflicted with food shortages and with low literacy, and famines and diseases that keep the population stagnant, India under democratic conditions has become an industrialising state with some 62 per cent of a population—nearly four times the number at the time of decolonisation—brought above the poverty line in 65 years. In spite of the nearly universally shared regret that poverty has not been totally alleviated and illiteracy fully eliminated what has been achieved is historically unprecedented. All other major nations of the world, except the United States industrialised and rose to power before they became democratic. In those cases, the rise to power or emergence of a major nation was viewed with concern by other major nations and often resulted in wars. That was the case with Britain, France, Russia, Japan, Germany and today's China. The US was founded as a democracy and its rise did not cause any concern in the world till the mantle of superpower fell on its shoulders after the decline of the British empire during the Second World War. While China's rise causes concern, India's emergence does not, as India is developing as a major economy and industrial nation after it became a democratic republic. Many people since independence, including some political parties in this country, have debated whether our growth would not have been faster and whether our poverty alleviation could not have been expedited if the country had adopted alternative models of development. Communism in China led to 30-40 million deaths due to starvation and even today poverty has not been totally eliminated in that country though their effort has resulted in much higher percentage of poverty alleviation than in our case. Inequality in terms of the Gini coefficient is worse in China than in this country. Since independence, starvation deaths have been averted in this country thanks to democracy and universal adult franchise. Only people of my generation would remember what kind of country this was at the time of independence. Today we are a trillion dollar economy and India is expected to become the third economy in the world in the next few decades. China's faster growth was mostly due to the massive Soviet assistance in the fifties and massive external investments, mostly by US multinationals, beginning in the eighties. Countries which became US allies

in the fifties, like Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Thailand and the Philippines did not benefit by way of development in the next three decades. It was only after the rehabilitation of Western Europe and Japan was completed that foreign capital was available for the development of the East Asian Tigers.

Non-alignment

There is a lot of confusion about whether non-alignment was just a strategy or an ideology. Non-alignment was a strategy to safeguard Indian security and was adopted by Nehru in 1946, even before India became independent, before the partition of India was decided upon and before a second nonaligned nation came into existence. However he formulated his strategy after Churchill's Fulton speech which was regarded as the initiation of the Cold War. The term 'non-alignment' originated from Nehru's broadcast of September 7, 1946 as vice chairman of the Viceroy's executive council, when he said: "We propose, as far as possible to keep away from power politics of groups aligned against one another which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale." Nehru, though a propounder of the nonalignment strategy was not enthusiastic about a nonaligned movement. He yielded to the pressures from Tito and Nasser and his colleague, Krishna Menon and attended and converted the first Nonaligned Conference in Belgrade into one against nuclear testing.

Even as he was adopting non-alignment as his strategy, it did not prevent him from keeping India in the Commonwealth, retaining British officers to man the senior most posts in the services and acquiring all defence equipment from mostly the UK and to a lesser extent from France and the US. India abstained from the condemnation of the Soviet Union over Hungary presumably as a tacit quid pro quo for Soviet support on Kashmir. While India rejected military aid from the West, its defence procurements and licences for defence production all came from the UK, France, the US and Japan. This was at the height of nonalignment.

But as Nehru sensed an increasing mutuality of security interests with the Soviet Union vis-à-vis China, India initiated its first purchases of AN-12 aircraft and Mi-4 helicopters in the late fifties. Then came the agreement on MIG-21 which the Soviets had refused to give to the Chinese. India realised that the Soviet Union was a more reliable countervailer against the increasingly hostile China than the US and the West. But the Chinese outsmarted Nehru by attacking India at the time of the Cuban missile crisis when the Soviet Union was totally preoccupied with US military moves and was unable to take any action to restrain China. After the Chinese attack, India was prepared to accept military equipment for its defence against China even as aid. It did so from October 1962 till September 1965 when such aid ceased to be available because of the Pak-India war of 1965. India also entered into a ten year credit arrangement for Soviet defence equipment purchase to be

repaid in nonconvertible rupees coming out of Indian earnings from exports to the USSR. During 1963-64, even as the West extended limited aid and equipment on credit, India entered into major defence deals with the USSR. It was recognised on both sides that the Indian defence preparedness programme was against the Chinese aggression and was well within the framework of its nonalignment vis-à-vis the two superpowers. As India had an acute foreign exchange shortage and it found the Soviet equipment was cheaper but was adequately robust and sophisticated to meet its security challenges, over a period of time the USSR became the near sole supplier of defence equipment to India.

Yet, during the seventies India purchased and obtained the licence to produce the Anglo-French Jaguar aircraft. In the early eighties, India got the British Harriers, the aircraft carrier *Virat* and the French Mirage 2000 fighters. An agreement was signed with the Reagan administration for purchase of GE 404 engines for the Indian LCA and other collaborations in that project. The Indian nonalignment was pragmatic and its central thrust was that India did not get itself involved in the antagonism between the two superpowers. It never meant that India would not obtain the support of either of the two super powers when its national security was threatened. In 1971, India concluded the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty to deter China and the US from interfering in the Bangladesh war. The deterrence so projected worked.

Imperatives of Indian Development

There is no other nation in the world, comparable to India in terms of the multiplicity of religions, languages and ethnicities within its borders. Such a multi-religious, multi-lingual and multi-ethnic polity can be held together as a nation only under a secular, pluralistic, democratic and quasi-federal constitution with autonomy for the states formed on linguistic basis. The values enshrined in the Indian Constitution were imperative to hold India together. No doubt, at the end of six decades India has started cohering as a market and is expected to become the third largest economy in the world in the next two decades. The Indian constitution was the basic strategy for this development.

Though a democratic constitution implied good and accountable governance and a delivery system of goods and services by the state to the common man very grave deficiencies have developed in this respect over the last four decades. Even the delivery of justice, a key prerequisite in a democracy, has not been achieved. Law enforcement has deteriorated over the years. Poverty is at unacceptable levels as is illiteracy. These vulnerabilities persist, though adult franchise has empowered the hitherto disadvantaged sections of the population at a pace incomparable to anywhere else in the decolonised world. The record of the Indian Election Commission in holding free and fair elections is something the whole country is proud of. Therefore

the issue of deteriorating governance under a democratic system is a serious internal security threat that needs to be addressed. We shall deal with it a little later. At this stage it is appropriate to sum up the developments of the second half of 20ᵗʰ century.

India as a Nuclear and Missile Power

Lastly, though India had been campaigning against nuclear weapons from the early fifties, the Indian leadership, from Jawaharlal Nehru downwards kept the Indian nuclear weapon option alive and finally declared India a nuclear weapon power in 1998, in a world which had maintained since the fifties that nuclear weapons and missiles were the currency of power. India was compelled to do so to counter the arming of Pakistan with nuclear weapons and missiles by China to use it as a countervailer against India. Nuclear weapons were legitimised for ever as a result of the unconditional and indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which was originally formulated as an interim Cold War measure for 25 years. Lastly, there was the Chinese inspired attempt to drag India into the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in violation of the Vienna Convention on Treaties. China thereby tried to block the Indian nuclear weapon test while it had conducted a weapon test for Pakistan on May 26,1990. Once India became a nuclear weapon power, after an initial pro forma protestation there was a major change of attitude of major powers towards India. By this time India had introduced economic reforms and dismantled the licence-permit-quota Raj. India had been able to launch satellites and prove its IT prowess at the time of the Y2K crisis. India had also built up a sizeable foreign exchange balance after an interval of 50 years. This was where we arrived at the end of the 20ᵗʰ century.

Strategic Environment of the 21ˢᵗ Century

The former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice aptly wrote: "For the first time since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the prospect of violent conflict between great powers is becoming ever more unthinkable. Major states are increasingly competing in peace, not preparing for war." There are many reasons for this long period of absence of war among major powers of the world. The existence of nuclear weapons is perhaps the primary reason. The establishment of the United Nations with veto power for the most war-prone powers was perhaps another. Powerful military alliances which deterred each other was yet another factor. Empires, an underlying cause of rivalry dissolved leading to a world order in which the majority of states in the international system were former colonies. The Korean War, the Vietnam War, the two Afghan wars, the Iran-Iraq war and the anti-colonial liberation wars all proved that while it will be possible for a technologically superior army to defeat a less well-equipped force, it is very costly and counter-productive to keep a population under occupation. The much publicised ideological

conflict between capitalism and communism did not lead to armed conflict as both camps were status-quoist and risk-averse. Communism as an ideology collapsed. In the last five decades, pluralism, secularism and democracy have made enormous strides and today nearly half of the world's population lives under democracy.

The 21st century world is vastly different from the 20th century world. The number of sovereign states has more than trebled. World population has trebled between 1940 and 2010. The productivity of human beings has increased manifold. World GDP has multiplied eightfold in this period. Transportation, communication and information revolutions have brought about radical changes in life styles. The international system has been globalised. Life expectancy has increased. Humanity as a whole has become more sensitised to concepts of gender equality, racial equality, secularism and equality of opportunity between human beings and among nations. The centre of gravity of economic and political power is shifting from the transatlantic region to the Asia-Pacific region. It is generally perceived that the 21st century will be a knowledge century. The hierarchy of nations is likely to be determined by the knowledge they generate rather than by the nuclear missiles and warheads they possess. There are vast migrations of populations across continents. It is expected that the Hispanics and Blacks will become a majority in the US in the next four decades. The European, Chinese, Japanese and Russian populations are ageing and consequently significant migrations may take place into these areas making pluralism an imperative for peace and domestic harmony among populations.

Most of the above developments are positive. Most of them emphasise the verity of the ancient Indian concept, "Vasudeva Kutumbakam" (The world is a family) However there are challenges and threats to this peaceful human progress. They are terrorism, failed states, one party system ideology, pandemics and organised crime. While the sophisticated management of alliance systems prevented nuclear proliferation, the opportunistic politics of some major nations led to proliferation to authoritarian regimes of doubtful legitimacy who have been trying to use nuclear deterrence to resist externally induced regime change. Such regimes also use terrorism as a derivative of nuclear deterrence and as an instrument of policy against democratic states. Major nations attempting to enhance their influence against other major powers have also used nuclear proliferation as a means of destabilising a region to counter other powers with established influence. Terrorism based on religious extremism rooted in particular sectarian cults, nurtured during the Cold War in Afghanistan has been expanded into a formidable instrument of national strategy shielded by nuclear deterrence and now poses a threat to pluralistic, secular and democratic societies. States have failed due to long standing misgovernance and the resulting chaos has given rise to piracy, drug trafficking and organised crime threatening the security of neighbouring

democratic nations. Some powerful non-democratic nations cultivate supportive relationships with states with illegitimate regimes and authorities in control of parts of failed states to derive mercantilist advantages in respect of energy resources and other raw materials. In the process they acquire a vested interest in keeping states serving as their instrumentalities unstable and the regimes illegitimate.

Security Challenges Different from the 20ᵗʰ Century

These are challenges that were not fully taken into account in the 20ᵗʰ century world order. The instrumentalities which helped to sustain peace, by and large, among the major nations in that century are not the most effective or appropriate ones for the new challenges of the 21ˢᵗ century. President Barak Obama has acknowledged that the probability of nuclear confrontation between nations is very low. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has covered the entire international system. Those who have not signed the treaty are nuclear armed nations and are not likely to give up their weapons so long as the NPT community holds the weapons legitimate through its unconditional and indefinite extension. The NPT cannot tackle the problem of using terrorism as a nuclear deterrent derivative and as a national security threat. Military alliances of the 20ᵗʰ century type are not effective to deal with 21ˢᵗ century threats as the Afghan campaign demonstrates. The United Nations is based on the sovereignity of nations and was not designed to defend values like pluralism, secularism and democracy. Without defending these values it is not possible to achieve poverty alleviation on a global scale nor ensure human security.

Security Challenges to India

There is no disputing that the gravest security challenge India faces is the jehadi terrorism for which the epicentre is Pakistan. Apart from India, the US, the UK, Russia, Indonesia, Spain, Iraq and Pakistan itself have been subjected to terrorist attacks. Pakistan has been using terrorism as state policy since it acquired nuclear weapons with Chinese help and with US acquiescence in the eighties. That was also the period when with Saudi monetary support and the US CIA's technical support thousands of jehadis were trained to fight the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. They were also conditioned by Wahhabi jehadi cult. The Pakistani army shielded by nuclear deterrence decided to use this force of trained jehadis against India in Kashmir and wrest control over Afghanistan by imposing the Taliban. The jehadis having persuaded themselves to believe that they defeated the Soviet Union the super power concluded that it was their manifest destiny to defeat the US, the other superpower, and expel them from Muslim lands. For the first time the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, accepted responsibility for jehadism when she admitted to ABC TV on November 12, 2010 that: "Part of what we are

fighting against right now, the United States created. We created the Mujahidin force against the Soviet Union (in Afghanistan). We trained them, we equipped them, we funded them, including somebody named Osama bin Laden. ... And it didn't work out so well for us."

While the US motives to create Jehadis were anti-Soviet, the Chinese motives to proliferate to Pakistan were anti-India, to use Pakistan as a countervailing power to contain India within the subcontinent. China supplied materials, equipment and technology to Pakistan to assemble nuclear weapons by 1987. The US acquiesced in this as a price for Pakistani support for the Mujahideen campaign in Afghanistan and broke off with Islamabad, invoking the Pressler Amendment when the Chinese conducted a nuclear test for Pakistan at their test site on May 26,1990. Though this has been disclosed by two US nuclear scientists, Thomas Reed and Danny Stillman in their book *Nuclear Express,* and at that time led to the Robert Gates mission to Pakistan, the US is still to reveal these facts officially. Since then, China has supplied ring magnets vital to run the centrifuges to Pakistan in 1995 (in clear breach of its obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty), two Plutonium production reactors and two power reactors in the last two decades. It has also armed Pakistan with nuclear capable ballistic missiles. It is now talking about supplying two more power reactors in defiance of guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group of which it was made a member in 2002.

What are China's motivations for doing this against India? China is now the second largest economy in the world and its ambition is to become the first in the world by overtaking the US. China is the only major power which has not accepted democratic values, though it has a market economy. The Chinese are persuaded that their model of one party system combined with a market economy would allow them to rise fastest in the world. Like all oligarchies, the Chinese Communist Party wants to perpetuate itself without accountability to the people. With 92 per cent of its people being Han Chinese, they are not willing to extend minority rights to Tibetans, Hui Muslims, Uighurs, Manchus, Mongols and other minorities. Since India, the US, the European Union, Russia, Japan, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Canada, Australia and South Korea—the major powers and the emerging ones—comprising half of the world's population are democratic, secular and pluralistic, China is worried about the pressures democracy will exercise on its population, especially as it is well integrated with the world of information technology. China considers India as a rival in spite of all verbal protestations to the contrary, since it has approximately an equal population and is proving that a developing country can grow fast economically without sacrificing democracy or pluralism. Pakistan and China are two countries in which opinions have been publicly expressed against India's unity and integrity.

China as Asian Hegemon

China's immediate objective is to become the hegemonic power of Asia. Towards that end it has to eliminate US influence and power from Asia and slow down India's growth. For both these purposes Pakistan serves as a convenient springboard. North Korea is its second springboard to countervail South Korea and Japan. China is increasing its involvement in Pakistan, including in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. It supports Iran with missile technology and is acquiring assets in oil in Iran and Iraq. It has laid a pipeline from Turkmenistan to China by passing Russian territory. It is supplying solid-fuelled nuclear-capable missiles to Saudi Arabia which in all likelihood will depend upon Pakistan for nuclear warheads. Sunni nuclear capability on both sides is a cause of concern to Shia Iran and consequently Teheran tends to rely more on China. That is a classic case of running with the hares and hunting with the hounds. An assertive China has today maritime and territorial disputes with India, Vietnam, ASEAN nations, Japan and South Korea. The Russians too are uneasy about China's rise with their vast resource-rich Siberian territory that is sparsely populated, being vulnerable to China. The Russian concern is demonstrated through its willingness to supply India with sophisticated defence technology which it will not share with China.

China's assertive behaviour is causing concern to the rest of the international community and is a repetitive story of the rise of a non-democratic power raising tension and leading to wars as was the case in the earlier centuries. The concern is not about China starting a war but trying to dominate as an untethered hegemon. Its capacity for mischief by nuclear proliferation to states with regimes of doubtful legitimacy to resist externally induced regime change with nuclear deterrence has been amply demonstrated. Pakistan and North Korea are classical examples of such states and there are reports that the Myanmar military junta may try to acquire nuclear weapons from North Korea.

Future World Order

The real issue is about the future of the world order. Whether it is to be democratic, pluralistic and secular or one ruled by a one party oligarchy which gives precedence to societal harmony over individual human rights. Obviously India's commitment is to a world order of pluralism, secularism and democracy. It is expected that in the next two decades the US will still be the most predominant power, China the second power trying to close its gap with the US and India will be the third—the swing power. While China will be ageing with its growth rate slowing down, India will have a youth bulge and the US will also be relatively young as a country since it allows immigration. India will be the most populous state in the world. In that world,

knowledge will be the currency of power, not nuclear warheads and missiles. How will the game of nations among these three be played? The US will try as hard as it can to retain its position as the leading technological and economic power. China will do its best to catch up with the US and become the middle kingdom of the world. India will endeavour to become as large a knowledge pool as possible. India will have three options. First to join hands with the US as a partner and ensure that China does not become the foremost knowledge power of the world and it is out-performed. That will also ensure that the world order will be pluralistic, democratic and secular. In the process, India will try to narrow the gap between itself and China though India will not be able to overtake China, if at all it can do so, till the late 21st century. The second option is for India to join hands with China to pull the US down in the competition among nations. China will become number one and it is doubtful whether the world order of pluralism, democracy and secularism can be sustained to the same extent in that world. That will mean a betrayal of the Indian Constitution and the values of the Indian freedom struggle. The third option is to be nonaligned not only between the US and China as many advocate, but between Indian pluralism, secularism and democracy, and Chinese oligarchical one party dictatorship and preference of societal harmony over individual human rights, and allow China to use Pakistan as a surrogate to wreck Indian unity and destroy Indian secularism. Some nonalignment indeed against one's own values and national security interests! India's partnership will be not only with the US but with all pluralistic, secular and democratic countries. But there will be more intensive people-to-people relationship between India and the US because of millions of Indian-Americans in the US.

Will it be an Unequal Partnership?

Will it be an unequal partnership as many Cold Warriors project? People entertain such inferiority complex mainly because they do not realise the full potential of India as a knowledge power. The Americans appreciate it and therefore highlight the people to people relationship. While US technology and organisational skills are far superior to those of China today, China has four times the US population and therefore will out produce the US in numbers of scientists, technicians, medical personnel and managers. If the US does not want to be overtaken by China, it needs a skilled manpower pool which has proved itself already and which does not have major problems in integrating in the US. India is English-speaking and democratic. The Indian American community has proved its worth to the US. An Indian can live in the US today in the 'Skype age' and keep his cultural identity and contacts with his family in India intact. He cannot do it in China. He can build a Meenakshi or Balaji temple in the US and have Diwali celebrated in the White House. Can you imagine that happening in Beijing? In return, US investments

and high technology can make India grow faster, especially when the world goes through the green industrial revolution and India its second agricultural revolution. After all China's fast industrial growth was mostly due to US support. Why should India not take a lesson from China?

The Indo-US partnership is not about the containment of China nor is it about armaments though they continue to play a role so long as the politico—strategic establishments are still thinking about the last war fought. And it would appear that the Central Military Commission of China and the Pentagon are very conservative in their thinking. The Indo-US partnership is about defending Indian pluralism, secularism and democracy from the challenges of one party oligarchical system allied to jehadism; it is about the future world order and making India the biggest knowledge pool of the world, alleviating poverty and illiteracy and as the Tamil Poet Subrahmanya Bharati called it, creating an unrivalled polity, a novelty to the world.

The idea of a partnership with the US to shape the future international order according to one's preference has occurred to the Chinese as well. Thirty-four years after Mao's death, *People's Daily*, the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, comes out on November 22, 2010 with an online proposal for 'peaceful coexistence' between a rising China and the US. It is to be noted that it is published online and therefore not addressed to the Chinese people but to the Americans at this stage. Since it has been published online it needs to be quoted in extenso for the rest of the world, especially Indians to understand its true significance. It is asserted that the article represents only the views of the authors who include John Milligan-Whyte and Dai Min, authors of '*China and America's Leadership in Peaceful Coexistence*', Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett, author of '*The Pentagon's New Map*' and leading Chinese policy experts.

The article prescribes: "When agreed upon by the presidents of both nations through an "executive agreement" not subject to US Senate ratification, the grand strategy will promote US economic recovery, increase US exports to China, create 12 million US jobs, balance China-US trade as well as reduce US government deficits and debt. Furthermore, it will stabilize the US dollar, global currency and bond markets. It will also enable reform of international institutions, cooperative climate change remediation, international trade, global security breakthroughs as well as facilitate the economic progress of developed and developing economies, the stabilisation and rebuilding of failed states and security of sea transport."

"The essence of the grand strategy is that the US and China will balance their bilateral trade and never go to war with each other, and the US will refrain from seeking regime change and interference in China's internal affairs with regard to Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, the Internet, human rights, etc. and China will continue its political, legal, economic and human rights reforms."

"The Taiwan situation will be demilitarised by an informal US

presidential moratorium on arms transfers to Taiwan, China's reduction of strike forces arrayed against it, a reduction of US strike forces arrayed against China and ongoing joint peacekeeping exercises by US, Chinese and Taiwan militaries. The strategic uncertainty surrounding nuclear program in Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) will be de-escalated by the US eschewing DPRK regime-change goals and China ensuring that DPRK adopt policies along the lines of Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms and terminate its nuclear weapons program. China, US, South Korean and other military forces will together ensure maritime safety in the Yellow Sea. The US and its allies will not attack, invade or seek regime-change and eliminate trade restrictions and promote trade with Iran. China will ensure Iran suspends development of nuclear weapons."

"China will negotiate the eventual resolution of sovereignty disputes on the basis of the ASEAN Code of Conduct and propose and substantially invest in a new South China Sea Regional Development Corporation in which its neighbours Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam are shareholders. The United States and China will harmonize and coordinate their roles in asian economic and regional security and relations with Asian nations to ensure the peaceful coexistence and the economic stability and growth of ASEAN nations in their bilateral and multilateral relations and roles in ASEAN, APEC, etc."

"China will invest up to one trillion US dollars at the request of the US President to implement the following package of new economic and business relations. The US will lift export bans on high technology put in place on the assumption of possible military conflict with China. China will purchase sufficient US goods and services to balance trade each year in exchange for providing American companies access to the Chinese market equal to the access that Chinese companies enjoy on the US market."

What China is proposing to the US amounts to this: On the ideological competition between democracy and pluralism on the one hand and one-party oligarchy on the other, let there be peaceful coexistence. In exchange for US freeing its high-technology and making it available to China as it did conventional technology in the three decades since the eighties and made China a factory of the world and the US a debtor of China, the latter will invest one trillion dollars in the US and create 12 million jobs over a period of time through joint development of those high-technologies both in the US and (unarticulated at present) China as well. Given that China has four times the US population, it will inevitably result in China overtaking the US as the leading technological power of the world. In other words, China is inviting the US, in exchange for creation of 12 million jobs over the years and reduction of US debt to surrender US lead in high technology to China as the US did its conventional technological lead.

Since the Chinese know that no US president will be in a position to

negotiate such a deal with Congressional approval they are suggesting that this should be done through an executive agreement. Any US President attempting this is likely to face impeachment. Then why does a Chinese team of scholars, including two Americans propose it? This appears to be a reaction to President Obama's recent trip to Asia when he visited four democratic countries—India, Indonesia, South Korea and Japan. During that trip he emphasised that there will be no containment of China but ideological competition with it. Especially in the Indian Parliament, he emphasised human rights. The Indian trip was advertised as one to create jobs in the US. China is signalling that they are prepared to invest in the US and create more jobs if the US will accommodate some of China's concerns. What has been put forward is perhaps maximalist demands and they are likely to be open to negotiation at much lower levels. It should be of interest to India that, India Pakistan, and Myanmar do not figure in the proposals. Does it mean that China is telling the US that the whole of South Asia is China's sphere and is not available to be negotiated?

What if China becomes democratic and accepts common international values? Sections of Chinese opinion have been urging that China should move towards democracy. Even the Chinese leadership has been conceding that they will progress towards democracy at their own pace in their own characteristic fashion. China's progress towards democracy should be welcomed by the rest of the world. Historical experience tells us that democracies have not committed aggression against other democracies. India has always maintained the ideal of 'Vasudeva Kutumbakam' (Humankind is a family).

Partnership on Climate Change, Food Security and Energy Security

The issues of climate change, food security and agricultural security have been areas for cooperative development in successive Indo-US joint statements on partnership. I recall the days in the fifties when as young extension officers we were asked to introduce Japanese and Chinese methods of paddy cultivation. Finally what rescued India from food shortage was the Green Revolution of the American, Norman Borlaug and Professor M.S. Swaminathan.

Challenges to Growth and Poverty Alleviation

Let us now look at the challenges to Indian growth and poverty alleviation. I mentioned earlier that governance in the country has deteriorated in the last four decades even as the empowerment of traditionally disadvantaged sections has advanced rapidly and the democratic form of governance has been maintained only in form and not in substance. Our Constitution makers made a leap of faith when they decided on universal adult franchise, though there were grave reservations expressed. History justifies their decision. But

they decided to prescribe the first-past-the-post system for election obviously influenced by the British model. The result is that a candidate can get elected even if he polls 25 to 30 per cent of the votes provided he/she happens to have polled highest among the multiple candidates contesting the election. An overwhelming majority of the elected members in our Lok Sabha and the state legislatures belong to this category of electoral winners. For instance, in the recent Assembly polls the ruling JD(U)-BJP alliance won 206 out of 243 seats in the Assembly. This result was obtained by the two parties on the basis of less than 50 per cent of the votes polled. In this system if a candidate is confident of a vote bank of 25-30 percent, he/she has a good chance of being elected. Therefore political parties resort to patronage politics focusing on caste groupings to win the polls, instead of the population as a whole. That in turn leads the ruling party in a state to favour certain sections of the population at the expense of others, often the majority. Therefore the democratically elected government does not deliver goods and services fairly and justly to all sections of the population. The non-inclusive growth is not because of globalisation but because of grassroot party patronage politics.

After the first three general elections, caste and communal factors began determining the outcome of state elections. Patronage-based governance also adversely affected the maintenance of law and order. Since no single caste grouping in a state was able to obtain a majority in the legislature, opportunistic electoral alliances both pre-poll and post-poll became the order of the day. In playing this kind of coalition politics, the caste and communal leaders showed themselves masters of real politik. Such patronage politics had to be based on muscle and money power. These factors underlie the large scale corruption and criminalisation of politics. One major source of corruption is the development programmes. And the other more pernicious one is the daily transactions of the bureaucracy with the *aam aadmi*. It is alleged that significant sums of money are collected at the time of recruitment of constables, and Class three and four staff. In that case you cannot but expect the subordinate bureaucracy to treat bribe taking as anything other than normal and routine. There are stories of ministers and heads of departments assigning quotas for remittance collection to senior officials.

We have had cases of senior politicians and bureaucrats being charged and prosecuted together in corruption cases. We had the case of the IAS officer, named as the most corrupt, being appointed as the chief secretary of a state. She has since been convicted of corruption. Even in respect of political corruption there are two categories. One category promotes industrialisation and urbanisation and collects money from the creation of wealth. The second, like the old feudal class, has a vested interest in keeping the people poor and dominating them. While the first category is seen in the faster-growing coastal states and southern states, the latter category is to be found in the Hindi belt and states with significant tribal population.

The political class claims that it submits itself to accountability at every election. This is a myth. If their accountability is to be judged by the majority of the constituents deciding on the basis of honesty, competence, service and corruption there is no question that the majority in most cases is against their election. It is because they are able to get elected with a 25-30 per cent plurality of votes that they are able to claim the People's court endorses them. Therefore so long as the first-past-the-post system of elections prevails, corruption and caste politics cannot be eliminated. Delivery of goods and services by the state to the *aam aadmi* will suffer. Poverty alleviation and illiteracy elimination programmes will be hampered. There is a simple solution to this problem, that is, to follow the example of many European countries that a candidate will be declared elected only if he receives 50 per cent of the votes polled. If in the first round of elections no one gets 50 per cent, there will be run-off elections between the two top vote getters. Since the winning candidate has to get a 50 per cent majority and in most places in India one will require more than two caste combinations to get that majority, partisan patronage politics based on two caste combination or one caste dominance will be made more difficult.

Strategic Challenges and Risks in a Globalising World:An Indian Perspective

N.S. Sisodia

Global Security Environment

The global security environment is evolving rapidly. The euphoria which had prevailed after the Cold War has gradually dissipated. While the probability of classical, inter-state conflicts or a great war like the Second World War appears low, intra-state warfare and tensions continue to abound. Many historical disputes persist, while new strategic challenges and risks are emerging. This essay outlines the key challenges and risks affecting the global security environment, highlights the main features of India's defence and foreign policies and argues that given the transformed character of the global security environment, co-operation among nation states is vital for effectively coping with modern day security challenges.

Power Shift to Asia and a Multipolar World

For some years now, power balance is shifting to Asia and scholars have been describing the present century as the Asian century. The shift is occurring due to the rise of China both as a dynamic economic power and as a potent military power. This trend has gained further momentum due to the rise of other powers like India and Indonesia. Despite its stagnation in the last two decades, Japan continues to remain a key economic player in the global economy. Its economic strength translates into a substantial defence budget. Under Putin's rule Russia has witnessed rapid resurgence, mainly due to rise in hydro-carbon prices but also due to the reassertion of national will. In Africa and Latin America, the growth of South Africa and Brazil has been noteworthy. Thus, the world is rapidly moving from a uni-polar phase to what has been variously described as a multi-polar, non-polar or a poly-centric era.

The global financial crisis accompanied by an unprecedented recession has weakened the economic clout of the United States and accelerated the rise of China. In 2009, the US budget deficit was estimated at $ 1 trillion,

which amounted to 7.5 percent of its GDP. According to the International Monetary Fund global loan losses were estimated at US $ 3.5 trillion. Several iconic companies based in the West collapsed as a result of this crisis and many managed to survive only as a result of massive doses of financial stimulus. The financial crisis soon spread to real sectors, dried up liquidity, dampened manufacturing and led to huge job losses. This crisis and by far the gravest recession since the Great Depression has come at a time when the US and NATO forces are over extended in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Great power transitions in history have often been associated with disruptive conflicts. The world may no longer have the stabilizing influence of a hegemon. Given American decline its allies face some loss of confidence in its ability to deliver on its security commitments. American unilateralism and economic decline has tarnished its moral standing and diluted its soft power to some extent. A sense that the US, pre-occupied as it is in Iraq and the Af-Pak region, may not have the capacity to intervene elsewhere has led to increasingly assertive behaviour among other states.

Rise of China

Above all, China's inexorable rise to great power status is becoming a source of concern among many nations. Countries of Asia and elsewhere are looking anxiously to see if China will be a status-quo power or a revisionist power. According to those subscribing to the 'realist' school in international relations, no great power in history arose in a peaceful manner, given the inherent nature of such a rise which is destructive to the previously established order. Most powers are wary about China's rise—Russia about its growing clout in Central Asia and North East Asia; Japan is concerned about its vulnerability to powerful China; and India about its growing assertion and continuing support to Pakistan. China asserts that its 'peaceful rise' will be unique in world history. This is a premise that will be watched closely, especially in the light of such analyses as by Alastair Iain Johnston who has shown that the Chinese have historically favoured a muscular/'parabellum' strategic culture that has privileged the instruments of force in their diplomatic engagements.[1]

The Chinese economy has grown at an impressive pace during the past three decades. While this has provided enormous prosperity overall, the export-driven growth concentrated mainly in coastal areas has led to stark disparities and societal tensions, which are now beginning to be manifested. Chinese cities for instance are among the most polluted in the world. The series of attacks on school children in the recent past are also being seen as signs of social tensions due to unsustainable economic growth. The Chinese will have to tackle these and related socio-political instabilities under a 'closed' political system that does not tolerate much public dissent. Adding to the uncertainties is increasing Chinese military expenditures, coupled with lack of transparency regarding those figures, as well as a lack of clarity

regarding Chinese strategic goals. According to SIPRI Year Book 2010, China's Military expenditure in 2009 was estimated at $100 Billion, next only to the US. During 2000 to 2009, it has grown by a phenomenal 217%, compared to a global average of 49.2%. The Chinese defence expenditure for instance has grown by more than 10 per cent each year for the past 10 years.[2] These Chinese imponderables will determine the nature of its rise and as one of China's biggest neighbours with unresolved border disputes, India will be affected profoundly by these developments.

Weak Multilateral Institutions

The global power transition has eroded the relative stability of the Cold War era. The bipolarity of that era often influenced the course of inter-state tensions. During that period, State behaviour could often be predicted and in any case was often controlled by the existential concerns of the two super powers. Unfortunately, the UN system erected by the victors of the Cold War and the United Nation's Security Council (UNSC) also remained ineffective as its members tended to judge issues based on their own narrow national interests. The UN systems will remain ineffective due to its inability to reform and reflect contemporary realities. Other regional structures like NATO, SCO, ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum, also have severe limitations in managing inter-state tensions.

The present-day security challenges need to be viewed in the above geo-political context. The contemporary world faces a variety of complex security challenges. Some of these challenges are traditional while others are non-traditional. Yet others are emerging on the horizon. While inter-state wars are much less likely they cannot be entirely ruled out. In many parts of Asia, territorial and historical disputes remain unresolved. Historical differences tend to get accentuated by new tensions and circumstances. Thus, conventional wars are still a possibility. Such hot spots exist in Middle East, East Asia, South Asia and on the eastern periphery of the Russian Federation as recent developments have shown.

Growing Militaries

Despite prospects of inter-state conflicts declining, global defence expenditure has been rising. According to SIPRI data, between 2000 and 2009 it has grown from $ 1053 billion to $ 1572 billion, an increase of 49 per cent. In East, South and West Asia, it has grown during this period by 71 per cent, 57 per cent and 40 per cent respectively. This is indicative of the persisting mistrust and apprehensions among major powers, adding to risks of conflicts.

However, asymmetric warfare and intra-state conflicts are often the cause of violence today. In fact, for the sixth year running, no active interstate conflict was recorded by SIPRI in its annual review (SIPRI Year Book 2010). During the entire period 2000-09 only three conflicts were fought between

states, the remaining being intra-state. These are being caused due to issues of identity, ethnicity, religion, minority rights, sectarianism, economic disparities and even international criminal networks.

Regional Security Environment in Southern Asia

Southern Asia, in particular, has been facing the scourge of religious extremism, terrorism and civil strife. The present problems can be partly attributed to the multi-dimensional plurality of Southern Asia. The region was economically, culturally and politically closely interconnected. These connectivities have been disrupted with the decolonization of the region. The emerging states are in the process of national consolidation which remains a work in progress in many parts. But the region has been profoundly affected by religious extremism and terrorism. India is situated in a difficult neighbourhood and faces the complex task of managing its security situation so that its primary objective of its own 'inclusive' economic development is not hampered.

Af-Pak Region: The Epicentre of Terrorism

The Afghanistan-Pakistan corridor has been described as the 'epicentre' of global terrorism. The former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown had observed that Pakistan was linked to 75 per cent of all terror plots affecting the United Kingdom.[3] Tacit support for terror activities directed against India by state or quasi-state agencies is a matter of deep concern for India. The world has been witness to the terror attacks inflicted on Mumbai on November 26, 2008. Nearly 170 people of many different nationalities perished in that massacre. However, the conspirators of that crime are roaming around freely in Pakistan.

Pakistan has become a 'rentier' state as it seems to be sustaining itself on the massive amounts of aid that the US and the West have been providing it—more than $12 billion since the September 11, 2001 terror strikes in New York.[4] While the restoration of electoral democracy in Pakistan had raised some hopes initially, its polity continues to be dominated by the Army. There are growing fears about the Talibanisation of Pakistani State, which has been rocked by increasing violence. Al Qaeda leaders—Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri are reported to be hiding in FATA region of Pakistan. Pakistani Army has been involved in a major conflict with the Taliban in the Swat Valley. The long-drawn strife has led to displacement of half a million civilians. However, given the previous history of close links of Pakistani Army and Intelligence agencies with Taliban and other Jihadi outfits, the sincerity of their resolve in fighting them has been questioned. Pakistan Army seeks strategic depth in Afghanistan and views Jihadi outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba as strategic assets vis-à-vis India. Hence, its approach towards fighting Jihadi groups has remained ambivalent. The Government in Pakistan has not shown

any willingness to prosecute the conspirators and perpetrators of terror attacks in India and the dialogue revived between India and Pakistan at the level of Prime Ministers remains stalled due to what is widely believed in India to be Pakistan Army's pressure. India would find it difficult to engage in a substantive dialogue with Pakistan on other substantial issues, unless Pakistan desists from supporting terror groups against India. Despite this stand however, the dialogue process between the two countries was initiated again after the April 2010 SAARC Summit at Thimphu. Senior Indian Ministers, including those holding the Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs (Interior Ministry), travelled to Islamabad to carry forward the process. However, the dialogue process has unfortunately come unstuck due to continued inability and disinterest of the Pakistani leadership to address core Indian concerns regarding cross-border terrorism.

In Afghanistan, a member of SAARC, President Obama's AfPak strategy is increasingly being seen as an kowtowing to Pakistani demands—on the issue of Indian 'presence' in the country and on drone strikes inside Pakistan, among others. The surge announced by President Obama in December 2009 has added another 30,000 troops to the 70,000 already present in the country. The US President has promised Americans that he will start withdrawing these troops by the summer of 2011, when greater responsibilities are intended to be given to the Afghan security forces.[5] There are many imponderables regarding the post-July 2011 situation in Afghanistan. A precipitate exit would seem unlikely given the enormous stakes involved. However, Pakistan's Army and the Taliban are biding their time in the hopes of filling the vacuum. This would undoubtedly lead to negative security implications for India and the region as a whole, given Pakistan's own political instabilities and connivance in fostering trouble inside Afghanistan. It remains doubtful, if the troop surge and anti-Taliban offensives can help bring about a measure of stability so that an Iraq-type 'success' can be achieved in Afghanistan. Continued instability in the Af-Pak region is likely to remain a matter of grave security concern for the world

India has been specifically targeted for attacks in Afghanistan. The July 7, 2008 and October 8, 2009 Indian Embassy attacks are a case in point, as was the March 2010 attack on a hotel housing Indian nationals. India on its part is committed to helping build a stable Afghanistan and assist its development, as was conveyed to President Karzai during his visit to New Delhi in April 2010.[6] India's nation-building activities have come for appreciation from varied quarters, including from the Afghans themselves. New Delhi has invested over $1billion in developmental assistance and is involved in building the Afghan national parliament building as well. It has recently also completed the Zaranj-Delaram highway. The US Af-Pak strategy has so far not shown very encouraging results. There is a perception in Afghanistan that the NATO forces would be leaving Afghanistan well before

the American Presidential election in 2012. This has emboldened both Taliban and its supporters in Pakistan. The continued criticism of President Karzai by Western powers has only served to further undermine the legitimacy of his Government. Afghan civilian institutions and security forces remain weak. Poppy cultivation continues to flourish and finance Taliban and warlordism in Afghanistan.

India's Unstable Neighbourhood

Intra-state conflicts have badly affected Sri Lanka which is just emerging from a long drawn out civil war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. However, in the absence of a political solution of the problem, the strife could reemerge in the future. Nepal was also wracked for years due to the armed struggle of Maoists. In an extraordinary event the monarchy in Nepal was overthrown peacefully and Nepal was declared a republic. However, the effort of political parties including the Maoists to write a new Constitution has yet to bear fruit, while peoples' problems which had caused the strife in the first place continue to remain neglected. Bangladesh succeeded in restoring electoral democracy but it is not yet clear whether the political divisiveness, under development and religious extremism which have led to violence and violence in the past would be effectively tackled in the foreseeable future. India is surrounded by States affected by instability and intra-state violence. These conditions have adversely affected growth and delivery of public services. India cannot remain insulated from the negative security implications of an unstable neighbourhood.

Threat of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction continues to be a source of concern. As President Obama has observed while there is hardly any prospect of inter-state nuclear confrontation, the risks of nuclear strike have increased. In a speech delivered at Prague, President Obama had advocated nuclear disarmament but also expressed doubts about being able to achieve it during his lifetime. Unfortunately, these encouraging pronouncements have not been resolutely followed up in practice. So long as some powers retain nuclear weapons, others will seek them, for a variety of considerations. So far the NPT has worked due to the fact that most aspiring powers were part of an alliance system. Despite the treaty, proliferation of nuclear technology and materials has continued. Its principal architect, Pakistan's A Q Khan who had operated his vast network, with its reach to Libya, Iran and North Korea, was released without suffering any penalties. This network could not have functioned without Pakistan Army's tacit support. The security of nuclear weapons and materials in Pakistan has been a source of anxiety given the strong 'jihadi' culture permeating Pakistan and documented efforts of groups like the Al Qaeda to obtain and use nuclear weapons/materials.[7] India has been an active

participant in efforts to ensure nuclear security, including at the recent Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) called by President Obama in April 2010. India also enacted the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, 2005, which entered into force on June 6, 2005, in tune with the provisions of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 of 2004 requiring member states to enact domestic legislation to secure nuclear materials and their transfer.

The proliferation of WMD and related technologies continues to be a matter of concern. The role played by China and North Korea in Pakistan's nuclear weapons pursuit is well-documented.[8] China also allegedly gave 50 kgs of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to Pakistan in 1982.[9] China's role in the evolving East Asian (and the West Asian as well) nuclear scenario is also under the scanner, given the lack of progress in the Six-Party talks.

While firmly opposed to Iran acquiring the nuclear weapon capability, India supports its nuclear energy programme to which it is entitled as a member of the NPT. Due to growing apprehensions about the availability of hydrocarbons and concerns about climate change, there is increasing interest in nuclear energy and some analysts are already referring to a 'Nuclear Renaissance'. Development of nuclear energy in a large number of countries is also likely to lead to worries about security of nuclear technological and materials. Easy access to technological information has today greatly empowered non-state actors. Not deterred by international treaties and driven by irrational ideological considerations, they may employ chemical or biological weapons. Such attempts have been made in the past and evidence of terror groups' interest in such technologies has also come to light of intelligence agencies.

Maritime Security

In this era of growing interconnectedness, ensuing maritime security has become vital. Nearly 90 per cent of global trade and 65 per cent of hydrocarbons are transported on sea routes. Apart from this, nearly 95 per cent of the internet traffic is managed through undersea cables. Any disruption of this traffic through action of hostile state or non-state actors can seriously hamper flow of information, energy or commerce. Growing incidence of piracy from countries like Somalia has adversely affected shipping. The region extending from the Suez and Hormuz to Malacca Straits remaining vulnerable to disruption. Over a hundred thousand ships traverse through the Indian Ocean each year.

Energy Security

The depleting hydro-carbon resources and instability in regions which are the principal sources of hydro-carbon energy have increased concerns about energy security. Conflict and instability in West Asia and to some extent in

Africa have impeded fresh investment and induction of technology which would help meet the growing global demand. Pipelines, which can establish economically efficient connectivities, cannot be laid in disturbed regions. Worries regarding global warming and peak oil also add to concerns about energy security. Countries with large demand like China have tended to acquire ownership of hydro-carbon resources in various countries. Others have followed suit. The Russian Government has used its hydro-carbon resources as an instrument of geo-political power. There is an anxiety among nation states about rise of resource nationalism in the future particularly, if the global community fails to find alternative sources of energy.

Apart from the 'real and present' challenges mentioned above, the global community faces many 'strategic risks'. These could be termed as non-traditional security challenges, given their non-military nature.

Climate Change
Climate change is one such 'strategic risk'. The negative effects of climate change could include the submergence of coastal communities and an exacerbation of existing problems like poverty, food and water shortages. It could hasten the spread of diseases and increase the potential for distress and conflict. Huge water deficits exist in countries in India's neighbourhood, including in China, Iran, and Pakistan. With melting of glaciers and inefficient use, the problem of water deficits is likely to become more acute. These could contribute to tensions and conflicts. Water concerns can however be managed if the necessary political will exists. Internationally, over 150 bilateral treaties have been signed in the past 5 decades. In the India-Pakistan context, the US-brokered Indus Waters Treaty is an example.

Pandemics
Other 'strategic risks' include pandemics and virulent infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS, influenza virus, and the 2003 SARS virus. The World Bank predicts that the next pandemic, could match the magnitude of 1918 influenza flu, which could kill more than 70 million people and cause a major recession exceeding $3 trillion.[10]

Cyber Security
The development and Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) has played a key role in globalization. At the same time, it has greatly increased humankinds dependence on ICT, making several systems like transport, banking & finance, telecommunications vulnerable to cyber attacks which should now be factored in by national security planners. India could also face the prospects of disruptive cyber activities in conflicts, like that faced by Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008. The irregular warfare capabilities of non-state actors will only increase in the coming decades.[11] Terror groups are

also increasingly using the internet to spread their ideology, seek funds, or network better. The Pentagon's *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World* indicates that future radicalism could be fuelled by global communications and mass media.[12] The UK Ministry of Defence Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) in its report predicting scenarios for 2007-2036 also notes that the explosion of ICT not only leads to greater prosperity but also heightens grievances.

India's Defence and Security Policies

Having considered the global and regional security scenarios, we now briefly discuss India's security policies. India's defence and security policies have continued to focus on the core national security objectives which are enduring. These are founded on India's core values of democracy, secularism, pluralism and peaceful coexistence. Since its independence, India has been engaged in socio-economic development of its people. India's national security objectives can be summarized as follows:

- Defending the country's borders as defined by law and enshrined in the Constitution;
- Protecting the lives and property of its citizens against war, terrorism, nuclear threats and militant activities;
- Protecting the country from instability and religious and other forms of radicalism and extremism emanating from neighbouring states;
- Securing the country against the use or the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction;
- Development of material, equipment and technologies that have a bearing on India's security, particularly its defence preparedness through indigenous research, development and production, inter-alia to overcome restrictions on the transfer of such items;
- Promoting further co-operation and understanding with neigh-bouring countries and implementing mutually agreed confidence-building measures; and
- Pursuing security and strategic dialogues with major powers and key partners.

During the cold war, India had pursued a policy of non alignment, essentially to avoid being a member of either of the power blocs. The objective was to ensure strategic autonomy and to pursue the cause of a large number of decolonized, newly independent nations. In 1971, India signed an agreement with the Soviet Union but never became a part of the Soviet bloc. This agreement enabled India to secure defence equipment and aid for economic development from the Soviet Union when such assistance was not forthcoming from other sources. During this period, India also attempted to achieve self-reliance and rapid economic growth with equity. But due to

inefficiencies of a centrally planned, public sector dominated and regulated economy, its growth rate remained low. India had to also fight wars with both its neighbours—with Pakistan in 1947-48, in 1965 and in 1971; and with China in 1962. While India won the war decisively against Pakistan in 1971 which was bifurcated, in an act of generosity, it did not press Pakistan for a conclusive settlement, with the result that Pakistan continues to harbour hostility against India. India, expecting friendship and cooperation from China was caught unawares in Sino-Indian war of 1962. It was this defeat in the border war with China that jolted India into a more realistic approach towards its defence preparedness.

During the mid-80s', policy makers in India began to revisit their approach to economic development. A modest attempt was made to liberalise the economy and bring about deregulation. However, it was the grave foreign exchange crisis of 1991, which precipitated fundamental changes in India's economic policies. The comprehensive reforms introduced in the 1990's included delicensing of industry, liberalization of trade, deregulation of the financial sector and positive measures to promote the private sector. Economic reforms and consequent opening up of India's economy accelerated economic growth and led to an outward orientation of India's foreign and defence policies.

The collapse of the Soviet Union which demonstrated to Indian planners the limitations of a centralized economy and the need to connect with other parts of the world had a profound impact on India's economic and foreign policies. A natural corollary of India's economic reforms was the liberalization of its foreign policy. India established diplomatic relations with Israel and soon a vigorous cooperation in defence ensued. Despite its centuries old trade and maritime linkages India had neglected its links with countries of East and South East Asia. A conscious policy decision was taken to restore these linkages through India's Look East Policy. This led to rapid growth in trade with countries of the region.

In a transformed international system, India's foreign and economic policies have acquired an outward-looking orientation. It has established strategic partnership with all great powers—the United States, China, Japan, Russia and the European Union. A strong relationship is being developed with the Republic of Korea, which India has always admired for its phenomenal growth as one of the Asian Tigers. It has developed defence relations with several countries and initiated a process of promoting understanding and military to military co-operation. India's defence procurement policies have been modified to facilitate greater diversification in sources of supply. Special policy initiatives have been taken to establish stronger linkages with all its neighbours and confidence building measures have been put in place with Pakistan as well as People's Republic of China.

India had to develop its own Nuclear deterrence as the Nuclear Weapon

powers failed to heed its calls for disarmament. Peoples' Republic of China with whom India has an unresolved boundary dispute had developed its own arsenal and Pakistan was pursuing a covert programme. In the absence of the cover of any member umbrella, India had to perforce develop its own nuclear weapons. These are meant for a credible minimum deterrence. India's Nuclear doctrine has committed to a policy of no-first use. Its nuclear posture is thus entirely for defensive purposes.

Meeting the Security Challenges

The contemporary and emerging security challenges call for much greater cooperation amongst nation states than has been possible in the past. The cooperation is vital not only because of the prohibitive direct and indirect costs of modern day wars but also because many challenges are transnational and no nation can meet them alone. In recent years, efforts made to tackle transnational terrorism, piracy, global financial crisis and pandemics are examples of how cooperative action alone can help achieve success. Such cooperative frameworks and action will be needed for dealing with climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, protection of the global commons like the oceans, outer space and also the cyber space. The challenge of depleting resources, particularly energy resources, also calls for a cooperative approach and action.

In the coming years, this approach would also open up on opportunity for close defence cooperation between India and the Republic of Korea. As mentioned above, India has forged strategic partnerships with the U.S., Japan, Russia, the European Union. A strategic partnership and a comprehensive economic partnership agreement has also been established with the Republic of Korea. Both India and the ROK enjoy a vibrant relationship in the economic sphere with many Korean companies in the auto and white goods sectors doing a flourishing business in India. A good understanding between the two countries, of each others security concerns will be conducive to deeper cooperation. Indian policy for diversifying defence acquisitions and encouraging the private sector offers opportunities for substantive cooperation in research and development, joint production and other collaborative ventures.

Both countries depend on open trade and energy imports. Security of sea lanes of communication is therefore of vital importance to both. This offers yet another opportunity for maritime cooperation. Finally, given the vital need for cooperative efforts amongst nation states to fight transnational security challenges, both ROK and India can greatly benefit from mutual defence cooperation.

We live in an uncertain and insecure world. While there are many positive trends which offer hope for more rational action by nation states, history is replete with examples of violent conflicts, even when peace and stability was

expected. There are emerging challenges and security risks coupled with the potential role of non-state actors. In this uncertain world, all nation states need to adopt a cooperative approach in facing common challenges. There is an opportunity for South Korea and India, with many commonalities complimentaries to join hands in this process.

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The Global Commons and India's National Security Strategy

Kanti Bajpai

India's national security strategy—or grand strategy—must include consideration of the challenges relating to the global commons. To say that India "must" do this in the future tense is to suggest it has not done so in the past, which would be incorrect. Historically, India has paid attention to global commons issues, partly as a good citizen in world affairs and partly out of regard for its own security. However, the stakes have sharpened over the past 20 years since the end of the Cold War. With the disappearance of the central strategic conflict between the Western and Eastern blocs and with the development of a more integrated world economy, the global commons has drawn greater attention. India must therefore be more attentive to the challenges of the global commons and internationalist in its national security stance than ever before.

India's security has traditionally been thought about in terms of domestic, regional, continental (Asian), and systemic challenges. Domestically, India's security is threatened primarily by insurgencies, separatist violence, terrorism, and communalism. At the regional level, the greatest threats to India are China and Pakistan. Both are military threats to India at the nuclear, conventional, and sub-conventional levels. Continentally, the rise of China is a concern for India. The rate of growth of Chinese power suggests that it could be the hegemon of the continent in the decades to come, seeking to push out the United States altogether and reducing India and Japan to acquiescent status. At the level of the international system, India must keep an eye on China and the US. China is not just an Asian power any longer. Its moves in Africa and Latin America and its massive economy, hard currency reserves, manufacturing base, and emerging technological capabilities suggest that it will be a superpower with the ability to project hard power beyond Asia and to exercise influence globally. The US will remain the greatest power in the system for perhaps another two decades before it goes into second place behind China. Both China and the US are a structural challenge to Indian

security in the sense that as the two greatest powers on earth they will strive to manage world politics in ways that suit their interests. In doing so, they may well affect India's security adversely. India must therefore be attentive to the military and economic power balance with both China and the US.

A national security strategy for India cannot afford to ignore or discount this list of traditional security challenges.[1] However, it can also not afford to ignore or discount global issues which affect the prospects of territorial integrity, the sanctity of national political and social life, the increase of economic well-being, and a balance of power relative to other major actors. This paper contends that (i) the safety of the planet from calamities, (ii) arresting climate change, preventing deadly epidemics, and stabilising the global economy, and (iii) global political stability, non-proliferation, the demilitarisation of outer space, and the freedom of the high seas are crucial for India's security.

Definitions and Organising Concepts

The term "national security strategy" is new to the Indian policy lexicon. It is used here interchangeably with "grand strategy", that is, the application of a nation's various resources for the purposes of security, where security is understood as the protection of territory and the political and social way of life within that territory, the promotion of economic well-being, and a balance of national power relative to other powerful states.[2] The global commons is defined here as "public goods". Public goods are benefits (or "positive externalities") that are widely if not universally enjoyed and that cannot be easily restricted in terms of their enjoyment. They cannot usually be provided by any single country, although this is not always necessarily the case. An overweening hegemon might provide public goods that others can enjoy without paying for them. Usually, though, global public goods require the cooperation, at the very least, of the most powerful states in the international system.

The following global public goods suggest themselves as being the most vital:

1. the safety of the planet from natural disasters, that is, extra-terrestrial catastrophe such as asteroids as well as large-scale terrestrial catastrophes (e.g. earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanoes)
2. the safety of the planetary biosphere from various man-made dangers, especially climate change
3. the prevention of deadly epidemics
4. the stability of the world economy
5. political stability across the world
6. the control of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)
7. the demilitarisation of outer space

8. the safety of the high seas beyond the Extended Economic Zones (EEZs)

A few comments are in order on each of these.

Natural Disasters

The safety of the planet from extra-planetary and earthly catastrophe requires little comment. Obviously, there can be no national security if the planet is in peril from extra-terrestrial danger. Terrestrial catastrophe is more limited in scope, but large-scale catastrophe usually affects more than a single country and often is consequential beyond the confines of a single region.

Climate Change

There are those who remain skeptical about the existence of climate change, the role of human behaviour in causing global warming, and the imminence of it. However, what is not in doubt is that warming beyond a point would undoubtedly be disastrous for everyone, both physically as well as socially. The exact tipping point remains controversial, but the value of a relatively temperate global climate is not a matter of debate. It is therefore proper to list it as a vital global public good.

Deadly Diseases

The safety of peoples from fast-spreading, deadly diseases is another global public good. It is important to underline the words "fast spreading" and "deadly". Slow-moving diseases that are life threatening, such as heart disease and cancer, are more manageable and controllable because there is time for mitigation and perhaps even cure and prolonging the length of human life is a greater possibility. Of concern also are deadly diseases rather than those that are "merely" debilitating or chronic, for roughly parallel reasons. The most fast-spreading and deadly diseases are those that are communicable from one human to another or from animals and insects to humans.

World Economy

The stability of the world economy is a global public good because in an increasingly integrated world there are no economies that can be protected from the vagaries and workings of this larger system of production and exchange that transcends national boundaries. What do we mean by a stable world economy?

First of all, a stable world economy is one that aims to provide economic growth as widely as possible. Generalised growth can lift millions out of poverty, improve the lives of those who are above the poverty line but are by no means comfortable financially, and generate employment. To do this, generalised growth must be sustained over time.

Secondly, stability of the world economy also implies predictability in the

workings of economic processes and institutions including the market. Without the expectation of predictability, there can be no long-term stability. If processes and institutions do not function along more or less expected lines, government policies and private decisions (corporate as well as household) will find it hard to generalize and sustain growth over a long period of time. The world economy consists of a massive system of production and exchange involving governments, corporations and businesses, and households. But the global economy is more than just the aggregate of goods and services. It is also processes and institutions such as public spending, fiscal policies, international trade, the movement of currencies and other financial instruments, and development and financial assistance or transfers by both international and national agencies.

Thirdly, stability in the global economy must depend on well-known and well-accepted norms, rules, principles, and decision-making procedures that govern production and exchange, that is to say, a meta-regime. This meta-regime is currently a liberal one in the sense that the dominant regime of norms, rules, principles, and decision-making procedures are those of the market. Thus, when we say the stability of the global economy is a global public good, we are endorsing a liberal world economy, primarily dependent on the decisions of individuals and private businesses working within a regime backed by national governments and inter-governmental agreements such as embodied in the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

Political Stability

Political stability in national polities is also a global public good. National politics are, in the general course, the business of individual societies and peoples. This is a basic global norm arising out of an essentially Westphalian world political order. In what sense, then, can national political stabilities be considered global public goods? How can national stability be a concern for others?

The broad answer is that there is no absolute right to, or recognition of, internal political sovereignty. This is evident from the constitution of the United Nations and international law. The reason that internal political sovereignty cannot be absolute is that instabilities within a polity might well spread beyond boundaries or might be exploited by sub-state actors to make trouble for other countries (e.g. transnational terrorist groups might use an unstable "host" polity to build a base of operations). In that sense, internal order and international order are not always and altogether separable, and foreigners can under certain circumstances rightfully claim to have a stake in the internal stability of other people's political systems. Beyond this, though, there is the tug and pull of the cosmopolitan responsibility to other peoples who may be in trouble at the hands of their own rulers. Thus, there is a "responsibility to protect" ("R2P") when the oppression and tyranny of

domestic rulers crosses a limit and when domestic populations demonstrably do not have the ability to protect themselves.[3]

To be clear, national stability here is not intended to mean the preservation of the status quo, particularly of unjust and tyrannical rule. It cannot be a global public good to support and perpetuate bad and violent rule. Rather, national stability is used in a deeper sense to refer to a form of long-term political existence based on the legitimacy of government, on the rule of law, and on the ability of state authorities to protect the lives of citizens and others in their jurisdiction including minorities. Widespread political stability across the face of the globe understood in this sense is a condition of a peaceful world. It is probably fair to say that this too reflects a notion of stability that is liberal in its fundamental conception.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Safety from the use of weapons of mass destruction is also a vital public good. There are those who argue that proliferation, particularly of nuclear weapons, is stabilising since the presence of nuclear weapons between the great powers and regional rivals ensures that major war is made unlikely.[4] Nonetheless, virtually everyone agrees that proliferation ought to be slowed if not stopped altogether beyond the present level. This is especially true of nuclear weapons. At least since the scientific studies of the 1980s it has been clear that even a limited use of nuclear weapons could transform climatic patterns and jeopardize civilised life all over the planet by ushering in a "nuclear winter".[5] The massive use of biological and chemical agents could also be cataclysmic. In this elemental and most basic sense, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, both vertically and horizontally, is a danger for everyone on the planet.

Outer Space

Outer space is the common heritage of humankind in the sense that its preservation in good health is vital for planetary survival and wellbeing. Thus, there is a general, though perhaps not quite universal, acceptance that outer space should not be militarised, for at least three reasons. First, battles in outer space may affect the outermost layers of air enveloping the planet which are crucial for health and safety below: military engagements in outer space might blow a hole into the ozone layer increasing health and environmental risks down on earth. In addition, military operations may damage vital assets, such as satellites, that non-combatant states have positioned outside the planet's outer atmosphere. Since satellites play such an important role in terrestrial communications, any disruption could wreak havoc. Finally, the reason that outer space should not be militarised is that battles fought in outer space might conceivably affect those nations not directly involved in combat. So, satellite and other systems placed in space

for military purposes may fall to earth, causing death and destruction to those not involved in the quarrel.

High Seas

States have a collective interest in the safety of the high seas, particularly beyond their EEZs. Since virtually all states today depend on foreign manufactures and natural resources, the movement of ships is crucial to the national economy. The safety of private and national cargo carriers, particularly on the high seas, is therefore a global public good. States that intercept shipping or that threaten to close national and foreign waterways, including choke points such as straits and canals, harm the interests not just of neighbouring states but also of states right across the globe. The same is true of pirates who attack and steal from international shipping. States that allow pirates to flourish are also guilty of interfering with freedom on the high seas.

The Global Commons: Three Key Features and Three Levels of Problems

Let us be more specific and systematic in dealing with the global commons and global public goods. The various issues listed in this paper as problems of the commons and public goods have at least three key features and can be grouped into three problem levels.

Three Key Features

First, the global commons threats to individual states are not necessarily equally stringent, nor are they invariant across time. The salience of threats will vary. There are threats that are more probable and consequential for India than they are for other countries. Threats may also recede or increase in salience over time. Working with other states or non-governmental actors must be based on recognition of the uneven nature of threats. What is vital for India may be relatively marginal for another state, and what seems unimportant today may be of great importance in the future. Eliciting cooperation and getting agreements will be made more complicated by this unevenness.

    Second, global commons challenges require long-term international cooperation and are not always susceptible to unilateral actions. They will therefore require the Indian government to work with other governments if they are to be managed optimally, even though there are mitigating things that the government can do on its own.

    Third, whereas most traditional national security challenges are caused by the willful, motivated actions of governments in respect of other countries, challenges of the global commons tend to be more complex in their causation. They arise from (i) natural processes (the effects of these may be exacerbated

by human actions or non-actions), (ii) the unintended effects of numerous micro-actions (or non-actions) of governments and non-governmental actors all over the world (ordinary people, communities, associations and organisations of various kinds, businesses and corporations), and (iii) the intended effects of actions by governments and non-government actors. Global commons challenges are therefore largely, though not completely, structural in the sense that governments are faced by negative externalities, i.e. public and shared threats that are the by-product of private and governmental decisions as well as the workings of the natural world.

Three Levels of Problems

The challenges of the global commons can therefore be grouped at three levels. At the first level are natural threats, acts of God, which affect the planetary biosphere. These include extra-terrestrial threats such as asteroid collisions with the earth as well as terrestrial threats such as massive earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions. Here the only sense in which human intentions and agency are involved is in the extent to which the ability to foresee and forewarn and therefore to take mitigating actions is a factor in the scale of suffering and destruction. The root causes here are natural processes. The extent of the damage to life and property though is a function of human intelligence, preparation, and cooperation.

At the next level are the unintended effects of the decisions and choices that cause negative externalities. Global warming brought on by large-scale and enduring patterns of production, exchange, and consumption is a level two problem. Also included at this level are deadly disease epidemics which are caused by a mixture of natural processes and human choices across communities and national boundaries. The agents here do not intend to cause negative externalities, but in aggregate, by their behaviour, end up doing so on a huge scale. It is the interaction of countless micro choices and decisions that produce outcomes that few if any actors intend. The workings of the global economy are also produced by millions of private micro-decisions and the decisions of big corporations and banks as well as governments which combine to produce flows of goods, services, and finance that can result in large-scale turbulence outside the control of governments.

Finally, there is a third level at which problems arise from motivated agents who either intend or do not intend altogether to cause problems across national boundaries. These include: political instabilities that are national and transnational in their origins and effects; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the militarisation of outer space; and dangers to the freedom of navigation on the high seas.

Large-scale internal disorders, caused by ethno-religious violence, may spread across national boundaries and may even impact countries much further away (the Tamil Eelam demand affected Tamil communities and host

countries in the West and Southeast Asia). Internal disorders that have cross-national effects are not intended to be negative externalities for others. At some point, however, agents may choose, for their own advantage, to make them deliberately transnational in effect—to draw in external actors, for instance, or to frighten national governments.

Transnational religious movements such as Islamic fundamentalism and extremism may also produce negative externalities. Some of these movements may have begun as internal reform efforts and then transmuted into transnational movements. Others may have begun as transnational movements with the clear intention that their effects would cross national boundaries and jurisdictions, indeed would challenge them or render them meaningless. We can think here of Al Qaeda.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological), their delivery vehicles (most importantly, missiles), and components towards the production of these systems can also be grouped in this third level of global commons challenges. States as well as non-state actors are involved in proliferation activities. While the drive for proliferation may be local in the sense that one state may merely wish to affect the security calculations of a neighbour, the effect of proliferation, clandestine or overt, may be much more systemic, with effects that were not intended by the proliferators. Proliferation well might bring about stability as between pairs of antagonists. However, as more states get weapons of mass destruction, the chances of their being used, intentionally or unintentionally, increases. The chances of misperceptions and miscalculations and the possibility of accidental use rise as the number of proliferators grows. If something can grow wrong, it will go wrong—eventually.

The militarisation of outer space and interference with the freedom of the high seas are also level-three problems. The former arises from the activities of states that possess advanced space capacities that could be or are intended to be used for military purposes; the latter involves both state and non-state actors. Fortunately, the militarisation of outer space has been slow, but, with improvements in technology and as more states join the space club the chances of military assets being positioned in space and military clashes occurring there increase. States that are militarising outer space are doing so primarily to meet the challenge of adversaries, yet they could end up endangering the wellbeing of non-adversaries as well.

On the whole, states have avoided interfering with the freedom of the high seas. Guided by the laws of the sea, shipping, both cargo as well as military, has been allowed to ply the oceans reasonably freely. The last 15-20 years has seen the rise of piracy, particularly in and around the Horn of Africa. Pirates operate for their own private gain but affect the security of shipping and thereby add to the problems of individuals, businesses, and governments for whom the freedom of the high seas is both an economic and security imperative.

The Three Levels and National Security

What are the implications of this analysis for national security strategy?

Level One: Natural Disasters

The first level of problems, that is, natural disasters or calamities, is the least political or geopolitical—there is no question of human causes (except as inaction in preparing to meet the threat). Since these phenomena affect the survival of the planet or the health of the planetary biosphere and therefore potentially everyone on earth (though not necessarily in equal measure), they are also more susceptible to international cooperation. In addition, these threats are usually sudden and unpredicted, but when they occur they pose a 'clear and present' danger. For this reason, agreements with others are relatively easy to achieve. The dire nature of the emergency produces at least short-term, triage-like cooperation. The management of the problem relies greatly on the use of advanced science and technology—to help forecast and forewarn if not predict the occurrence, to explicate what the effects might be and what mitigating actions might be taken, and to help in the rehabilitation of those who have suffered. Since science and technology are more or less universal in the kind of data they utilize and the cause-and-effect reasoning they employ, these more protracted problems are the least controversial though they are not necessarily easily managed given that the costs and distribution of social interventions can be daunting.

Level Two: Climate Change, Deadly Diseases, and Global Economic Dislocation

The second level of problems is extremely challenging. Since they arise from the decisions and behaviours of millions of human beings in many different states, organisations, and occupations, any governmental actions to manage the externalities that result have to take into account the micrology and diversity of the problem: mitigating and managerial decision-making will have to understand that the targets of government and international policies are ordinary men and women, governments, organisations and communities, and people of different nationalities, ages, cultures, vulnerabilities, responsibilities, and socio-economic backgrounds.

Thus, the problems of climate change and of turbulence in the world economy are the result of not only millions of decisions and behaviours; they are also the culmination of processes that occur over a long period of time, years if not decades. There is not a clear and present danger in the sense that a volcanic eruption constitutes an immediately recognizable threat. The science of climate change is increasingly well understood and accepted but that of the world economy is not. Data and cause-and-effect knowledge are more controversial, at least in respect of the workings of the world economy. A national security response therefore will be enormously complex.

Effectiveness in managing the problem will depend on the cooperation of many governments, peoples, and non-governmental actors and will therefore be very protracted and inclusive.

So also the spread of deadly diseases arises from the choices of millions of private and public actors, individuals as well as collective entities. The biological sciences are the key to dealing with the etiology and symptoms of diseases, but the social sciences also are vital in increasing our understanding of how human practices contribute to their spread. The relationship of human practices to the spread of disease is itself a complex and controversial issue and often very political in nature. We need only recall the early reactions in India to HIV-AIDS which saw the government and various social actors denying that the disease was likely to be a major threat to the health of the Indian people. The problem with deadly diseases is that there are so many of them. A national security strategy that takes account of them in a country such as India, where the population is enormous and the range of diseases is large and growing, will confront an enormous challenge.

Level Three: Internal Disorders, Transnational Movements, Proliferation, the Militarisation of Outer Space, and Piracy on the High Seas

The third level of problems is easier than level-two problems, at least in respect of the question of agency and therefore fixing responsibility. Since it is easier, government policy is less complicated than in level two where the causes of phenomena are harder to fix and where agency and responsibility are so diffuse. The agents in large-scale internal disorders are identifiable. So also transnational religious movements and their militant wings can be identified; indeed, they are usually eager to be known and tend to publicize their activities (though not always their locations and headquarters). Even in the case of proliferation activities, a fair amount of information is available, at least in so far as the activities of proliferating states are concerned. The covert activities of private individuals and groups are harder but not impossible to know. At this juncture, the militarisation of outer space rests with a handful of states which have advanced technological capabilities. To that extent, agency and responsibility are easy enough to assign. In the case of piracy on the high seas, identifying precisely where and when pirates will strike and which pirates are responsible for which attacks is difficult. However, pirates must operate from a home base or bases. These bases are within the jurisdiction of states. It should be possible to identify those governments whose territories are playing host and to collaborate with them to tighten their border controls.

While government policy may be less complicated in terms of fixing agency and responsibility, this does not mean that level-three problems are *un*-challenging. Politics, sociology, and anthropology are the governing

'scientific' disciplines of several of the issues discussed here, and data and cause-and-effect knowledge are far more controversial. In addition, suasion over time may work quite well in respect of climate change and economic behaviour, but it is likely to be far less efficacious with groups that are alienated from, indeed pitted against national and global orders. Those who are defending national survival by building weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) are not likely to be persuaded to give them up by mere words. Terrorists who are trying to acquire WMDs to use against powerful states and opponents such as India are not susceptible to reasoned argument on the negative externalities that would be caused by terrorism. Stopping the great powers from using outer space for military purposes is by no means easy. The US, Russia, and China have already developed systems for outer space positioning and use. Suasion and pressures on these powers will be unlikely to work in the short term. It will need considerable diplomatic skill and finesse to get them to halt and then reverse their policies on the militarisation of space. So also persuading indulgent or weak governments that they should cooperate to control international piracy will not be easy given that there may be powerful host interests that benefit from the presence of pirates.

Where cooperation on level-two problems in the end must be almost universal and inclusive, cooperating on level-three problems will be *with* some and *against* others. Cooperation here may, in addition, involve the use of force. The decision to use force is always difficult, particularly for modern democracies where public opinion, opposition parties, and the media must be satisfied that the danger is direct and more or less immediate and that the use of force is unavoidable. The threats posed by internal disorder in various parts of the world which could spread beyond national boundaries, transnational religious groups that spread disaffection and terror on a global scale, and proliferating states and private organisations may require India to ally with others not just to share intelligence but also to intervene with force. The international community may have to intervene in the domestic affairs of others or to use force against states those acquiring WMDs. Humanitarian intervention and the use of force in the service of non-proliferation are uncomfortable for India which holds to a traditional and fairly orthodox position on sovereignty and which has been a critic of the non-proliferation order.

The Global Commons and India's National Security Strategy

How should India deal with each level of global commons challenges?

Level One: Natural Disasters

Level-one problems, acts of God, are intermittent. The probability of their occurrence at any given time is low, but it is certain that they will occur now and then over a long-period of time. When they occur, the damage they will

cause will be very large. Their size and scale make international cooperation vital. No country can deal with them on their own. India must therefore work steadily to construct and then maintain international structures and systems to forecast and forewarn and to manage international disasters.

Level Two: Climate Change, Deadly Diseases, and Global Economic Dislocation

Level-two problems—climate change, the spread of deadly diseases, and turbulence in the world economy—are chronic in the sense that they are the culmination of millions of small and big decisions over an extended period of time.

Climate change: Climate change, which has arisen from industrialisation and the rise of mass consumption societies, is a phenomenon that has taken three hundred years to occur, but is now a reality. Its consequences are probably already being felt in some measure and will intensify in the next three to five decades.

Climate change will have differential effects. There is widespread agreement that India and the developing countries in the global south will be more affected than the developed countries in the global north. India is amongst the twelve most vulnerable countries and is in the vicinity of other countries that will be most badly affected by climate change.[6] This is a stark, massive truth that the government has not shared with the public in sufficient measure. While India is embarked on policies that will try to reduce carbon dependence within the country—and even here its efforts are fairly timorous—without a global reduction in emissions the country will be hard pressed to cope with the effects of climate change. All of India's current security challenges, internal and external, will pale into comparison with the devastation that climate change will bring. Indeed, the viability of India as a democratic, united entity will be in doubt. This suggests that in the face of northern resistance and complacency, India will have to compromise on its stance if an international covenant on carbon emissions and on technology transfers is to be achieved. This may be a hard prescription to swallow, but it would seem to be inescapable.

Deadly diseases: The spread of deadly diseases is also the product of millions of decisions, private decisions as well as policy decisions. Personal habits and health choices as well as social policies combine to produce epidemics. Epidemics have always spread globally. The difference now is that the spread is much faster given modern transportation and the movement of people across continents and national boundaries. India will face a whole new barrage of diseases. Until a few years ago, dengue fever and chikungunya were relatively rare occurrences in India. They are now commonplace. One estimate is that India is home now to at least two dozen new infectious diseases and the resurgence of older ones that had been brought under

control.[7] Millions of people are affected each year by deadly diseases. Quite apart from the human misery that is caused by the diseases, there are the very material consequences: manhours lost in the workplace, rising private and public financial expenditures on health care, and the loss of human capital. In addition, massive epidemics could lead to large-scale social disruption and instabilities, with political ramifications.

With its tropical climate, high levels of poverty and illiteracy, poor public hygiene, and governance weaknesses, curbing deadly diseases and managing the outbreak of epidemics will be a huge challenge for India. A particular concern for the future is the growing problem of drug-resistant forms of various bacterial diseases. A number of diseases are now multi-drug resistant.[8] The Indian government must regulate the indiscriminate use of antibiotics which is causing antibiotic resistance to increase. While research on new drugs is proceeding, it may not be able to keep pace with the spread of antibiotic resistance. India must play its role in slowing the resistance to present-day antibiotics. This will entail a massive public campaign to educate the public which has become hooked on antibiotics. It will also require better vigilance over doctors and nurses, and, crucially, pharmacies which continue to sell antibiotics without prescriptions, more or less on demand. Among the steps India desperately needs to take is to increase international cooperation, to massively expand its National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), to improve local health surveillance systems, to train a whole new generation of epidemiologists, and to work closely with veterinary doctors and clinics (70% of the new diseases are zoonoses, that is, diseases transmitted from animals to humans, especially from mammals).[9] India also needs to step up efforts at international monitoring and collaboration. Dealing with the rise of deadly diseases is an area of national security strategy that is almost as vital as climate change. In both cases, going by the record so far, the Indian government's efforts have been timid at best, and time is running out.

Global economic dislocation: Turbulence in the world economy seems to be cyclical. The market produces extraordinary economic growth when its power is unleashed, but it also has a tendency to implode periodically. We seem to be in a phase of turbulence that could last a decade or more, just as in the 1920s and 1930s. India has not done badly in spite of the economic meltdown that occurred in the 1990s and then again in 2008. This does not mean that the Indian economy is immune to cyclical downturns. Indeed, as it integrates with the global economy, it is likely to be more susceptible to business cycles.

As for the global economy, here India can afford to take a harder stance, on issues such those tabled at the Doha round. India's continuing economic growth suggests that it can hold out. Having said that, it is evident there will be intense pressures on New Delhi. The northern countries are in recession, with high levels of unemployment and high fiscal deficits. They need to

restart their economies and cut their deficits. A Doha agreement and greater access to big, fast-growing economies is vital. At the same time, their leaders will be under pressure to save domestic jobs, and the temptation to turn protectionist will be strong. India will therefore face pressures on multilateral trade negotiations and on the opening up of its markets. It will also have to head off protectionism in the developed countries. On balance, though, in comparison to climate change, the position is likely reversed in terms of negotiating strength: at this moment, the developed countries probably need a deal more than India.

There are other world economic issues at stake. After the meltdown of 2008, there is concern that the global financial system—comprising the central banks, the banking system, investment houses, and business corporations—needs greater regulation. Here there does not seem to be a fundamental north-south divide. A healthy financial order is in everyone's interest. The G-20 and conclaves of central bankers are already at work to help coordinate policies and to evolve regulations which will increase transparency, reduce irresponsible financial transactions by the private sector, allow more timely interventions by national regulators, and enhance communication and cooperation amongst central banks. India is part of the G-20 and the consultations between central bankers and is playing a role in evolving a stronger regime. Obviously, Indian involvement should continue.

Level Three: Internal Disorders, Transnational Movements, Proliferation, the Militarisation of Outer Space, and Piracy on the High Seas

Key level-three problems—internal disorders spreading beyond national boundaries, religious extremism going global, WMD proliferation, the militarisation of outer space, and piracy—are also chronic in terms of their being long-term in gestation and prolongation. Problems such as these have arisen over time, perhaps several decades, and will persist well into the future.

Internal disorders: Internal disorders in Africa and Asia, the rise of Islamic extremism, and proliferation will continue to confront the world for as long as we can see into the future, that is, 15-20 years. India is not immediately affected by the events in Africa, but in the longer term there at least three concerns. First, to allow disorder in Africa (or anywhere else for that matter) to go unchecked is to undermine international society which, while it is conservative in the matter of intervention, cannot be oblivious to tyranny and violence for moral and political reasons—principally because to do so would be to encourage other potential tyrants and murderers. Second, disorder in Africa could affect India more directly over time. Failing states in Africa may provide havens for pirates, terrorist groups, religious extremists, and proliferators. Third, there are Indian interests in African countries that could be harmed. In particular, Africa is a growing market for Indian goods,

services, and investments. It is a rich source of strategic minerals and oil. It is also home to an Indian diaspora which has links to the mother country.

As India becomes more powerful, it needs to use its economic and political power to fashion global order and to foster stability and cooperation. In particular, internal disorders are related to what might be called a "revolution in human affairs", namely, a global rise in education, health, media access, awareness of rights, desire for the good life, sustained economic development, social and spatial mobility, and urbanisation, amongst other trends. Put differently, never before in human history have so many people been politically and socially mobilised. Governments can respond by democratising their political systems and improving standards of governance; or they can try to regulate and repress this upsurge. If they do the latter, disaffection will eventually increase, radicalisation of one sort of another will follow, and violence and disorder will result.

How should India respond to internal disorders in other places? This is a difficult area of policy. One answer to the problem of internal disorder is humanitarian intervention which has most recently been enshrined in the UN as "the responsibility to protect" or R2P. New Delhi, understandably, is cautious about R2P given its own internal disorders and its historic vulnerability to superior powers. Nonetheless, India must probably review its stance in the light of current challenges internationally. India was the object of non-proliferation controls, yet it has supported major portions of the non-proliferation order. It has been the object of sanctions, yet it has supported sanctions against others. Given India's size and growing power, its fear of international intervention against it is increasingly misplaced. Moreover, its willingness to address domestic grievances, however imperfectly, and its capacity for self correction means that the international community is unlikely to intervene in India's internal affairs.

India must therefore consider reviewing its extremely conservative stance on humanitarian intervention/peacekeeping. The point is not that India should become a unilateralist, imperialist power but rather that it be more open to and active in lending support to intervention in extreme cases of disorder. From a longer term, more preventive perspective, India must consider using various tools of democracy promotion and foreign aid to bring about greater political openness on the part of autocratic governments and to build greater governance capacities in weak states. How India uses its experiences with democracy and its economic surpluses to help and influence others and to promote more responsive governance is something its policy makers will have to seriously debate in the years ahead.[10]

Disorder in Asia is closer to home and even more dangerous, partly as a result of the proximity to India but also as a function of the conurbation of threats—internal governance collapse, religious extremism that is exported, and proliferation. Here Afghanistan and Pakistan are clearly the most

worrisome, with Pakistan even more momentous than Afghanistan given the presence of nuclear weapons in that country and its location next to India. But worrying also are Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia as also Central Asia in terms of internal governance and religious extremism. North Korea as a problem is closer to Pakistan, with the possibility of internal chaos twinned with nuclear weapons proliferation causing huge regional and continent-wide instabilities. The traffic between the two countries on nuclear weapons and missiles indicates that the problem of Pakistan and North Korea is not simply a matter of parallelism in terms of the challenges that they represent. The problem is also the nexus between the two states and their ability to proliferate to yet others such as Iran. Here a mixture of engagement with the governments of these countries, in spite of provocations, and international cooperation to curb extremism and proliferation are vital.

Transnational movements: The problem of religious extremism going global, particularly Islamic extremism, looks to be a long-term challenge. It has already and will continue to directly affect India.

With Pakistan next door, Islamic extremism is in the neighbourhood. Pakistan is both affected by extremism and plays a role in fostering it. While the government of Pakistan has taken steps to curb some part of Islamic extremism (in Swat, in particular), it has allowed extremists to flourish in others, particularly those elements that are fighting India. The selectivity of the Pakistani government means that extremism will continue to fester if not grow. Pakistani extremism is being helped by Islamic extremism, Shia and Sunni, from other parts of the world.

Islamic extremism comes in many forms, but it is the Al Qaeda form that is the most worrying. It is this decentralised and globalist form that has produced cells everywhere, even in the heart of Western Europe and North America. It could win converts in India too, but in any case it will work with anti-Indian extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as Bangladesh to attack India and to foment trouble amongst Indian Muslims.

India cannot deal with the problem purely domestically. Tracking extremist groups, penetrating them, capturing those plotting terrorism, and bringing to justice those who attack India and other countries requires global cooperation. It is clear that while cooperation with Western countries is vital, it is also crucial to reach out to Muslim countries that are both havens for and targets of extremism. Saudi Arabia, the Emirates in the Gulf, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt and other North African countries, sub-Saharan African countries, Central Asia, Bangladesh, and Pakistan are all key players in this regard. India cannot give up on dealing with any of these countries, not even Bangladesh and Pakistan, no matter how difficult it is to sustain cooperation with them. In short, dealing with Islamic extremism means long-term engagement with the Muslim world in a way that India has not done for decades if ever.

Proliferation: WMD proliferation has proceeded apace since the 1940s. Of greatest concern is nuclear proliferation. In every succeeding decade, there has been a new entrant to the club of nuclear powers—Britain and France in the 1950s, China in the 1960s, India and Israel in the 1970s, South Africa and Pakistan in the 1980s, and North Korea in the 1990s. Iran appears to be close to becoming a nuclear weapons power as we close out the first decade of the 2000s. At this rate, we can expect at least two new nuclear weapon states in the next 20 years. More worrying still is the prospect of non-state actors getting a nuclear bomb, even if it is only a dirty bomb, and actually detonating a device. It is no secret that various Islamic extremists including Al Qaeda are trying to get a device. India could be a target of an attack or threat of an attack. Various other countries might also be targets, including the US and other Western powers.

Apart from the immediate human catastrophe, there will be enormous social and political convulsions in any country that is subject to nuclear terrorism. In the case of a major economic power, the effects of the devastation on its economy and therefore the world economy are incalculable. The calls for retaliation, with nuclear weapons, will be enormous—and it will be a strong leader indeed who would refuse to retaliate. Howsoever irrational retaliation might seem, there is a strong possibility that it will be carried out. Those who urge retaliation might not be terribly patient or discriminating in terms of the target—they would argue that deterring future attacks requires swift and horrible revenge. Retaliation would only plunge the world further into crisis—human, military, diplomatic, political, and economic.

These are apocalyptic possibilities, and India cannot afford to ignore them. Obviously, the most important thing is to prevent nuclear materials or a ready-made nuclear device falling into the hands of extremists. Prevention can mean many things. At least one serious and disturbing possibility is pre-emption. If there is information that a terrorist strike is imminent, there will be the temptation to pre-empt if it can be established who is threatening to strike and where the group is based. A doctrine of pre-emption as much as retaliation could be extremely destabilising. A threatened state might simply issue a statement that it has reliable information that an extremist group is planning an attack, that Country X is 'host' to the group, and that therefore a pre-emptive strike against the host is justified. This might set in motion threats and counter-threats, particularly if the host happens to be a nuclear weapon state.

Clearly, India must work towards a strengthened non-proliferation order, with much better intelligence cooperation between many states. Such an order would entail a dialogue and, in the end, an understanding amongst all the nuclear weapon states about the kind of response they should individually and collectively mount to a nuclear terrorist attack. India should consider piloting through the United Nations a collective security pact on nuclear terrorism.

Cooperation amongst the existing nuclear weapon states will not be easy. There is a natural tendency on the part of every power to be extremely guarded about its nuclear weapons policies and its responses to an attack. In the case of China and Pakistan, there is the question of their role in proliferation. An attack by Islamic extremists will inevitably draw attention to Pakistan as a possible provider of components, plans, materials, and even a bomb. As a possible target of nuclear terrorism, India will have to think through its own response very carefully. Its thinking may have to be shared with other powers. At the very least, the issue of nuclear terrorism is one that India should discuss in its strategic dialogues and partnerships, of which it has several. At the moment, it is probably discussing everything except the response to nuclear terrorism.

India's entry into the non-proliferation order, particularly the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), takes on added significance from the point of view of tightening non-proliferation controls and greater access to proliferation information from a range of states who are members of the NSG. Indian policy makers must also give serious consideration to joining or being associated with the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in order to help deter and intercept WMD-related technologies that are being smuggled across the high seas.

Outer space militarisation: The outer space treaty ("Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies", 1967) bans the countries from placing nuclear weapons and other WMDs in outer space including on any celestial bodies. It also prohibits the testing of any weapons, the conduct of military maneuvers in space, and building military bases, installations, or fortifications on celestial bodies. It does not, however, rule out the stationing and use of conventional weapons in space. A Space Preservation Treaty would have banned conventional weapons. Unfortunately, it has not been signed by any governments, though it has found support amongst non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (colloquially known as the "Space Treaty", 1979), which bans any military uses of celestial bodies and commits signatories to seek permission from all states in the exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies, has also not found much support, especially among the space faring nations, including India.[11]

This should probably change. Even though it is fraught with complexities, India should consider reviving the idea of a complete and total ban on the militarisation of outer space at least in respect of positioning any conventional weapons in space or on celestial bodies. At the very least, India should support a reopening of the debate on a space preservation treaty. The issue of defensive weapons being placed in space will inevitably form a major part of the debate: it is this issue perhaps more than any other that complicates

the outlawing of conventional weapons in space. India has joined the US in supporting the development of missile defence. Missile defence potentially includes space-based systems—satellites but also weapons. While there is a case to be made for missile defence (particularly against unauthorised or accidental launches of WMDs), there is also a case against it on the grounds that it can undermine deterrence. India will have to consider the balance between the benefits from missile defence and the costs to deterrence stability from the deployment of such systems. As things stand, the technical difficulties and financial costs of constructing an effective missile defence system are enormous, especially in space. It may therefore be possible to get the major military powers to agree to prohibit missile defence in space, at a minimum—though it must be admitted that this would be no easy sell.

High-seas piracy: As things stand, the freedom of the high seas is under the greatest danger from pirates and from states that allow pirates to operate from their soil. India is already one of the most active countries in combating piracy.

In recent years, the Indian Navy has come to the rescue of ships from the Asia-Pacific to the Indian Ocean. As the biggest regional navy in the Indian Ocean region, India has the capacity to lead the fight against pirates. Over the past 20 years, it has done a lot to build links with other navies, from Japan at one end to the Gulf at the other. It can and should do more to reach out to the Indian Ocean island states, the Gulf, and the east African littoral to collaborate with them against piracy. In addition, the South African navy, the continent's largest, should be a natural ally.

Naval cooperation with the US is deepening across the board, but at this juncture is perhaps most crucial in respect of tackling piracy. New Delhi should also consider engaging the European Union (EU) over the issue. If the EU is interested in playing a greater international role, ensuring the safety of the oceans is an issue that fits well with its internationalist and global good citizenship vision. The major EU states may have to think once again of sending their navies far from European shores. The Indian Navy and the European navies should begin a process of consultation and military exercising.

India-China naval cooperation is an idea whose time has come. It is inevitable that the Chinese navy will enter the Indian Ocean in the coming years. India must consider working with it to control piracy. This is in China's interest too since a large portion of its international trade plies the Indian Ocean. An incidental benefit of engaging the Chinese navy is to begin the process of confidence building with it. The navies of India and China will expand in strength and reach. They will therefore encounter each other on the high seas. Avoiding confrontation will be important, even as they cooperate. The two powers should therefore consider signing an "Incidents at Sea" agreement of the kind that the US and Soviet Union signed in May 1972.

Enlarging the scope of naval partnership with regional navies to increase inter-operability, to share intelligence, and to expand coverage of the ocean against piracy are just some of the measures India must take. Improving its own naval capabilities, quantitatively and qualitatively, is also a vital necessity. The Indian navy has, for far too long, been relatively neglected amongst the three services. As India becomes an Asian power, it can no longer afford to ignore its navy. Diplomatically, India should do more to persuade littoral states, particularly in the Horn of Africa and east Africa, to toughen their policies on piracy. It should also be prepared to help build the naval capabilities of the littoral states. India has the ship building technology to build fast, light vessels that can protect coastal areas. These could be sold to littoral countries, particularly in east Africa. New Delhi might also seek naval ports of call if not more permanent facilities on a regular basis along the east African littoral in countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Madagascar.

Policy Recommendations

This paper has made some suggestions specific to various global commons challenges. In summary, these are:

1. cooperate on global early warning and disaster management structures and processes
2. reduce carbon emissions domestically and compromise with the Western powers on an international climate change treaty
3. aggressively regulate use of antibiotics and mount a massive public education campaign on the responsible use of antibiotics
4. expand the National Centre for Disease Control and work more closely with veterinarians to control zoonoses
5. conclude the Doha round of trade negotiations but bargain hard with the Western powers
6. work with Western governments to stem protectionist forces in the developed economies
7. use the G-20 and other institutions such as the conclave of central bankers to improve the regulation of the global financial order
8. review India's policy on humanitarian intervention/international peacekeeping, democracy promotion, and foreign aid in the service of building global political stability
9. improve intelligence capabilities to keep track of transnational extremist movements
10. engage the Islamic world more widely and work more closely with the governments of Muslim countries to check the influence of religious extremists
11. enlarge intelligence cooperation on non-proliferation and promote the idea of a collective security pact on nuclear terrorism

12. cooperate with the US in pushing India's membership of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG)

13. review the decision not to join the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

14. re-open the issue of a ban on conventional and defensive weapons in outer space

15. deepen cooperation with Indian Ocean, East African, and Gulf states against piracy; expand cooperation with the US, South Africa, and the EU on maritime security; open a dialogue with China on maritime security and a bilateral "Incidents at Sea" agreement

16. improve India's naval capabilities and improve the naval capabilities of Indian Ocean and East African states

In closing, what should the Indian government be doing to increase its ability to deal with global commons challenges to national security? The following initiatives suggest themselves.

First, India needs to build capacity to think about the link between the global commons and national security strategy. This means much greater expertise and staffing in the Ministry of External Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the National Security Council, and various other ministries including Finance and Environment, amongst others. In the Ministry of External Affairs, the government should restructure the present regional desks into functional ones dealing with issue areas rather than geographical areas. At a minimum, External Affairs needs more "issue" desks. It also needs more officers, perhaps three times as many as the 600 officers presently staffing its precincts.

Second, India's policy-making apparatus needs better coordination. In particular, the ministries involved in the various global commons issues need to be included in national security discussions within the government.

Third, the government should consider involving think tanks and other non-governmental organisations in decision making related to the global commons. This is happening in areas such as climate change and international trade. It needs to happen on a larger scale. Think tanks in turn need to be more multidisciplinary and to increase expertise and staff strength. They also need to communicate more to the general public. Indian think tanks are obsessed with their impact on the government. In a democratic society, think tanks need to consider how to keep the general public better informed— indeed, this may be the more important task. Think tanks also need to reach out to both national and state politicians, the media including the Indian language media, and non-governmental organisations.

Fourth, India must work more closely with the big powers, particularly the US, China, the EU, Russia, and Japan. It must also coordinate better with various rising powers, especially Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey as well as various middle powers including Australia, Canada, Malaysia, and Singapore. The G-20 is a vital forum for

coordination with a range of states, and Indian diplomacy should be directed towards supporting it—even at the risk of alienating those who are not members.

Fifth, India must work with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) when it can but should not be tied to NAM positions when its interests diverge. It is proper for India to try to represent the interests of those who are not sufficiently heard and who are not powerful. On the other hand, interests will differ, and India must be prepared to chart a course that is commensurate with its own interests and its understanding of more cosmopolitan goals. India does need the support of the NAM states to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and so there is an incentive to side with the Movement in a tactical sense. However, it is not likely that India (or any other state) will be made a permanent member in the next decade given regional and other objections to reform of the Council. To play to the NAM gallery in search of votes is therefore largely a waste of diplomatic time and resources. When India is powerful and consequential enough to be voted in, it will be made a member expeditiously enough.

Sixth, India needs to take the initiative in dealing with global commons issues. The G-20 and UN are key vehicles for dealing with these issues. While India has a respectable record in promoting world order, over the past two decades India has been rather more reactive than creative. New Delhi needs to show more leadership. The G-20 and UN are key vehicles for India's global commons initiatives. The former has the virtue of bringing together the twenty most influential powers without whose cooperation very little can be achieved. The latter has the virtue of bringing together all states and therefore is vital if there is to be wider acceptance of multilateral efforts to deal with the global commons. At the very least India needs to give greater attention to both institutions. It should be at the forefront of trying to make the G-20 an effective, coherent, lasting body. It should also try to revitalize the UN. India must join the effort to bring about administrative reforms in the UN. It must also consider substantially increasing its contribution to the UN. Its assessed contribution is a mere 0.53% while India's share of global GDP is around 5%. India's contribution should be closer in line with its global economic strength.[12]

Seventh, since global commons issues increasingly involve a range of non-governmental actors—as agents of threats or as partners in managing various threats—Indian diplomacy must reach out to these entities in a way that it has traditionally never done. India has generally been suspicious or contemptuous of non-governmental actors. This is a shortsighted policy and cannot be sustained in a globalised world in which there are so many agents bearing on issues. At one level, India's public diplomacy must be massively increased in order to reach out to these entities, to keep them better informed of Indian policy, and to enlist their support—or, at any rate, to stop them

opposing Indian policies. At another level, non-governmental actors are sources of information and ideas and can enlarge policy thinking. International accords, more and more, will be made around nodes and networks which will have around them states and non-state actors (businesses, NGOs, religious organisations, the media, and so on). The UN, various other multilateral and global agencies, and governments already invite the views of a range of stakeholders. There is little prospect that the transnationalisation of global governance will reduce. It will grow. The Indian government simply has to acknowledge this reality and learn to use it to best advantage rather than fear it or be dismissive of it, as is largely the case today.

Finally, India must recognize that global commons challenge are often related in vicious cycles and that action on one will therefore contribute to reducing the probability or intensity of other challenges. At the very least, natural disasters, climate change, the outbreak of epidemics, global economic stability, internal political stability, extremism, and perhaps even proliferation are related. Indian policies must take into account these "negative synergies". The costs of inaction in any one area may therefore be much greater than is usually reckoned.

<div align="center">NOTES</div>

1. A number of recent works on security and strategy pay much greater attention to issues related to the global commons. See in particular Kapil Kak, *Comprehensive Security for an Emerging India* (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2010), Rajiv Kumar and Santosh Kumar, *In the National Interest: A Strategic Foreign Policy for India* (New Delhi: Business Standard Books, 2010), and Rajiv Kumar and Raja Menon, *The Long View from Delhi: To Define the Indian Grand Strategy for Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2010).
2. The term grand strategy was coined by the British strategist, B.H. Liddell Hart.
3. On "responsibility to protect", see "The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty," December 2001, available at http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#chapter_2 [accessed on May 24, 2011].
4. Kenneth N. Waltz has most famously argued that nuclear proliferation is a stabilising force in international relations. See his defence of this proposition in Kenneth N. Waltz and Scott D. Sagan, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, Second Edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002).
5. On the notion of a nuclear winter, see Paul Ehrlich, Carl Sagan, and Donald Kennedy, *The Cold and the Dark: The World After Nuclear War* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984).
6. The World Bank, *Convenient Solutions to an Inconvenient Truth: Ecosystem-based Approaches to Climate Change*, June 2009, Washington, D.C., p. 19, available at http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/Convenient_Solutions_to_an_Inconvenient_Truth.pdf [accessed on May 24, 2011]. India is in a list of the twelve most affected countries along with Bangladesh and China in its immediate vicinity.
7. See the interview with India's joint director of the zoonose division of the new National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), New Delhi, on the emergence of new diseases: "India Upgrades Its Disease Surveillance Network, *Nature News,* August

17, 2009, available at http://www.nature.com/news/2009/090817/full/news.2009.825.html [accessed on May 24, 2011].

8. "New Multidrug-Resistant Enterobacteria Spreads from India, Pakistan to United Kingdom," *Infectious Diseases* News, August 111, 2010, available at http://www.infectiousdiseasenews.com/article.aspx?id=67601 [accessed on May 24, 2011]. Indian authorities have officially has rejected the contention that a new multidrug resistant bacteria originated in India. The larger issue though is scarcely in doubt, namely, the indiscriminate and improper use of antibiotics on a massive scale in India leading to antibiotic resistance. Of course, India is not the only country where antibiotics are being improperly used. Hence the need for greater international cooperation on the issue.

9. "India Upgrades its Disease Surveillance Network," *Nature News*, August 17, 2009, available at http://www.nature.com/news/2009/090817/full/news.2009.825.html [accessed on May 24, 2011].

10. On India's role in democracy promotion thus far, see Jan Cartwright, "India's Regional and International Support for Democracy: Rhetoric or Reality?" *Asian Survey*, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 403-28, C. Raja Mohan, "Balancing Interests and Values: India's Struggle with Democracy Promotion," *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 30, no. 3, Summer 2007, pp. 99-115, and S.D. Muni, *India's Foreign Policy: The Democracy Dimension* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2009). On India's soft power, see also Jacques E.C. Hymans, "India's Soft Power and Vulnerability," *India Review* Vol. 8, No. 3 (Aug. 2009), pp. 234-265.

11. India signed the Outer Space Treaty in 1967 but took fifteen years to ratify it, being one of the last countries to do so. Only China took longer.

12. Irwin Arieff, "Need a Job? UN Payroll Is a Bright Spot in Bleak Times," *The InterDependent*, available at http://www.theinterdependent.com/100303/need-a-job-un-payroll-is-a-bright-spot-in-bleak-times [accessed on May 25, 2011] on the Indian contribution. Arieff notes that China's contribution is 3.25 per cent and Brazil's is 1.6 per cent. The US pays 22 per cent of the UN's budget. For the view that contributing more to the UN is not in India's interest see Pragmatic Euphony, "Why Should India Fund the UN?" *Pragati: The National Interest Review*, available at http://pragmatic.nationalinterest.in/2008/11/14/why-should-india-fund-the-un/ [accessed on May 25, 2011].

CHAPTER 4

Grand Ideology, Bland Strategy*

Rahul Sagar

As its economic power, military strength, and cultural influence expands, India draws ever closer to becoming a leading player in world politics. Yet relatively little is known about what Indians take to be the nature of international politics, and correspondingly, how their power and influence should be used. This article sheds light on both of these topics. Put briefly, it argues that on the whole Indians believe that they are likely to be best served by an international order characterised by peace, stability, and liberal norms, which will allow India to focus on economic development and political consolidation. However, if this broadly peaceful and orderly quest for prosperity and status encounters aggression or humiliation, then it is likely that calls to enhance India's military power, which are relatively muted at present, will grow louder.

Four Visions

India's foreign policy is informed by four competing visions of India's place in the international system: *moralists* wish for India to serve as an exemplar of principled action; *Hindu nationalists* want Indians to act as muscular defenders of Hindu civilisation; *strategists* advocate cultivating state power by developing strategic capabilities; and *liberals* seek prosperity and peace through increasing trade and interdependence. These currents in Indian political thought are better described as 'visions' rather than 'schools' or 'ideologies,' because the objectives they commend are often elucidated as images or ideals, rather than as conclusions derived from sustained arguments about the nature of international politics. Inevitably there are points of contact and overlap. Nonetheless, one can discern four distinct, typically competing, objectives being commended: moral exceptionalism, martial vigour, state power, and wealth.

Moralism

The view that India should serve as a moral exemplar in world politics can be traced to the revolutionary character of India's freedom movement, whose protagonists saw themselves as undertaking a doubly moral endeavour: they were not only fighting on behalf of human freedom and dignity, but also using means that were equally profound. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, translated this urge to display exceptionalism into policy. Nehru deeply believed that India ought to set an example to the world, but he rejected the notion that this required adopting the doctrine of nonviolence called for by Mahatma Gandhi. Rather, India ought to leave its mark, Nehru argued, by setting the standard for peaceful and cooperative behaviour. To him, this meant that India ought to take minimal recourse to the traditional practices of international politics: the external and internal balancing of power. Since self-determination had been the goal of the freedom movement, Nehru argued that India should not forsake its freedom of action, particularly its capacity to speak truth to power, by entering into alliances which would demand adherence to uniform policies. Therefore Nehru recommended a policy of non-alignment, which sought to maximise India's autonomy by eschewing an explicit alliance with either the West or the Soviet bloc. "Inevitably it means that to some extent we have to plough a lonely furrow," Nehru said of his policy; "nonetheless that is the only honourable and right position for us to take." Nothing "could be more injurious to us," he asserted, "than to become camp followers in the hope that some crumbs might fall from their table." The unusualness of Nehru's stance was compounded by an unwillingness to rapidly develop India's own military resources. This stance was rooted in Nehru's unhappiness with the notion that peace must be sought through strength. "It is true that nobody will listen to you if you are weak," he said, "but, as you develop your strength to negotiate, unfortunately the other party also goes on developing its strength." India's peaceful ouster of the British had challenged this exhausting dynamic, Nehru argued, by demonstrating that "physical force need not necessarily be the arbiter of man's destiny." It is this line of thinking that has made argumentative diplomacy the leitmotif of Indian conduct.

If sustained, the desire to act in a 'moral' fashion has two implications for future Indian conduct. First, India will continue to be sceptical of alliances that threaten its freedom to act and speak as it wishes. A recent example of this independent streak is the conflict between India and the US over Iran. Even though it shares America's concern about Iranian nuclear weapons and has its doubts about Iran's reliability as an energy supplier, India has gone out of its way to remind the US that it will pursue an 'independent' policy vis-à-vis Iran. Another implication of the desire to act in a principled fashion will be India's continued leadership of coalitions endeavouring to ensure that international regimes take account of the interests of the developing world.

India's role in the debate over the principles that should govern the distribution of costs and responsibilities for reducing environmental damage provides a good example here. India views proposals by developed countries for mandatory universal caps on greenhouse gas emissions as 'green imperialism' that maintains current inequalities in absolute emissions, while simultaneously denying developing countries the patterns of industrialisation and consumption through which developed countries historically modernised. Hence, it has argued that a convergence over time of per capita emissions can be the only fair objective of international environmental regimes.

It is increasingly unclear though whether India's conduct will in fact continue to be shaped by Nehru's vision. Though his proud defence of Indian exceptionalism still reverberates in Indian ears, his policies face a growing chorus of criticism from those who wish to see India adopt stances that correspond to its cultural, military, and economic potential. These critiques, which are outlined below, have already begun to influence policy and portend further shifts in the role India conceives for itself in international affairs.

Hindu Nationalism

The oldest and most trenchant critique of the Nehruvian vision is that of the Hindu nationalists, who until the late 1980s were restricted to the margins of Indian politics, but have since come to lead one of the country's two major political coalitions. The Hindu nationalists are driven by contradictory impulses of pride and shame: pride in what they consider the self-evident importance of Indian civilisation, and shame at its past subjugation by Muslim and British invaders, and at its continuing weak response to security threats. From this potent mix of motives comes a burning desire to resurrect the glory of India and to prevent the recurrence of humiliation. The only way to accomplish this, the Hindu nationalists argue, is to reform Indian society in two ways. First, Indians need to be taught that conflict is inherent in international politics, because "the spirit of world domination" is ineradicable so long as humankind is divided into nations. Indians must, therefore, appreciate that "whatever the strategy, the basic rule of relations between nations is the law of the jungle—the strong feeding upon the weak and getting stronger." Second, in order to survive in such an environment, India needs to cultivate national strength. While the Hindu nationalists concede that attaining such strength requires paying attention to the material basis of state power, including military and economic development, they insist that its ultimate foundation lies in the unity and muscularity of Hindu society, which requires instilling a sense of "heroism, manliness and other noble virtues" in the Indian populace.

Although one should not underestimate the organisational strength and shrewdness of the Hindu nationalists, their world-view has decidedly limited

purchase on the Indian mind at present. This is attributable, in part, to the continuing appeal of India's syncretic traditions, and to a deeply ingrained cultural preference for diffusing conflict through accommodation. Significant political obstacles also play an important role. The heterogeneity of Indian society, and the fractious identity politics this generates, as well as the federal nature of India's political system, undercuts the electoral appeal of the Hindu nationalist agenda. The future does not bode well either for the Hindu nationalist movement. Its leaders recognise that India cannot equal America and China without embracing economic liberalisation and globalisation. However, the materialism and individualism these processes foster challenge the self-sacrificing communitarian ethic espoused by the Hindu nationalists, undermining their efforts to create a 'virtuous' Hindu society. Indeed, it is already possible to discern India's rapidly expanding middle class, long considered the BJP's natural constituency, increasingly displaying nationalist sentiments that are symbolic and transient rather than substantive and sustained: the kind expressed by jingoistic sloganeering rather than genuine self-sacrifice.

Realism

The second major critique of the Nehruvian ideal of principled action has emerged from the members of India's nascent strategic community. Not unlike the Hindu nationalists, India's strategic analysts view international politics as a domain where national power is the ultimate arbiter of national fate. But they take a very different view of what constitutes national power. In contrast to Hindu nationalists, who emphasise the contribution of a unified and muscular civil society to national strength, the strategic community focuses primarily on military and economic aspects of state power. Indeed, they usually view Hindu nationalism as an enervating presence in Indian politics, since pogroms organised by its militant element compel the state to address internal rather than external challenges to security and order. Furthermore, since Indian strategists appreciate the direct correlation between economic and military capabilities, they favour rapid modernisation, unlike the Hindu nationalists, who are suspicious of modernity.

The Indian strategic community displays consensus on two important precepts. First, there is unanimity that India needs to practice what has been described as statecraft "characterised by unsentimental, quick-thinking and fleet-footed foreign and military policies able to exploit opportunities and to register tangible, not abstract, gains for the country." This view is a reaction to India's hitherto ambiguous answer to the existential crisis provoked by Nehru's counsel—namely, should it act morally or strategically in the international arena? To the strategists, the answer is clear; but Indians, they complain, fail to recognise that "between high idealism and the hard stone of a pursuit of national goals what will splinter is always this 'moral aspect'."

The strategic community's recognition of force as the ultimate arbiter of international politics also leads it to promote the development of India's economic and military capabilities, especially a credible second-strike nuclear capability and a comprehensive array of conventional military forces, including the capacity to project force beyond the subcontinent.

The strategic community faces its greatest challenge in propagating this worldview among India's political elite, whose general lack of interest in strategic affairs has been widely noted. This is not to suggest that there is no evidence of strategic planning in India; a degree of planning has been undertaken with respect to the development of nuclear and missile technologies in particular. However, there is an undeniable sense in which the operative mentality in general has been that of *jugaad*, a colloquial Indian term that roughly translates as 'a quick fix' or 'a work-around'. This mentality can be traced to India's uneven encounter with modernity: the forms and institutions have been imported or grafted on, but the spirit of modernity, an innate appreciation of rational thinking, has not taken root. For example, a National Security Council and National Security Advisory Board have been created on the backs of grand-sounding public declarations. But in practice these institutions have been widely criticised for being poorly conceived, inadequately staffed, and excluded from the decision-making process. Unfortunately for the members of India's strategic community, India's political elite do not feel compelled to change their ways because they believe that the country is powerful enough to ward off the worst-case scenario of invasion and conquest for the foreseeable future. Indeed, the tendency toward ad hocism has been made worse in recent years by the arrival of coalition politics, which has encouraged the adoption of policies directed at the exigencies of electoral competition. This tendency can arguably only be altered by the experience of mass suffering which alone can produce a nationwide constituency for strategic planning.

Liberalism

The third, and most recent, challenge to the Nehruvian vision of principled action has come from liberals disenchanted with India's circumstances. By the early 1990s, they argue, it had become clear that India was unable to cultivate either the external support or the internal resources required to undertake principled action. The inadequacy of its internal resources derived from its economic policies, which had discouraged trade, stifled private enterprise, and channelled state resources into unproductive public enterprises. As a consequence, far from serving as a moral exemplar, by the late 1980s India was experiencing an extended "crisis of governability" as economic stagnation undermined human development, devastated government finances, and fuelled political unrest. Nor could India hope to address these problems in peace and tranquillity, much less receive foreign

assistance to do so, since its past emphasis on principled behaviour had precluded the development of diplomatic and economic relations based on common interests. The pursuit of autonomy via non-alignment was held especially responsible for this outcome. It was viewed as having promoted disengagement, since collaborative agreements were frequently seen as potential threats to India's sovereignty. The same postcolonial prickliness could also be seen in India's efforts to promote 'Third World' solidarity, which provided little material benefit and fostered a confrontational attitude vis-à-vis the West. In both instances, opportunities for profitable cooperation were lost as a result of policies seen in retrospect as symbols of excessive insecurity.

Liberals argue that two lessons should be learned from this disappointing precedent. The first is that power, rather than moral prestige, ought to be the objective of state action, since it is the "argument of power," rather than the "power of the argument," that is truly efficacious in international politics. Nor should the state's focus be on the cultivation of military power. This is not only inappropriate, in the light of India's acute developmental needs, but also unnecessary, since the interdependence fostered by globalisation rewards economic power and makes violent conflict unprofitable. The second lesson is that India's policies should be informed by pragmatism, rather than abstract principles. In particular, when ideal circumstances are unavailable, cooperation should proceed on the basis of compromise, because material outcomes are more important than rigid adherence to principles.

Should the liberal vision prevail, over the coming decades India stands to become a great commercial power once again—a *bania* superpower (*bania* being the moniker of the Indian community occupied with trade or commerce). Its external policies will, correspondingly, be directed primarily towards ensuring access to resources and markets. India's formative experiences, as well as its steadily deepening social links with the West in particular, will make it unwilling to use force to obtain these objectives, unlike the great commercial powers of the past. Instead, it will strongly favour the development of multilateral regimes to regulate international trade and politics, and provide orderly and fair mechanisms of conflict resolution. The populist character of India's democracy as well as its enormous developmental needs make it likely that trade surpluses will be invested in social, rather than military, programs. A prosperous India, in this respect, will more likely resemble postwar Europe than either contemporary America or China. It will have little inclination to expand geographically and its influence will primarily be commercial and cultural.

Which Ideology will Prevail?

On the whole, it is unlikely that any one of the visions outlined above will monopolise the world-view of Indians in the twenty-first century, because they represent ideas about politics that wax and wane with circumstances.

What matters therefore is their comparative influence in any given period. On this count the playing field appears far from level. There is growing consensus in India that the pursuit of moral prestige has proved unrewarding. The demanding vision of the Hindu nationalists enjoys only limited public support, and India's political elite display little willingness to pursue the tough policies advocated by the country's strategic community. Increasingly, therefore, it appears that India will pursue prosperity and peace, a strategy that promises to transform it into a great commercial power. Such a development would have positive implications for India and the international system. It would satisfy India's desire for recognition and create new constituencies for peace and stability in Asia and beyond, founded on the prospect of mutually beneficial trade and investment.

But it is not a given that the liberal vision will ultimately prevail. As a vast majority of Indians share the liberals' deep sense of scorn for India's past economic performance, the implementation of economic reforms has broad, if unorganised, support. This gradual embrace of the market economy, which began in 1991, now promises to transform India into one of the three largest economies in the world over the course of the twenty-first century. But fearsome challenges lurk under the surface of India's economic resurgence. Refracted through the prism of identity politics, pent-up needs and desires have begun to produce an impatient and increasingly rapacious democratic politics. The political class emerging from this churn revels in a fiscally lethal form of competitive populism and a constitutionally lethal politicisation of public institutions. It is also increasingly criminal in nature, with approximately a quarter of the elected members of the national legislature facing serious criminal charges. The most immediate consequence of these trends has been a steady deterioration in the rule of law, which ultimately threatens economic stability (not unlike Russia in the late 1990s).

Furthermore, while India's rise will primarily be a consequence of internal, rather than external, developments, it would be naive to imagine that the process will not invite the jealousy of current and rising powers. Consequently, much depends on whether America and China are willing to countenance that rise. An effort on their part to contain India will have significant intellectual and cultural consequences. The liberal vision lays its faith in the idea that compromise is usually preferable to conflict, a tenet undergirded in this case by India's cultural proclivity for peaceful conflict resolution. But if it becomes apparent to Indians that compromises merely disguise the threat of violence and are likely to further entrench inequalities in status, a deep disillusionment will set in. It would confirm what the Hindu nationalists and the strategists yearn for Indians to comprehend—that domination, rather than cooperation, must be the ultimate objective of a state seeking greatness.

Grand or Bland?

It is one thing to argue that ideas inform interests. It is quite another to argue that interests direct action. In this essay I have focused on the former. I have tried to identify the competing ideologies that instruct Indians on what their interests are—morality, pride, power, and wealth. However, what I have not discussed is whether any of these ideologies actually influences or directs Indian foreign policy. My own view is that the execution of India's foreign policy is so haphazard and hesitant as to make it nearly impossible to attribute it to some clearly thought out ideological stance. Thus today we have a government that responds to border incursions by saying that it wants to engage in constructive economic diplomacy, but then cannot establish a workable visa regime that would allow scholars and students from China to visit India. Prior to this we had a government that promised to display vigour, but did little when IC 814 was taken to Kandahar and even less when the entire political leadership was nearly decapitated by an attack on Parliament.

The point I want to close with then is that though India may be self-sufficient in the kinds of ideology that inform grand strategy, there is little reason to believe that *any* ideology will meaningfully affect policy in the near term. The obstacle between ideas and outcomes remains—'the system'. *Kya kare system he aisa hai* is the slogan of the day. I am not in a position to say what will make the system 'work'. Perhaps the answer will come through a natural process of political evolution. More likely though, if world history teaches anything, is that 'the system' will have to be destroyed by war, humiliation, and bloodshed before it can be rebuilt. Until such time, I fear, the cultivation of a grand ideology will be accompanied by little more than bland strategy.

CHAPTER 5

Reforming the Military Institutions
and National Security Strategy

Rumel Dahiya

India simultaneously is entering a period of strategic opportunity but is also facing tremendous challenges that include terrorism and internal unrest, that threaten its vital self interests such as a peaceful neighbourhood. It has to cope with the prevailing uncertainty, the global shift in balance of power and persistent external threats. More importantly, despite overall impressive economic growth, the domestic threats and challenges have the potential of hampering the rise of India. As it grows economically and gains greater geopolitical heft it will be required to play a more proactive role on the world stage. It is incumbent upon the leadership therefore to clearly articulate India's national vision, interests and objectives to the world and ensure a synergy in all the instruments of our national power to achieve the desired ends.

India needs a National Security Strategy (NSS) that takes care of present day security threats and the potential challenges to national security, and safeguard national interests. The strategy is all about the way the country will use the means available to it to exercise control over a set of circumstances to achieve its objectives. Institutions play an important role in the formulation and execution of strategy. India has no clearly articulated NSS, and this is mainly an outcome of institutional weakness. This weakness has also resulted in sub-optimal military effectiveness.

Military institutions influence military effectiveness which in turn affects the outcome of security goals set by the NSS. Besides, by ensuring efficient utilisation of resources without compromising the quality of military power, institutions can help to ensure the availability of resources for meeting social goals set by the NSS. Thus, reforming military institutions is necessary for the success of the NSS. Institutional behaviour is not easy to change but it is essential for India's national security.

This paper begins by attempting to define national security and by examining the concept of national security, and then analyses the concept of military effectiveness and the role of institutions in ensuring that. It then

identifies India's national interests, and the existing threats and potential challenges to the nation's security which must be addressed. In the next section, present institutional shortcomings and their indicators are enumerated before recommending the reforms that must be undertaken to ensure national security. The paper ends by highlighting impediments to change.

Definition and Concept of National Security

There is no single universally acceptable definition of the term national security. A simple yet broad definition is the 'quality or state of being secure from danger or anxiety'. For social scientists it means 'The ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats'. The noted American diplomat and scholar George Kennan provided a crisp definition of national security, in the American context, as: "the continued ability of this country to pursue internal life without serious interference." The American journalist Walter Lippman defined it thus: "A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war." The British political scientist Barry Buzan defines security as: "the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile."

These definitions would highlight the difficulty of defining the concept of national security. It remains a weakly conceptualised, ambiguously defined, but politically powerful concept.

The scope of national security has expanded over time. Presently, the concept of national security includes all those aspects which are critical for a nation's survival, growth and well being and for ensuring which, a country is prepared to use all the tools of diplomacy, persuasion, coercion, threat or force. Military security, an essential element of national security, is a function of military effectiveness, which itself stems from military doctrines, capability and readiness in terms of cost and effort.

Concept of Military Effectiveness

The traditional instrument available to a sovereign state to provide security for its citizens is its armed forces. They protect the territorial integrity of the nation and its way of life, provide muscle to the nation's diplomacy and safeguard its economic interests in a hostile external environment. To be able to perform its assigned role the military has to be effective.

Military effectiveness is defined in *Creating Military Power—The Sources of Military Effectiveness*,[1] as, "the capacity to create military power from a state's basic resources in wealth, technology, population size and human capital". It can be assessed by four central attributes:

- Integration—i.e. synergies within and across levels of military activity and avoidance of counterproductive actions;
- Responsiveness—i.e. ability to tailor military activity to the state's own resources, environmental constraints (both internal and external) and opportunities, and in accordance with its adversary's strengths and weaknesses;
- Skill—ability to assimilate new technologies or to adapt to sophisticated doctrine and demanding forms of military organisation, including the capacity to ensure that military personnel are motivated and prepared to execute tasks on the battlefield; and
- Quality—or the capacity of the state to supply itself with essential weapons and equipment at economical rates.

The more a military exhibits these attributes, the more capable it is of generating military power.

In a nutshell, how well a state uses the resources available to it determines its military's effectiveness. Military institutions are involved in mobilising resources and determining their use for generating maximum military effectiveness. Effectiveness in a very large measure is a function of the robustness and efficiency of institutions and its purpose is to serve national interests.

India's National Security Interests

Let us begin by recapitulating the concept of national interests and then define India's major national security interests that need to be protected. The four basic national interests of nation states are the defence of the homeland, economic well being, the creation of a favourable world order or external environment, and the promotion of national values. These national interests are generally graded on a three or four-tiered scale of priorities or intensities as survival and/or vital, major and peripheral interests. The most basic and abiding national interest is the survival of the state. All other interests can and do change in intensity or priority from time to time.

The sub-divisions tend to be judgmental. I will only cover India's vital interests here. In my view, India's first order national interests include: security of India's sovereign territory with its values intact (survival of the state); internal stability and security; elimination of terrorism and violent religious extremism; creation of a secure environment conducive for sustained economic development; access to all sources of energy; free flow of commerce; stable international economic order and financial systems; non-discriminatory access to scientific and technological progress; peace and stability in its immediate neighbourhood and the Indian Ocean region, and; autonomy in decision-making.

In security terms, our vital national interests are: protection of our

sovereignty and territorial integrity; the protection of the lives and property of our citizens against external aggression and terrorism; deterrence against the use or threat of use of weapons of mass destruction; preventing establishment of foreign military presence and ensuring stability in our immediate neighbourhood and finally; security of sea lanes of communication. It is in the context of these interests that threats and challenges to India's security are examined.

Threats and Challenges and India's National Security Strategy

Since a National Security Strategy must take care of present day security threats and potential challenges, it is necessary to identify these.[2]

(a) Current Threats/Challenges

(i) *Pakistan:* Pakistan is the immediate source of direct threat. Keeping in mind the India-centricity of Pakistan's foreign and security policy it would be safe to presume that proxy war, will continue to be the corner stone of its India containment strategy. This threat is exacerbated by the US need to accommodate Pakistan because of its dependence on the country to prosecute the war in Afghanistan and continued support from China. Its nuclear capability and calculated low threshold for use of nuclear weapons continue to limit India's options in dealing with it.

(ii) *China*: In the near term, the threat from China exists in terms of possible border tensions, diplomatic spats and the incremental expansion of China's footprint in our immediate neighbourhood. A clash of interest can also occur in the IOR as China increases its forays or questions growing Indian power and legitimacy. Moreover, cyber and space based threats are both near and real.

(iii) *Internal Threats:* Internal security is the greatest challenge facing India today. Festering insurgencies in the Northeast and J&K, and left wing extremism make India look like a state under siege. The reasons for these developments are complex and can be traced to the cumulative outcome of Pakistan's use of terror as a weapon, poor governance, the criminalisation and communalisation of politics, increasing social awareness and failure of the state to provide economic benefits to the deprived. Networking of externally inspired and supported terrorism with domestic terror groups makes this threat even more potent.

(b) Medium and Long Term Threats/Challenges

(i) *China:* China's capabilities are growing at a rapid pace and the difference in its comprehensive national power vis-à-vis India is increasing. China's intentions are, however, not clear and we have to consider the possibility of a negative change in the Chinese posture. Its posture could

change in the event of a political upheaval in that country or if the power asymmetry increases dramatically. Despite growing economic interaction and commonality of interests on certain global issues such as climate change, there are a large number of issues between the two countries, which if not managed with prudence, could lead to conflict and more importantly, confrontation. Conventional military conflict between India and China is by no means inevitable. Although credible nuclear deterrence on the part of India may appear to discount the possibility of a major war being initiated against India, a limited or localised war with the aim of showing up India as a weak state is very much possible. India's propensity for strategic restraint, its high nuclear threshold and China's history of brinkmanship displayed during the Korean War and the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1969 support this hypothesis.

(ii) *Energy Security:* Due to rising demand, competition for energy resources will be a challenge for most import dependent countries. Turbulence in the Middle East may further contribute to energy insecurity and military involvement of external powers to secure energy resources from the region will also pose a direct security challenge to India. Due to India's energy dependence on the region and the presence of about five million strong Indian diaspora in the region, any conflict there will also present a serious social and economic challenge to India.

(iii) *Maritime Security:* India's continued economic growth will depend more and more on increased trade and import of energy resources and raw materials. Security of its island territories and of sea lanes of communication will be of critical importance to India. Other major powers will also face this criticality. The perception of vulnerability and power play in the IOR has the potential of becoming a serious security challenge for India.

(iv) *Insecurity and Instability in the Immediate Neighbourhood:* This remains a real medium and long term challenge. Weak political institutions and poor capacity of states combined with rising population, internal dissonance, rising religious fundamentalism and ethnic or sectarian violence may cause serious internal instability in India's neighbourhood. Our adversaries may attempt to make further inroads into these countries and pose a security threat to India.

(v) *Militarisation of Space and Cyber Security:* The apparent stability of the nuclear balance and the quest for seeking new areas for military advantage may prompt some states to move towards weaponisation of space. India, with its as yet limited space capability, will face a major challenge in protecting its space assets in case of a conflict. Similarly, cyber space will be a greater challenge going forward—both for security and economy.

India's National Security Strategy

A national security strategy is the outcome of a long-term vision. Envisioning any long-term perspective calls for a deep and involved thought process. For

a country of our size and stature, the institutionalised strategic thinking mechanism within and outside the government is inadequate. India has never had a coherently articulated national security strategy, certainly not in the public domain. George Tanham rightly suggests that "over time, a set of policies and strategies evolved informally to deal with complex strategic dilemmas related to internal unity and potential threats from abroad." However, the general contours of India's NSS can be pieced together from the speeches of its leaders on various occasions and perception of its strategic thinkers. India seeks to achieve its national security interests through rapid and sustained economic growth to reduce social inequality and regional imbalances; influence events to engender stability and security in the neighbourhood; create a favourable external environment for continued economic growth; develop adequate military power to deter external aggression or coercion and secure its energy and resources supply, and; create conditions for India's rise as an important player in international affairs consistent with its values of democracy, pluralism, secularism and rule of law. Let us now examine how the shortcomings of its military institutions have affected India's national security interests.

What are the Shortcomings?

Some of the major indicators of the shortcomings are: an inability to alter the strategic behaviour of Pakistan and China and the ineffectiveness of strategic deterrence; inadequacy of the existing doctrines and lack of direction from the political rulers has resulted in the failure to generate workable alternatives in the face of crises as in 2002 and 2008; stalled or imbalanced modernisation; continued reliance on imports for military equipment; inefficient logistics set up for want of operational and logistical synergies and inter-service differences; the inordinately long time taken to bring festering insurgencies under control; lack of surgical strike capability; failure to groom and produce competent leaders, and; deterioration in quality of life and work environment reflected in persisting shortage of officers in all three services. The net result is that we have a large military establishment but which is not well equipped and is sub-optimally organised to meet the existing and emerging threats in a cost effective manner.

The shortcomings in India's defence management originate from organisational inadequacy, lack of direction and control, intellectual stagnation and frictions among institutions. Some of these shortcomings are internal to the armed forces but most of them are the result of the lack of appreciation, at the highest level, of the use of force as a useful instrument of politics and therefore abysmal lack of direction. The security policy—if it exists—has become subservient to foreign policy. The responsibilities to formulate and coordinate defence policy are fragmented and ill defined resulting in lack of accountability and therefore, poor outcomes. The NSA,

who should organise and coordinate national security management on behalf of the prime minister, think ahead and work as a forward planner on national security, is saddled with executive responsibilities and diplomatic fire fighting; the Ministry of Defence lacks the human and intellectual capacity to formulate and execute defence policy; the Department of Defence Finance functions as an instrument of obstruction on behalf of the Finance Ministry to delay any kind of defence spending; the DRDO neither develops reliable military systems nor permits their import in time and the procurement process is beset with chronic delays, inefficiency and allegations of corruption. On their part, the services are loath to review their organisations, generally dislike jointness and integration due to perceived loss of influence; have an ageing leadership profile with inadequate tenures in command assignments, lack systematic leadership development and training, suffer from narrow regimental loyalties, give no room for innovative thinking and above all have developed tolerance for corruption.

What Needs to be Done?

An analysis of the shortcomings mentioned above also point to the path of reforms. Let me briefly describe the institutional reforms essential for achieving military effectiveness in India at the two levels of government and within the military establishment.

(a) At the Governmental Level

(i) *Articulation of National Security Strategy:* There is a need to clearly articulate a national security strategy which can form the basis for drawing up a national military strategy, a long term perspective plan for force development, acquisition etc. The organisation mandated to formulate NSS must have domain knowledge of all aspects of national security, emerging challenges posed by geo-political alignments, technological developments affecting the nature of warfare, ever changing concepts of deterrence and the like. The National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) is obviously best suited for this task.

(ii) *Civil Military Relations:* A sound security strategy requires that military considerations be integrated with non-military concerns involving diplomacy, economic policies and domestic policies. Civil-military conflict can interfere with the smooth functioning of high level policy-making institutions and thereby undermine national strategy. To bring disparate elements together requires close cooperation and frank, honest exchanges between civilian and military leaders.

(iii) *Higher Defence Management:* There is no single or competent agency for laying down defence policy and no coordination between various agencies such as ministries of home affairs, external affairs, finance, defence and the intelligence services. The NSCS has to have an effective military

component to advise on security issues. A chief of defence staff (CDS) needs to be appointed to overcome inter-service differences and render single point military advice to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). Integration of the Ministry of Defence and services headquarters is also essential for formulation of sound defence policy. There is also a need to create a cadre of civil servants specialising in matters of security. Officers so selected should be assigned only to ministries of defence, home, finance, NSCS and the cabinet secretariat. This will provide some continuity and facilitate capacity building. The armed forces must be an integral part of the 'decision-making' process on issues of national security that involve them, directly or indirectly.

(iv) *Formulation of Clear Military Doctrines:* This issue is relevant at both, governmental and military levels. The doctrines have to be integrated with India's political objectives. There is a need to define the political objectives, analyse security dilemma of the adversaries, factor in the resource constraints and structure armed forces to meet specified ends. Politico-military congruence is therefore a must.

(v) *Resolving the Procurement Dilemma:* This issue which impacts defence preparedness in a major way requires policy for determining the role and accountability of the DRDO, involving domestic industry in research and development and defence production, and prioritising of acquisitions based on current and future needs. Only the political leadership can resolve inter-institutional and inter-service differences in this sphere.

(vi) *Manpower Policy:* The officer profile in the three services is a matter of concern. Not only is there a shortage at a critical level but the quality and age profile at senior levels is unsatisfactory. Due to very short tenures at higher levels, senior commanders can hardly influence their respective commands and are constantly anxious about their next promotion. There is a lack of continuity even in critical appointments thus affecting any forward thinking and long term policy planning. The government needs to step in to ensure that the age profile of senior officers is lowered in a time bound manner.

(vii) *Integration and Jointness:* Here I quote Admiral Sureesh Mehta:

> Today, the scope of activity of the Indian armed forces ... ranges from internal security tasks, augmenting diplomatic effort, bilateral and multilateral cooperative efforts with other countries, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and go on to cover the entire range of tasks across the full spectrum of conflict. The need for greater integration of the armed forces with the MoD, and the Ministry of External Affairs, as well as establishment of effective coordination mechanisms with several other ministries and agencies, is therefore incontestable Amongst the services, as we develop leaders, organisations, systems and doctrines, we must continue to strengthen trust and confidence amongst the services and between service components that are committed to joint operations.

Integration and jointness are as much required between the service headquarters and MoD, as amongst the services. Considering inter-service rivalries, this process will by necessity, have to be top driven.

(b) Reforms at Services Level

(i) *Preventing Wasteful Expenditure:* India's developmental needs will be high in the foreseeable future and defence allocation is unlikely to be raised much beyond present levels in terms of percentage of GDP. There is considerable scope to improve the quality and efficiency of defence expenditure both, on revenue and capital expenditure sides. Review of organisations and establishment of joint inter-services logistics, training institutions and functional commands can save major manpower costs. Better management of inventories, prevention of corruption in procurement and works through improvements in procedures and practices, and better project management can spare funds for modernisation. Instead of procuring highly expensive legacy systems, services need to focus on niche capabilities and systems which will be suitable to meet potential threats. Adoption of a performance based logistics (PBL) strategy under which the original manufacturer or its nominated contractor maintains the weapon system at the specified level of operational readiness and usage would also help.

(ii) *Military Education:* India's military institutions are good at imparting professional skills but do not educate its future military leaders in military history, strategy, doctrines, or give them any understanding of geo-politics, economy and much else that is required. Every officer needs to be capable of analysing the trends and apply theory into practice realistically. Education, with its focus on intellectual development, is the need of the hour.

(iii) *Leadership Development:* The future, considering its expected complexity, ambiguity and turbulence, will demand extraordinary leadership—especially strategic leadership—across the military. The leadership development process must create leaders who are competent, have the right education and the service experience through appointments tenanted. Ability to articulate one's honest views must be encouraged. Strategic literacy is needed if military leaders are to provide sound strategic advice to the political leadership.

The reforms, if carried out in a comprehensive and sustained manner, will generate unity of purpose, make institutions accountable and responsive, create strategic options, enhance India's military effectiveness and, make deterrence credible. It will not only help create a favourable external and domestic environment for stability and growth but also engender a feeling of security amongst the citizens by reducing their fear and anxiety.

Difficulties that Stand in the Way of Reforms

In independent India's history defence reforms at some scale were attempted

only twice. The first attempt was led by the then defence minister, Y B Chavan, when rationalisation of the military and civil structures in the Ministry of Defence was carried out, logistic services were overhauled and shortages of weapons and equipment started to be made up through re-prioritising the activities of domestic defence enterprises and opening up of foreign sources. The second attempt at reforms started in 1980s when under the guidance of Gen Sundarji the mechanisation of the army took place, operational concepts and doctrines were revised and new weapon systems were inducted. These two instances indicate that the reforms in India's defence structure were mainly personality driven. Crisis can also force reforms like it did in the wake of the 1962 War; yet the lessons drawn from the reform process that followed the Kargil conflict does not inspire confidence. The institutional reforms have, however, never been attempted in a meaningful way.

The need for reforms does not mean they will automatically take place. Here I use the theory of Path Dependence, mainly applied in economics, to explain my scepticism. This theory explains how the set of decisions one faces for any given circumstance is limited by the decisions one has made in the past, even though past circumstances may no longer be relevant. Inferior standards can persist simply because of the legacy they have built up. Besides, our common culture of low expectations from institutions of state, self-before-society, and tolerance for sub-optimal outcomes will prevent any long lasting reform process from taking hold. The prevailing system of authority without accountability is difficult to change without external direction and coercion since those who benefit from it are least likely to support the change.

Conclusion

The international environment India faces and is likely to face in the years ahead requires a well formulated security strategy with effective military power to back it. Writers and thinkers from within India and abroad have been opining that India has failed to build a first-rate military with strategic reach and an independent deterrent. Because of disconnect between the political and military leadership and in the absence of an articulated NSS there is no common view of national security. Due to the lack of strategic vision and higher direction, the institutions work in water tight compartments without coordination. The practice of strategic restraint has transformed into a strategic constraint. Inter-service rivalries prevent them from integrating their headquarters, logistic infrastructures, training institutions and developing joint doctrines. What we need is a strategically effective military: an instrument of power capable of serving the national interests of India in a competent and cost effective manner. Institutional reforms are therefore a crying need of the hour. Besides the difficulty of changing the strategic culture at the directional level, even military organisations are often conservative and risk-averse and thus are typically resistant to change, especially disruptive

change, since it can threaten the stability of normal day-to-day operations, standard operating procedures, war plans and even career paths. Both institutions and belief systems have to change for successful reform since it is the mental models of the actors that will shape choices. This is a difficult but not an impossible task.

NOTES

1. See "Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness" in Risa A. Brooks, ed., *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 2-3.
2. Our greatest security threat today emanates from the all pervading and institutionalised corruption. It has not only enfeebled the state but also poses an existential threat to it. Discussion of this grave threat to national security—nay the nation's survival, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.

CHAPTER 6

The Maritime Dimension in India's National Strategy

Sarabjeet Singh Parmar

'In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice.
But in practice, there is.'

—*Yogi Berra*

Introduction

National interests are the bedrock of any national strategy. A threat to our national interests or an objective to be achieved is the starting point for any strategy. The threat can be existent or evaluated. A strategy must be modified and should evolve with any change in the threat or objective. Therefore, any strategy must be flexible and be based on what the nation views as a futuristic goal. There are many definitions of national strategy, which can also be termed grand strategy. A grand strategy is a political-military, means-ends chain, a state's theory about how it can best "cause" security for itself[1]. It can be defined as the art and science of developing and using political, economic, diplomatic, psychological and military means, both during peace and war, to safeguard national security interests.[2]

Any national strategy depends on a variety of tangible and intangible fields. These fields would collectively and at times individually have a bearing on national interests. From these interests would flow the security objectives. The word security has earned a ubiquitous distinction and is often attached to terms like economic, oil, food et al; terms that have an inherent strategic element.

The most vital national interest for a nation would be continued economic progress and well being of the country. History is testament to the fact that nations have used their economic power to further their national interests. National security objectives have been invariably derived from economic aims set out over a period of time. Economic goals have led to competition both at the national and international level. These competitions in turn, have led to the amalgamation of national assets and strong self reliance based on

infrastructure and technology. This however depends on a well defined national policy that has to stand the test of time and any change in governance. As India is a maritime nation there is also an intrinsic link between economic power and maritime strategy.

This paper seeks to identify the prevailing maritime threats and objectives that impinge on our maritime strategy and require immediate attention. The paper also postulates steps that could be taken so as to achieve a cogent maritime strategy. The formulation of strategies varies from nation to nation and in the Indian context there are certain aspects that have to be understood. Therefore, before entering the portals of threats and objectives, I feel it is important to revisit history briefly and recapitulate the road travelled by India in its quest for a national and maritime strategy.

Backdrop

The 'apparent' non-existence of a cogent and well defined set of national values is an aspect that becomes clearer when one understands the circumstances of India's birth, the legacy left by the British and the threats that India has had to contend with. In 1947, India inherited many dis-advantages—the accumulated minuses of many centuries—but one great advantage, that of a resurgent nationalism[3]. The nation was born after the traumatic experience of partition without sufficient wherewithal to support itself. The existing infrastructure was structured to support a colonial territory. Infrastructure was hence created on the basis of expediency which—apart from uneven development—meant that a comprehensive and concrete national policy was not formulated to establish India's national interests and security objectives. However, India has since come a long way and has reached a stage where a lot of imperatives are falling into place.

One such imperative is the revival of the nation's rich maritime heritage, a heritage that was lost in the sands of time. Indian history and culture offer a fund of historical precedents and philosophical precepts to guide Indian's strategy making efforts. With this wealth of insights to draw on, political leaders and mariners will likely display an impressive measure of intellectual flexibility and agility as they prosecute their maritime strategy.[4]

History shows that as most of those who ruled India had their eyes focused on land frontiers, imperialistic powers invaded via the sea, with a staying effect that charted the course of our nation's history. The fact that India was subjugated and ruled by invaders who came not over mountain passes, but from across the sea, is a fact that should remain embedded in our memory forever. It should also influence our current and future attitude to maritime power.[5]

Threat—Maritime Security

The Indian Ocean is best seen as one of the world's great maritime highways, with some 50 per cent of the world's merchant shipping passing through the Strait of Malacca. It joins the Pacific and Atlantic worlds.[6] And when the

Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal are factored in we get a vast water body that connects India to the rest of the world. India, geographically therefore, sits right atop the mid point or fulcrum of this water body which forms part of the IOR. For many nations this region is seen as an area of transit for their shipping and a means of connectivity. However, for India it is a nerve centre as its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) originate and terminate here. The spread of island territories, a long coast line, the Exclusive Economic Zone, off shore oil exploration, fishing and the allotted deep sea mining area also demand that a stable and secure maritime environment be ensured and maintained.

The geopolitics of the IOR has also given rise to threats. It would be prudent to view these threats in tandem with the unique features of the region. There are 56 nations in the region and around one third of the world's population lives in this area. This number combined with the economic divide and differing modes of governance has resulted in a rise in piracy, terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear issues. This growing threat has forced nations to strengthen their presence in the region to ensure safety of shipping and their national interest.

The region is home to a wealth of natural and mineral resources. The inability of most nations in the region to harness these resources is slowly leading to the ingress of extra regional nations. This influx could be a source of future conflict which would undermine maritime security and therefore affect regional stability.

To counter or counter balance these threats India needs to define its national interests with a cogent and visible national maritime strategy. This strategy would have to be drawn up by a number of agencies and ministries and guided by political vision and direction. National interests would have to be permanent and non-negotiable. However, actions to ensure the sanctity of national interests would be dictated by changes in the prevailing geopolitical environment. This would require a continuous study of the region. Formulation of a matrix with groups, sub-groups and interlinks could ensure this. For example a "Regional Group" could be broken into "Internal Regional Sub Groups" analysing the nations of South East Asia, West Asia, Middle East, Africa and an "External Regional Sub Group" for Europe, the rest of Asia, North and South America. Similarly, groups and sub-groups could be formed to analyse governance, military, economics and trade. Based on the analysis of the matrix, policies that would blunt threats and strengthen objectives could be formulated.

Threat—Piracy

Piracy is being examined as a separate aspect as it involves a plethora of laws, nations, threat to sea going trade and could in due time, if not addressed, give rise to instability in the IOR.

As per UNCLOS article 101[7], piracy consists of any of the following acts:

- Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,

committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

– On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
– Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

• Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft
• Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraphs above.

Article 101 is supplemented by articles 105, 106 and 107. Article 105[8] clearly states that a pirate ship may be seized on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state. It also states that the courts of the state carrying out the seizure may decide the penalties to be imposed and the action to be taken. Article 107[9] states that the seizure may be carried out only by warships or by ships clearly marked and identified as being on government service and authorised to that effect. Article 106[10] on the other hand could be considered a dampener as it states that seizure on inadequate grounds would hold the state affecting the seizure liable for loss and damages.

Although Article 100[11] states that all states shall cooperate towards the suppression of piracy, it again limits the action to acts of piracy on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of any state. Given the increase of piracy over the years and the fact that only an act committed on the high seas is considered to be an act of piracy inhibits and restricts states from taking effective action to curb the malaise.

Deployment of warships by states has not had the effect of reducing piracy. Figures as per International Maritime Bureau report for the period January 1, 2010 to September 30, 2010 are indicative of the fact that acts (attempted and actual) of piracy the world over are on the increase[12]—239 in 2006, 263 in 2007, 293 in 2008, 406 in 2009 and 289 as on September 30, 2010.

The breakdown of these acts[13] in the IOR, as per the above report, is also alarming. However, it is clearly apparent that the number of incidents have come down in the areas where states have vigorously pursued anti-piracy actions.

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	Upto 30 Sep 2010
India	4	7	10	10	4
Bangladesh	33	13	9	12	18
Sri Lanka	-	4	1	-	-
Somalia	8	26	12	47	56
Gulf of Aden	9	10	51	100	44
Malacca Straits	8	4	2	2	1
Arabian Sea	1	4	-	1	2
Indian Ocean	-	-	-	1	-

The United Nations Security Council has adopted various resolutions (UNSCR 1846[14] in 2008, renewed annually by UNSCRs 1897[15] and 1950[16]) permitting the entry into Somalia's territorial waters by states and regional organisations cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. A study of piracy over both time and space, makes it clear that naval operations alone will not eliminate it. The best approach is to remove at least one of the three pillars of piracy: geography, political instability, or safe havens. Since the first pillar, geography, is almost impossible to change, primary consideration must be given to the remaining pillars, both of which are land based.[17]

As it became clearer that only land operations would either reduce, if not stop piracy completely, the UN Security Council adopted various resolutions (1851[18] in December 2008, renewed by UNSCRs 1897 and 1950) authorising land based operations.

Despite the mandate authorised by the UNSCRs very little has been done to tackle the problem from land. The US has established a Military Command in Africa (AFRICOM). As per a Congressional Research Service Report[19] prepared by the US DOD—"there are no plans to have a significant troop presence on ground". The African Union force presently deployed in Somalia has been asking for more UN troops. More troops would enable effective control over areas from which the pirates operate thereby curbing their operations and would eventually eradicate this menace from the area. This aspect requires international understanding and cooperation between nations. Till no international understanding and commitment is achieved, piracy would have to be combated by navies at sea, which as of now is considered 'ineffective' in ending piracy in the area.

India being an affected nation has been proactive in combating piracy at sea and was one the first nations to send ships to the affected areas. There are two viable steps that India should take to combat piracy. Firstly, use its navy as a central force to form a regional cooperative group. This would ensure availability of more assets thereby providing security to shipping in the area. Secondly, utilise its position as a responsible nation and non-permanent member of the UN Security Council to push for land based operations. Thirdly, insist for a revision of the definition of piracy. A suitable revision would enable nations to tackle piracy in a more comprehensive manner. These actions would enhance its position not only as a regional stability factor but also increase its value as a futuristic international stability factor.

Objective—Indian Merchant Shipping

The shipping industry is effectively the most cyclic of all industries. Being a global industry, it is affected by a whole gamut of factors which range from: economic conditions, political events, natural disasters and age of existing

vessels, new vessel delivery schedules, availability of ship building slots with shipyards, government regulations etc.[20] This part of the paper examines the issues germane to Indian shipping vis-à-vis the present number and state of ships, the Indian government's stance on issues like tax regulations and Indian merchant navy personnel. Shipping is measured in tonnage but for simplicity purposes the paper refers to number of ships.

The Indian shipping industry comprises of about 31 companies that account for around a total of 974 ships (as on December 31, 2009 as per the Ministry of Shipping (MoS) annual report 2009-10[21]) and is 17th in the world. The Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), a central Public Service Undertaking (PSU) is India's biggest shipping company and accounts for approximately 30 per cent of Indian Tonnage. As on November 1, 2010, SCI had a total of 77 ships.[22] As per the MoS annual report 2009-10, during the period January 1, 2009 to November 30, 2009, 440 ships were chartered for government cargo. Out of these only 138 were Indian flagships and they carried 38.8 per cent of the total cargo. The report further states that SCI has plans to acquire 62 vessels during the XI plan at a cost of about Rs. 13,000 crore. Out of these 62, seven have been delivered, orders for 32 ships have been placed and orders for 23 ships will be placed. However these numbers also cater for the replacement of ships that would be taken out of service due to age. The status of other Indian shipping companies is also similar. This nominal increase does not auger well for the increase in India's overseas trade. It implies that India would have to charter more foreign flag ships which would result in outflow of foreign exchange revenue. This outflow if invested in Indian shipping companies would result in the healthy growth of Indian shipping. In addition the availability of foreign flag ships in times of crisis or conflict would reduce considerably or be available for a price. Therefore more Indian flag ships need to be built, preferably in Indian shipyards so as to ensure that the ship building industry also grows in tandem and is able to meet the shipping companies' requirements.

A major disadvantage Indian shipping companies face, vis-à-vis foreign companies, is the tax regime. Twelve different levels of taxes (direct and indirect) are levied on the Indian shipping industry. In comparison most of the foreign companies operate from tax havens. This deters foreign companies from setting up a base in India.

Some nations like the US and China have a policy that requires national cargo to be carried by their flag ships. India has a substantial cargo base. In addition the government controls substantial cargo movement through PSUs. A policy of cargo reservation would go a long way to promote Indian shipping.

Indian merchant navy personnel are preferred by a majority of companies over other nationalities for two main reasons. The ability to speak English is the first. Secondly and more importantly is that the Certificate of Competency (CoC) issued in India is one of the toughest to obtain and this increases the

employment prospects of Indian merchant men. Indian merchant personnel prefer to work for foreign companies due to higher pay, easier tax regimes and also because an Indian working for a foreign company has an NRI status. This has resulted in a manpower shortage for Indian ships. It would be difficult to obtain a census on the number of Indians working for foreign companies but the number sailing on Indian flag ships would be minuscule in comparison. This is a drain that the Indian shipping industry can ill afford.

Shipping is important for trade and therefore has a direct impact on a nation's economy. The National Maritime Development Programme of 2005 is a step towards strengthening India's shipping industry and port infrastructure. But even so, urgent steps require to be taken to improve Indian shipping. Firstly, increase the orders for ships by ease of funding, either by lower interests on lending rates or by soft loans from a corpus that would have to be created. Secondly, revise the tax regime so as to enable Indian shipping to compete with foreign companies on equal terms. Although the government introduced the Tonnage Tax system from the financial year 2004-05 more needs to be done. Thirdly, promulgate a policy to ensure reservation of cargo shipments by Indian flag ships. Fourthly, initiate steps to retain Indian merchant personnel by offering remuneration that is equal to that offered by foreign companies.

Objective—Port Infrastructure

As per the MoS annual report 2009-10,[23] India has 12 major ports and about 200 minor ports. The major ports are managed by the Port Trust of India and are under the jurisdiction of the Government of India. The minor ports are operated by state governments. This section examines the major ports as they handle about 90 per cent of the nation's trade. Out of the 12 major ports six are on the west coast—Kochi, New Mangalore, Mormugao, Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT in Mumbai), Mumbai and Kandla; and six are on the east coast—Kolkata (Haldia), Paradip, Visakhapatnam, Ennore, Chennai and Tuticorin.

Ports provide the connect between land and sea for the passage of trade. To ensure a healthy state of trade a port has to be productive. The productivity of a port is measured in terms of a set of key performance indicators. In simple terms the performance of a port is generally measured in terms of the speed with which a vessel can leave post entry to the port, the speed at which cargo is handled (loading or unloading) and the duration that cargo stays in port prior to shipment or post discharge. Although there has been an increase in productivity, the performance of Indian ports does not compare favourably with the efficiency of other ports in the world. To improve productivity three main parameters require to be studied—capacity, efficiency and connectivity.

The aggregate capacity of the major ports as on March 31, 2009 was 574.77 million tonnes per annum (MTPA).[24] In comparison the Port of Singapore

registered a total cargo tonnage of 471.5 million tonnes.[25] The dual situation of limited capacity and a growing demand is creating congestion at ports, berthing delays and longer turn around time of ships. The available depth of water in some major ports precludes the entry of large vessels. As a result these ships have to go to other ports and offload the cargo meant for India to smaller vessels thereby increasing the freight cost, congestion and turn around time.

Efficiency is reduced due to outdated equipment, training and labour practices. This results in loss of revenue because of ships waiting for a berth and on the berth itself.

Connectivity to ports is in relation with the movement of cargo. Ports require both road and rail connectivity with the hinterland to ensure fast shipping of cargo. The lack of adequate connectivity is restricting the productive growth of most Indian ports.

In order to keep pace with the growing demand of sea borne trade there is need to fast track the upgrade and expansion of port infrastructure and review the management practices. The resources necessary for this can be provided by privatisation. Although the port sector has been opened to private industry more needs to be done to ensure progress.

Many ports of the world have involved the private sector and this has resulted in a change in the organisational model. The Landlord Port model is fast replacing the Service Port model. In this model the port authority retains control over port infrastructure, planning, leasing, safety, navigation and coordination. The private operators provide the cargo service, marine service, berths et al. Presently Ennore, which commenced commercial operations in 2001, is the only major port of India with a Landlord model. The changeover of all ports to this model would depend on the efficiency levels achieved at Ennore.

Although all major ports have both road and rail connectivity, they require an improvement in quality as well as capacity. This fact has been commented upon by the MoS in its annual report 2009. The report of the Committee of Secretaries on rail road connectivity had stated that each major port should preferably have four-lane road connectivity and double line of road connectivity. The rail connectivity is to be implemented by Indian Railways and the road connectivity by National Highways Authority of India (NHAI). These need to be fast tracked.

Objective—Maritime Forces

Maritime forces in the context of strategy include the Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard, elements of the Indian Air Force, Army, central and state governments. The responsibility of ensuring both external and internal maritime security is an enormous task and therefore, need constant reviewing. This would have to be based on the evaluation of threats and objectives

carried out by a study of the matrix as mentioned earlier. These aspects could be grouped into two categories—"Intra IOR" and "Extra IOR". India is already viewed as a prominent player within the IOR. If India wants to be viewed as a global player then it would require showing its presence in areas beyond the IOR. Therefore, the capability of maritime forces to operate in areas beyond the IOR for extended durations in pursuance of maritime strategy requires review.

As of now there are some generic aspects that require attention. First, is the requirement to maintain a prominent presence in the IOR for ensuring a stable and secure environment. Second, is the security of India's interests in the areas beyond the IOR. In order to be viewed as a stable global player, both these aspects would have to be portrayed as "non aggressive". Third, is the security of India's SLOCs. A visible presence would ensure safety of shipping in peace and intent in times of crisis or conflict.

Fourth, is the internal security aspect. Security of the island territories and coastline has been the subject of an ongoing debate. The Home Minister, in February 2009, had stated that the centre had decided to set up a coastal command. As of now it is yet to see the light of day. The delay is possibly due to the differing views of various agencies and ministries involved. This issue requires serious thought and possibly an act of parliament to ensure establishment of the coastal command.

Conciusion

In the Indian context national strategy has come to mean much more than just safe guarding the nation's territorial and political boundary. It also includes economic well being.

The emerging Indian economy has aided a resurgent India to be a voice to be heard on the world stage and a regional power of consequence. As the economy booms and India grows both in stature and power the level of competition will also rise. There will be more threats to be faced, objectives to be achieved and a greater responsibility to be borne.

The ability to project substantial power across the seas while abiding with international law and the importance of the oceans for a nation's growth lends an impetus to the maritime strategy of India. Maritime strategy, which is so essential to India's growth, faces multiple threats and therefore requires to be visible and stated clearly. This would not only enhance the much needed stability in the seas surrounding India but would also aid in economic growth.

<div align="center">NOTES</div>

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Left Wing Extremism—
Challenges and Approach

Vivek Chadha

"It would not be an exaggeration to say that the problem of naxalism is the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country."[1]

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, 13 April 2006

Introduction

This paper will address the subject in the broader framework of Left Wing Extremism (LWE) rather than Naxalism, as beyond the issue of semantics, it tends to limit its historical and contextual framework, which is realistically torn between the genuine problems of the local people and the irrational demand for "a new democratic revolution in India" achieved "by overthrowing the semi-colonial, semi-feudal system under neo-colonial form of indirect rule."[2] It also tends to club Naxalism and the more recent phenomenon of Maoist violence, which gives a wrong perception of these being synonymous with each other. It is evident that LWE is not a sixties phenomenon. Deprivation, land alienation and exploitation of the underprivileged have repeatedly been the reason for popular uprising in the country even prior to independence.[3]

In the past, these movements have been restricted to areas, characterised by tribal, demographic or geographical islands of deprivation. This fragmented approach continued until 2004, when the MCC and PWG, two of the most virulent proponents of violence, as the preferred means to an end, joined hands to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist), i.e. CPI (Maoist). Never had these islands formed an archipelago, linking the regional groups through the proclamation of a common intent.

This paper examines some very pertinent and timely questions. Why did the prime minister term it the "single biggest internal security challenge" despite the fact that LWE has been in existence for decades? Is it merely the

geographical spread of this influence, or is it the turmoil within it, that is a cause for greater concern? If the threat is as potent as it is described, what is the approach of the government to combat it? The paper will attempt to answer these questions to help better understand the strategic implications of the threat for India.

The Threat

Magnitude

India has been affected by, what can be called, a chronic case of insurgency since independence. From the uprising in Nagaland, Mizoram, Tripura and Assam in the Northeast to Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir in the north, challenges to the integrity of the country have been both real and unrelenting. However, none of the insurgencies have had the geographical or demographic spread of LWE. While there are varying estimates of the influence of this contagion, with most being lower than actual, probably the most realistic estimate was given by Home Minister P Chidambaram on September 14, 2009, while addressing Director Generals (DGs) and Inspectors Generals (IGs) of police, when he acknowledged that their influence extended over 2000 police stations in 223 districts across 20 states.[4] Adding to the bigger picture, he admitted greater violence in areas under 400 police stations in 90 districts of 13 states.[5] However, it is evident from various government estimates and priority schemes that 34 of these districts have been identified as the most affected by Naxalism.[6] Giving an estimate of the demographic influence of the challenge, a study indicates its impact over 40 per cent of the country's area and 35 per cent of its population.[7] In stark comparison, Jammu and Kashmir represents just one per cent of the country's population, despite including areas not affected by insurgency; while the four most affected states of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura in the Northeast represent a mere 3.3 per cent.[8] In terms of the geographical spread, Jammu and Kashmir and the four states of the Northeast represent 6.7 and 3.8 percent of the country's area.[9]

Understanding the Conflict

According to the Chhattisgarh chief minister, Raman Singh, the country is facing "a major tragedy of terrorism in the form of Naxalism."[10] Further, Maoist groups involved in the struggle have also been classified by the state and central governments as "terrorist groups" under Section 16 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 and Unlawful Activities Prevention Act 1967, amended vide Article 35 of 2008.[11] However, despite the few who describe LWE as a terrorist movement, it remains a classic example of insurgency. There are indicators of coercion and use of violence as a means of forcing compliance; however, it is evident that in a number of areas, there is local support for the uprising.

A poll conducted by the *Times of India* in the Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh, in some of the most severely affected districts like Adilabad, Nizamabad, Karimnagar, Warangal and Khammam, found that almost 60 per cent of those polled indicated that Naxals were good for the area, with only 34 per cent perceiving an improvement after they had been overwhelmed.[12] Yet another distinct characteristic of the movement has been discernable intellectual support for the cause.[13] This has been a distinct facet of the struggle since the beginning of the movement, despite a degree of disillusionment amongst some sections of supporters, given the relatively recent Maoist flavour of the movement. The contradictions posed by the support base were captured by the prime minister, when he said, 'In the initial days of the movement, many of the best and the brightest had been attracted towards the movement. Almost 40 years later, the Naxalite movement has lost much of its intellectual élan, but it has gained in strength.... There are still many members of the intelligentsia associating with the movement who are backed by a sizeable lumpen element.'[14] It is this intelligentsia that Hilary Pias quoting from a press interview of Professor Sherigara, alludes to, despite their being a part of the university staff, based on allegations of the campus being used by the Maoists.[15]

It is debatable whether this support is a result of the popularity of the cause or a reflection of the government's apathy to the abysmal condition of locals, which has pushed them towards the lesser of the evils. The paper based on evidence discussed indicates a mix of the two.

Unified Action

There is an interesting contradiction and an accompanying irony to the existing state of affairs in the fight against LWE. While the recent past has witnessed a unified approach on the part of the Maoist cadres, and especially so after the creation of the CPI (Maoist), the states affected by the contagion have failed to take a cohesive approach. As a case in point, the success of Andhra Pradesh and the resultant pressure only led to Maoist cadres moving into neighbouring states, where changed equations allowed them to recuperate, regroup and subsequently renew their operations. It is also for this reason that the interstate boundary region of Dandakaranya in the Bastar region remains the hub of training and operational camps.[16]

An analysis of the outlook of some of the states affected by LWE reveals that Andhra Pradesh adopted a hardline stance against Maoists with reasonable success. While they employed specially trained forces like the Greyhounds, Chhattisgarh preferred the Salwa Judum initiative.[17] West Bengal, especially the Trinamool Congress, remains sympathetic to the Maoists and Jharkhand negotiated a truce with them.[18]

On the policing front, the states impacted by LWE have a mix of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and local police combating the Maoists. Given

the differences in command and control structures, equipment profiles and most importantly their respective ethos, seamless integration has remained a serious challenge.[19] The Dantewada massacre of April 6, 2010 raised serious questions regarding the interoperability of the police and the CRPF, especially in view of the accusations and counter accusations levelled by both sides.[20]

Capability Divide

There is a distinct difference between the vastly improved tactical operations being launched by Maoists and those of the police. The CPI (Maoist), the most dominant LWE group which was responsible for 88 per cent of the total incidents and 89 per cent of the killings,[21] reinforced this capability through the attacks at Dantewada that led to the killing of 76 police personnel. In contrast, the incident highlighted the lacunae in certain key facets of training, motivation, leadership and equipment as well as logistics support for police personnel.[22] The casualty figures of the last three years are a further indicator of a constantly improving Maoist cadre and the inability of the police to blunt this potent threat. The figures given below indicate an alarming trend, wherein, a positive attrition ratio of 3.1:1 in favour of the police in 2008 was reversed to 1:1.4 in 2009 and 1:2.2 till June 2010.

Casualties	SF	Extremists
2008	91	339
2009	317	217
2010 (till Jun)	209	97

Source: Ministry of Home, Government of India.[23]

Besides the quality of training and motivation, effective numbers as on January 1, 2007, are also stacked against police forces in states affected by LWE.

State	Authorised	Posted	Deficiency	Percentage Deficient
Andhra Pradesh	108075	88807	19268	17.8
Bihar	74188	52075	11421	15.4
Chhattisgarh	42236	27369	14867	35.2
Jharkhand	54277	51828	2449	4.5
Maharashtra	76826	69844	6982	9.1
Orissa	47216	38492	8724	18.5
Madhya Pradesh	76826	69844	6982	9.1
West Bengal	88377	70370	13007	14.7

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India.[24]

The Union Home Secretary, G.K. Pillai, highlighting the problems related to policing in LWE affected states said that against the authorised average of 220 policemen to a lakh of population, the present average is a mere 138, which is further accentuated in states like Bihar and West Bengal where it is

56 and 82 per lakh. He adds that with 12 policemen as the actual strength in a Naxal hit area police station, the actual effective strength taking into account leave and other duties is just six to seven, which is grossly inadequate to fight the existing nature of the threat. However, the most worrying description of policing is that: 'They (the police) just lock the door and play cards inside and the Naxals are allowed to do what they want to do outside. They don't bother the Maoists, the Maoists don't bother them either.'[25]

Disillusioned Population

Most insurgencies that have challenged the authority of the state in the past, have taken root along the periphery of the country. The distance of these regions, physical and psychological from the "national mainstream" has often been cited, amongst other reasons, for alienation and lack of development. This has at times been aggravated due to ethnic differences and fundamentalism in the area. However, the sustained neglect of the region impacted by LWE focuses on the so called "mainstream" in the heartland of the country. It therefore merits analysis to derive reasons for this disillusionment.

The specific case of Dakshin Bastar Dantewada district will serve to highlight the issue. The district has a population of 719487 of which 564931 are scheduled tribes (ST), a percentage of 78.52 per cent. The literacy rate is 30.17 per cent, the lowest in the country. Of the 1220 villages in the district, only 491 have domestic and 44 agricultural electricity. There are paved approach roads to 191 villages and bus service to 52. Medical facility is available in 201 villages and there are three colleges for the entire population of the district.[26] The per capita income of the district at current prices after adjusting of district domestic product (DDP) for incomes like mining which does not go to the local people is a mere Rs 9133.[27]

With similar conditions prevailing in most LWE affected districts in Chhattisgarh, it is not difficult to understand the frustration of the people. This frustration is aggravated by the fact that this region has the richest mineral resources in the country, yet the benefits have not reached the people.[28] Conversely, a number of them have faced displacement both for reasons associated with setting up of industries and subsequent Maoist or Salwa Judum persecution. Chhattisgarh is one of the few insurgencies where the proxy self protection group in the form of Salwa Judum, became almost as feared and as detested as the CPI (Maoist).[29] In May 2008, the Planning Commission described the Salwa Judum as "an abdication of the state itself" and called for its immediate scrapping.[30]

D. Bandopadhyay, Executive Chairman, Council for Social Development, quoting Walter Fernandes, suggests that from 1951 to 2005 over 5.5 crore people have been displaced in the country. Of these, in case of the tribals, only 18 to 20 per cent have been rehabilitated.[31] As per the Ministry of Rural

Development Annual Report 2007-08, 5.06 lakh cases of land alienation were registered, covering 9.02 lakh acres of area.[32] A large percentage of this pertains to areas affected by LWE.

Tribals, who constitute a large percentage of population in LWE affected areas, have also been displaced because of conflicts in various areas. One estimate puts this figure at 4,01,425 of which 36,991 Adivasis from 201 villages in Dantewada district and 10,949 Adivasis from 275 villages in Bijapur district live in 23 camps run by the government. It is also estimated that 1,20,000 Gutti Koya tribals of Bastar and Bijapur districts of Chhaittisgarh have taken shelter in Andhra Pradesh because of Maoist and Salwa Judum violence from January till June 2008.[33]

There was also a conflict of interest based on contradictory laws in areas affected by LWE. The Wildlife (Protection) Act of 1972 and Forest Conservation Act 1980 were viewed and implemented in parochial terms, thereby bringing the otherwise complementary existence of tribals and jungles into conflict. These acts snatched the traditional rights of tribals based on records or the lack of them, whereas ownership in these areas was based more on traditional and generational mutual understanding amongst the people.[34] Shifting cultivation and collection of forest produce were stopped, with numerous tribals facing land alienation and persecution by forest guards. The exploitation of the poor locals is a reality irrespective of the final beneficiary. The Maoists take their cut for illegal mining or tendu leaf cultivation[35] and the forest guards for collecting forest produce.[36] The tendu leaf trade is a live example of the middlemen as actual gainers of the trade, with the tribals gaining little and that too at the risk of physical harm.[37]

Approach

The overarching approach to combat LWE has been declared on a number of occasions as, "development and police action".[38] Interestingly, the prime minister compares it with the ability to "walk on two legs" through an "effective police response" and reducing the "sense of deprivation and alienation".[39] As part of this broad strategic guideline, it is best to assess the strategic guidelines provided by the prime minister himself, which have since become the basis for sustained action.

Based on the two pronged approach indicated by the government, the policing half of the strategy highlights the following issues[40]:

(a) A "better trained and equipped" police force.
(b) Improvement in "weapons, buildings and vehicles".
(c) Ensuring "all 'thanas' in Naxal areas are fully manned and fortified".
(d) Manning by "capable, competent and motivated officers and staff".
(e) Provision of suitable "incentives to attract best police personnel".
(f) The "need for protecting policemen from undue harassment" in the course of execution of their duties.

(g) State level action should create a "specialised force on pattern of Andhra Pradesh's Greyhounds".

(h) Posting of "capable officers from other states" if the need so arises.

(i) Police actions should be "supported by effective intelligence gathering".

(j) There is a need for "coordination among states—in intelligence gathering, in information sharing, in police responses".

(k) Setting up of "unified commands for badly affected core areas".

(l) Need for a "liberal surrender and rehabilitation policy".

The second aspect related to developmental issues also gave an overview of government policy. Key aspects include[41]:

(a) No restrictions will be placed on "allocating additional resources".

(b) Criticality of "good governance" and ensuring "implementation of developmental programmes" to include "monitoring" and no "leakages".

(c) Need for "reducing the burden of debt" of tribals.

(d) Ensuring no "unnecessary harassment of tribals by compounding and closing small forest offences".

(e) Provision of "effective price and procurement support" to the tribals.

(f) Ensuring "employment and land to the poorest" in the region.

(g) Providing for "local participation in governance".

Effective Police Response

Augmenting Force Levels. In a bid to enhance the force levels in LWE affected areas, a number of steps were taken by the government. Sanction was given for the raising of an additional 38 CRPF battalions in 2009 to augment the strength of central police resources and 58 CRPF battalions were provided for anti-Naxal operations to the affected states.[42] In August 2008, approval was also granted for raising of 10 Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (COBRA) with one sector HQ over the next three years.[43] For the year 2008-09, the states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand were sanctioned 3500 and 3400 special police officers (SPOs). [44] Vacancies for IPS in the civil services entrance exam were increased from 130 to 150 to reduce deficiencies at the SP level. The year also witnessed the sanction of 72 additional posts for Bureau for Police Research and Development.[45]

Modernisation and Strengthening the Police Force: The central government also decided to bear the cost of engaging helicopters for states to enhance their operational effectiveness. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has inducted 10 ALH/Dhruv helicopters, which have been stationed at Ranchi and Raipur.[46] Rs 501.53 crore were allotted for the Modernisation of Police Forces (MPF) scheme and Rs 64 crore for fortification of police stations in 32 Naxal affected districts.[47]

Intelligence: With the aim of strengthening intelligence in LWE affected states, five per cent of MPF has been allocated for strengthening special branches in Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa. In 2008-09, this allocation was Rs 40 crore.[48]

Infrastructure Development: An approval was given as part of the Eleventh Plan with an allocation of Rs 500 crore for improving infrastructure to include better roads and tracks, establishment of secure camping ground and helipads, enhancing security of police posts in threatened areas at a cost of Rs 99.99 crore for the year 2008-09.[49]

Coordination: The inability of the police to coordinate operations was also addressed to an extent through the sanction of a dedicated satellite based all India police network (POLNET).[50]

Training: Land has been allocated for opening 20 counter insurgency and counter terrorism schools in the states of Assam, Bihar, Orissa, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. It has also been decided to set up a central academy for police training at Bhopal as a centre for excellence.[51] A Special Tactics Wing has been established by the National Police Academy Hyderabad with special emphasis on counter Naxal and counter terror operations.[52]

Development

Over a period of time, a number of developmental projects have been initiated in LWE affected areas. As part of the Backward Districts Initiative (BDI), Rs 45 crore were allocated for 147 districts for 2007-08.[53] For the year 2009-10, Rs 4938.96 crore were earmarked for nine flagship projects. However, the inability to monitor these projects has impacted implementation, which has led the Planning Commission to put in place a Management Information System (MIS) to monitor implementation of major developmental projects in 35 districts in 9 states.[54] Further the monitoring of projects is being done by the Home Minister himself who at a conference of Members of Parliament from 34 Naxal affected districts held on April 30, 2010, unveiled data that showed 5.86 to 86.70 per cent fund usage,[55] a limitation which could well change for poor project implementation.

Schemes like Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) and National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme (NREGP) have achieved the dual purpose of improving the economic conditions of the people and simultaneously contributing towards development of the region. Besides these, the Backward Districts Initiative (BDI), Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF), National Rural Health Mission Scheme (NRHMS) and Sarva Shiksha Abhyan (SSA) have all contributed to improving the situation. The PMGSY envisages roads for all villages with habitations of more than 500 for normal and 250 for tribal areas, with additional plans for the most affected 33

districts.[56] Central assistance for the initiative to open Ashram Schools and hostels for boys and girls has been increased from 50 to 100 percent.[57]

There has been an attempt to address the contradictory provisions of the Wild Life and Forest Acts through the enactment and subsequent implementation of The Scheduled Tribes and Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006. This recognises the forest rights of tribals, with provisions for providing benefits to them. With the Act coming into force on January 1, 2008, a debate continues on issues related to its implementation in conjunction with Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas Act (PESA) and the effectiveness of the two to provide the much needed protection to tribals.[58]

Common Initiatives

The aim of achieving an integrated developmental response has been initiated through a number of monitoring mechanisms at various levels. This includes, an Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) under the HM to monitor a coordinated approach to Naxal violence and related aspects and a Standing Committee of Chief Ministers under the HM to coordinate policy on political, security and developmental aspects. At the bureaucratic level, integration is planned through the coordination centre headed by the Union Home Secretary with Chief Secretaries and DGPs as members. A task force has been constituted under Special Secretary (Internal Security) with senior intelligence, central and state police representatives for coordination of operational issues. An inter ministerial group, led by an Additional Secretary (Naxal Management) has also been constituted with members from developmental ministries and the Planning Commission to coordinate implementation of schemes.[59]

Analysis of Threat

The geographical expanse of the area is often referred to as the Red Corridor, given the near seamless integration of interlinking districts across states and the relative fluidity with which the extremists have been able to follow the path of least resistance for both offensive manoeuvres and existential retrograde tactical retreats. The geographical spread is further enhanced by the lack of integration among states and a unified approach to combating LWE. A number of reasons can be ascribed to the state of affairs. First, perceived political compulsions have led state governments to follow their respective lines of action—at times contradictory to the stance of the central government, or that of the neighbouring state. Second, differences of opinion amongst state governments have also led to friction and the inability to forge a united front. Third, the varying capacities and professional capabilities of states influence their ability for unified approach. It is evident that the individual challenge for each state government remains a higher priority than

the collective response of the country. Unless this changes, interstate differences will continue to provide operational loopholes for the Maoists.

The expression of discontentment of the Maoists perpetuated through irrational violence can be contested at the political, ideological and military level; however the exploitation of the tribal sections remains a valid and justifiable rallying point, and a vehicle for psychological and strategic communication for the ideologues that can be both genuine and exploitative. The ability to separate the two will remain a challenge, given the inability of vast sections of intellectuals and the population at large to discern the thin line separating the two.

Insurgencies like LWE hit a country where it is the most vulnerable; the soft underbelly of a rapidly growing economy. The indigenous roots of the movement, a representative majority which has been devoid of the fruits of growth and endured decades of exploitation, takes away from the counter insurgency force, the moral authority to deviate from all but the right way of countering the movement. And this can only be resolved by addressing the justifiable problems of the people and enforcing a calibrated police response.

At the ideological or popular level, extremist Maoist thought may not have much following beyond the hard line fringe elements, however, as compared with any other insurgency or terrorist movement that the country has faced, the humane face of LWE continues to draw sympathy, especially for some of the issues and rights or the lack of the same that the struggle was built upon. Aspects like exploitation by the mine mafia, forest mafia, land alienation and money lender exploitation have all contributed towards support for the problem, though not for the expression of discontent by the CPI (Maoist). There is also a functional and ideational dichotomy between addressing the challenges of, what is essentially an insurgency, and tackling what have been classified by the state and central governments as terrorist groups. Does the strategy go about neutralising the terrorists as per strategies associated with counter terrorism, or approach it as an insurgency, which is a consequence of the genuine dissatisfaction of the masses at large? This contradiction remains a challenge both at the strategic and functional level.

In Chhattisgarh, the literacy rate is 64 per cent, however only 22 per cent of tribals are literate.[60] This along with other developmental lacunae illustrates the challenge faced by the government. The state of affairs present a situation wherein the lack of education closes employment opportunities to these people and increasing industrial encroachment and land alienation robs them of the limited opportunities that exist. Yet again a challenge, which has neither a quick fix solution nor an easy one.

The challenge faced by the police in LWE affected areas is multi-dimensional. Their numbers are not necessarily the fundamental problem. The police are neither equipped nor trained for counterinsurgency operations.

Their police station based deployment, given the limited strength does not give them suitable defensibility. The police stations are not built, strengthened or sited for defensibility, given their primary responsibility of law and order. This lays them open to being overrun by an adversary with even limited numbers and limited tactical capability. Given the present capability and numbers of Maoists, they present themselves as a vulnerable target for the taking. Their poor intelligence, intercommunication, training and mobility takes away the ability to concentrate forces in acceptable time frames, thereby giving a clear edge to Maoists, who on the contrary have these very advantages. This limitation can only be addressed by specialists who augment the local intelligence provided by the police stations given their wide spread and have the simultaneous capability and adequate numbers to hold attacks until support can be provided. While this defensive measure is put in place, surgical strikes on the Andhra Greyhound model are needed to wrest the initiative from the Maoists.

Conclusion

LWE, as is evident from the analysis, does present one of the gravest challenges to national security. The physical and demographic spread of the problem and the nature and degree of disillusionment reflects an unenviable reality, which will need the sincere, unified and focused attention of every element of the government machinery to neutralise the hard line fringe Maoist element and simultaneously bring inclusive development to the areas, which is neither exploitative nor influenced by the interests of powerful lobbies.

<div align="center">NOTES</div>

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Thinking about Counter Terrorism in India's National Strategy

S. Kalyanaraman

This paper is in three parts. First, it makes the case for carrying out a comprehensive and periodic net assessment of the threat of terrorism facing India, and argues that this is an essential prerequisite for designing a counter terrorism strategy. Second, it highlights identity as the root cause of terrorism in the Northeast, in Jammu and Kashmir and in the Indian hinterland comprising several states in northern and western India. This paper does not classify the Maoist challenge to the Indian state and the armed activities of left wing extremist groups as terrorism, which are best characterised as insurgencies. And finally, the paper posits a broad framework for thinking about a counter terrorism strategy for India.

The Imperative of Net Assessment

A critical prerequisite for designing a counter terrorism strategy is a comprehensive net assessment of the threat of terrorism confronting India.[1] Such an assessment must include the nature and scope of the threat as it exists and as it is likely to evolve, the domestic and foreign groups posing the threat, the ideologies, motives and grievances that drive these groups to resort to terrorism, and an assessment of their capabilities, evolving tactics, possible future targets, etc. Although the constant refrain in India is that the country has been a victim of terrorism since the 1980s, the Indian security establishment has not seen it fit to carry out such an audit. Is this because of a lack of political will or political direction? Or is it because the security establishment simply does not have the resources in the form of dedicated personnel and an agency or department to carry out such an assessment? Or is it simply because such an assessment is not considered necessary? Whatever be the reason or combination of reasons, it is imperative that the Indian security establishment carries out, as a first step, such a net assessment as a prerequisite for evolving or perfecting a counter terrorism strategy. If there is a lack of knowledge about who the terrorist actors are, what motivates

them, what capabilities they possess and what capabilities they are in the process of acquiring, what their sources of funding are, who their supporters are, whether there are factions within terrorist groups, the proclivities of terrorist leaders, whether terrorist groups have popular support or do they see themselves as vanguards priming the people for a mass uprising, how can the process of designing a comprehensive strategy to deal with the challenge of terrorism even begin?

An assessment of this kind, moreover, has to be made periodically. Firstly, because, otherwise, the security establishment is likely to operate within a framework of understanding the threat as it existed and not as it constantly evolves. A good example here is the way in which Indian security agencies and political leaders characterised several terrorist attacks in the Indian hinterland a few years ago as the activities of Pakistan-based jihadist groups like the Jaish-e-Mohammad and the Lashkar-e-Taiba or those based in Bangladesh like the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami. It was only after the first email was received in November 2007 from the Indian Mujahideen claiming responsibility for some of these attacks that it became evident that radical Indian Muslim youth were directly involved in such terrorist violence. Further, because of the lack of a comprehensive periodic assessment of the nature and scope of the terrorism challenge confronting India, the security establishment was also blind to the emergence of another set of terrorist actors in the form of radical Hindu youth who had actually carried out some terrorist attacks during this time like the bomb attacks on the Mecca Masjid in Hyderabad and at Ajmer Sharif in Rajasthan. These attacks were initially attributed to foreign jihadists or Indian Islamists. It is therefore imperative that a periodic net assessment of the threat of terrorism is carried out within the Indian security establishment.

A second reason for the necessity of such a periodic net assessment is to take into account the changing tactics, weaponry and capabilities of terrorist groups. A periodic assessment will enable security agencies to respond more effectively and also prevent them from continuing to function on the basis of preconceived notions. The November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai by the Lashkar-e-Taiba offers a good example in this regard. Yes, it is not possible to predict the future or anticipate every move of terrorist groups. Admittedly, surprise is a major fact of life. But the fact that Pakistan-based jihadist groups had carried out a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 necessitated a reassessment of the capabilities of these groups, their likely targets, and the likely form their future attacks may assume. The Indian security establishment knew or should have made an effort to become aware that the attack on the Indian parliament was part of the larger jihad against India that groups like the Lashkar had unleashed. In June 1999, for instance, the chief of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hafeez Sayeed, had declared publicly that the mujahideen are waging jihad not only for the liberation of Kashmir but also for the independence of India's 200 million Muslims. He went on to note

that the jihad will continue till Himachal Pradesh, Bihar, Hyderabad, Uttar Pradesh and Junagadh are liberated from Indian rule.[2] Sayeed had also subsequently declared that his mujahideen will unfurl the Islamic flag on Delhi's Red Fort.[3] And almost precisely a year after this declaration the Lashkar-e-Taiba demonstrated its intent by carrying out an attack on the Red Fort in December 2000. This lacuna in the Indian security establishment's understanding of the evolving nature of the threat posed by the Lashkar-e-Taiba and other groups, domestic and foreign, could have been avoided if only periodic net assessments of the threat of terrorism had been made.

A third related reason for carrying out periodic net assessments of the threat of terrorism is to ensure that a well thought out counter terrorism strategy and counter terrorism measures are adopted proactively instead of in knee jerk fashion in the aftermath of an attack. Thinking through the issue and framing a suitable counter terrorism strategy helps prevent needless panic and excessive reaction, which are precisely some of the objectives of terrorist groups. Counter measures taken under such circumstances will, moreover, only result in the adoption of ad hoc measures that are not subsequently fine-tuned or followed up to deal with the evolving situation and the evolving nature of the threat.

For instance, the 1993 terrorist attacks in Mumbai by the Dawood Ibrahim syndicate led to the initiation of joint patrolling—termed Operation Swan—along the Gujarat and Maharashtra coasts to prevent the smuggling in of arms and explosives through the coast as had been done by the Dawood gang.[4] But given the absence of any subsequent comprehensive periodic assessments and consequently the need to improve the counter measures adopted or to imagine the nature and scope of threats to anticipate, the infiltration by the Lashkar-e-Taiba's 10-member team could not be prevented in spite of some intelligence being available on that score. Again, after the 26/11 attacks, there was a flurry of activity in terms of a renewed emphasis on coastal security and a reorganisation of the coastal security set-up.[5] But this is clearly not enough. What is needed is thinking ahead about future attacks, the form they could take, how they may be executed, and the evolving capabilities and tactics of terrorist groups. And for this, the basic prerequisite is periodic assessment of the evolving nature of the terrorist threat confronting the country.

Another example of ad hoc measures taken in the heated atmosphere of the aftermath of an attack is the decision after 26/11 to establish NSG hubs in some cities to enable a quicker response.[6] But the fact remains that it will still take these teams a few hours to reach the venue of a terrorist attack, unless of course the target happens to be in the same city where the NSG hubs are located. This was a stop-gap response to the heat and emotions generated by 26/11. Instead, it would be far more useful to establish SWAT teams within the police forces of states and cities that are more prone to terrorist attacks, since such units will be able to respond in a matter of minutes instead of hours. The police forces of Delhi and Punjab began to take the lead

in this regard in the aftermath of 26/11; some other police forces like those of NOIDA, for instance, have drawn inspiration from their example.[7] However, given the history of counter terrorism police forces in India, it is not clear how long these experiments will last, especially given the propensity of these forces to commit excesses as well as their actual record in rising to the challenge posed by terrorist groups.

Scepticism is warranted given, for instance, the record of special police teams in tackling the challenge of terrorism in Mumbai. The Mumbai Police had established an Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) as early as December 1990, drawing inspiration from the SWAT team of the Los Angeles Police Department. But because of the excesses it committed, including the infamous shootout at the Lokhandwala Complex,[8] the ATS was wound down in January 1993. And this happened two months before the Dawood Ibrahim gang carried out its multiple terrorist attacks in the city. Yet, it took the Mumbai Police eleven more years to re-establish the ATS. And when it did so in July 2004, the tasks of the new ATS were broadly defined as gathering information about the activities of anti-national elements within the state, co-ordinating with "information agencies" of the Centre and other states, and tracking and eliminating the activities of criminal syndicates including the smuggling of drugs and counterfeit currency notes.[9] But this force proved incapable of handling the 26/11 terrorist attacks and its chief, Hemant Karkare, and some of his deputies lost their life as they rushed around to battle the Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists.

Because of the ATS's inability to tackle terrorism, the Mumbai Police found it necessary to establish an elite anti-terrorist squad called Force One. Reports, however, indicate that this commando unit has simply not gathered much force. The land allotted to serve as its hub is locked in a dispute with tribal people living there, which has also meant lack of space for training.[10] In addition, the training itself is reportedly inadequate given the lack of ammunition for practice firing. While a Force One commando fires 25 to 30 rounds of ammunition a day, NSG personnel reportedly use nothing less than 300 rounds even in routine practice sessions.[11] Furthermore, Force One is also reportedly facing a serious equipment crunch. Only 10 per cent of the commandos have been provided with bullet-proof vests and helmets, while other essentials like blast-proof eyewear, stun grenades, digital radios, etc. have not been procured.[12] Even more embarrassing was the incident when two Force One commandos almost collapsed due to exhaustion when they had to stand under a November sun for 45 minutes after having given a one-hour demonstration of their skills to assembled political leaders.[13]

The main reason for this state of affairs appears to be lack of funds. Between its establishment in the aftermath of 26/11 and November 2010, Force One held only three training sessions of 15 days each with the trainers from Israel, because each sessions costs Rs. 10 lakh.[14] While the Maharashtra government allotted Rs. 126 crore for enhancing the capabilities of the police

force in the aftermath of 26/11 and followed it up with another Rs. 102 crore in 2009, this has clearly been inadequate considering that these funds were earmarked for a host of purposes—upgrading equipment, training personnel, expanding the Quick Reaction Teams, and setting up Force One.[15]

A main factor that has hampered counter-terrorism measures in India has been the lack of political will to initiate the reform of the police, who are the first responders in a terrorist attack and who moreover should be the main source of intelligence about the activities of suspicious individuals and groups. As is the norm, over the years a number of committees have been appointed in the aftermath of a particularly violent terrorist attack. These have highlighted the imperative of initiating the necessary reforms and have even mapped the necessary measures in great detail. But there has been very poor follow-up. It is well known that India's police-to-population ratio is well below international standards. It stood at 126 police personnel per 100,000 people in 2006, and fell further in 2007 to 125 per 100,000. The international standard is between 225 and 500 police personnel per 100,000 people. In addition, there is an acute shortage at the leadership level: a 15.3 per cent deficit against sanctioned strength at the levels of Director General of Police and Deputy Inspector General; and a 35 per cent deficit at the levels of Senior Superintendent of Police and Deputy Superintendent of Police.[16]

It is universally acknowledged that counter terrorism is best carried out by police and intelligence agencies. The Intelligence Bureau, for its part, has a grand total of 300 personnel who are actually involved in generating counter terrorism intelligence from the field. And the total number of personnel in the organisation and those deployed in the field are also estimated to be much less than what is considered necessary.[17] This is the state of affairs nearly a decade after the Girish Saxena Committee submitted a report on intelligence reforms in 2001. To recall, the Saxena Committee was established after the intelligence failure of Kargil. While some of the Committee's recommendations were indeed implemented like the establishment of the Multi Agency Centre, it appears that this Centre did not perform its function adequately and it was re-established with a renewed mandate in the aftermath of the 26/11 attacks.[18]

All these reinforce the fact that measures are taken only in the panic and sense of failure generated by an incident, only to be plagued by inadequate follow-up and a return to the usual quiescence and the regular forgetfulness till the next attack after which again a mad scramble ensues briefly. And the cycle goes on. Instead, what is needed is proactive thinking about the evolving threat of terrorism and how to tackle it instead of adopting knee jerk and ad hoc measures post and during crises, and then forgetting all about them on the assumption that the steps taken will suffice. Given that there has been no reduction in terrorist attacks even after some of these recommended measures have been implemented, it is clear that they are clearly inadequate and that they need to be refined and reinforced by additional measures in

the face of the evolving nature and scope of the threat. And for this the essential prerequisite is: the periodic net assessment of the threat of terrorism.

Causes of Terrorism in India

There are three theatres or regions where India confronts the threat of terrorism at present, albeit in varying degrees of intensity—the Northeast in general and Assam and Manipur in particular, Jammu and Kashmir, and the Indian hinterland.

The Northeast is home to several tens of militant groups, though this region has now become relatively quiet because of the various ceasefires negotiated between the Indian government and many of the groups operating in the region. The only prominent groups that have not entered into a ceasefire at present are based in Manipur. The principal motivating factor for the resort to terrorism by rebel groups in the region stems from their sense that their ethnic community is distinct from 'mainland' Indians, from their understanding that these territories were not part of India before the advent of British rule, and based on which they demand independence. In essence, the root cause of terrorism in the Northeast is the assertion of distinct identities; and in many cases this assertion of identity is not only vis-à-vis India and mainland Indians but also with reference to other tribal groups within the Northeast itself. Thus, the fundamental challenge before India as far as the Northeast is concerned is to reconcile the sense of a distinct identity that these groups represent and articulate with that of the broader identity of India as a multicultural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious democratic polity and equalitarian society.

In the case of Jammu and Kashmir, the question of a distinct identity and the state's distinct place in the Indian Union have become intertwined with political disenchantment caused by the repeated interventions of the Centre in the state's political process. Of course, the Centre's repeated interventions have been driven by the fear of the state otherwise spinning out of Indian control, particularly given that Pakistan is a party to the Kashmir conflict. A critical point in such interventions was reached in 1987 when electoral malpractices led to the denial of victory to several contestants of the Muslim Conference, many of whom subsequently took up arms to attain 'azadi' or merge with Pakistan. It cannot be denied that there continues to be a substantial degree of popular support for the cause of azadi, as has been evident during the last three summers of street protests. Instead of misreading this demand as a vague and anguished expression of disenchantment with governance and the inability of elected state governments to offer the people better socio-economic prospects, the issue must be understood as one of identity. Some in Kashmir assert that identity in the context of autonomy for the state, others in the context of independence, and some others in the context of a merger with Pakistan. But the fact remains that the assertion of each of these groups is of Kashmir's distinct identity. Thus, the challenge once again

before the Indian state is reconciling the Kashmiri sense of a distinct identity with that of the broader identity that the idea of India represents.

In Jammu and Kashmir as well as in the Indian hinterland, there is also the additional challenge of dealing with Pakistan's sponsorship of terrorist violence through jihadist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba. From one perspective, even the India-Pakistan conflict can be understood as a clash of distinct identities. Pakistan's claim on Kashmir has stemmed from the position that the latter is a Muslim-majority state, notwithstanding the fact that this norm of partition was not applicable to the princely states. And Islamist groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba are simply the radical face of Pakistan's very conception as an Islamic state. In the words of Hussein Haqqani, it is the ideological commitment to the idea of Pakistan as an Islamic state that gradually evolved into a strategic commitment to exporting jihadist ideology; in this sense militant Islam is essentially a state project gone awry.[19] Thus, even the challenge posed by Pakistan and the radical terrorist forces it sponsors against India boil down to the issue of identity.

The third theatre where terrorist groups are active is the Indian hinterland comprising several states across northern and western India.[20] Three different sets of actors are engaged in terrorist violence in this theatre in an action-reaction cycle. A group like the Indian Mujahideen, comprising of radical Indian Muslim youth, has been resorting to terrorism driven by the grievance that the organs of the Indian state including the police and the judiciary as well as the political system at large have failed to safeguard Muslims and their interests. They specifically cite the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the widespread communal violence that occurred in its wake as well as the more recent targeting of Muslims in the communal violence in Gujarat in 2002 as reasons for waging a jihad against India and a war for civilisation. In essence, these occasional lapses in the political process coupled with the rise of radical Islam in the region appear to have forced open the issue of the identity of Indian Muslims. For their part, radical Hindu youth who have become mobilised on the issue of a Hindu India during the 1980s and 1990s have become incensed by the repeated terrorist attacks unleashed by the Indian Mujahideen and the Lashkar-e-Taiba, and seek vengeance against the perpetrators of these attacks and their sympathisers. Thus, this cycle of violence also ultimately boils down to one of assertion of new identities.

Framework for Thinking about a Counter Terrorism Strategy

Based on this understanding, a framework for thinking about a counter terrorism strategy for India can be worked out at three levels—long term, medium term and short term.

If the threat of terrorism confronting India is understood in terms of assertions of distinct identities and contestations over identity, then a counter terrorism strategy has to necessarily involve the strengthening and propagation of the idea of India as a multicultural society and a democratic

polity where all groups are equal stakeholders and where there is enough space for all groups to celebrate their particular identities. In addition, especially given the reality of the mobilisation of the Hindu Right which has upset the former political equilibrium, a new political consensus needs to be forged to promote communal harmony and maintain the strict rule of law. This will have to unfold and be sustained over the long term.

These steps are, however, unlikely to counter the challenge posed by Pakistan and the jihadist groups it sponsors against India, though Pakistan itself has become a victim of the ideology it has fostered and of the radical forces it continues to nurture. The options before India to bring about fundamental changes within Pakistan are limited, even non-existent. India does not have the capability to force a change within Pakistan through an all-out war and a regime change, especially given Pakistan's possession of a nuclear deterrent. Nor is the option of a limited war or the calibrated use of military strikes likely to force a change in Pakistan. Exercising these options will neither deter Pakistan nor the groups operating from its territory. In any event, the limits of military coercion were clearly demonstrated during the crisis of 2001-2002. Any such action, moreover, will only strengthen the hands of the military establishment, whose very raison d'etre is anti-Indianism built on the foundation of the pressing threat posed by India to Pakistan's very survival. An attempt by the Pakistan military to orchestrate such a threat perception by highlighting the possibility of an Indian military response was clearly evident in the aftermath of the 26/11 attacks. Under these circumstances, the only practical option before India appears to be one of encouraging Pakistan, in tandem with the international community, to weed out the jihad culture that has taken root in its territory and which has begun to exact a heavy toll upon Pakistan itself, and to move towards becoming a moderate democracy.

In the medium term, India must enhance the strength and capabilities of its police forces and the intelligence apparatus, as well as fine-tune mechanisms for the flow of information and coordination of action.

And in the short term, the fight needs to be taken to domestic terrorist groups through a concerted police- and intelligence-led campaign. These efforts must focus on arresting terrorist cadres and leaders and bringing them to justice. At the same time, international cooperation must be fostered to deny safe havens to terrorist groups and choke off their funding and sources of weaponry. Last, but not least, potentially vulnerable targets must be identified and protected.

NOTES

1. I have drawn on the ideas of Dr. Bruce Hoffman to make this case for a periodic comprehensive assessment of the threat of terrorism. See his testimony titled "Combating Terrorism: In Search of a National Strategy," before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee

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5. Ibid, pp. 28-32.

6. For the flurry of measures initiated after the 26/1 Mumbai attacks, see P. Chidambaram, "HM Statement at the Conference of Chief Ministers on Internal Security," January 6, 2009, at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=46412 (accessed April 21, 2011).

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8. The inspiration for the 2007 Bollywood movie *Shootout at Lokhandwala*.

9. Mumbai Police, http://www.mumbaipolice.org/special/anit_terror_squad.htm (accessed April 21, 2011).

10. "26/11: No Force in Force One," *NDTV*, November 26, 2010, at http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/26-11-no-force-in-force-one-68649 (accessed April 21, 2011).

11. Presley Thomas, "Is Force 1 Good Enough?" *Hindustan Times*, October 10, 2009, at http://www.hindustantimes.com/Is-Force-1-good-enough/Article1-463389.aspx (accessed April 21, 2011).

12. "26/11: No Force in Force One," *NDTV*, op. cit.

13. Vijay V. Singh, "Force One Cops Can't Stand Heat," *Times of India*, November 25, 2009, at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-11-25/india/28081712_1_commandos-force-one-home-minister (accessed April 21, 2011).

14. "26/11: No Force in Force One," *NDTV*, op. cit.

15. Meena Menon, "A smart anti-terror force for Mumbai now," *The Hindu*, November 25, 2009, at http://www.hindu.com/2009/11/25/stories/2009112561591800.htm (accessed April 21, 2011).

16. Ajay Sahni, "A triumph of form over content," *Seminar*, no. 593, January 2009, at http://www.india-seminar.com/2009/593/593_ajai_sahni.htm (accessed December 19, 2010).

17. Ibid.

18. See Home Minister P. Chidambaram, "HM Statement at the Conference of Chief Ministers on Internal Security," January 6, 2009, op. cit.

19. Hussein Haqqani, "The Role of Islam in Pakistan's Future," *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 28, no. 1, Winter 2004-05, pp. 89-90.

20. For a comprehensive assessment of the challenge of terrorism in the Indian hinterland, see S. Kalyanaraman, "India and the Challenge of Terrorism in the Hinterland," *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 34, no. 5, September 2010, pp. 702-16.

CHAPTER 9

International Terrorism and National Security Strategy

Deepa Prakash

What is the place of international terrorism in the formulation of Indian National Security Strategy (NSS)? The answer to this question remains unsettled. The resilience of Al Qaeda in its base on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and its growing network of affiliates as well as continued threats from state and non-state entities across the border present clear international threats to Indian national security. At the same time, unique challenges from internal movements and other non-traditional security threats beg the question that to what extent should transnational terrorism determine and figure in the formulation of India's national security strategy. This paper outlines the key trends evident in the evolution of international terrorism and assesses their significance for India. I contend that international terrorism in the next decade is of mixed and partial relevance for India. My paper suggests that India's NSS response should be attentive not just to areas of convergence with the international community on terrorism but also areas of dissonance, stemming from India's own experience, context, identity and strategic environment.

I ask the following questions:

1. How do trends in the evolution of terrorism relate to Indian interests and experience?
2. How can India balance a global role in combating international terrorism with the unique domestic challenges to national security?

Before embarking on the rest of this paper, it is pertinent to state the scope of my paper. For the purposes of the IDSA strategy project, this paper is restricted to the following First, I focus on examining international or transnational terrorism only. While India's domestic challenges and context play an integral role in directing India's counter-terrorism initiatives at the multilateral level, in this paper I do not deal with the important subject of domestic terrorism and political violence. Secondly, I do not explicitly delve into the issue of counter-terrorism, although counter-terrorism studies are the

other side of the terrorism studies coin. For the purposes of this paper, I confine myself to studying the implications for India's NSS in the light of the developments in international terrorism. Lastly, the paper does not make concrete recommendations for policy in the vein of a briefing but instead outlines the contending pressures and issues that India will have to balance over the next decade while formulating a response to international terrorism as a part of a broad-based NSS.[1]

The paper is broadly organised as follows. In the first section, I assess the place of terrorism within the grand strategy and National Security Strategy (NSS),[2] by making a comparative study of where terrorism figures in the national security strategy of key countries comparable to India in role and interests. Section two outlines the key contours of the evolution of international terrorism and discusses how these relate to and impact Indian experience and interests. Based on the core trends in the literature as well as the empirical record of international terrorism, I argue in section three that these trajectories and preoccupations partially reflect the challenges faced by India, thus setting up dilemmas for India's role in leading global terrorism initiatives. These further inform my discussion, in the fourth and last section, of policy orientations for India in the coming decade.

Terrorism in National Security Strategy

National Security Strategy

Before discussing the place of international terrorism in the formulation of a National Security Strategy (NSS), it is important to have an understanding of NSS. An NSS is based on the larger concept of a grand strategy and is a formulation for using the military, diplomatic, economic and political resources at the disposal of the state to best serve long-term national interest. As Gaddis succinctly puts it "Grand Strategy is the calculated relationship of means to large end." (Gaddis 2009) Such strategising however is not unconstrained and an NSS must be based on an understanding of the limits and constraints of a state's power and resources and also take into cognizance the cultural and ideational 'screens', within which a state operates (Feaver 2009).[3] NSS is responsive to changing threats, structures and opportunities, which is why it is a fluid concept. Finally, a successful NSS needs to coherently tie policy to underlying philosophical commitments and orientations. Dissonance delegitmises the strategy and makes for politically costly policy outcomes. Thus, Indian policy makers should deliberate three issues while incorporating transnational terrorism into the formulation of Indian NSS: first, what are India's objectives with regard to dealing with international terrorism; second, what are the material and ideational aspects that constrain India's ability to respond to international terrorism, and third, the need for coherence between those capabilities and the pursuit of policy options.

The Place of Terrorism in National Security Strategy

India's experience with terrorism, both domestic and international, has been long and tumultuous so the place of terrorism in Indian national security policy is ahead of the curve compared to other major states. Indeed, broad changes in the international environment since the 9/11 attacks in 2001 have led to a revamping of NSS in several key states with comparable stakes in international security to India. Over the last couple of years, the US, the UK, France and Turkey etc. have revised their national security strategies.[4] In 2008, Germany's CDU party began actively deliberating Germany's first NSS since the end of the Second World War. A renewed importance is therefore being given to rethinking national security strategy in a world that looks markedly different since the immediate end of the Cold War. A common thread running through these articulations is that National Security Strategy needs to be geared to contend with a new 'age of uncertainty' and risk.[6] These uncertainties stem from two other commonly cited features—the replacement of threats from states by threats from non-state actors and the related identification of international terrorism as a primary national security concern. Thus, terrorism is now firmly a front burner national security issue for many liberal democracies, thus expanding the notion of NSS from state-centric military issues[7]. As mentioned above, India's long experience with terrorism as an integral part of national security should make it relatively easy to formulate an NSS that incorporates the issue of international terrorism but as I will argue below and throughout this paper, the current trajectory of international terrorism does not allow easy solutions answers for Indian policy makers in this realm.

National Strategy as Danger or Opportunity

Despite the place of terrorism at the forefront and centre of the NSS of many important states in the international system, transnational terrorism presents a dilemma for those interested in an Indian NSS. If strategy stems from a sense of 'danger', then the resilience of Al Qaeda as a global network and the rise of Islamist groups clearly places international terrorism squarely on the Indian security agenda. This sense of danger or 'emergency' as some have seen it (Schepple, 2004) has already led to the creation of a set of legal and normative instruments that call for states to adopt a unified and standardised approach to combating terrorism[8] and India's global commitment and leadership within the emerging regime is already evident in its key role in drafting the Draft Comprehensive Agreement on International Terrorism.

However, as the ambivalence of the Obama Administration's own NSS suggests, a central focus on international terrorism risks undermining attention on other, arguably equally credible long-term threats to national security, which the array of topics raised at the IDSA strategy workshop attests. Given the limited military, diplomatic and economic resources the

extent to which international terrorism should figure in an NSS becomes important because the costs of overreaction are significant. In the Indian context, these questions are compounded by the disconnect between terrorism as perceived and experienced by Western liberal democracies and India's own unique challenges as a state where internal insurgency and externally sponsored terrorism have long figured in the national security calculus. Thus, if 'strategy' reflects a proactive and forward thinking approach rather than one that is reactive to 'danger', then it is debatable to what extent Indian policy towards terrorism should respond to international trends. Given the limits of resources and constraints on statecraft, it becomes imperative to review closely how far the trajectories of international terrorism resonate with Indian interests. The next section of this paper analyses this briefly.

Trends in International Terrorism and the Indian Context

In this section I outline the main distinguishing characteristics of contemporary transnational terrorism. These are based on expert and scholarly analyses as well as data on the empirical record of international terrorism.[9] I then argue that these trends have mixed resonance for Indian security interests.

The evolution of terrorism is understood and traced in a fairly standard way by terrorism experts and scholars. The era of 'transnational terrorism', with its explicitly political agenda and formal organisational structure, emerged in the 1970s as a product of the internationalisation of the Israel-Palestine conflict.[10] High profile airline hijackings, hostage taking and attacks on leaders and diplomats set terrorism on the international agenda during this period and saw the promulgation of the first piecemeal UN conventions on terrorism. Scholars trace the next shift to the end of the Cold War with the evolution of political conflict in the Middle East and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which together laid the foundation for the emergence of Al Qaeda. To those assessing the significance of the Sarin gas attacks in Tokyo, the 1993 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the US embassies in Africa, all signs appeared to point towards an 'especially disquieting' set of impulses, logics and scale driving political violence (Juergensmeyer 2000). Thus, the notion of 'new terrorism' has gained ascendancy, backed by data tracking the empirical record of terrorist attacks. This view broadly coheres with the way the US and other Western liberal democracies understand the emerging threat from terrorism. I organise the trends identified as constituting the 'new' terrorism under seven broad themes. My purpose in this section is not to affirm the veracity of these trends but instead to highlight mainstream understanding of contemporary terrorism.

Goals and Motivations: The decline of 'traditional' terrorism and the rise of religious/Islamist terrorism

The first dimension concerns new goals and motivations of terrorism. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, inspiration as well as material support for leftist parties dried up (Hoffman 1999). Ethnic nationalist violence that erupted at the end of the Cold War is also placed within the category of 'traditional terrorism'. 'Traditional' organisations seek 'identifiable' things such as secession, autonomy or territory and explicated these causes in the wake of their attacks. The short-lived interest in the connection between poverty as a root cause of terrorism has waned in the light of little empirical support for this proposition. The focus is thus now squarely on the role of religion and on Islamist movements in particular. In contrast, 'new terrorists' may not link their actions to comprehensible political demands, instead citing religious or apocalyptic goals (Hoffman 1999). This has led to a debate about the extent to which grand strategies such as 'containment' or 'deterrence' can deal with violent non-state actors.

Organisational Structure: The rise of networks and decline of state-sponsors

The second dimension refers to the changing organisational structure of international terrorism. This refers both to the prevalence of networks of non-state groups and the diminishing role of states in fostering international terrorism. The 'new terrorism' thesis accords importance to transnational networks, cells and 'protean' structures between geographically and politically far-flung groups as exemplified by the idea of a 'leaderless Jihad'. These networks are in contrast to the previously clear command and control structures between groups and state sponsors of terrorism (Hoffman 1999, Hoffman RAND article, Stern 2003; Laqeuer; 9/11 Commission report). What is more, these groups learn from each other. As Enders and Sandler state, it is an irony that 'collective action amongst terrorist groups in sharing training and financing has been quite substantial' compared to that between states.

This shift goes hand in hand with a perceived decline in state sponsorship of terrorism. Some argue that state sponsorship remains salient but has taken on a more covert and passive form (Hoffman 1999a; Crenshaw 2001; Byman 2005). But even these arguments rest a lack of capacity argument according to which state sponsors often lack the means to crack down on terrorist activity within their borders. Thus state sponsorship is increasingly centred on the provision of safe haven, or even more passively as 'breeding grounds' for terrorism but the notion of active sponsorship is in decline.

Changing scope and nature of terrorist attacks

The very notion of terrorism rests on the premise of indiscriminate violence. But while the earlier form of terrorism implied attacking the instruments and

symbols of the state, it has now come to focus directly on non-combatants and civilians. Since groups may have religious goals that are only tangentially related to political objectives, they are seen as willing to inflict and sustain large amounts of civilian casualties[11]. While winning is not always a defined and realistic goal for such groups, losing is "unthinkable" (Morgan). Juergensmeyer argues that while these goals may appear irrational and 'pointless' to outside observers, people who are part of these movements understand such acts as being purposive and part of a larger 'script'. This move towards indiscriminatness also accounts for the increased use of suicide terrorism, although later work on this phenomenon has suggested other, more rational logics for the preference for suicide attacks (Pape 2005). This also leads to the fear that terrorists would gravitate towards weapons of mass destruction.[12] Indeed, the Obama Administration's NSS identifies the primary threat to US national security as coming not from terrorism per se but from nuclear weapons deployed by terrorists.

Three elements make for this formulation: first, the increasing danger from WMDs/CBRNs in the hands of terrorists who exhibit a growing preference for high casualty symbolic acts or 'spectaculars' (Hoffman 1999; Enders and Sandler 2002; Cronin 2003); secondly, linked to the previous point, terrorist groups are willing to inflict and sustain high levels of violence in the face of overwhelming odds. Thirdly, the danger from cyber-terrorism and the conduct of a war of ideas via the internet also reflects a change in the nature of terrorism.

Increased Lethality

These trends work together in augmenting the lethality of terrorism. Indeed, despite a steady decline in overall incidents from their peak during the 1970s, there has been a rise in the lethality stemming from 'spectaculars'.

Targets of Terrorism

The new shifts also account for changed targets of international terrorism and the sources of that threat underscoring two points :

First, that the US, as well as US interests and allies, are now the primary targets of Trans-national terrorism networks.

Sources of Threats: The predominance of Al Qaeda

As a consequence, the primary threat is assessed as coming from Al Qaeda and emanating from its base in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. The current strength of Al Qaeda is the subject of debate. Experts such as Hoffman, argue that Al Qaeda has passed the 'longevity' test that few terrorist groups manage to and is now operating exactly as its name 'the base' suggests.[13] This is due to its ability to 'evolve, adapt and adjust' to post 9/11 counter-terrorism measures. Hoffman highlights four aspects of Al Qaeda: Al Qaeda Central,

which consists of the 'remnants of the pre-9/11 Al Qaeda organisation', Al Qaeda affiliates and associates who 'benefited from Bin Laden's largesse and/ or spiritual guidance and/or have received training, arms, money and other assistance from Al Qaeda.'

The last two elements are Al Qaeda locals who are 'adherents' and have or have had some direct connection with Al Qaeda and finally, the Al Qaeda Network which are radicals with no direct connection with Al Qaeda but are 'motivated by a shared sense of enmity and grievance towards the United States…' Hoffman assesses the primary threat as originating from the first two dimensions of Al Qaeda (Hoffman Testimony 2005). Because of the varied aspects of Al Qaeda and its tendency to inspire disaffected 'bunches of men' there is also a renewed policy and scholarly interest in the mechanisms and causes of radicalisation.

The preceding section has briefly outlined the main lines along which transnational terrorism is understood to be developing and the main contours along which states will try to combat terrorism in the coming decade. It is important to note that each of the dimensions of the 'new terrorism' is refuted, contextualised or problematised in alternate accounts which emphasise continuities in the targets, motivations and ideas surrounding terrorism (Cronin 2003; Duyvestyen 2004). However, there is a broad policy and academic consensus on these trends in international terrorism, which has led to a specific research and policy agenda, as exemplified by the thrust of the NSS articulations of major Western liberal democracies.[14]

Implications for Indian National Security Strategy

As readers will have surmised from the above discussion, these trajectories have complex and mixed implications in the Indian context. On the one hand, some trends closely reflect India's interests and security preoccupations. As Admiral Mehta acknowledges, the existence of 'sinister non-state forces' and their connections with state actors present security dilemmas for India.[15] Al Qaeda will constitute an important threat to Indian security, compounded by its growing affiliations with Pakistan-based groups such as the JeM, LeT and LiJ, which have the capacity to threaten security even by themselves. Secondly India's growing ties with the United States figure increasingly in both states' national security strategies and will continue to do so.[16] Shared interests in counter-terrorism cooperation, intelligence sharing and in the stability of Pakistan are the important cornerstones of this partnership. These ties will augment the threat from Al Qaeda and its affiliates in the coming decade. The spectre of nuclear proliferation and cyber terrorism and their connection with international terrorism also represent problems for Indian national security for which solutions must necessarily rely on international cooperation.

Despite these commonalities of interest, it is also important to see what

does not figure in the emerging international agenda on terrorism. The trends outlined above sideline issues that violence and the continued salience of active state sponsorship remain vital threats. For instance the idea that poverty may in fact spur terrorism is not as easily dismissible in the Indian context as it appears to be in the realm of transnational terrorism given that the Naxalite movement has been identified as the greatest threat to Indian national security by the prime minister. Thus while networks of non-state actors are relevant for Indian security, the strong relationship between these networks and supportive states remains important in determining the Indian agenda.

Furthermore, India's long-standing experience of contending with internal and external terrorism highlights issues that have not yet been fully realised in the international discourse on terrorism. For instance, concerns over the role of Pakistan's ISI point us to the many shades of state sponsorship evident in empirical reality of terrorism. While experts such as Byman (2005) have urged policy makers to assess state sponsorship as constituting a spectrum of behaviour rather than as a rigid category, it has been difficult to translate into international strategy. India is in a good position to spearhead agenda setting in the realm of counter-terrorism by distinguishing between 'rogue elements' within states in contrast to the broad concept of state sponsorship itself. This has ramifications for how states think about not just the ISI but also other such elements such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, to give one prominent example. Similarly, the somewhat simplistic and uncritical linking of 'Islamism' with terrorism represents a practical and ideational disjuncture with India's multi-cultural and diverse identity on one hand and its experience of the plurality of threats on the other, defying simplistic associations. Attentiveness to cultural and ideational 'screens' and the strengths inherent in a pluralistic democratic polity must be reflected in India's NSS.

Lastly, an area of growing scholarly, policy and activist concern is the impact of counter-terrorism measures on civil liberties and human rights. Now that, what Schepple referred to as, the 'international state of emergency' following 9/11 has began to wane, the violation of human rights is emerging as an issue integrally related to international terrorism. Although this paper consciously does not deal with trends in counter-terrorism, it is pertinent to note that issues such as political assassinations, targeted killings and the use of torture are now on the table. India's ability to formulate a strategy that is attentive to these issues and that champions human rights will be important for influencing both domestic and international perceptions.[17]

I have thus far suggested that the implications of transnational terrorism for an Indian NSS are mixed and that any deliberation on grand strategy should be attentive not just to the commonalities of interest but also to the particularities of the Indian experience. Trends that drive the international

agenda on terrorism do not fully account for the gamut of interlinked threats facing India. These problems reflect a more complex security environment than is reflected in the international terrorism agenda and emphasise continuities rather than a clear shift from patterns of the past. Indeed, the Indian context suggests a need to be attentive to the linkages between 'old' and 'new' forms of terrorism and the relationships between transnational and domestic movements. What would the key components of a national strategy on terrorism be? This last section details the choppy waters that India will have to navigate to balance the trajectories of transnational terrorism into a comprehensive national security strategy.

Elements of an Indian National Security Strategy Related to Terrorism

As I stated at the start of this paper, the NSS is based on 'where you want to go' keeping in mind the optimal equation of material and ideational constraints and strengths.

India's interest with regard to international terrorism is threefold. First, it is to secure India against Pakistan based groups and Al Qaeda affiliates that represent the primary international threat to India. Secondly, it must do this while avoiding getting involved in long-drawn counter-terrorism campaigns that will detract from other strategic concerns as well as domestic threats. Thirdly, it must assume a leadership role in the emerging counter-terrorism regime in cooperation with major players while being mindful of the perspective afforded by its own experience. This involves shaping the international terrorism regime's agenda as well as complying with it.

Limits and Constraints

While India does not have the military force that states such as the US and the UK have brought to bear for combating terrorism, the benefits of such an approach are far from clear, as is evident from current US dilemmas in Afghanistan or the still unsettled legacy of military operations against the LTTE by the Sri Lankan government. Thus it is both a constraint as well as an opportunity that Indian national security strategy will have to take into account for developing tools for combating terrorism.

At a multi-lateral level, India must continue its global role as a norm entrepreneur in the international effort against terrorism. This means doing what it can to comply with international counter-terrorism measures to counter the ability of networks to operate easily across borders. But at the same time, it must use its own experience to push for the inclusion of issues that are being sidelined on the basis of dominant interpretations and filtering of terrorism trends. Thus, India must:

- Extend, as it is already doing, its concept of international terrorism

to focus on the emergence of transnational networks.
- Emphasise the continued salience of state sponsorship of terrorism but be attentive to its myriad forms.
- Not shy away from debates over the definition of terrorism—India has strong reserves of political capital with many developing countries and in West Asia for whom the definition of terrorism is far from settled. While there are risks in doing so, India must be open to deliberation on definitional issues that are key to achieving meaningful consensus beyond piecemeal measures.
- Stemming from the previous point, balance interests and relationships in West Asia Along side issue convergence with the West.
- Work to persuade important states for whom terrorism is not a front-burner issue of the depth of challenges faced by India from these quarters and its resilience in confronting them.

Two relationships are key to dealing with terrorism and the Indian NSS: India's complex relationship with Pakistan and India's growing ties with the United States.

With regard to Pakistan

India's view of Pakistan as the 'epicentre' of international terrorism is now conventional wisdom. This constitutes a vindication of sorts for Indian diplomacy but the changed context now facing Pakistan requires a flexible and nuanced response from India. Such a response requires understanding the constraints placed on the government of Pakistan by radical movements and terrorist groups and identifying those elements that are chiefly responsible for supporting violence targeted at India. Thus India must

- Rhetorically and behaviourally demonstrate interest and support for the stability of Pakistan as well as Afghanistan while calling attention to rogue elements within the state apparatus.

Understand and support capacity building in counter-terrorism for these states:

- Be attentive to linkages between domestic groups of concern for India and transnational networks.
- Make an effort to locate and proscribe the multiple avatars of groups—both in terms of reducing the operations of the groups as well as delegitimising them.

With regard to the United States
- India's growing ties with the US and the US's status as the primary target international terrorism bring with it the increased threat from Al Qaeda and its affiliates.

- India must navigate the US-Pakistan relationship with a shared interest in ensuring Pakistan's stability and capacity to sustain counter-terrorism measures.
- Side-by-side, India must act as a check against too narrow a US approach towards combating terrorism—thus resisting pressure to commit too readily to too broad an agenda against 'international terrorism'.

Conclusion

This paper has sought to highlight the tensions and dilemmas India must weigh in deciding its response to the emerging patterns and developments of international terrorism while formulating a National Security Strategy. While the threat from international terrorism is considerable, India must weigh its response in light of unique domestic challenges and other pressing interests that require the nuanced management of statecraft so that it is attentive to 'danger' but seizes 'opportunity'. I hope to have suggested that this is a conversation worth having.

Notes

1. As the paper develops and with feedback from the workshop, this could eventually be added to the paper.
2. Throughout this paper I shall use the terms 'Grand Strategy' and 'National Security Strategy' interchangeably. This is appropriate given the wide array of topics included under the idea of 'National Security Strategy' in the IDSA strategy workshop agenda. Some would argue that National Security Strategy is one, albeit a major, component of an overall Grand Strategy but a preliminary analysis of various NSS documents suggests a similar broad view.
3. Peter Feaver "What is Grand Strategy and why do we need it" available at http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/08/what_is_grand_strategy_and_why_do_we_need_it
4. Turkey's 'Red Book' is not publicly shared but its contents are the subject of public speculation and comment. The other national security statements and France's white paper on security are freely available.
5. See the German white paper available on http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_germanys_national_security_strategy/
6. The very title of the latest British National Security Strategy statement is derived from this idea of uncertainty.
7. Of course, some of India's key partners do not face a direct threat from international terrorism, which Indian NSS should also take into account.
8. I draw on John Lewis Gaddis's idea that suggests that American Grand Strategy stems from creative responses to danger at pivotal times. See John Lewis Gaddis (2009) "What is Grand Strategy?" Keynote Address at Duke University February 26, 2009. Available at http://www.duke.edu/web/agsp/grandstrategypaper.pdf
9. A variety of databases—government, think tank and academic collect incident data on international terrorism. For some mainstream sources see this web page compiled by students at Haverford College. http://people.haverford.edu/bmendels/terror_attacks Much of my analysis is based on the US government's data on

international terrorism which forms the basis of the State Department's annual Country Reports.

10. Before this phase, the common delineations of the history of terrorism refer to pre-modern examples such as the Zealots-Sicari, the Thugs or the Assassins and the era of modern terrorism originating with the Reign of Terror in the aftermath of the French Revolution and carrying on to the anarchist anti-tsarist groups in Russia (Rapoport 1983; Laquer 1999).

11. Hence many authors cite the fatwa issued by Bin Laden and associates in 1998, which argued that it was the duty of Muslims to kill Americans, regardless of their proximity to the U.S. government. The 9/11 Commission notes that this was 'novel' in its call for indiscriminateness (9/11 Commission).

12. Since there has been no major manifestation of this scenario, some scholars acknowledge the technological conservatism of terrorist groups who they argue exhibit a preference for the traditional instruments of guns, bombs and targeting planes (albeit used on an unprecedented scale for 9/11) (Hoffman).

13. Most groups and movements do not last more than a year, according to research on terrorist life cycles. However, with its resurgence on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and its ability to have emerged intact from the US campaign, Al Qaeda is now seen as even more threatening.

14. See Abrahms and Foley (2010) for a concise review of this research agenda.

15. Address by Admiral Sureesh Mehta "India's National Security Challenges—An Armed Forces Overview" at India Habitat Centre August 10, 2009.

16. See for example the 2008 US National Intelligence Council's Report entitled Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World which devotes specific attention to China and India as 'Rising Heavyweights' and the 2010 NSS released by the Obama Administration which refers to India as a rising 'centre of influence'.

17. The UN has identified the importance of states maintaining attention to human rights Along side counter-terrorism activities. As UNSC Resolution states, "States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism must comply with all their obligations under international law… in particular international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law." As a 2010 Human Rights Watch report puts it, at present the Indian government's definition of terrorism is seen as too 'vague' and 'overbroad' as compared with the UN special rapporteur's definition of terrorism which specifies only those acts to be terrorism that 'are committed with the intention of causing death or serious injury; are committed for the purpose of provoking terror or coercing the government to do or refrain from doing any act; and are in line with international conventions relating to terrorism." Human Rights Watch identifies a few priority actions for the Indian government to take into account—including a more specific definition of terrorism, prevention of arbitrary arrest and detention and promoting freedom of association.

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Nuclear Weapons and India's National Security Strategy

Rajesh Basrur

It seems rather odd that, at a time when there is a perceptible shift in the centre of gravity of global strategic politics toward Asia, Indians lack a full awareness of their distinctive contribution to the thinking and practice of nuclear strategy. India has taken an approach to nuclear weapons that has the potential to become the benchmark for the world's nuclear powers; yet it has not only failed to articulate its position, but appears to be in danger of letting nuclear strategy slide toward the superfluities of the Cold War era. Its minimum deterrence strategy is optimal for national security, but there is a growing tension between its political and technical components that needs to be addressed. This is the result of leaning too much on concepts developed elsewhere, particularly in the United States, that grew out of an altogether different strategic environment and, even there, resulted in an excessively large arsenal. A stable nuclear-strategic framework requires that India work out a well-thought out and integrated set of ideas and practices as the basis of national security. This in turn can be a model for all nuclear powers.

India's minimalist approach, reflected in its adherence to "minimum deterrence," rests on two pillars. Normatively, it is embedded in Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru's profound moral distaste for the indiscriminate large-scale destruction that nuclear weapons represent. That the actual acquisition of these weapons occurred over a long period of time—the bomb was first tested in 1974, but built only circa 1989—speaks of a reluctant concession to realpolitik. On the pragmatic side, as a result, the preference for a posture that regards it unnecessary to display India's nuclear teeth in order to achieve deterrence demonstrates a restraint that is remarkable for a nation that fought as many as four wars in the first quarter-century of its independence. This restraint continues, but signs of stress are evident in the growing divergence between two ways of thinking about nuclear weapons. The *political* component of nuclear weapons, which represents how political decision makers think about them, remains minimalist and

predominantly concerned with how not to use the weapons. In contrast, the *technical* component of nuclear weapons, which lies within the jurisdiction of professionals who think about strategy and/or operate the weapons and represents the possible use of the weapons, has steadily drifted away from minimalism toward an expansive and open-ended approach. The emerging gap is the consequence of the professionals' tendency to conform to a strategic lexicon that is essentially of Western, specifically American, origin. Unless Indian thinking develops its own vocabulary and discourse in the realm of nuclear strategy, it will be difficult to resist the trend toward an open-ended approach. This will, in turn, produce both rising costs arising from the unrestrained quest for more and "better" weapons and potential risks relating to arms race stability and the tensions produced by it.

India's Minimalist Strategic Culture

It is sometimes said that Indians lack a strategic culture. There are two errors in this view. First, all strategic establishments have a strategic culture for better or worse: a strategic culture is no more than a patterned way of thinking and acting.[1] What the critics mean is that Indians tend not to think strategically. This too is erroneous. Aside from the abundance of examples of strategic thinking in Indian history—which, like any other history, is replete with war, peace, diplomacy and the strategising that surrounds them—we cannot ignore the strategic thinking that went into Nehru's conceptualisation of nonalignment, Indira Gandhi's bifurcation of Pakistan, or Narasimha Rao's repositioning of India in the post-Cold War period. To be sure, there is much that is lacking in strategic planning with respect to India. Most obvious is the need for an integrated national security decision making apparatus that works effectively on a day-to-day basis. But this does not mean that India does not have a strategic culture with respect to nuclear weapons. On the contrary, its nuclear-strategic culture is both realistic and optimal.[2]

The key components of this strategic culture are:

(i) *Non-centrality of nuclear weapons to national security:* Nuclear weapons are viewed as deeply problematic because they produce high risks and cannot be defended against. Hence, though nuclear threats have existed since China's 1964 test, which came soon after its war with India, there has never been a sense of urgency in India's nuclearisation. The decision not to build an arsenal immediately after the 1974 test and the absence of deployment after the 1998 tests show that India has been a reluctant nucleariser. India has also committed itself to a policy of no first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons, which rules out other roles for them such as first use against conventional attack and nuclear coercion.[3]

(ii) *A political rather than a technical approach to nuclear weapons:* Indian policy makers regard nuclear weapons as political instruments that

are "unusable." Their sole function is deterrence and their use must be avoided as far as possible, in contrast to an operational view, which tends to regard them as extensions of conventional weapons. The predominance of the political view means that the desire to avoid nuclear use overrides all considerations of doctrine and strategy.

(iii) *Emphasis on minimum deterrence:* This involves the conviction that deterrence does not require a large or highly sophisticated nuclear arsenal. Indian minimalism has a number of components.[4] First, extensive testing of warheads is not viewed as essential. Immediately after the 1998 tests, the Indian government, backed by its nuclear scientists, announced that more tests were not needed. A moratorium on testing has remained in place since then. Second, there is a presumption that a balance of power approach can be dispensed with, since the central idea of a "minimum" is that one need only have enough capability to make the costs of an attack unacceptable to adversaries. This in turn precludes arms racing. Third, the Indian conception of minimum deterrence allows for a posture that is "recessed," i.e. India's nuclear weapons need not be kept actively deployed. In practice, the warheads are not mated with delivery vehicles; indeed, the warheads themselves are stored in an unassembled state. Such a posture is non-provocative and hence defensive in orientation.

(iv) *Strong commitment to arms control and disarmament:* This is a logical extension of the long-held apprehension that nuclear weapons are as much a source of insecurity as of security. India's has consistently called for comprehensive, non-discriminatory and multilateral disarmament, but the earlier unrealistic expectations of its feasibility have been toned down. Today, bilateral as well as multilateral (non-discriminatory) arms control is considered acceptable. India has agreed on a number of confidence building measures (CBMs) with China and Pakistan.[5] In contrast with the United States and the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan agreed on a nuclear CBM even *before* they officially declared their nuclear weapons status when in December 1988 they signed an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities.

All of the above form an integrated strategic framework that has remained largely in place over the years. It is readily evident that the first and third points have no connection with American (and indeed Soviet) thinking during the Cold War. Policy makers everywhere adhere to the second point, but more often than not neglect its implication: if no one wants the first nuclear shot to be fired, that is surely an acknowledgement that deterrence works at a minimal level of capability and there is not much to be said in favour of large and sophisticated forces. The fourth point, particularly with regard to universal and comprehensive disarmament, has

gained not a few new followers of late, notably among Cold Warriors of yesteryear. But none of them has provided clear justification for their radical turn other than to proclaim the banal fact that the Cold War is over and to make the bland affirmation that overkill capability is superfluous. But while India has retained much of its minimalism, the seeds of a Cold War approach are discernible in the way that the technical language used by its experts, who invariably draw from an American vocabulary, has gained strength in the wake of the 1998 tests.

The Rise of the Technical Perspective

The technical-operational perspective can be traced back to the 1950s and the writing of Albert Wohlstetter, who in fact fathered the strategic language that came to dominate the discourse on nuclear weapons.[6] Wohlstetter held that, since the Soviet Union had lost millions of lives in the Second World War, it could tolerate enormous human losses. This in turn meant that, in order to deter it, the United States would require the assured capability to inflict massive damage on it. It followed that, to be fully secure, one had to develop the capacity to retaliate in a big way after absorbing a surprise attack.

Thus, a viable deterrent force had to possess three characteristics. First, it had to possess the *certain* capability of inflicting *massive* damage on the enemy. This in effect meant that the norm was the possession of large forces. Second, it followed that, for effective deterrence, one had to possess "survivable" forces. These forces had to ride out a possible surprise attack and retaliate massively after absorbing large-scale losses. Here lay the origins of the central pillar of Cold War orthodoxy: the concept of "assured second-strike capability." And third, by extension, one had to maintain an advantageous "balance" of forces to counter the risk of severe attrition arising from a major surprise attack. The overall thrust of Wohlstetter's argument was that the United States had to maintain large, diverse and very sophisticated nuclear forces against the Soviet threat.

Even a rudimentary acquaintance with Indian writings on nuclear weapons reveals that the strategic language they use is embedded in Wohlstetter's writings (though that language is so deeply rooted in the discourse that one may employ it routinely without ever having read Wohlstetter). Thus, the Draft Nuclear Doctrine produced by the National Security Advisory Board in August 1999 called for a triad of air, land and sea-based delivery systems whose "survivability will be enhanced by a combination of multiple redundant systems, mobility, dispersion and deception."[7] The majority of Indian experts on nuclear strategy use similar language.[8] Even the late General Krishnaswamy Sundarji, who affirmed that the requirements for minimum deterrence are "finite," and that India must not commit the American error of "obscene amassing of unusable weapons," consistently expressed his concern about the problem of vulnerability and survivability.[9]

The problem inherent in the concepts bequeathed by Wohlstetter and his successors is that they are conducive to precisely the kind of force development that led to the strategic obesity of Cold War forces. Thus, we have in India the unquestioned development of a range of weapons for which the justifications offered are invariably those germinating from the writings of Wohlstetter. For instance, it is often said that a nuclear triad is essential for deterrence. The reasoning is drawn from Wohlstetter and rests on the claim that effective deterrence requires survivable forces with assured second-strike capability. The orthodoxy holds that submarine-based ballistic missiles are the least "vulnerable," often leaving out caveats that these forces are likely to be most offensively oriented while on distant patrols, that red lines at sea are almost never clear, and that accidents at sea have the potential to override command and control mechanisms. The claim that the sea leg of a triad is necessitated by India's commitment to NFU is of dubious merit.[10] There is no reason to believe that any one leg of a triad is more effective than the others because deterrence does not work by complicated calculations about how much damage is sustainable and precisely how much damage capability is required to deter. The actual working of deterrence has very little to do with its technical-operational aspect. It has much more to do with its political aspect, as will be shown below.

Likewise, there is good reason to reconsider the merits of the range of weapons now under research and development, with—no doubt—still more being contemplated. It is not clear why there should be a push for longer-range missiles that are capable of striking targets at diverse ranges from 700 km to 5,000 km. For instance, the notion that Beijing must be targeted in order to deter China is dubious. It involves the unstated perception that Chinese leaders will be willing to dispense with smaller but still large cities that are closer to India. Kunming, with a population of over 5,000,000 is less than 1,500 km from Kolkata. Guangzhou, with a population of over 10,000,000, is about 2,500 km from Kolkata. In both cases, intermediate-range missiles fired from the Indian Northeast would have to traverse a smaller distance. One need only consider whether the Indian government would be willing to tolerate possible nuclear attacks on Kanpur or Allahabad or Patna in a confrontation with China to appreciate the point.

The Historical Reality of Deterrence

Strangely, very little comparative study has been done on how deterrence actually works when nuclear-armed states are involved in confrontations. This author's brief study of five hostile nuclear pairs reveals an interesting pattern. The five pairs are: United States-Soviet Union; United States-China; Soviet Union-China; United States-North Korea; and India-Pakistan.[11] In every case, the political leadership showed a strong preference for war avoidance regardless of the specific distribution of nuclear and conventional power

between the adversaries. The "stronger" of the pair avoided armed conflict even at the level of full-scale conventional war owing to the risk of escalation. In most cases, the distribution of nuclear capabilities was lopsided. For instance, in the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the ratio of warheads was more than 1:10 in favour of the United States.[12] But President Kennedy was not buoyed by this "advantage." His overriding concern was that even a single nuclear bomb should not explode over the United States. Similarly, the nuclear balance was theoretically tilted heavily in favour of the Soviet Union during its border clashes with China in 1969, but that was of little comfort to Soviet leaders.[13] Again, in 2006 the United States contemplated a preemptive strike against North Korea, but held back as there could be no assurance that the latter's fledgling arsenal would be decimated.[14] In short, all the calculations of operational experts count for virtually nothing as the threat of nuclear war draws close. In good part, this is because, as any military officer will allow, it is hard to predict the course of a war once it has begun. In the case of nuclear war, the problem is compounded by the high speed and extraordinarily high levels of destruction that are likely to follow.

Yet, it is also true that when war is not around the corner, experts are prone to think in conventional ways about nuclear weapons, to engage in arcane planning for damage infliction and limitation, and to consider the weight of a specific distribution of power as vital. While it is often said that nuclear weapons are "revolutionary," we are tempted to think of them in the same way as we think of conventional weapons because we do not have any experience to draw upon.[15] The established "thought style" prevails even in an altered environment.[16] When catastrophe is imminent, the pattern changes into one in which great caution and the preference for war avoidance override all standard modes of analysis. But once the crisis recedes, we tend to return to old ways of thinking. Seen from this perspective, much of Indian thinking about nuclear weapons is fundamentally discordant with both India's own experience and with the experience of other nuclear powers.

Toward a Rational Nuclear Strategy

A number of conclusions may be drawn from this brief analysis. Indian strategic thinking needs to reflect on the historical reality of nuclear weapons and be more self-aware about where its fundamental ideas are coming from. The American approach to deterrence is irrelevant, risky and waste-inducing from the perspective of its own historical context and still more from that of India's. Deterrence always works at a minimal level and Indians need to shed the vocabulary of American strategic discourse and build a consistent "thought style" of their own. This thought style must be pre-eminently political rather than operational and should be based on the clear understanding that nuclear weapons are indeed revolutionary and should not be viewed in conventional terms.[17]

The starting point of minimum deterrence logic is that, given the speed and scale of potential destruction involved, nuclear deterrence is based on the *posing of risk* and not on the certainty of causing damage. It follows that a number of the concepts that are basic to the prevailing conventionalised discourse have to be dropped. The term "credible" is superfluous because the projection of even a low level of threat carries sufficient risk for the receiver of the threat to take it very seriously indeed. The US perception of the North Korean threat is illustrative. Similarly, the ubiquitous concern about "vulnerability" to a first strike and "survivability" can be largely dispensed with. Because they cannot know in advance the percentage of targets they will successfully destroy in a surprise strike, rational political decision makers—like Kennedy in 1962—will be stopped cold by the prospect of one or a handful of retaliatory strikes wreaking havoc on their own territory. Above all, minimalist thought needs to abandon the concept of "secure second-strike capability," which has little to do with how decision makers think when confronted by war, but is invariably the basis of arms racing and mutual insecurity.

Of current relevance is the drift toward tactical nuclear weapons in the subcontinent. In April 2011, Pakistan tested the Nasr (Hatf-IX) short-range nuclear-capable ballistic missile in response to the so-called "Cold Start" doctrine being developed by the Indian Army. This will undoubtedly lead some Indian strategists to call for a symmetrical response. Some sentiment in favour of "flexible response," tactical nuclear weapons, counter-force doctrine and limited nuclear war already exists.[18] However, such prescriptions are problematic because, first, tactical nuclear weapons lower the threshold for nuclear use and, second, there is no certainty that escalation can be avoided.[19] Limited nuclear war may be possible, but one should not bet the lives of millions on it.

In practical terms, what all of this boils down to is the following: (1) A few dozen weapons are sufficient to pose the risk required for an effective deterrent regardless of the size of the adversary's forces. (2) A high degree of sophistication is not necessary, e.g. extremely accurate weapons are not a prerequisite for a sound nuclear force; and one need not possess missiles capable of delivering multiple warheads. (3) A nuclear triad is not essential—each leg in itself constitutes a sufficient deterrent. (4) A recessed posture in which weapons are normally kept in an unassembled state is compatible with effective deterrence. (5) Nuclear warfighting doctrines and capabilities should be strictly eschewed. (6) Arms control/disarmament negotiations need not be hampered by concerns about maintaining "balances."

A compact force structured along these lines has distinct advantages. First, it obtains deterrence while retaining a non-offensive posture and is thus intrinsically stable. Second, it avoids the kind of strategic force inflation that occurred during the Cold War. This saves precious resources from being

wasted on overly large nuclear forces. Third, small forces are inherently safer than large ones with respect to the risk posed by accidents, unauthorised launch, and terrorist attack. And fourth, if reinforced by a well-developed doctrine, a small force with a defensive posture provides a model to which other nuclear powers can look as they seek to downsize their arsenals. In this context, it is notable that, in the United States and Russia, no doctrinal basis has been developed for a transition from very large forces based on the doctrine of assured destruction to much smaller forces en route to possible universal nuclear disarmament.

Finally, it is essential that the civilian leadership develop a better understanding of nuclear weapons doctrine and posture than is the case today. The political component of nuclear weapons strategy is far more critical than that of conventional weapons. Unlike conventional weapons, nuclear weapons require very close monitoring owing to their potential for rapid cataclysmic effects. The civil-military bargain, which means civilians control decisions on war and peace while the military decides what equipment it needs, is no longer viable in the context of nuclear weapons. Militaries are inherently inclined toward an operational perspective that focuses on weapons use, whereas the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons make them primarily political instruments, the chief purpose of which is non-use. It is therefore obligatory for the civilian leadership to understand nuclear weapons in depth in order to ensure they remain fully under control in every respect at all times.

NOTES

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Nuclear Doctrine and Conflict

Ali Ahmed

Introduction

India has made enviable progress since independence in building social equality, deepening democracy and economic development. These gains not only need to be maintained but also need to be enhanced, over at least another generation, and definitely till 2020—the time horizon of this workshop. India's approach to security would therefore require being mindful of the national endeavour. In other words, India's civilisational trait of temperance and its strategic culture of resolve and restraint need to be in evidence for the duration. While crises and conflict can be anticipated in the interim, given the security circumstances of the neighbourhood, the national aim must not be lost sight of.

India's military doctrines are predicated on a strategic doctrine of deterrence.[1] Deterrence is based on both the surety of denial and possibility of punishment. An offensive orientation in its military doctrines and expanding military potential has been in evidence of late for reinforcing deterrence.[2] Currently, India's conventional doctrine has a proactive and offensive orientation. Its nuclear doctrine posits inflicting 'unacceptable damage' in retaliation.[3] While threats exist and could arise over the decade, it is unlikely that these cannot be managed through diplomatic means and political strategy. However, wild cards such as internal political instability that could affect the judgment of both neighbours need to be factored in. Conflict outbreak, despite best intentions and however unlikely, nevertheless needs to be taken into account. In any case, contingency preparedness in the absence of threats is a valid recourse.

It is argued that this requires a melding of conventional and nuclear doctrines. This implies a movement in both doctrines. This paper proposes that conventional doctrine move towards an explicit limited war formulation. The nuclear doctrine in turn needs to genuflect to limitation by ensuring conflict termination at the lowest possible level of nuclear use—in line with the 'Sundarji doctrine'.[4] This argument is presented in two parts: in the first

part the current doctrinal interface is discussed. The second part recommends that the Sundarji doctrine of ending any nuclear exchange at the lowest possible level be adopted.

The Doctrinal Interface

India has two potential adversaries, Pakistan and China. India has a differentiated[5] strategic orientation for each, given its differing power equations and problems with the two. With respect to Pakistan, India has been forced to keep its capability for coercion, if not compellence, at a minimum, keeping Pakistan's resort to terror and proxy war below India's 'level of tolerance'. Over the last decade, the conventional doctrine against Pakistan has been popularly termed as the 'Cold Start' doctrine.[6] Lessons from the Kargil War and Operation Parakram have wrought a change in India's strategy—of the eighties—of relying on counter offensives for deterrence—to a proactive offensive strategy.[7] This is to be executed by the launch of integrated battle groups up to limited depth with the strike corps released in their wake in keeping with the stated political aims. Giving itself the capability does not imply a reflexive resort to offence. Instead, military action short of all out war to deliver on limited political aims is to be preferred.

On the other hand, in the face of Chinese assertiveness,[8] India is moving from 'defensive defence' to 'active defence',[9] which implies greater investment in conventional capability. Improved infrastructure in Tibet has enhanced Chinese offensive capability. Combined with the problem of intrusions across an unresolved border situation, this has heightened the threat perception. India's response to this has been an improved defensive posture to include deployment of additional forces to retrieve lost ground or, if necessary, to take the conflict on to the Tibetan plateau.

India is well aware of the nuclear backdrop and is conscious of the fallout of military engagement on the country's economic trajectory. Therefore, deterrence will continue to be a primary military option. Deterrence can only be improved to being prepared for the worst-case scenario of conflict outbreak. Doctrinal preparedness requires abiding by the tenets of limited war. Limitation of conflict would be in the mutual interest of the antagonists. Currently, India's doctrine in respect of Pakistan includes offensive operations by strike corps. The escalatory potential of this can be tempered by various means such as the choice of sector for operations etc. Likewise, against China, while minimal stakes in a possible border war lend themselves to escalation control, the problem of 'face saving' may force a significant pull in the other direction. In other words, on both fronts, even if a war is ruled out, in the remote case of one, there are inherent escalatory possibilities that will require deliberate efforts to contain.

This provides a two step buffer to the nuclear level—one is war avoidance and the second is its limitation. The nuclear level is further insulated by

nuclear deterrence operating independently. However, sanguinity along these lines does not help deterrence. Currently, India's nuclear doctrine contemplates inflicting unacceptable damage in retaliation for enemy nuclear first use of any kind against India or its forces.[10] The term used in the doctrine to underscore the intent is 'massive'.[11] Even if it is not 'massive', the very possibility, if not certainty, of India's violent nuclear reaction is meant to deter nuclear first use.

However, utmost analytical attention, necessitated by the nuclear overhang requires that the possibility of nuclear use by the enemy be factored into any consideration of conflict. In Pakistan's case, the oft-quoted contingency of nuclear use in its own territory against a nondescript target as a strategic signal for termination has been mentioned. Since its threshold is not known, it cannot be taken as 'high' and its doctrine as one of 'first use but last resort'.[12] In the case of China, nuclear use has not been thought through in light of both states having a 'No first use' policy (NFU). But to conjure up a scenario: China could resort to nuclear use at a low escalatory level in two circumstances—in case its internal political situation, that gives rise to the conflict in first place, permits it; and two, in case it is placed in an untenable position due to the unexpected operational success of Indian joint air and ground forces.

India's nuclear doctrine is meant for deterrence.[13] Massive nuclear retaliation is explicable in cases of enemy first strike. It is intended as a disarming strike, decapitation strike or as counter value targeting. Inflicting unacceptable damage on the enemy in case he has caused unacceptable damage in his nuclear first use is understandable. However, in such a case of higher order nuclear retaliation by India in response to lower order nuclear first use by the enemy, a like response from the enemy can be expected. This could prove costly for India and make the doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation untenable. Therefore, enemy nuclear first use is not implausible.[14] India need not then be tied down by its nuclear deterrence doctrine, but should realistically prepare for a nuclear exchange, even if unprovoked and inadvertent.

Once first use has occurred, the situation is not of deterrence but of its breakdown. Therefore, the doctrine need not dictate India's response. Instead, the response could be guided by a separate nuclear operational or employment doctrine. This may be in the form of a proportionate or commensurate response, particularly in the case of low level nuclear first use by the enemy. This would enable escalation control and avoid strategic nuclear exchange. In other words, the nuclear doctrine could be flexible.[15] Flexibility does not reduce deterrence since India has the capability for escalation.

It bears iteration that India's conventional doctrine needs to be informed by limited war thinking. This is not explicitly so at the moment. Even while the overarching military doctrine may continue to envisage use of strike corps

etc, a separate, supplementary, limited war doctrine needs articulation alongside. The nuclear doctrine for deterrence clearly foregrounds the potential for a massive nuclear retaliation in case of nuclear first use. However, in case of a deterrence breakdown, the operational doctrine need not be unduly restricted by the declared doctrine. Any inbuilt flexibility need not necessarily be in the open domain.

Therefore it is recommended that the 'Sundarji doctrine', be adopted,[16] for the following reasons.

The Sundarji Doctrine

The Sundarji doctrine posits *termination of nuclear conflict at the lowest level of escalation*.[17] This may entail offering politically acceptable terms to terminate war. The doctrine's call is for early, if not immediate, termination, not only of nuclear exchange(s) but also of the conflict. The difficulty of nuclear conflict termination in face of pressures for nuclear escalation is acknowledged in this formulation. Therefore, it unambiguously states that such an escalation should be avoided. It also incentivises the enemy, who has a shared interest in avoiding escalation to acquiesce. The doctrine has two major advantages. The first is that it is in sync with India's national aims and with its follow-on conflict aims. The second is that it takes cognizance of India's strengths and weaknesses as a society and polity.

India's national aim, mentioned at the outset, is to fulfil its potential. The national interest is in conflict avoidance to the extent possible. In case of conflict outbreak, the objective would be determined by the need for the least possible deflection from India's growth trajectory which implies that it would be limited, capable of being attained without inordinate economic and human costs. Mutuality with China can be expected, since any diversion would set it back with relation to the United States. Since India would not like a set back in relation to China, it would restrict the stakes involved in any confrontation with Pakistan. This entails limitation both at the conventional and nuclear levels.

The current doctrines at both levels do not automatically envisage limitation. While limitation is the subtext in both the doctrines, it is not a given. This could lead to inadvertent escalation. Nuclear first use on the adversary's part could lead to possible counter city exchange(s) which are bound to have an adverse affect on the economy, society and polity. The gains of the last six decades and of the last two in particular would be squandered. Even if conflict termination finds India advantaged strategically, the price may prove rather high in relation to the original stakes.

In the light of India's vulnerabilities, a nuclear exchange may prove unaffordable. This is particularly so if a prudent view is taken of the effectiveness of the 'idea of India'. There are known deficiencies in India's governance structures and processes given which India would be unable to

cope effectively with a nuclear attack, not only at the place of occurrence but also in terms of its psychological, political and social effects. In case of disruption at the national level, because of the leadership's enforced restriction to the National Command Post, or due to partial or successful decapitation, the governance challenge would be considerable. The targeting of the national capital could lead to a de-centering of India over the long term. If governance is to carry on, democratic methods may prove inadequate. Thus, even if a government regains control, it would be at the cost of India's democratic character. India as it has developed post independence cannot survive unacceptable nuclear damage. That a nuclear adversary ceases to exist thereby is no compensation or consolation. It follows that India should prudently avoid inflicting unacceptable damage unless it has similarly been attacked first.

This is an under-researched area. While the physical effects have been discussed,[18] these may in the long term turn out to be the lesser evil. The political effect would be that lower classes would be more imposed upon. They could become more inclined to follow Maoist philosophy. This would have its own backlash with the state and the upper sections of society tending towards the Right. The vacuum could herald a revolution and a counter-revolution. The second dimension is social disruption. In case of conflict with Pakistan, involving nuclear weapons, the possibility of India's Muslim minority being targeted for guilt by association cannot be ignored. This would make India ungovernable over the duration of bloodletting and could also have a geographical effect in terms of ethnicities opting out of the 'union'. Lack of security that a nuclear exchange signifies involves a breach of social contract by the state. The affected ethnic groups, and those witnessing it, may choose to rescind the tacit contract with a state that has not provided security as stipulated. For instance, in case of a nuclear exchange even at the lowest level with China in the east, the ethnic groups there may want out of an India-China contest that imperils their homelands. While this pessimistic scenario may not translate into reality, the risk is not worth taking.

What does this imply for the deterrence doctrine? The implication for the deterrence philosophy is that promise of infliction of unacceptable damage only deters unacceptable damage in nuclear first use. The formulation, favoured by India, that 'nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons' stands disputed by Pakistan's reliance on nuclear weapons as deterrents for conventional war. Therefore, the risk of nuclear weapon use exists. Clearly, the option of inflicting unacceptable damage, if it lays India open to like attack, is unthinkable. The understanding that India can take the necessary measures to survive, such as ballistic missile defences, disaster management, civil defence improvement etc appears plausible. However, given that there are pronounced deficiencies in India's institutional culture, this could prove to be a delusion. A political view, sensitive to India's wider concerns, needs

to be taken of institution-led arguments along these lines. The commitment trap needs to be avoided. Therefore, instead of the cultivation and exhibition of 'resolve' as prescribed by deterrence theorists, India would do well to ponder the virtues of self-deterrence.

India's political leaders are not obliged to risk national suicide to prove that deterrence theory—questioned by nuclear pessimists[19]—works. The strategist's approach to nuclear deterrence is distinct from that of the decision maker at the political level.[20] India's leadership in the Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority needs to be apprised of its democratic obligations at a higher level than the strategic advice they receive from the Executive Council.[21] They need not be held hostage to declaratory doctrine. They need not be held hostage to nuclear strategists either. They need to envision their role as political decision makers and protect India's long term interests, of which survival is primary, in mind.[22] The least damage to India or the idea of India would be if any nuclear exchange, likely to be an inadvertent escalatory act, is terminated at the lowest level. This requires that India's nuclear doctrine follow Sundarji formulation.

The 'Sundarji caveat'—*of offering the enemy politically acceptable and fair terms for conflict termination*—would also require to be operationalised.[23] This may entail having direct and uninterruptible links with the enemy even in the face of crises and conflict. It requires the creation of a standing mechanism such as the nuclear risk reduction centre. This would be more than a confidence building measure or a nuclear risk reduction mechanism. It could prove critical in managing escalation and war termination in a conflict. Its role at other times could be to facilitate doctrinal exchange and more ambitiously arms control and disarmament, both conventional and nuclear. Shared interests may help in mirroring thinking. Reconciling of doctrines can be taken up through negotiations in this mechanism.[24]

What are the implications for deterrence? Deterrence has been variously defined.[25] As per one definition, the very capability suffices to deter. This is termed existential deterrence. A variant of this is that the capability is substantial, and has a thermonuclear dimension. In the second conceptualisation, deterrence needs to be constantly worked upon. It is predicated on the certainty of retaliation. A variant of this is that the retaliation must be considerable to deter. India's current doctrine is inspired by the latter. Instead, when less is enough, more is not necessarily better.[26] In other words, reversion to existential deterrence would help keep the nuclear complex under control in both peace and war.

The problem with this is a tendency towards deterrence 'creep' or a move away from 'minimum' to 'limited' deterrence.[27] Even if India can afford this, it would mean moving away from the draft nuclear doctrine which states that India would not be slave to the Cold War deterrence concepts. A conscious check of the nuclear complex is required. During peacetime, the nuclear

complex needs to be entrenched in the Indian democratic system of checks and balances, first through parliamentary oversight; and second, by extending the oversight through the political council, activated also for peace time control. Doing so would make for qualitative deterrence. In wartime, this will be facilitated by the Sundarji doctrine that lends itself to protecting the 'minimum'. It eschews nuclear war, does not envisage a variegated nuclear arsenal and enables a city avoidance strategy.

Conclusion

A critical question is: *What is the national interest in case of a conflict going nuclear?* The answer is informed by India's national aim. Though any security circumstance is indeed substantively changed by the foregrounding of the nuclear overhang, the national objective would continue to have currency. The primary aim would be to survive the conflict as intact as possible, which means the less damage sustained the better. Damage inflicted on the enemy is secondary. As seen, survival over the long term is endangered by unacceptable damage. Democratic political responsibility lies in appreciating that the national interest would be to ensure a termination of the nuclear conflict at the earliest. Termination of the war itself would be essential. This is more likely at the lowest level of nuclear use. The higher the levels of nuclear exchange the less likely the possibility of nuclear war termination. The idea that nuclear escalation control is not possible may well be right. But not attempting escalation control would make this inevitable. Therefore, a move towards the Sundarji doctrine is necessary.

NOTES

1. The menu of strategic choices ranges between appeasement, conciliation, coercion, deterrence and compellence. According to Kautilya, the strategic prongs are '*sam, dam, dand* and *bhed*'.
2. While conventional doctrines are routinely described as 'proactive', the nuclear doctrine has some offensive elements such as the NFU caveat extending nuclear deterrence to cover a major attack by chemical and biological weapons.
3. Cabinet Committee on Security (2003), 'Press Release of the Cabinet Committee on Security on Operationalisation of India's Nuclear Doctrine 04.01.03' http:// meadev.nic.in/news/official/20030104/official.htm. (Accessed July 02, 2008).
4. See K. Sundarji, 'India's Nuclear Options', Wellington: DSSC *Trishul*, V (1), 1992; and 'Nuclear Deterrence Doctrine for India', Part 1 and 2, *Trishul*, V (1) and V (2), 1992.
5. Karnad terms India's doctrines varying with respect to Pakistan and China as 'differentiated' doctrine.
6. Gurmeet Kanwal, 'India's Cold Start Doctrine and Strategic Stability', *IDSA Strategic Comments*, 1 June 2010.
7. Praveen Sawhney, 'Punching Hard: Learning from Operation Parakram, the army sharpens its pro-active strategy', *Force*, Jan 2008
8. The PM used the term 'assertive' in relation to Chinese behaviour.

9. Two divisions are being raised in the Northeast to counter the China threat perceived as having increased with the infrastructure development in Tibet.

10. Manpreet Sethi thinks destroying five to six cities would be 'unacceptable damage' in the Pakistan context (*Nuclear Strategy India's March Towards Credible Deterrence*, Knowledge World, New Delhi, 2009, pp. 251-252). Gurmeet Kanwal believes that up to 10 cities may require to be targeted to inflict unacceptable damage on China.

11. Cabinet Committee on Security (2003), 'Press Release of the Cabinet Committee on Security on Operationalisation of India's Nuclear Doctrine 04.01.03' http://meadev.nic.in/news/official/20030104/official.htm. (Accessed July 02, 2008).

12. Rajesh Rajagopalan posits that a rational Pakistan is unlikely to use nuclear weapons other than as a last resort. This is unlikely to happen since India would not push it that far (*Second Strike: Arguments of Nuclear War in South Asia*, Penguin, New Delhi, 2005, p. 43).

13. 'Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine', 1999, http://meadev.nic.in/govt/indnucld.htm (Accessed October 10, 2008).

14. Ali Ahmed, 'Pakistani Nuclear Use and Implications for India', *Strategic Analysis*, 34 (4), July 2010.

15. Bharat Karnad favours a flexible doctrine that relies on varied armaments.

16. K. Sundarji, *Vision 2100: Strategy for the Twenty First Century*, Konark Publishers, New Delhi, 2003, p. 146.

17. Ibid.

18. 'The Consequences of Nuclear Conflict between India and Pakistan', Natural Resources Defence Council, http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/southasia.asp

19. Robert Jervis, 'Deterrence theory revisited', *World Politics*, 31 (2), 1979, pp. 289-324.

20. This is the insight gained by both McNamara and McGeorge Gundy from their experience.

21. The organisation of the Nuclear Command Authority is given in Cabinet Committee on Security (2003), 'Press Release of the Cabinet Committee on Security on Operationalisation of India's Nuclear Doctrine 04.01.03' http://meadev.nic.in/news/official/20030104/official.htm. (Accessed July 02, 2008).

22. Ali Ahmed, 'The Political Factor in Nuclear Retaliation', *Strategic Analysis*, 34 (1), January 2010.

23. Ali Ahmed, 'In Tribute: Recalling the Sundarji Doctrine', *USI Journal*, Jan-Mar, CXXXVIII (571), 2008, pp. 108-14.

24. Ali Ahmed, *Reconciling Doctrines: Prerequisite for Peace in South Asia,* IDSA Monograph, pp. 78-82. http://www.idsa.in/monograph/ReconcilingDoctrinesPrerequisitefor PeaceinSouthAsia_aahmed_2 010

25. Rajesh Rajagopalan, 'Nuclear strategy and small nuclear forces: The conceptual components', *Strategic Analysis,* 23 (7), pp. 1117-31.

26. More is not better when less is enough (Kenneth Waltz).

27. Rajesh Basrur, *Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security*, Singapore: NUS Press, 2009, p. 172.

Strategic Implications of Human Capital Today

G. Balatchandirane

"The United States takes deserved pride in the vitality of its economy, which forms the foundation of ... national security ... That vitality is derived in large part from the productivity of well-trained people and the steady stream of scientific and technical innovations they produce.

The most effective way for the United States to meet the challenges of a flatter world would be to draw heavily and quickly on its investments in human capital.

An educated, innovative, motivated workforce—human capital—is the most precious resource of any country in this new, flat world"

—*The Gathering Storm Report*, 2007

Any discussion on India's security strategy would have to take into account the current transformation of the Indian economy and thus the drivers and brakes of this process. An added dimension that has to be considered is the set of changes set in motion by the current wave of globalisation and the move towards a knowledge economy. India's security ultimately depends a great deal on its economic and technological strength. An appreciation of the impact of education, especially higher education, on economic growth and technological development and hence on India's power is important in this context. Even when we talk of important national objectives like a rapid reduction of poverty or of exploiting India's demographic advantage so that the growth momentum is maintained, the role of education becomes critical. This paper looks at some of the obvious and not so obvious pathways through which education can contribute to India's rapid economic transformation and in the process be a major factor in the nation's security strategy.

Role of Education

The seminal role of education in economic growth was brought to the fore in the mid twentieth century. Conventional factors could not explain much of this growth and this ultimately led to a pinpointing of the contribution of education to economic growth. It was the writings of Theodore W. Schultz and Gary S. Becker that compelled policy planners to view education as an investment and not treat it as an expenditure thereby according education a prime place in the debates on development.[1] The term "human capital" implied that expenditure on training and education should be seen as investments in human beings which would lead to rises in productivity and earnings; this was similar to investments in physical resources like plant or equipment which are directly involved in the production process. In other words, human capital represents a productive investment that leads to a buildup of the knowledge and skills of the labour force of a country. The ensuing rise in labour productivity would have a favourable impact on economic growth. The greater the educational spread and the higher the educational level of the population, the larger the stock of human capital. Any investment produces returns and the returns of education, both private and social, have been extensively studied and have been found to be positive and significant.[2]

A few of the beneficial effects of education in society that have been widely enumerated in the literature are: (a) education contributes to economic growth substantially and the returns on investment in education are equal to or are more than investments in physical capital, (b) education has an important poverty reducing impact, and (c) education plays a positive role in reducing income equalities.[3] There are also a large number of non-measurable, non-economic returns to education that positively impact on society. Further many scholars have pointed out that just because some of these non-economic returns cannot be quantified, one cannot belittle their importance to society.[4] The non-economic benefits of education include huge returns on investment as evidenced by lower infant mortality, increase in life expectancy, lower fertility rates, promotion of democracy, human rights, political stability and reduction in pollution, among others.[5] There is no denying the fact that the externalities to investments in education are large.

Poverty Reduction

Economic development can be defined as raising the standard of living of people and enabling them to have access to a larger basket of goods and services. The elimination of poverty would contribute to this goal as poverty is seen as a state in which living standards do not improve and the human access to goods and services does not increase. Of all the investments made to combat poverty reduction, the World Bank has found that those made in

education have the highest return.[6] Educated people have higher income earning potential and they are able to improve the quality of their lives. Education is the key to empowerment and helps people become proactive, gain control over their lives and widens the range of available choices. With increased earning ability, political and social empowerment and a greater capacity to take part in community governance, people are easily able to break the poverty cycle.[7] However, basic education alone would not be enough for poverty reduction strategies. Secondary and higher education too have to diffuse if a country is to post meaningful reduction in poverty levels because it is only at this level that the gains from the primary education can be consolidated. Secondary and higher education help in innovating technology and sustaining growth, provide skills to ensure entry into the labour market, and raise people permanently above the poverty line.[8]

While the foregone is accepted wisdom, the importance of education and human capital has become increasingly important today. The rate of technological change today is very high. R&D is important like never before as knowledge-intensive production activities are taking on a larger space in production. The rise of the knowledge economy adds further momentum to this trend of an increasing emphasis on human capital. For India, there is a huge advantage in the demographic dividend it has now. After a few decades this advantage may not exist. However what we need is not just a large youthful population; if it is not an educated one, it is not of much use.

Impact of Globalisation

In the current wave of globalisation the local markets are getting increasingly integrated with the world markets. The share of the trade/global GNP has been rising in the last two decades, revealing an increasing propensity for nations to connect through trade and commerce. If a country does not have a large share of its population educated at least up to the basic level, integration with the world markets becomes quite difficult.[9] Education thus plays an important role and prevents the country from falling into the "Low-Skill, Bad-Job" trap. In other words, when countries with low labour costs attempt to exploit their comparative advantages by holding down wages, they end up in a vicious circle of low productivity, deficient training, and a lack of skilled jobs; they are never able to compete in international markets for skill-intensive products. Cheap, semi-skilled labour provides only an important entry point into global value chains; enlarging the educational base and climbing up the educational ladder is clearly the only way to break out of this cycle.

There is another factor that has to be considered in a globalised world. The existing inequalities in educational achievement translate into inequalities in utilising new economic opportunities. The *overall* levels of expanding of employment-generating modern production are reduced. The low spread of

elementary education can severely hinder successful integration with the world market. For instance, the nature and range of goods exported by South Korea since the 1970s or by China from the 1980s show clearly how crucial basic education is for catering to the world market, given the levels of product specifications and quality control. Secondly, there is also a failure on the *distributive* front. The lower the numbers of the educated persons, the less participatory the growth process and only a small section of the nation would have its income-earning power enhanced.[10]

In concrete terms, how does education, the dominant component of human capital, contribute to economic growth? No country has been able to have significant growth in the last century without first attaining an enrolment ratio of 10 per cent at primary level. When literacy levels increased from 20 to 30 per cent, real GDP levels rose between 8 to 16 per cent for a number of countries. A whole range of studies have highlighted the positive impact of education on economic growth and development.[11]

Knowledge Economy

When an economy moves in the direction of creating and trading in knowledge, it is making a shift towards a knowledge economy. Production and consumption of knowledge comes to define the economic activity. In other words, a knowledge economy is one in which innovation takes precedence over exploitation of natural resources. Labour costs are no longer important and the lack of resources does not pose a serious drawback. Innovation is critical and for this to happen two requisites are necessary. There has to be a substantial pool of human capital and the R&D spend has to be healthy. India is wanting on both counts.

R&D Spend

GERD is the Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D—in the four sectors of business, university, government and non-profit. Human resources are a better statistic as "the ceiling on research and development activities is fixed by the availability of trained personnel, rather than by the amount of money available. The limiting resource at the moment is manpower."[12] The GERD statistic is used as it is easily quantified, whereas the human capital statistic is mired in definitional and measurement issues. Despite the Indian government's talk of increasing the R&D spend, it has been stagnating at below 1 per cent of the GDP as shown in Table 1. This is in stark contrast to what other countries spend and this is brought out in Table 2. Table 3 gives a perspective on the share of different countries in the total global spend on R&D. India's position vis-à-vis China stands out.

Table 1: GERD Spend in India

	GERD (constant 2,000 Rs millions)	Real growth rates (%)	GERD/ GDP ratio
1992	83,476	–0.16	0.76
1993	85,038	1.87	0.73
1994	93,824	10.33	0.77
1995	93,197	–0.67	0.72
1996	96,510	3.55	0.69
1997	106,647	10.50	0.71
1998	119,081	11.66	0.76
1999	129,542	8.78	0.77
2000	143,976	11.14	0.81
2001	156,879	8.96	0.84
2002	160,219	2.13	0.81
2003	163,037	1.76	0.80
2004	172,756	5.96	0.78
2005	179,600	3.96	0.75
2006	229,538	27.80	0.88
2007	248,954	8.46	0.87
2008	274,128	10.11	0.88

Source: UNESCO 2010.

Table 2: Global Spending on R&D

	2009 GERD PPP billions, U.S.$	2009 R&D as % of GDP	2010 GERD PPP billions, U.S.$	2010 R&D as % of GDP	2011 GERD PPP billions, U.S.$	2011 R&D as % of GDP
Americas	433.2	2.2	446.7	2.2	458.0	2.2
U.S.	383.6	2.7	395.8	2.7	405.3	2.7
Asia	372.5	1.9	400.4	1.9	421.1	1.8
Japan	139.6	3.4	142.0	3.3	144.1	3.3
China	123.7	1.4	141.4	1.4	153.7	1.4
India	28.1	0.8	33.3	0.9	36.1	0.9
Europe	267.0	1.7	268.6	1.6	276.6	1.7
Rest of World	34.2	1.2	34.8	1.2	36.3	1.2
Total	1,107.0	1.9	1,150.6	1.9	1,192.0	1.9

Source: Battlle Corporation 2010.

Table 3: Comparison of Global Spending on R&D

(per cent)

	2009	2010	2011
Americas	39.1	38.8	38.4
U.S.	34.7	34.4	34.0
Asia	33.6	34.8	35.3
Japan	12.6	12.3	12.1
China	11.2	12.3	12.9
India	2.5	2.9	3.0
Europe	24.1	23.3	23.2
Rest of World	3.1	3.0	3.0

Source: Battlle Corporation 2010.

Diagram 1 shows the strong correlation between the amount spent on R&D by a country and the scientists and engineers that it has. Namely, the creation of human capital critical for the knowledge economy and the spend

Diagram 1: Link between R&D Spend and Human Capital

Source: Battlle Corporation 2010.

on R&D are closely linked. The countries on the top right are advanced nations that have spent huge amounts on R&D over a long period of time and hence have a sizeable stock of human capital. The other noteworthy point is that despite China being at a far lower level than Japan, it spends, in absolute terms, the same amount as Japan. India spends as much as UK or France or South Korea, again in absolute terms. While on a per capita basis both India and China spend much less than these countries, India is way behind.

China accounts for close to 20 per cent of the total number of researchers in the world. India accounts for 2.2 per cent. The share of researchers in the developing world has grown from 30 per cent in 2002 to 38 per cent in 2007, but China alone accounts for two thirds of this increase.

On the positive side, there has been a spurt in the number of R&D centres in India. From less than 100 in 2003, the number has grown to 750 in 2009, exponentially. A majority of these centres are devoted to information and communication technology, automotive and pharmaceutical industries. This is where some of the most advanced technological improvements or breakthroughs are attempted. About a fifth of the total global research staff of some of the global information technology giants are working in their Indian R&D centres, clearly indicating the potential for India in this area.

Likewise the over 750 captive centres which were set up to capitalise on the low wages in India, and which now account for revenues to the tune of $11 billion in 2010,[13] have been moving up the value chain and play a key role in developing highly skilled talent. Of late, these centres are also producing emerging market-specific products.

Why is human capital important? Futron's 2009 ranking of 10 countries in its Space Competitiveness Index uses the three basic dimensions of government, human capital and industry to calculate the competitiveness of the countries. Fifty individual metrics across these three dimensions are studied. Incidentally, India ranks ahead of the Republic of Korea, Israel or Brazil. This once again points to the potentially advantageous position of India.

Frugal Engineering

The concept of frugal engineering is important in the Indian context. This is an approach that is followed in emerging markets. It does not have to do with taking a product developed in the industrially advanced countries and then removing the not so necessary features. Nor is it simply a question of low-cost engineering. In frugal engineering, design and product development takes place on a clean slate, keeping in view the specific requirements of emerging market customers as these may not be addressed by products made in the mature markets. In the process the unnecessary features are excluded. Cost discipline is a philosophy that informs the whole process. The developed

Table 4: Indicators on Researchers

	Researchers (thousands)		World share of researchers (%)		Researchers per million inhabitants		GERD per researchers (PPP$ thousands)	
	2002	2007	2002	2007	2002	2007	2002	2007
World	5,810.7	7,209.7	100.0	100.0	926.1	1,080.8	136.0	158.9
Developed countries	4,047.5	4,478.3	69.7	62.1	3,363.5	3,655.8	161.3	195.0
Developing countries	1,734.4	2,696.7	29.8	37.4	397.8	580.3	78.5	100.5
Least developed countries	28.7	34.7	0.5	0.5	40.5	43.4	37.6	43.8
Americas	1,628.4	1,831.9	28.0	25.4	1,890.9	2,010.1	196.4	236.9
North America	1,458.5	1,579.8	25.1	21.9	4,483.2	4,624.4	204.2	252.8
Latin America and the Caribbean	169.9	252.1	2.9	3.5	317.1	442.5	130.0	137.4
Europe	1,870.7	2,123.6	32.2	29.5	2,348.5	2,638.7	127.5	147.9
European Union	1,197.9	1,448.3	20.6	20.1	2,473.9	2,936.4	172.1	182.9
Commonwealth of Independent States in Europe	579.6	551.5	10.0	7.6	2,796.1	2,735.3	31.7	49.8
Central, Eastern and other Europe	93.2	123.8	1.6	1.7	887.2	1,125.9	149.4	175.1
Africa	129.0	158.5	2.2	2.2	150.2	164.3	53.1	64.6
South Africa	14.2	19.3	0.2	0.3	311.4	392.9	158.9	225.6
Other sub-Saharan countries (excl. South Africa)	84.1	98.4	1.4	1.4	444.1	477.1	30.2	33.3
Asia	2,064.6	2,950.6	35.5	40.9	554.2	745.9	103.6	125.2
Japan	646.5	710.0	11.1	9.8	5,087.0	5,573.0	167.3	208.4
China	810.5	1,423.4	13.9	19.7	630.3	1,070.9	48.4	72.0
Israel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
India	115.9	154.8	2.3	2.2	111.2	136.9	102.6	126.7

Source: UNESCO 2010.

product addresses the needs of the consumers in the emerging economies and their numbers are huge. It is not that companies in emerging markets alone are involved in this process. Even MNCs that operate in emerging markets have found that it pays to develop products that are frugally engineered. But this does not mean they can compromise on quality as the customers in emerging economies are very demanding. A number of them have found that such products sell well not only in the emerging economies but they also have a big market in the mature ones too.[14] Among the products developed by MNCs in India, the hand held electrocardiogram machine developed by General Electric at its Bangalore facility costing about $2,000, which is a fraction of the price in the US, is a good example. A number of other products have been developed and they are finding favour in developed economies too. An X-ray machine which performs the most basic functions like chest X-rays has been developed in China at a cost that is just 5 per cent of the machines made by foreign companies. Fifty per cent of the Chinese market is served by this product.

This process addresses the bottom of the pyramid. While the profit margin might be thin, and the number of customers very large, there is ruthless paring down. So there is a trend towards remaking many of the products in emerging economies through the frugal engineering route by both local companies and MNCs. A critical input in frugal engineering is the local talent or the human capital of the emerging economy. If India were able to quickly supply the requisite human capital, there would be an explosion of cost effective but high quality products which can boost India's exports.

India is no IT Superpower

A study of the total IT business generated in India shows that we account for just about 3 per cent of the global business. The high visibility of India's IT growth has been aided by the fact that it is over two thirds dependent on exports and outsourcing by the West which has become a hot topic as it has been linked to the loss of jobs. India also happens to be the largest information technology products exporter. While talk of India being an IT super power is premature, it cannot be denied that India matters a good deal in the global IT services sector. In less than a decade the Indian IT sector has been able to rapidly move up the value chain. Thus despite the fact that India faces serious competition from other countries in low end services like call centres, BPOs and the like, as India straddles the complete value chain, from the low end to the highest end like R&D, there are large areas of potential expansion. One constraining factor is, however, the quantity and quality of the human capital that is available. While the total number of engineers produced in India might be an impressive 400,000 per annum, the industry finds that the majority of them are not up to standard. The predictions for the requirements in this area are huge and there is an urgent need to supply high quality engineers.

The Large Human Capital Deficit

Despite talk of India having the world's third largest scientific and technical manpower pool, the number in relation to the country's total population is quite low. For instance, India has 158 scientists and engineers per million population, compared to 5183 in Japan, 4103 in the USA, more than 2000 in France, Australia and Canada, 2678 in the UK, 1611 in Cuba, 459 in China and 274 in Vietnam as shown in Diagram 2.

The growth of knowledge-intensive industries might lead one to think that India is on the path to becoming a knowledge economy. However two issues need to be pointed out. The first has to do with quantity. There is a serious shortage of technically trained personnel, according to industry. The rapid industrial expansion in the face of increasing global integration of industry has created a huge demand for skilled personnel which is not met. This aspect is not confined to technical education only. The second issue has to do with quality. The most glaring example is provided by the IT industry

Diagram 2: Per capita availability of Scientific and Technical Manpower

Source: Das, Suranjan 2007.

which has found that only 15 per cent of the graduates are fit enough for its needs. The shortage of qualified personnel in the BPO sector too is an issue.[15] With the trend of MNCs looking for opportunities in emerging economies,[16] any shortage of human capital is going to adversely affect the expansion of industry in countries like India.

While the total number of graduates passing out each year is almost double the number China produces, less than 5 per cent have the basic vocational skills. The figure for Korea is 96 per cent, for Germany 75 per cent and for the US 68 per cent. It is also held that just about 25 per cent of the engineers that India produces have the language skills, practical knowledge and cultural attitudes to enable them to work for MNCs.[17]

The availability of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D in India and China is given in Diagram 3. The stark contrast with China is obvious with the Chinese density of total human resources in science and technology close to double the Indian figure. Likewise India lags way behind China in terms of scientific publications as shown in Diagram 4.

Diagram 3: Stock of Scientists and Engineers Engaged in R&D in India and China, 2005

Note: The definition of human resources in S&T is broad and covers 'people actually or potentially employed in occupations requiring at least a first university degree' in S&T, which includes all fields of science, technology and engineering. The term R&D personnel, as defined by the OECD *Frascati Manual* (2002), covers 'all persons employed directly on R&D', which includes those providing direct services such as R&D managers, administrators and clerical staff. The *Frascati Manual* defines researchers as 'professionals engaged in the conception or creation of new knowledge, products, processes, methods and systems and in the management of the project concerned'.

Source: UNESCO 2010.

Diagram 4: Scientific publications of India compared with Brazil and China

Source: UNESCO 2010.

India however has big plans for expanding the higher education sector. For instance, it has been decided that 30 new universities will be set up thereby raising the student enrolment from about 1.5 crores in 2007 to about 2.1 crores in 2012. The total number of IITs is to go up to 16. Ten new National Institutes of Technology are to come up. In higher education, the government wants to raise the gross enrolment ratio from 11 per cent in 2007 to about 15 per cent in 2012 and to about 21 per cent by 2017. For the projected figures in 2012, enrolments will have to go up by 9 per cent per annum, which is quite possible as tertiary enrolments rose by 15 per cent between 2006 and 2007. Impressive as these figures are, we need to keep in mind that no country in the world became a developed country without reaching at least 30 per cent gross enrolment ratio in higher education. At present this figure for India is a little over 12 per cent.

Gathering Storm Report

The US response to the perceived decline in American science and technology was massive. The rise of outsourcing in areas like ICT, and the perception of the onset of a flat world and the possibility that the US may not be able to retain its number one position were additional factors. A high power committee was set up to study the issue and give recommendations. The report was entitled "Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energising and Employing America for a Brighter Economic Future." Its finding was that: "Having reviewed trends in the United States and abroad, the committee is deeply concerned that the scientific and technological building blocks critical to our economic leadership are eroding at a time when many other nations are gathering strength." What was to be the corrective action? The four areas

where recommendations were made were school education, research, higher education and economic policy. *It is significant that three of the four issues to be addressed were education related.*

After the report was published in 2007, in 2010, the same set of people wrote "The Gathering Storm Report Revisited" in which they pointed out that the earlier trends had only strengthened in the five year period since then. The follow up report urged that greater efforts be made to make the US competitive by investing in education. This conclusion was strongly influenced by a number of studies that showed that, over the past half-century, 50 per cent to 85 per cent of the increase in the nation's gross domestic product (GDP) was attributable to advancements in science and engineering. While the overall economic situation has deteriorated significantly since the report was released, other aspects of the competitiveness picture have changed as well. For example, one new threat has emerged while the other has not diminished. These are—higher education and K–12 education, respectively.

Concluding Remarks

No nation has ever become economically strong without an educated population. There is no way that national security can be achieved without economic muscle. Education contributes to economic development in manifold ways.

The widespread diffusion of primary education alone is not sufficient to enable a country to exploit opportunities in a fast globalising world. A large share of the population needs to be educated up to the secondary level—at least—to benefit from the prevailing economic order. Without at least 30 per cent of the relevant age population getting access to tertiary education, no nation in the world has been able to achieve developed status. When we tote up numbers to show how much progress we have made in spreading literacy, it might help to keep in mind that the total number of illiterates in India surpass the entire population of the US.

Immediately after independence there was an opportunity but we managed to miss the bus; neglecting to educate our children was a major reason. The commitment of the state to providing education to the masses has always been suspect. We now have another opportunity to get things right and achieve meaningful and sustained economic growth which can be inclusive. A large number of inequities in the society will also be done away with in the process. But the state has been reluctant and has either delayed, or obfuscated issues or wasted time in sterile hairsplitting. It is for civil society to act concertedly to force the state to provide education at all levels to the public. Finance is not an issue at all as the East Asian countries' experience tells us. The countries in East Asia did not spend time in futile debates. They

got down to business, built institutions, spread education and were reaped the fruits of economic development.[18]

The US, when faced with threats to its supremacy in science and technology is discovering the merits of public funding for education. It is high time we got our act together and maximise our demographic advantage—which can be huge—but can come to naught if we continue to keep our children uneducated. It is worth recalling what the 'Gathering Storm' report says:

> "Our culture has always considered higher education a public good—or at least we have seemed to do so. We have agreed as a society that educated citizens benefit the whole society; that the benefit accrues to us all and not just to those who receive the education. … Now, however, funding for state universities is dwindling, tuition is rising, and students are borrowing more than they receive in grants. These seem to be indications that our society increasingly sees higher education as a private good, of value only to the individual receiving it. A disturbing aspect of that change is its consequences for low-income students. College has been a traditional path for upward mobility—and this has been particularly true in the field of engineering for students who were first in their family to attend college. The acceptance of higher education as a personal benefit rather than a public good, the growth of costly private K–12 schooling, and the shift of the cost burden to individuals have made it increasingly difficult for low-income students to advance beyond high school. In the long run, the nation as a whole will suffer from the lack of new talent that could have been discovered and nurtured in affordable, accessible, high quality public schools, colleges, and universities."

The report stated that: "… the investments are modest relative to the magnitude of the return the nation can expect …" The report also discussed whether higher education is a public or private good which might have some relevance to us in India engaged as we are in debates on whether higher education is a public or private good and whether the state should subsidise higher education or not.

NOTES

1. Schultz, Theodore W. 1961. and Becker, Gary S. 1964
2. Psacharopoulos, George and Harry Anthony Patrnos 2002.
3. Tilak, Jandyala B. G. 1989.
4. Lewin, Keith M. 1997.
5. McMahon, Walter W. 1999.
6. Thus the heavy emphasis the World Bank has been laying on education in the recent past. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTEDUCATION/ 0,,contentMDK:20298916~menuPK:617572~pagePK:148956~ piPK:216618~ theSitePK: 282386,00.html, accessed on 13 Dec 2010.

7. Asian Development Bank 2001 and 2002.
8. Tilak, Jandhyala B.G. 2006.
9. The Asian Development Bank considered this as critically important that it had a "Special Chapter—Education for Global Participation" in one of its recent annual publication of the *Key Indicators*. See Asian Development Bank 2003. Countries of East Asia came in for praise for their high quality primary and secondary education systems as well as the way they could build on this advantage and participate increasingly in the global economy; the contrasting experience of South Asia was also pointed out.
10. Sen, Amartya 1996. Recent research confirms this. See Shastry, Gauri Kartini 2010.
11. Tilak, Jandyala B. G. 1989.
12. Statement of US science adviser J.R. Steelman in 1947, as quoted by Godin 2002.
13. NASSCOM/Zinnov Market Consulting
14. An example for the former is the car Nano. The small fridge called ChotuKool by Godrej which can run even on a battery activating a chip and a fan and priced at Rs 2500 would be another example.
15. Kuruvilla, Sarosh and Aruna Ranganathan 2010.
16. Enderwick, Peter 2009.
17. Battlle Corporation 2010.
18. For details see Balatchandirane, G. 2007, 2001, 2000 and 1995.

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Economic Policy Dimensions of India's International Strategy

Ajay Shah

India's Unexpected Rise

The rise of India into a position of some significance on the international stage has caught most observers, including most Indians, by surprise. The change that has taken place is stark and surprising. As recently as 1994-95, India was largely inconsequential on a global scale. At that time, India's GDP was slightly below $300 billion. A short 15 years later, India's numbers are hard to ignore. GDP in 2009-10 stood at $1.24 trillion, i.e. it rose 4.2 times. Expressed in nominal US dollars, this was a compound growth rate of 10 per cent.

While this was a remarkable performance, its international impact has been magnified owing to the growth of India's international economic engagement. One good measure of India's footprint on the global scale is the sum total of money flowing in and out of India, on the current and capital accounts. In 1994-95, it was $132 billion. From the viewpoint of the world, India constituted a $132 billion business opportunity. But in 2009-10, the figure had risen to $1.36 trillion. India as a business opportunity was roughly ten times larger in 2009-10, in dollars, as compared to what it was a mere 15 years before.

This remarkable pace of change in India's international economic engagement was because of a combination of two facts. First, GDP had grown 4.2 times over these 15 years. In addition, the gross flows on the balance of payments (i.e. the sum total of money flowing in and out of India, on the current and capital accounts) grew from 45 per cent of GDP in 1994-95 to 110 per cent in 2009-10. Not only did GDP go up 4.2 times, but the scale of international transactions per unit GDP more than doubled. Put together, this meant a tenfold rise in gross flows.[1]

These developments have had a considerable impact upon international relations. The larger GDP has generated resources for the projection of power.

And larger international economic engagement has generated a greater interest on the part of other countries to engage with India.

The Future is not Assured

Mechanical extrapolation is a popular way of peering into the future. Mechanical extrapolation into the next 15 years presents a pleasant picture: In 2024-25, GDP will be 4.2 times more or $5.2 trillion, and gross flows on the BOP will be $14 trillion. But an examination of the affairs of nations over the long term also engenders a certain scepticism about such extrapolations.

Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, the USSR and post-war Japan are all examples of countries which did well in the short term, and where the observers who predicted long term high growth were proved wrong by the events. In fact, there are some forces which come into play and stall growth after the strong showing of 15 years.

Rapid growth requires a reorganisation of the state: In the private sector, there is a rule of thumb, according to which each doubling of the number of employees of a firm, necessitates fairly fundamental and far-reaching changes in its organisational structure. In similar fashion, roughly speaking, post each doubling of GDP, fairly fundamental surgery is required in the organisation of the government. A set of laws and government agencies that were appropriate for an India with a $250 billion GDP are quite out of place in an India with a $500 billion GDP. And the set of laws and government agencies which are appropriate for an India with a $500 billion GDP are quite out of place in a country with a GDP of $1 trillion. Rapid growth requires radical and unprecedented structural reform of the government.[2]

In the US, with growth of 3.5 per cent, each doubling of GDP takes 20 years. This gives the political system 20 years to reinvent government to deal with the new world that such a doubling represents. But in India, the growth rate of 7.5 per cent, means that the GDP doubles every nine years. This requires the political system to reinvent government every nine years. High growth is thus a harder environment for economic and political reform: it requires a much greater ability for analysing and modifying the state.

Over confidence: But at the same time, the organisation of laws and government agencies which presided over high growth are likely to obtain positive feedback because of high GDP growth. Despite the fact that India's has a per capita GDP of $1000 to $1500, while the best organised countries of the world have a roughly 50 times larger value, there is an increasing sense in India that the superior Indian growth rate has demonstrated the superiority of the Indian policy framework. This has made politicians and bureaucrats closed to the idea of reform, thus undermining any prospect of a fundamental review of laws and government agencies.

Pressures for redistribution: Democratic policies generate pressure for redistribution of the newly created wealth. Many poorly thought out policies that try to take wealth from the rich and give money to the poor have unintended consequences, and weaken the very foundations of growth.

Escalation of corruption: Governance in India has had many weaknesses for many decades. The high rate of GDP growth has increased the stakes with regard to industries with a high government interface. This has given a new fillip to corruption where businessmen and politicians have a 10 or 100 times greater incentive to formulate distorted policies, when compared with the conditions in 1995. Other things being equal, these policy distortions are hampering growth.[3]

In international experience, very few countries have sustained high growth over multiple decades (Pritchett 2000). Japan, Korea and Taiwan are the only Asian countries which have caught up with Western standards of economic prosperity. Hence, it would be appropriate for India to approach the next 15 years with caution. A replication of the growth of the last 15 years is not an entitlement.

Fiscal Space

As India gains significance in world affairs, the issue of fiscal space becomes more important. Fiscal space is the extent to which the government is able to borrow when faced with rare and catastrophic events once every few decades. These extreme events can include wars, climate change or economic crises.

If the government is indeed able to borrow between 10 to 100 per cent of GDP in case of any of the above extreme events, then it becomes a powerful tool for addressing these extreme problems and keeping the country on track. If, on the other hand, the government is unable to borrow when faced with an extreme catastrophe, then the country is likely to suffer from a prolonged relapse or strategic defeat.

Prudent public finance, as exemplified by Great Britain, was based on a framework wherein the government borrowed in order to fight wars and at all other times, ran surpluses in order to repay debt. Great Britain engaged in very large scale of borrowing three times: for the Napoleonic Wars, for the First World War and for the Second World War. This constitutes three episodes of very large scale borrowing in 200 years. Their incremental borrowing for the Napoleonic Wars was roughly 50 per cent of GDP; their incremental borrowing for the First World War was roughly 100 per cent of GDP and their incremental borrowing for the Second World War was roughly 125 per cent of GDP. In most other years, the government ran surpluses and paid back debt.

At present, this framework is simply absent in India. In good times and in bad times, the Indian government incurs deficits and borrows. For an

emerging market, a prudent level of debt is roughly 60 per cent of GDP, including the debt of centre, states and local governments. India is already at values near 100 per cent in this regard. There is essentially no headroom to take on substantial debt for coping with a catastrophic situation. This is an important flaw in India's long-term strategy.

India's long-term interests would be best served by the following:

- Ordinarily, debt should be at roughly 25 per cent of GDP, thus leaving scope for borrowing of 25 to 50 per cent of GDP in an extreme situation.
- There should be a hard legal constraint where debt cannot exceed 60 per cent of GDP unless there is a catastrophic situation.
- In most years, the government must run a surplus and be paying its debt.
- Once in a few decades, a controlled outburst of borrowing should take place, in response to extreme situations.

Deep Integration into the World Economy

A nation's status in the world is critically about an extensive engagement with the world economy. The processes of economic diplomacy and 'soft power' are closely related to economic inter-linkages with the world. As emphasised earlier, India has undergone two changes over the last 15 years: On one hand, GDP has risen, but in addition, cross-border flows expressed as per cent of GDP have also risen substantially. Looking forward, an enhanced engagement with the external world will make a considerable difference to India's footprint in international affairs, and the extent to which countries will have an interest in being mindful of India's interests.

From a policy perspective, this requires a shift away from an isolationist framework rooted in mistrust of foreigners. While many changes have taken place, much more remains to be done. The policy agenda in the four components of cross-border movement should be as follows:

Goods and services—While India has made significant progress in removing trade barriers, major constraints remain. Customs tariffs in India remain high by world standards. Until the Goods and Services Tax comes into force, tax considerations will inhibit international trade. Considerable non-tariff barriers remain in place in the form of poor infrastructure for transportation and communications, and special situations such as the barriers that are faced for importing used cars.

Capital—While India has liberalised capital flows in many ways, it remains one of the least open countries of the world, even when compared with other emerging markets. The cost-benefit analysis of the existing system of capital controls is increasingly hard to justify. India has veered towards de facto

openness while retaining a complex licence-permit raj of de jure restrictions (Sinha 2010). Full openness on the capital account, and particularly large scale FDI both in India and by India will be of great importance in the emergence of India on the global stage.

People—Visa restrictions have hobbled India's international economic engagement, both for short-term visitors (e.g. for conferences) and for long-term immigration. All great powers attract migrants, who benefit the host country both by contributing top quality skills and by connecting the host country with their homeland. India needs a much more open visa framework for short-term visitors, short-term workers and long-term immigrants.

Ideas—India's restrictions on foreign media companies inhibit the free flow of ideas across the border.

These issues are of particular importance in South Asia itself, where India is remarkably isolated from countries where there are enormous opportunities for cross-border interactions in the above four dimensions. This region also vividly illustrates the issues at stake. If India were to embark on a strong unilateral liberalisation on these issues in South Asia, then it would achieve prominence in the region, it would matter more to the policy-making elite of the countries of the region, and there would be a greater commonality of interests between India and the countries of the region.

The Role of Mumbai

Global financial centres are important nerve centres of the world economy. They are meeting points for firms and countries that seek to raise capital, and for investors who seek to deploy capital. Countries with global financial centres achieve a considerable prominence in the eyes of all the users of these services. At present, there are two global financial centres: New York and London. Looking into the future, the three other cities that can fulfil this purpose are Shanghai, Hong Kong and Mumbai.

Can Mumbai emerge as a global financial centre? This question needs to be evaluated based on the eight elements of a global financial centre.

A large local economy
India fares well in this dimension, with a high growth economy that has been globalising even faster than it has been growing. Gross flows across the border generate demand for India-linked international financial services.

High skill, low cost labour
India fares well on high skill, low cost labour in many aspects of finance. At the same time, there are two critical bottlenecks. First, the scale and capabilities of universities are low. As a consequence, the labour force has

high talent and learns on the job, but is under-equipped in aspects that can only be acquired through a formal education, such as mathematical finance. Given the emphasis on learning-by-doing and not learning at university, there are strong spill overs from the human capabilities created for domestic finance to the human capabilities available for export-oriented financial service production. In addition, the numerous constraints of domestic financial regulation have led to a lack of sophistication in Indian finance, thus inhibiting the skills of the employees.

Democracy, rule of law and the legal system

India fares well on democracy and the rule of law. However, the legal system—defined as laws, lawyers and courts—fares poorly in comparison with the UK and the US. Critical laws like the RBI Act and the Securities Contracts Regulation Act are many decades old, and are out of sync with current knowledge. The delays in courts are amongst the worst in the world.

English

India is well placed with regard to the English language.

A strong financial system

The Indian equity market performs extremely well by world standards. The Indian stock exchanges—NSE and BSE—rank 3rd and 5th in the world by number of transactions. The success of the equity market has tapped into capabilities for risk-taking and trading that date from many centuries ago. However, looking beyond the equity market, the rest of the Indian finance sector is backward by world standards.

Mindshare

India has a high mindshare in the world, because of the importance of India in the business strategy of all large corporations, strong media coverage, the 'soft power' that comes from cinema, music and literature, and the success of Indians living outside the country. In particular, individuals of Indian origin are at senior levels of all global financial firms. They can be a useful bridge for financial exports from India, when India develops those capabilities.

A multi-ethnic, multi-national workforce

There are elements of Indian society that are not welcoming of outsiders. The older elements of the elite often have anti-globalisation instincts. Political parties such as the Shiv Sena are opposed to the influence of foreigners and foreign ideas. However, the influence of these groups is limited. By and large, India is a multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-ethnic society which accepts people from all over the world, and is keen on international economic integration.

High quality urban governance

Mumbai has extremely poor urban governance. As recently as one decade ago, the picture was quite different. India had not yet achieved high rates of growth and globalisation; the stock exchanges were not the top-five in the world by any yardstick; India had not yet achieved large exports of software, and; large scale business process outsourcing to India had not begun. Hence, in 1997, the idea of Mumbai as an international financial centre was implausible. It is these very developments over the last decade which force a rethink of India's trajectory, and suggest that financial exports from India are indeed feasible if certain policy corrections are made.

The sense that India has certain long-term advantages in the field of financial services exports, motivated the projection of Mumbai as an international financial centre (IFC) in a report produced by the Percy Mistry Committee for the Ministry of Finance in 2007. This report remains the primary source of the implications of India as an open economy for fiscal, financial and monetary policy (Mistry 2007).

Projecting into the future if India is able to achieve (a) consistently high GDP growth, (b) enhanced integration into the world economy on both trade and financial flows, (c) a high quality legal system, (d) a high quality financial system, (e) marginalisation of the elements of the political system which are inimical to globalisation, and (f) high quality urban governance, then Mumbai will be able to become an important IFC.

The Role of the Rupee

A similar set of issues concerns the rupee. At present, the four dominant international currencies are the dollar, the euro, the yen and the pound. Can the Chinese renminbi and the Indian rupee join these ranks?

The idea of the rupee as an international currency may seem far fetched, but it is not implausible. Until 1959, the Indian rupee was the official currency of Dubai and Qatar, and it was legal tender there until 1966. The rupee has also been used in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East. The use of the rupee in East Africa extended from Somalia in the north, to as far south as Natal. In Mozambique, the British India rupees were over stamped. At many locations worldwide including in South Asia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Israel, etc., there are informal arrangements where Indian rupees can be used or exchanged.

At present, there is $40 billion of daily trading in the rupee, of which a full half takes place at overseas locations. This suggests a substantial international role for the rupee.

The two critical factors which will determine India's progress on the internationalisation of the rupee are: (a) The extent to which the RBI is trusted to deliver low and stable inflation so that there are no concerns about the value of the rupee, and (b) The extent to which controls upon cross-border

commerce are removed, thus enabling non-residents to use and participate in rupee-related markets. If these two elements are put into place, India's economic dynamism is likely to translate into a place for the rupee among the five or six major international currencies of the world.

Conclusion

In summary, what are the insights that economic analysis can offer about India's rise as an emerging power? The first key point is that while India has unexpectedly risen to prominence in the last 15 years, the perpetuation of this growth cannot be taken for granted. Our fond hopes are not our destiny. There are important reasons why the next 15 years will have an under performing economy compared with the last 15 years. Substantial policy actions are required to preserve the microeconomic foundations of growth.

The second major issue is that of fiscal space. India's fiscal stance makes it vulnerable. When a catastrophic problem strikes once or twice a century, a massive government response is required. This requires the headroom for borrowing between 25 and 75 per cent of GDP in crisis response. India's fiscal strategy, at present, disables such a scenario. Since the government cannot mount such a response, the country will suffer greatly when these extreme scenarios arise.

India's rise into international prominence is critically about India's deeper integration into the world economy. While much has been done towards easing international restrictions against international engagement, much more remains to be done in order to match the way advanced countries treat the issues of trade in goods and services, cross-border flows of capital, rules about movement of people, and the movement of ideas.

If India succeeds in achieving high GDP growth in coming years, two important possibilities are the rise of Mumbai as a global financial centre, to rival what New York or London have today, and to rival what China will build in Hong Kong and/or Shanghai. There are some good reasons why India might be able to compete in this space. However, success here is by no means assured, and major changes are required in the economy policy strategy in Mumbai's urban governance in order to achieve success in this.

Finally, there is a possibility that the Indian rupee can join the dollar, the euro, the pound and the yen in the elite club of international currencies. The Chinese have already launched a broad-ranging strategy for renminbi internationalisation aiming to achieve this. Once again, the rupee has important strengths in such a prospect, but major policy reforms are required to translate the possibilities into reality.

<div align="center">NOTES</div>

1. On these issues, see Shah (2008).
2. As an extreme example of this problem, see: *RBI at age 75 (or 96): Old is not gold*, 2

April 2010,http://www.mayin.org/ajayshah/MEDIA/2010/rbi_75.html on the web.
3. On this issue, see *Don't take growth for granted*, 14 August 2010, http://www.mayin.org/ajayshah/MEDIA/2010/middleincometrap.html on the web.

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CHAPTER 14

Contemporary Health Security
Challenges, and National Strategies

Rajib Dasgupta

Current literature on the Indian context has focussed on health security within a broader context, and as integral to economic and social security. Some scholars have focussed on the importance of economic instruments for health care security emphasising initiatives such as insurance markets and community based health insurance as an adjunct to a public health service system of varied effectiveness across the Indian states. The IDSA National Strategy Project (INSP) seeks to focus on critical dimensions of India's national strategy with a 2020 perspective. Broadly speaking, India faces multiple health security challenges. National and global optimism regarding India as an emerging nation-power is largely centred on a comfortable macro-economic position, quality human resources and the demographic dividend. Good health and health care are necessary to bring much of this to fruition, not just for individuals but for the nation as a whole. The optimism is tempered by the contradictions that we face. Cutting edge medical technology and care in corporate hospitals is at par with some of the best in the world in areas such as cancer, orthopaedics, cardiology, infertility and dental care. On the other hand the unfinished agenda of food security, water-sanitation and responsive primary health care out of the reach of millions, is complicated by issues of geographical, economic and social access.

The Global Health Security Initiative

Health security is the buzzword of the new millennium. Viewed differently in different contexts, it is of relevance to India for planning a national security strategy. The impetus for formulating a health security strategy followed in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001 in the USA. The then United States Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson, stressed the need for countries fighting bio-terrorism to share information and coordinate actions to improve global health security. In less than two months,

the first ministerial meeting of the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) was convened in Ottawa, Canada to discuss global health security. Ministers and senior health officials from the European Commission, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the United Kingdom, the United States and the World Health Organisation participated in this meeting. India, with its long history of being at the receiving end of terrorism, was not included in this group. International biological, chemical and radio-nuclear terrorism were the areas of focus and international cooperation on these matters was agreed upon. A Global Health Security Action Group (GHSAG) of senior officials was established to develop and implement strategies to tackle the perceived threats.

The current GHSI working groups/networks will help get an under-standing of the priorities:

- Risk Management and Communications Working Group
- Pandemic Influenza Working Group
- Chemical Events Preparedness
- The Global Health Security Laboratory Network

Projects are also under way in the following public health areas:

- Field Epidemiology and Outbreak Investigation
- Public Health Aspects of Radiological and Nuclear Threats
- Research Collaboration
- Capacity Building and Training for Emerging Infectious Diseases

WHO's Vision

The World Health Organisation (WHO) had as its theme, 'International Health Security' in 2007, to urge governments, organisations and businesses to "invest in health, build a safer future". The WHO focussed on public health emergencies such as emerging diseases (SARS and avian influenza), humanitarian emergencies, health risks from effects of climate change or environmental degradation, and other acute health threats. The WHO envisioned international health security as a 'first line of defence' against health shocks that could potentially devastate people, societies and economies. The Director-General in her message focussed on cross-border health security in an increasingly connected and mobile world. Given the complexities of the problems, a number of non-government actors such as business organisations, civil society and international agencies were also taken on board. Notwithstanding these complexities, the core focus was on public health systems, investments in disease surveillance and prevention, and 'simple and affordable' interventions for clean drinking water and malaria.

The National Rural Health Mission (NRHM)

The NRHM is unarguably the biggest 'stimulus package' to the health service system. 'Health' is a state subject in the Indian Constitution. Yet, increasingly national programmes are dominating agenda setting. Often this is in response to international programmes such as polio eradication, AIDS, TB or filarial elimination. The NRHM gives a boost to finances, human resources and management techniques for reforming health services in high-priority states. Increased resources for health, about 2 per cent of the GDP, is a reality and poses a challenge to designing interventions that are epidemiologically relevant, contextual and ethical.

The Third Common Review of the NRHM highlighted key successes and challenges that need to be addressed urgently.

Improvements	*Challenges*
Services	
A shift in patient loads from secondary to primary levels is a marker of strengthening of primary level institutions	Decline in admissions in some states, excluding institutional delivery; attributed to aggressive pricing strategies by private providers as well as Private Public Partnerships (PPPs)
Sustained increase in institutional deliveries	Increase in normal deliveries (that can well be conducted at peripheral institutions) at district hospitals an unnecessary burden
Sub Centres, adequately equipped, have been accredited for institutional deliveries in Uttarakhand and Rajasthan	Anaesthesia and blood transfusion services continue to be one of the biggest stumbling blocks for caesarean sections and other surgeries
AYUSH (Ayurveda, Unani, Siddha and Homeopathy) doctors have substantially augmented services; including deliveries in some states/districts	Dearth of basic equipments such as blood pressure instruments
Infrastructure	
Upgradation of buildings and amenities	Augmentation at several places not of health centres commensurate with increased patient loads
Improved drug supply; generic supplies through co-operatives	Continued irrational use of drugs and non-availability of essential drugs
Increased availability of laboratory and radiological services	Drugs being prescribed for purchase from outside
Waste management systems in place	Appropriate utilisation still a big question mark
Emergency referral transport systems established in several large states	Based on population norms, inadequacy of numbers of institutions in most states
Human Resources	

Improvements	*Challenges*
Near 100,000 more personnel, workers and managers, in the health services	Attracting and retaining personnel in difficult areas
Nearly 700,000 ASHAs (Accredited Social Health Activists) in place	All positions are contractual; problems of attrition
Increased training and skill building	No long-term Human Resource strategy; the notion of 'minimum critical human resource density' Deficiencies in key specialities—Gynaeco-logy & Obstetrics, Paediatrics and Anaesthesia
Decentralisation and Communitisation Process of district planning streamlined in several states; mentorship also yielding results	Inadequate analysis of epidemiological, Health Management Information Systems and contextual data; often ending up with 'generic' plans
Village Health and Sanitation Committees (VHSC) set up and functioning in most states	Village health planning weak; lack of capacity and clarity
Rogi Kalyan Samitis (RKS) functional in most curative institutions	Functions largely as an instrument of cost recovery rather than of participatory governance

Prioritising Urban Health

The proportion of urban population living in 393 Class I cities (population of over 100,000) was 68.7 per cent as per the 2001 census. Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Gujarat are some of the major states where the urban population exceeds 40 per cent. In absolute numbers, there are 41 million persons living in the urban areas of Maharashtra—14 per cent of the national population. It is estimated that by 2020-25, about 40-50 per cent of India's population would be urban. The concentration of urban population in the larger cities has been a unique feature of urbanisation in India with 35 million-plus cities.

The 61st national sample survey (NSS) recorded an addition of 4.4 million urban poor persons between 1993-94 and 2004-05. Nearly 80 per cent of the new jobs (increasingly contractualised and informalised) totalling 19.3 million between 1991-2001 were generated in urban areas. There is no uniform urban health system in the country similar to the rural health service. Increasing numbers of urban poor are greatly burdened, both for routine needs and emergencies. The last two decades were marked by a series of epidemics of emerging and re-emerging communicable diseases—Cholera O139, Plague, Dengue and Dengue Haemorrhagic Fever, Chikunganya Fever, SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) and H1N1 Influenza (Swine Flu)—most of them clustered in urban locales.

The unfinished agenda of water supply and sanitation is a serious challenge. It exposes millions to the risks of water borne illnesses. A recently released publication of the Ministry of Urban Development provides data on water supply, sanitation and sewerage services for 28 major cities:

- Household level water supply is available in only 40-55 per cent of dwelling units in 23 cities
- 17 cities have per capita consumption of less than 130 litres per capita per day
- None of these cities have 24×7 supply
- Intermittent supply and leakages in pipelines contribute to contamination and water borne diseases
- No sewerage network *at all* in five cities
- Sewerage coverage in 23 other cities averages about 59 per cent
- Among cities that have a wastewater collection system, the average collection is about 55 per cent
- Average collection of municipal solid waste was about 75.3 per cent
- 16 of these cities have municipal solid waste collection systems of low reliability, and most lack a proper monitoring system
- Only 8 per cent of the waste was scientifically disposed of

The Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission (JNURM) is addressing some of these issues. The Central Public Health and Environmental Engineering Organisation (CPHEEO) has estimated a requirement of Rs.172,905 crore for provision of safe water supply and sanitation services to the urban population by 2021.

The Eleventh Five Year Plan thus proposed to introduce the National Urban Health Mission (NUHM) as a 'thrust area' that in conjunction with the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) would form the 'Sarva Swasthya Abhiyan'. The key elements included:

- Provision of essential primary health care services,
- Appropriate technology through public-private partnership, and,
- Health insurance for the urban poor.

The drafts of the NUHM have undergone several changes; and it has now been postponed to the Twelfth Five Year Plan. Urban health systems are highly complex entities involving 'sub-actions' across many institutions with numerous goals.

The recently formulated Gujarat Urban Health Project seeks to reform urban health services in the state in the coming decade and may provide a model for other states. The key strategic approaches include:

- Uniform Urban Primary Health Centre (UPHC) system for all urban areas

- Promoting, supporting and institutionalising public-private-partnerships for referral, secondary and tertiary care
- Promoting, supporting and institutionalising civil society participation and partnerships
- Develop and strengthen management and support mechanisms at districts, regions and state levels

The initiatives in Surat and Ahmedabad are instructive for cities that are gearing up to face the challenges of urbanisation, epidemiological transition and providing for the marginalised urban and peri-urban populations. These are also examples that show that urban health services can be energised within existing frameworks by closely interacting with the private sector providers, without external (specifically, central) assistance and under strong public ownership.

Challenges of Child Health

Despite considerable economic, scientific and technological progress, nearly two million of the 26 million children born each year die before completing five years of age. Half of these deaths occur within the first month of birth. The under-five mortality rate has reduced from over 200 per thousand during the early 1970s to about 70 per thousand by now; but there has been a slowdown in the rate of improvement since the 1990s.

Trends in early Childhood Mortality, India, 1971-75 to 2008, SRS

Period/Year	Neo-natal Mortality rate (NNMR)	Infant mortality rate (IMR)	Under-five mortality rate (U5MR)
1971-75	73	134	210
1976-80	75	124	193
1981-85	66	104	161
1986-90	57	91	137
1991-95	49	76	113
1996-2000	45	71	98
2001-05	38	61	84
2008	35	53	69

Source: Registrar General of India.

Deaths in the perinatal period are due to slow foetal growth, foetal malnourishment and immaturity, hypoxia, birth asphyxia and other respiratory conditions. Among infants, most of the deaths are due to conditions originating in the perinatal period (64.2 per cent), followed by infections and parasitic diseases (8.9 per cent), diseases of the respiratory system (7.3 per cent) and the rest due to other causes. In the one year age group, infectious and parasitic diseases are the major causes of death (28.4 per cent) followed by diseases of the respiratory and nervous system (29.3

Data Source: National Family Health Surveys.

per cent), remaining attributed to other causes. The same diseases impact all high Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) countries.

There are considerable social disparities in child mortality, best exemplified by the following differential in reduction of IMR across the three rounds of the National Family Health Survey (over the last 15 years).

Despite the affirmative policies pursued by both central and state governments, decline in mortality indicators has been slowest among Scheduled Tribes (STs). The mortality situation needs to be seen in conjunction with the poor nutritional status in the disadvantaged groups.

Data Source: National Family Health Surveys.

Key strategies currently being pursued by the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare include:

- Increasing coverage of skilled care at birth for newborns in conjunction with maternal care.
- Implementing a newborn and child health package of preventive, promotive and curative interventions, using a comprehensive IMNCI (Integrated Management of Neonatal and Childhood Illnesses) approach.
- Strengthening and augmenting existing services like Essential Newborn Care and management of Acute Respiratory Illnesses (ARI) and Acute Diarrhoeal Diseases (ADD) in areas where IMNCI is yet to be implemented.
- Implementing the Multi Year Strategic Plan (MYSP) for the Universal Immunisation Programme (UIP).

There is a renewed emphasis on bringing down neonatal mortality in order to improve overall child survival. Care of the newborns seeks to prevent hypothermia and infection; and involves early initiation of breast feeding and basic newborn resuscitation. The IMNCI strategy is focussing on common childhood illnesses that are significantly responsible for mortality and morbidity including neonatal illnesses, ARI, diarrhoea, measles, malaria and malnutrition. The IMNCI package is aimed at strengthening care both at household (through outreach services) and at institutional (sub-centre and primary health centre) levels. Navjaat Shishu Suraksha Karyakram is seeking to provide basic newborn care and resuscitation, emphasising upon prevention of hypothermia, prevention of infection and early initiation of breast feeding.

Non-communicable Diseases

Broadly clubbed together as 'non-communicable diseases', a group of chronic diseases is fast emerging as an epidemiological challenge. These include cancers, cardio-vascular diseases, strokes, diabetes, blindness, mental illnesses and substance abuse. This 'silent emergency' is complicated by the fact that there is lack of systematic data in the country. The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) has been making efforts towards that end. The National Cancer Registry Programme has been in operation since 1981-82. According to last available reports, the age adjusted incidence rate in urban registry areas varied between 98.7 and 138.3/100,000 among men and between 108.0 and 143.4/100,000 among women. Commonest sites of cancers in men include lung, oesophagus, pharynx and stomach. In women the commonest sites are cervix, breast, oral cavity, oesophagus, stomach and ovary. Untreated (not receiving/accepting) cancer rates are as high as 40-45 per cent in some registry centres.

With an estimated 50 million diabetes cases, India is most affected by this new epidemic. In part explained by the increased life expectancy, the lower age of incidence (despite low basal metabolic indices) social changes occurring within relatively shorter time spans and lifestyle changes have been hypothesised to be the 'causes of the causes'. A recent study in Kerala found a high risk of non-communicable diseases, in some cases even higher than industrialised countries (e.g. USA), with interesting patterns of socio-demographic and behavioural risk factors along with biochemical risk factors. There was a low prevalence of alcohol intake or tobacco use among women but there was a higher prevalence of overweight and abdominal obesity, although there was low prevalence of hypertension and dyslipidaemia. A study from northern India reported that the prevalence of most risk factors for cardiovascular diseases in the rural population was similar to those in the urban population, except for the sedentary lifestyle.

In July 2010, the Government of India approved the National Programme for Prevention and Control of Cancer, Diabetes, Cardiovascular Diseases and Stroke (NPCDCS) for implementation during the Eleventh Five Year Plan. Though yet to take off significantly, this is an important step towards the recognition and mitigation of the problem. Hundred districts in 15 states will be taken up in the current phase. The proposed strategies include:

- Promoting healthy lifestyles (through health education and mass media) at country level
- Opportunistic screening of persons above the age of 30 years
- Establishment of non-communicable disease (NCD) clinics at CHC and district level
- Training manpower and strengthening of tertiary level health facilities

The overall prevalence of diabetes, hypertension, Ischemic Heart Disease (IHD) and stroke has been estimated to be 62.47, 159.46, 37.00 and 1.54 respectively per 1000 population of India. Current research underscores the contribution of social determinants to both the causation of diseases and access to treatment services. The Indian programme will need to think with far greater imagination beyond the small but important steps that are being initiated.

In the contemporary world, disasters, both natural and man-made, have emerged as public health emergencies. Disaster management is a comprehensive exercise much beyond health needs. The establishment of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) is a positive step in this direction. Nuclear disasters and bio-terrorism pose unique challenges to our weak and patchy health service system. The NDMA has come out with a set of guidelines and has emphasised disaster preparedness. Training programmes to be able to implement disaster management plans are being undertaken.

Emergency Response Centres and Emergency Response Teams are being put into place. Understandably, these involve inter-sectoral coordination and technological inputs including GIS based emergency preparedness and response systems. Emphasis is also being laid to prevention mechanisms, and educating and informing the public.

Conclusions

As we prepare for the second decade of the new millennium, the country continues to grapple with a double burden in terms of the health security of the nation. Some of the largest causes of deaths are ironically preventable including child (and adult) nutrition and access to responsive primary health care. Long term treatment and complications of chronic diseases imply a larger (but not necessarily sole) role for secondary and tertiary institutions endowed with appropriate technology and skilled human resources. Disasters will challenge the public health system to a level that it is not generally used to, or capable of. Disparity in capacities across states particularly those with inadequate geographical and social access to services must be addressed. Health is a state subject but new programmes and initiatives are increasingly national (and global). The next decade will therefore be focussed on vastly strengthening the systems. The dwindling and skewed distribution of human resources will pose a unique challenge without simple answers. Infusion of technology in public systems is expensive but must be a priority. There is an increasing and dangerous divide between the public-primary and tertiary-corporate, creating a dualism in the system. Communitisation processes (weak so far in the NRHM) need to be made more meaningful to ensure that services are broad-based; everybody is going to need them—both for diabetes and disasters.

South Asia in India's National Security Strategy

Arvind Gupta

Introduction

India's growth and development is closely linked with that of its South Asian neighbours. Its South Asian neighbours, although distinct political entities, are part of the broad based Indian civilisation and have many common characteristics. However, developments of the last few decades have shown that despite numerous commonalities, there is certain mistrust between India and its South Asian neighbours. Many of these problems have been inherited from the colonial past and the circumstances of their creation. The problem of poverty in most countries is also linked with the issues of governance and weak institutions.

In terms of size and population India is the largest country in South Asia, much bigger than its South Asian neighbours. It has nine immediate neighbours—China, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. China, Indonesia (maritime) and Myanmar are not considered as part of South Asia. Afghanistan is also an immediate neighbour as it has a small border with Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.[1] The SAARC consists of all the above countries except China, Indonesia and Myanmar. However, China has observer status in the SAARC.

South Asia's dominant geographical features are the Himalayas in the north, the Indian Ocean in the south, the Arabian Sea in the west and the Bay of Bengal in the east. India is a peninsula jutting out into the Indian Ocean while the Himalayas form its northern boundary. The Himalayas and the Indian Ocean contribute immensely to India's well being. India has a variety of climates and a fertile soil. The life-giving monsoons are the result of complex interaction between the Indian Ocean waters and the Himalayas. The glaciers in the Himalayas are the sources of water for the numerous perennial rivers of India.

Geography makes India both a land as well as a maritime power. Land

India's International Borders and Coastline

India border

Legend
India border
—— India-Afghanistan Border
—— India-Bangladesh Border
—— India-Bhutan Border
—— India-China Border
—— India-Myanmar Border
—— India-Nepal Border
—— India-Pakistan Border
India's Coastline

Map not to Scale.

and ocean have had a powerful influence on Indian culture. India has been linked to far-flung regions of Asia and Europe through the land (Silk route). It has had a millennia old interaction with the eastern coast of Africa in the west and with the South East Asian cultures through the sea. Thus India is located at the cross roads of several civilisations with a long tradition of contact with Africa, Europe, China and the Far East.

As a result of these contacts, India has assimilated many external cultures and influences and is a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-religious society. While it absorbed Christian and Islamic influences from the west, it radiated Hindu and Buddhist influences to the rest of the world.

India is a relatively young nation-state though it is one of the oldest civilisations. Moulding a billion strong population into a democratic nation-state, providing its people decent living standards and ensuring social harmony is perhaps the largest experiment in social engineering in the world. Success in nation building will have a powerful impact on the regional and global security situation. Since India became an independent nation state in 1947, it has achieved several notable successes in this endeavour. This has imparted confidence to the people to continue on the chosen path and seek their rightful place in the world.

India's endeavour in the next few years will be to lift millions of people

out of grinding poverty, as even today nearly 80 per cent of Indian people live on less than two dollars a day. An equally major task before the Indian government will be to provide security to the people. This is necessary for India to survive as a nation state. India's strategy will be geared to achieving that objective of security and development in a democratic, peaceful and stable environment.

How should India deal with its difficult neighbourhood so as to ensure its security interests? How should South Asia be factored in India's national security strategy in a 10-year framework? This paper analyses the emerging global and regional security environment, examines the main characteristics of South Asia, the key features of India's relations with its neighbours and suggests how South Asia should be factored into India's national security strategy. The last section makes suggestions for the formulation of India's national security strategy in so far as South Asia is concerned.

Global and Regional Environment—Scenarios

The global security environment has undergone a radical change since the end of the Cold War. This has had a major impact on South Asia's security environment. The centre of power in the world is shifting from the West to Asia. Several new rising powers are challenging the old world order—India and China in Asia, with China having become the world's largest economy, after overtaking Japan and is expected to overtake the US economy in the next twenty years or even sooner. India is also set to become the world's fourth largest economy by about 2040. India is likely to enjoy the demographic dividend for another thirty years or so while China will begin to face the problem of ageing population. In South Asia, all countries are expected to increase their populations although at declining rates. By 2050, South Asia is likely to have over 2.5 billion people—about a quarter of the world's population. Energy, food and water shortages are likely to become acute. Climate change will also lead to a rise in sea levels, uneven rainfall, melting glaciers, coastal erosion, salination of fresh water resources, frequent floods and drought cycles and extreme weather events. All countries in South Asia will face the challenges of man made and natural disasters affecting vast populations. Providing job opportunities to the burgeoning young populations of South Asian countries will emerge as the most important tasks before the governments.

The regional environment is also likely to undergo major change. In a deteriorating security scenario, China will have emerged as an assertive superpower by 2050 vying for influence in South Asia and in its neighbourhood. This could lead to a sharpening of the rivalry between India and China. The competition may manifest itself in the Indian Ocean region. Iran is believed to be developing a nuclear weapon. If it succeeds in doing so, it could lead to nuclear weapon proliferation in West Asia. The

developments in the Korean peninsula may compel Japan to adopt more robust military postures, which could include the possibility of it acquiring a nuclear weapon. The China-Japan rivalry may become more acute. The US will retain a footprint in Asia but it will have to compete for influence with China. China's growing assertiveness may lead to tensions in the South China Sea, the Sea of Japan, Bay of Bengal, and in South East Asia.

However in a more positive security scenario, China's rise may prove to be beneficial. Its economic growth may boost global economic growth and particularly in the countries of South Asia and East Asia. It may become a partner in the rise of a new international order based on economic integration and cooperation. It may seek to downplay its bilateral problems allowing other countries the space to grow. It may cooperate with India and sort out the boundary dispute in a spirit of mutual accommodation.

A third scenario envisages a faltering in the economic growth of China leading to the rise of social tensions within. This scenario would create a great deal of uncertainty in the global order. China may begin to look inwards and may become even more aggressive. An unstable China will affect South Asia directly as the India-China competition may become more acute. The Pakistan-China nexus could also become weaker.

In all the three regional scenarios, South Asian countries, including India, will have to be prepared to face a great deal of uncertainty. They will need to adopt hedging strategies to deal with the various problems of security and development.

Characteristics of South Asia

South Asia occupies an important place in India's overall security scenario. The following are the distinctive features of South Asia:

- *Diversity:* South Asia is a highly diverse region that has absorbed cultural, social, political and economic influences from various sources. Hundreds of languages and dialects are spoken in the region. All the major religions of the world are practiced here. South Asia's culture is assimilative. In the process, it has developed as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual region.

- *Asymmetry:* India is several times larger in population and size than any other country in South Asia. Its geographical features make it both a land power and a maritime power. The economic rise of India will have major influence on the geo-strategic situation in the region. India's dominant size makes its neighbours apprehensive about its intentions. China and India are the two rising powers. The outcome of the competition between the two will determine the security situation in the region.

- *Poverty:* Nearly 1.5 billion people live in South Asia, most of them

in dire poverty. In recent years, South Asian countries have registered a handsome economic growth but it is still not sufficient to pull the masses out of poverty. South Asia has a predominantly young population but the lack of education and job opportunities make the population restive.

- *Democracy:* Since its inception as an independent nation state, India has embarked upon an unprecedented experiment of bringing its people out of poverty through a democratic experiment. Democracy has taken roots in India but the task of nation building is yet not complete. India's neighbours have not been so lucky with democracy. Many of them have experienced long periods of military dictatorship. Institutions of governance are weak. India is naturally sympathetic to democratic sentiments in South Asia. This creates problems between India and its neighbours.

- *Least integrated region:* South Asia is one of the world's least integrated regions despite numerous commonalities and complementarities. Regional cooperation has not yet taken firm root mainly due to prevailing mistrust.

- *Security issues:* The region continues to suffer from a myriad of security problems ranging from insurgencies and terrorism to the ever present danger of a military conflict between India and Pakistan. South Asia's surrounding geo-political environment is also conflict-ridden. Some of the world's enduring hotspots—the Middle East, Afghanistan—are in India's extended neighbourhood. China, India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons whereas Iran is reportedly developing one clandestinely. Proliferation of nuclear weapons and the danger of nuclear weapons falling in the hands of radical groups in Pakistan present a security threat to all. There is as yet no common security architecture in South Asia.

- *Influence of external powers:* External powers have traditionally had a major influence on developments in the region. The US and China at present exert great influence in the region. China, though not a South Asian power, has shared borders with many South Asian countries. It has an ongoing border dispute with India. In recent years its attitude on the boundary question has hardened. It is beginning to treat boundary issues as territorial issues, particularly in the east. China's growing influence in the region complicates the security situation.

India's Relations with the Neighbouring Countries

India's security relationship with its neighbouring countries is often characterised by a lack of trust. The following factors are important:

- **Weak states**: Many of India's neighbours have poor governance and weak economies. This creates instability with implications for Indian security.

- **Anti-India feeling**: Anti-India sentiments abound among India's South Asian neighbours. The prevailing power asymmetry makes them suspicious of India.

- **External balancing**: Many countries in the region seek external help to balance India. They involve external powers—US, China—into India's security calculus.

- **Non-traditional security issues**: The entire South Asian region including India is vulnerable to the new security threats arising out of terrorism, climate change, organised crime, human trafficking, drugs etc. The existing mechanisms for dealing with these challenges are either weak or non-existent.

- **Lack of security mechanism**: There are no regional security mechanisms in South Asia to deal with the common security issues. There is near absence of meaningful security dialogue among South Asian countries. The SAARC convention on terrorism has proved to be ineffective.

Traditionally, India's foreign policy has devoted considerable attention to relations with South Asian countries. However, India's relations with the neighbouring countries have not been smooth. The neighbours regard India with suspicion. India feels that the neighbours are not sensitive to its security concerns.

Following are the key features of India's relations with its neighbours:

- *Pakistan*: The India-Pakistan relationship is characterised by mistrust and hostility. Both possess nuclear weapons. They have fought four wars in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999. In addition, India has been fighting a proxy war with Pakistan in Kashmir. The situation is unlikely to change in the near future. A series of agreements govern India's relations with Pakistan ranging from—the Indus Water Treaty (1960) and the Shimla Agreement (1972) to the Lahore Declaration (1999) apart from a number of sectoral agreements. In recent years, India has had a "composite dialogue" with Pakistan on a number of issues in fits and starts. For Pakistan, Kashmir remains central. India, on the other hand, wants a more broad-based relationship with Pakistan. Since the Mumbai terrorist attacks (26/11), India wants Pakistan to address the terrorism question. Pakistan's complicity in terrorism has brought the relationship to an impasse. The growing instability in Pakistan will compel India to recast its policy towards Pakistan.

Pakistan will continue to pose the most serious security challenge to India in the near to mid-term future.

- *Afghanistan:* The developments in Afghanistan have radically transformed the regional security situation. India has been adversely affected by these developments. Pakistan has become a front state of the West for fighting terrorism. This has led to the strengthening of the military in Pakistan which has had a hostile attitude towards India. India's access to Central Asia has been cut off. The Af-Pak region also is home to a number of radical groups that are ill disposed towards India. Pakistani society too has become radicalised. Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan has grown. A number of Afghan refugees have come to India. Indian diplomats and experts have lost lives in Afghanistan trying to help rehabilitation and reconstruction there. India has given aid worth $1.2 billion but the country is still far from stable. External powers like the NATO and the US are deeply involved in the country. The country has become the scene of a new Great Game in the region. In the future too, India's security will be greatly affected by the developments in Afghanistan.

- *Nepal*: Nepal is passing through serious political instability and has been through a civil war for ten years. The monarchy has been abolished but a new political structure has not yet been established. The open border makes India vulnerable to numerous security challenges emanating from Nepal. There have been links between the Nepali Maoists and the Indian Maoists. India has a unique relationship with Nepal based on the India-Nepal Treaty (1950). The treaty provides for an open border and obliges India to give Nepali citizens national status. Millions of Nepali citizens work in India. But, Nepal regards the treaty as one sided and an infringement of Nepal's sovereignty. It wants a revision of the treaty. India is not opposed to the revision but the Nepalese side has not come up with any suggestions. Anti-India feeling is particularly strong in Nepal. The Nepalese blame India for interfering in its affairs. Nepal will continue to present India with difficult security challenges.

- *Bhutan*: Bhutan's geo-strategic location between India and China makes it critical for India's security. Indian insurgent groups have often taken shelter in Bhutan. India's relations with Bhutan are the best that India has with the neighbouring countries. Cooperation between Bhutan and India in the hydroelectric sector has worked to the advantage of both countries. Bhutan has an unsettled border with China. The settlement of the border between the two will have implications for India. India has updated its bilateral treaty with Bhutan. The relationship is based on India's broad based assistance

to Bhutan in return for Bhutan recognising the primacy of India's security concerns.

- *Bangladesh*: Bangladesh, adjacent to India's restive northeastern states, is critical to India's security. Bangladesh can provide India with critical connectivity to the northeastern states but has generally been reluctant to do so. That position, however, may be changing. Indian insurgent groups have often taken shelter in Bangladesh. Illegal migrants in large numbers cross from Bangladesh into India on a regular basis despite border fencing. Insurgents in the Northeast get their arms by routes passing through Myanmar and Bangladesh. Bangladesh is the world's most densely populated country. In the future, the adverse consequences of climate change would push large number of Bangladeshis into India. Although India helped in the birth of Bangladesh, the bilateral relationship has not been easy. Recently the relationship has improved but on the whole, the relationship has been problematic. At least one major political party and one Islamic party in Bangladesh have opposed close relations with India. Bangladesh's opening to the Bay of Bengal makes it an important country even for a landlocked country like Nepal.

- *Sri Lanka*: India's relations with Sri Lanka have been bedevilled by the Tamil ethnic issue which remains unresolved despite the defeat of the LTTE. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) had to intervene in 1987 to help the government fight the LTTE. In recent years, India-Sri Lanka relations have improved particularly in the economic field. Both have a free trade agreement which has helped in the growth of bilateral trade. India is helping post-LTTE Sri Lanka in rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts and also in infrastructure building. India is sensitive to Sri Lanka's opening up to China and Pakistan as this could have security implications for India.

- *Maldives*: The location of the Maldives in the Indian Ocean makes it of geo-strategic importance for India. Democracy is taking roots in Maldives. India's relations with Maldives are improving rapidly. India helped avert a military coup in the country in 1988. Maldives pays due regard to India's security concerns.

- *Myanmar*: Although Myanmar is not a part of South Asia, it is closely linked with India due to common history and a long, porous shared border. A number of Indian insurgent groups take shelter in Myanmar. India's security in the Northeast is dependent on cooperation from Myanmar. India and Myanmar have been cooperating on the security front. India is also helping Myanmar with infrastructure construction. Myanmar is India's bridge to South East Asia. Myanmar can also play a role in India's energy security. China's

economic and political influence in Myanmar is also growing. China has gained access to the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar. This brings in an element of competition between India and China in Myanmar.

- *China*: China is now trying to enter the South Asian space where India has traditionally enjoyed a pre-eminent position. The future trajectory of Sino-Indian relations will have a great impact on the security situation in South Asia. China is all set to break the Himalayan barrier and increase its influence in South Asia. India has serious security issues with China that include the unresolved boundary issue, competing for influence in South Asia, jockeying for scarce energy resources and China's nexus with Pakistan in the security field including missile and nuclear. China has not hesitated to bolster Pakistan against India. The relationship between the two is growing steadily. For India, managing China's growing influence in South Asia will be the major challenge in the near future.

What should India do?

India's national security strategy has to take into account the rise of China and the instability prevailing in South Asia. India will have to manage its relations with South Asia first, by expanding its comprehensive national power and by offering its neighbouring countries' the benefits of integration and second by countering the growing influence of external powers, particularly, China. In the coming years, India will have to proceed on the following tracks:

- *Governance:* India will have to rely on itself to meet its security challenges. It must strengthen its own democracy, economy, and security institutions. India will need to increase its comprehensive national strength. Good governance, social cohesion, all round economic development, an outward looking foreign policy backed by deft diplomacy, and a strong military will be key to addressing the security challenges.

- *Analytical capabilities:* India must strengthen its early warning systems and should develop capacities to analyse the global and regional developments accurately. This will require building analytical capabilities within and outside the government. It will be very important to understand the intentions of China and Pakistan both of which have a large influence on the South Asian security scenario.

- *A new version of the Gujral doctrine:* India will need to closely engage with its neighbours. It must develop an updated version of the Gujral doctrine in order to inspire confidence in its neighbouring

countries. It must allay their perceived fears of Indian domination, interference and insensitivity. India should offer generous packages of economic assistance, trade and investment to each of its neighbours. In particular, it should help build social and economic infrastructure in the neighbouring countries. The neighbours must benefit from the economic growth of India.

- *Regional cooperation:* India should take the lead in strengthening regional cooperation and devote sufficient resources for this purpose. The SAARC and sub regional cooperation should be strengthened.

- *Border management:* India must urgently address the challenge of border management. The borders with all must be well regulated and monitored without making it difficult for people to cross it. Physical and people-to-people connectivity must be strengthened.

- *External powers:* India should make it clear to the outside world that external powers should show sensitivity to India's security concerns. India, through its words and actions, should make its security red lines clear to the rest of the world so that there is no ambiguity on this score. In particular, India will have to devise ways and means to deal with a rising China which has ambitions of playing a dominant role in South Asia.

- *Focus on Pakistan:* India will need to develop a multi-pronged well honed policy towards Pakistan. Pakistan is likely to become increasingly unstable. India's policy should be based upon sufficient deterrence to discourage Pakistan from military adventures against India. At the same time, India must reach out to the people of Pakistan who want good relations with India.

- *Counter terrorism:* India is located close to the epicentre of international terrorism in the Af-Pak region. Terrorist groups like the LeT have become global in their reach and they have India firmly in their crosshairs. They will continue to get support and sustenance from sections in Pakistani society and the establishment to pursue an anti-Indian agenda. The increasing radicalisation of Pakistani society will have an adverse impact on Indian security. India should strengthen its counter-terrorism mechanism to deal with the threat.

- *Maritime security:* Many of India's security threats emerge from the seas and are transmitted from there. India will need to pay special attention to maritime issues as many of its threats come from the sea. The Indian navy and the coast guard must be strengthened. India should play its due role in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea as well as for the protection of SLOCs.

- *Nuclear deterrence:* India faces a harsh nuclear environment. Nuclear

weapons will continue to play an important role in India's security calculus. Nuclear deterrence should be strong and robust.

- *Science and Technology:* India's growth as a major power will depend upon how soon it becomes a major scientific power in the world. Innovation is the key. It needs to increase its share in global high tech trade and also become self-reliant in strategic technologies necessary for national security as well as economic development. India should be prepared to play its role in sharing the fruits of scientific and technological development with its neighbours, particularly in the IT, space, nanotechnology, pharmaceuticals, bio-tech, agriculture and other areas.

- *Human resource:* India has a distinct advantage in having a large pool of young people. But the key task before India will be to provide its young population with high quality education and job opportunities. It will need to pay attention to developing human resource.

Suggested content on South Asia for a National Security Strategy document

Based on the above analysis, the national security strategy document for India could contain the following:

India shares a common cultural and security space with the countries in the South Asian region. As a prominent Asian nation with critical national interests in South Asia, India has special responsibility to ensure peace and stability in the region. India will work towards this end by cooperating with other countries in the region.

India will maintain close and cooperative ties with each of the South Asian countries. It will pay special attention to the specific needs of individual countries and develop bilateral ties accordingly. It will endeavour to deepen political and economic ties with its South Asian neighbours not always insisting on reciprocity.

India supports the deepening of regional cooperation in South Asia. It will work towards the strengthening of the SAARC. Particular attention will be given to forging economic integration, promoting physical and social connections, building human resource capacities in the region, and dealing with critical issues like climate change, energy, food and health security which affect the South Asian region. India will share its scientific and technological resources and capacities with the neighbouring countries in South Asia.

India believes that South Asian countries are capable of dealing with their problems without the involvement of external powers. Only regional countries should be members of the SAARC. Countries outside the SAARC should be involved in an observer capacity or as dialogue partners.

In addition to the SAARC, India will support sub-regional cooperation in the SAARC involving some South Asian countries on specific issues. It will also favour economic cooperation with countries outside the South Asian region, particularly with adjacent geographical regions like the ASEAN, the SCO etc.

India will deal with its security challenges through diplomacy. But it will maintain robust military strength to guarantee security and stability in the region.

India attaches great importance to its relations with China. It believes that both counties have enough room to develop. It will seek to maintain peace and tranquillity on the border and settle the boundary question through negotiations. It will seek to expand the area of cooperation in all spheres including in the field of security.

India is conscious of the fact that Pakistan remains the key to security and stability in the region. It will seek to normalise its relations with Pakistan paying special attention to people to people ties, trade and investment and confidence building.

Given the complex nuclear environment in India's neighbourhood, India will maintain no first use nuclear strategy and a credible minimum deterrent and a second strike capability. It will participate fully in the work of the Conference on Disarmament pursuing the larger goal of universal non-discriminatory complete nuclear disarmament.

India has a large EEZ. The security of the sea lanes of communication is important for India. India will develop the necessary naval and coast guard capabilities to ensure its maritime interests and security. It will pay special heed to the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea regions where India has vital territorial, economic and security interests.

India will work with South Asian countries to develop a security dialogue to discuss the common problems which affect the region. It will contribute towards instituting a suitable security dialogue forum for this purpose. It will also discuss non-traditional security issues with neighbouring countries. India will cooperate with neighbouring countries to deal with the adverse impact of climate change and natural disasters. It will discus and cooperate with its neighbours on the problems of food, water, health and energy security.

India will participate in regional economic and security fora in the regions adjacent to South Asia. It will contribute to the evolution of an Asian security architecture and regional integration.

Innovation is key to India's economic growth. India will seek to build capacities in science and technology for economic growth and also to meet the security needs of the country. It will promote scientific and development cooperation with neighbouring countries. Higher institutions of learning will be built to train the young in high technology and in disciplines needed for a balanced economic growth.

The training and skilling of the young population will be given high priority.

India's growth as a nation will depend upon how well it deals with the challenge of energy poverty. India will accomplish the various missions of he National Action Plan on Climate Change. These missions will provide the young people and help in the renewal of the country.

India will ensure that its growth is inclusive and beneficial for its neighbours.

NOTE

1. India has 14818 kilometres of land borders and a coast line of 7516.6 kilometers. All states except Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Delhi and Haryana have an international border or a coast line. 92 of India's 593 districts are border districts in 17 states. Like all boundaries in South Asia, India's boundaries are also man-made. India shares 14,880 kilometres of boundary with Pakistan (3323 km), China (3488 km), Nepal (1751 km), Bhutan (699 km), Myanmar (1643 km), and Bangladesh (4096.7 km). India is endowed with an EEZ of 2.013 million sq kms. After the delimitation of the continental shelf, the sea area of responsibility of maritime agencies will increase to 2.9 million sq kms, which would be almost equal to India's entire land mass.These figures have been taken from Pushpita Das (ed), *India's Border Management: Select Documents,* IDSA, New Delhi, 2010.

A Note on the China-India-US Triangle and India's Strategy

Tanvi Madan

Discussing the relations between China, Japan and the United States, Harry Harding laid out some questions about the future of that strategic triangle:

> Will it be a concert of powers, in which the three great nations share enough common values and common interests to work together to promote peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region? Will it be a firm alliance of two against one—an alignment in which the United States and Japan work together to contain the expansion of Chinese power? Will it be a balance of power, in which Japan tries to mediate a 'new Cold War' between China and the United States?

> Conversely, will the United States attempt to mediate an emerging rivalry between China and Japan in Asia? Or will the triangle be highly fluid, with each pair of countries working together on some issues, but finding themselves in disagreements on others, without forming any firm or enduring alignment?[1]

The same questions can be—and are being—asked about the China-India-United States strategic triangle. While the relative importance of each country in the world and in the eyes of other countries has changed over time, neither the triangle nor the debate about its potential nature is new. But, with the growing power and influence of China and India, and the changing context of the relations between the three countries, these questions have assumed greater importance—not just in op-ed columns or in think tanks around the world, but also in the corridors of power in India. Indeed, some scholars have recently identified the management of the China-India-US triangle as the overarching challenge for Indian diplomacy. The triangle does not just present challenges, but opportunities for India as well. Each one of the scenarios given above is possible. How India deals with these challenges, opportunities and scenarios will affect not just India's relations with China and the US, but its foreign relations across the entire spectrum. It will also likely impact the internal dimensions of India's strategy.

This note considers some of the ways India can choose to manage this strategic triangle. It is not intended to serve as a prescriptive document, as much as one that provokes dialogue about the strengths and weaknesses of potential strategies. This note looks at India's objectives, as well as the spectrum of strategies for triangle management and their strengths and weaknesses. It pays particular attention to India's existing strategy and its potential pitfalls and possibilities.[2]

Before discussing what India's strategy should be with regard to the triangle, it is important to ask—what are India's objectives? Some have argued that India's key strategic objectives are protecting its security (external and internal), economic prosperity and ensuring India has fair access to global public goods. China and the US will likely play a role as India seeks to achieve each of these objectives. Their role can be of supporters or spoilers. Therefore, to the extent possible, India's strategy in one sense needs to be geared towards shaping American and Chinese attitudes to ensure that these countries facilitate the achievement of India's objectives—or, at the very least, ensure that these two countries do no harm. Furthermore, India will need to leverage both relationships to maximise the benefits and minimise the risks to the country as it seeks to attain its goals. Among other things, this requires constant assessment of how the Indian relationship with one country can help shape the other country's attitude towards India.

The Spectrum of Strategies

When considering how to deal with the triangle, one can identify a spectrum of strategies:

- **Trust No One:** Based on the assumption that other states are unreliable and will operate to further their own interests, and not India's welfare. Their interests can indeed complicate India's objectives. Therefore, the best strategy is to keep both China and the US at arm's length, making use of the countries when appropriate, but minimising their impact on India.
- **Yankee Go Home:** Based on the fact that, as emerging Asian giants, China and India share common objectives and they should, therefore, work together to achieve those goals. Furthermore, the interests of third parties, especially the US, can jeopardise India's relations with China. Therefore, India should work with China to limit the role and influence of the US in their relationship, and in Asia and—more broadly—the world.
- **The Dynamic Democratic Duo:** Based on the assumption that India and the US have far more in common; moreover, that India and the US have similar objectives—i.e. containment—when it comes to China. Thus, India should seek a *de facto* or even *de jure* alliance with the US to counter China.

- **Why Can't We All Just Get Along:** Based on the perception that there is ample space for all three countries and the most significant challenges they face are not ones that can be dealt with alone. Therefore, the best way forward is for China, India and the US to cooperate to maintain stability and prosperity in the region and beyond.
- **'Hedgemony':** Based on the assessment that the regional and global landscapes are in flux. China and the US are hedging their bets, and, therefore, India should too. India can even strive to play a key part in Beijing and Washington's hedging strategies. Doing so, and keeping its own options open would give India more room for manoeuvre and allow it to maximise benefits from both relationships.

These strategies are not mutually exclusive, and neither are the assumptions nor the perceptions upon which they are based. For example, a lack of trust in the reliability of external actors, which can result in a trust-no-one approach, is partly also what leads to a hedging strategy. As another example, hedging and trilateral cooperation can co-exist—in fact, cooperation is an essential component of a hedging strategy.

These strategies must be assessed not just in terms of whether they help India achieve particular objectives with regard to China and the US, but one must also consider their impact on broader Indian strategy and objectives. Thus, for example, India can decide to adopt a confrontational stance towards China, but this will have repercussions for India's internal stability and prosperity, as well as its regional and global goals. Furthermore, any strategy has to be feasible, given the constraints—institutional, fiscal, resource-based, domestic political, external—which exist in India; or the strategy must include ways to overcome those constraints.

The strategy of keeping China and the US at arm's length and the Asian G-2 option that attempts to exclude the US are neither feasible nor desirable. First, as mentioned above, whether India likes it or not, China and the US will likely have as much—or possibly even more—of an impact on India's policy options across the board as any other actors or factors. This impact will be by virtue of the fact that those two countries will have a significant role in shaping the regional and global landscape that India will face.

Second, the three countries are increasingly interacting on many planes. Geopolitically, the idea of what constitutes each country's backyard has changed. India considers itself a South Asian country, as well as an East Asian country—this is not necessarily a new sentiment—but it is being acted upon on a larger scale today. Controversial as some might consider this, China is increasingly active in both East Asia and South Asia as well. The US, by its presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and in Afghanistan, has influence in both regions. In addition, as they seek resources and influence, all three countries are also coming across each other in other parts of the world—

including Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East—as well as in multilateral institutions. On the functional plane, the countries are interacting on issues ranging from climate change to global public health to international trade and finance. On these issues, India can choose to go it alone or partner with China against the US, but chances are it will find itself left behind or outmanoeuvred, especially if China alters its stance.

Beyond the discomfort based on principle—and the domestic blowback—that might result from an Indian strategy to ally with the US against China, in the short-to-medium term; this option is unlikely to be in India's interests. One has to ask whether any given strategy resolves or exacerbates India's China conundrum, without compromising other goals. Seeking an alliance with the US has the potential to exacerbate rather than contain the situation. Furthermore, the imperatives for such an alliance—access to resources, support in international forums, and creation of a deterrent—can be satisfied without an alliance, and in a way that is not counterproductive to India's internal and external goals. Finally, at a time when the US is unwilling to confront China and has shown little, if any, desire for such an alliance, and India does not have the capacity to take on China head-on alone, this is not necessarily even a feasible option.

A trilateral cooperative, collaborative strategy in and of itself is unlikely to be feasible as well, no matter how desirable it might be. India has convergent interests with both China and the US, but it also has divergent ones. Furthermore, even in terms of convergent interests, while the countries might agree on objectives, they might differ on approach.

The Hedging Option

India's chosen strategy has been one of hedging at two levels: one has involved hedging at the level of partners; the second has involved hedging against certain contingencies within a partnership.

Hedging through Partnerships: While it might be an oft-stated rhetorical goal, India has never been self-sufficient. Traditionally, Indian policymakers have sought to maintain freedom of action, keep options open, and deal with the uncertain reliability of external powers by diversifying its dependence. This has resulted in multifaceted relationships with a number of countries, including China and the US. The nature, depth and breadth of these bilateral relationships are different. But maintaining relations with both countries gives India the opportunity to maximise the benefits and minimise the risks of those bilateral relationships.

Hedging within Partnerships: Hedging does not assume that relationships with these various countries will always be good. In fact, it allows India to guard against and prepare for the possibility that they will not. One way of hedging against the risk of a change in the tenor of a

partnership is by devoting resources internally to prepare for such a change. Another way of hedging against a change in another country's attitude has been by maintaining other partnerships that could potentially serve as insurance policies.

To give an example: given the uncertainty about China's intentions, India's strategy towards its neighbour has involved cooperating, if possible, and competing, if and when necessary. It involves a strategy of (a) working towards the best-case scenario, while (b) planning and preparing for the worst in its relations with China. Within the relationship, this dual-track approach requires India to assess the correct balance between engagement and containment, between resources devoted to defence and development, between friendliness and firmness. Beyond the Sino-Indian relationship, India can look to the US to play a role in both (a) and (b).

Hedging has its critics. It has been derided as fence sitting or a product of indecision. Some have argued that India loses out by being unable to make up its mind—that, by hedging, India is not just reducing the risks, but also the benefits. Others argue that the transaction costs—the time, the effort, the attention spent—are just not worth the reduction in risk.

But, given the relative disadvantages of the other strategies—and the fact that they are neither suited to the landscape Indian policymakers are dealing with, nor do they offer the most effective path to achieving India's objectives—the hedging strategy continues to be the most appropriate for India. India's relations with China and the US might not be similar in nature or degree, but India needs working relationships with both countries to achieve the strategic objectives listed above—security, prosperity and access to public goods. Among other things, attaining these objectives requires resources and influence. Indian policymakers do not function in the realm of unlimited resources or influence. But India can leverage its relationships with China and the US to enhance its resources. It can look to these countries for the acquisition of markets, resources, investments, technology and innovation, as well as influence. India will have to assess whether it can best acquire these from one of the countries, or both, or through other means.

At times, India's interests might require collaborating with both countries, deriving the maximum possible benefits from China and the US, while not entirely depending on either one of them. At other times, the situation might call for India to compete with one country and cooperate with the other. At yet other times, it might call for competing with both, without letting the competition turn into a confrontation that might harm other Indian objectives. Hedging allows movement between these approaches according to the evolving situation.

Furthermore, hedging between China and the US can allow India to do three things:

- Use US concerns about China to elicit support for India's security, for economic growth and development, for a larger Indian role in multilateral institutions and global governance more broadly
- Use China's concerns about US-India bonhomie to persuade and pressure Beijing to act in or, at least, not against India's interests
- Guard against Sino-US cooperation that can harm India's interests

To Tilt or Not to Tilt?

Hedging is in line with India's foreign policy of no permanent allies, lots of good friends. But it is important to remember that India's foreign policy has never been of the hub-and-spoke variety—i.e. all countries have not been kept equidistant and bilateral relationships have not been treated equally. At different times, the country has had closer relationships with some countries—the degree of closeness has been determined, among other things, by the level of importance of the other country, India's priorities and needs at the time, the willingness of the other country to engage with India, and India's other options in terms of partners.

There will be times when India has to make a choice between China and the US and tilt—tactically or strategically. India has, indeed, tilted in the past to take out an insurance policy against China (in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and then again in 1971). Hedging has not precluded—and should not preclude—tilting towards certain countries when the circumstances call for it—in fact, hedging makes tilting possible.

Tilts can either be tactical or strategic. Tactical tilts can take place in certain forums or to achieve sub-objectives—for example, China and India working together in climate change negotiations, or Chinese and Indian companies combining to out-bid an American company for an energy asset. Discussion about strategic tilting has focused on India moving towards the US to contain China. In the event that such tilting takes place, the countries will need to be prepared for such tilting to be seen as provocative. But one must also remember not to dismiss the potential of India tilting towards China, if that is deemed essential to achieve Indian objectives.

Would tilting be counter to what many have identified as another Indian objective: strategic autonomy? One would be hard pressed to find a country that is absolutely autonomous. Even India has not enjoyed complete independence of action. Furthermore, strategic autonomy needs to be put in context. It is better seen as a means to an end, rather than an end in and of itself. If it is seen as an objective in its own right, then it must be put in an appropriate place in the list of India's priorities—under certain circumstances, one might have to give up some autonomy to achieve security, prosperity or access to public goods.

Pitfalls and Possibilities

Hedging as a triangle management strategy has certain advantages. But, as India hedges, there are certain aspects that will determine the effectiveness of such a strategy, as well as whether it will continue to be a viable one.

The Sino-US Relationship

Hedging can expand a country's options, but it can also be constraining since it inherently requires more than one viable available option to be functional. In this case, for example, it requires the availability of the US option to offset any China risk (unless India can find a combination of countries that can play the same role). The state of the Sino-US relationship will determine to a great degree whether such a US card will be available for India to play to hedge against China—or if a China card will be available to hedge against the US.

The Sino-US relationship has affected India in the past. In the early 1950s, for example, Indian policymakers saw US hostility towards China as harmful to both Indian and global interests. Nonetheless, Indian officials tried to use that hostility and the US view of India as a democratic contrast to authoritarian China as leverage—for example, when making the case why the US should be interested in assisting India economically. Later in the decade, as India's own relations with China deteriorated, New Delhi came to see Sino-US hostility as beneficial to India. As Sino-US relations improved, however, a major reason for US-India cooperation dissipated, as did India's importance in US eyes.

How China and the US perceive each other will continue to affect India's options and the questions Indian policymakers will have to consider. If China and the US see each other as *strategic competitors*, should India play along with the US as willing foil or bulwark or subcontractor in Asia, deriving whatever benefits come with that role? Or should India continue to keep its options open vis-à-vis China? On the other hand, should New Delhi see Washington's attitude as destabilising India's relations with China—as making India more insecure—and should it then tilt towards its neighbour to offer reassurance?

If the two countries see each other as *strategic partners*, will they collaborate in a way that narrows India's options? Should India jump on the bandwagon and seek to participate in Sino-US collaboration, making the most of its relations with both? Or should it stay off the bandwagon, at the risk of getting left behind? As China and the US try to work together on a range of issues that are transnational in character, will India, which often is a key stakeholder, play spoiler or collaborator? Or can it be the swing vote, courted by both?

If *strategic reassurance* is the dominant approach in Sino-US relations, will Indian policymakers see US efforts to reassure China as being at India's expense? Can New Delhi piggyback on Washington's efforts to gain reassurance from Beijing to elicit its own assurances from China? Should India

and the US act in concert to reassure China, and, in return, seek reassurances from China? Should the US and India coordinate when there is a lack of reassurance to pressure China? Or should India seek assurances from China, even at the expense of its relations with the US?

Leveraging US Concerns about China

In the case that India and the US have shared concerns with regard to China, there have been discussions on Indian coordination with countries like the US and Japan, as well as suggestions of capacity building with US assistance and investment (in the military, economic, educational and technological spheres among others). It is important to keep in mind, however, that just because India and the US might share an objective with regard to China—whether containment or managing China's rise—Indian and US policymakers might not agree on how to go about achieving that objective. In other words, there might be consensus on ends, but not on means. The consequences of this should not be underestimated. In the past, how to deal with China has been the subject of serious disagreement in the US-India partnership, with repercussions for the relationship beyond the triangle.

Furthermore, while India can choose to derive benefits from US concerns about China, there must be awareness that this generates certain expectations in the US as well. If India does not meet those expectations, disappointment follows. Therefore, certain questions have to be anticipated: What can India offer the US? How far should India be willing to go to deepen the relationship?

Leveraging Chinese Concerns about the US-India Relationship

On the one hand, India can use its ties with the US to shape China's attitude toward India in a beneficial way. On the other hand, Chinese insecurity about the US-India relationship—even if it does not develop into an alliance—can cause Beijing to undertake or speed up actions that are detrimental to India's interests; for example, by strengthening its ties with Pakistan and other countries in India's neighbourhood. These activities can create a more insecure environment for India. Thus, India will have to be careful that the way it seeks its objectives with regard to the US does not end up being counterproductive to its goals with regard to China, or more broadly.

The Impact of Sino-Indian Relations on the US

This aspect gets less attention, but needs to be thought through as well. China in the past has not just been a subject and source of cooperation between India and the US, but also of contentiousness. Today, US-India relations are considered to be on more solid ground, and Sino-Indian relations seem to have stalled, if not deteriorated. But, if there comes a point when Sino-Indian relations seem to be improving and the US relationship with China is

deteriorating, the impact on US-India relations could be negative. Washington could come to see New Delhi as unhelpful, and New Delhi could come to see Washington as playing a destabilising role that is not in India's interests. This is not a farfetched scenario given Sino-Indian interaction, especially in the economic realm, and India's desire not to provoke China.

Outside the Triangle

While it might be a useful device to think of China, India and the US as constituting a strategic triangle, the three countries' relations are hardly closed off from what is going on around them. The triangle does not exist in a vacuum. There are other relationships, especially with countries like Myanmar, Iran, Japan, Nepal, Pakistan, and Russia, that will influence the triangular dynamics. Furthermore, each country in the triangle has other interests in a host of sectors and has a range of imperatives at different levels—sub-national, national, regional and global. Moreover, policymakers have a variety of constituencies to cater to. This makes the situation fairly complex and fluid. The triangle will influence the events and actors surrounding it but, in turn, those events and actors will have an impact on the triangle. Thus, Indian policymakers will have to use a hedging strategy, while integrating it with India's interests across geographical and functional spectrums, and at different levels; they will also have to anticipate how American and Chinese policymakers might do the same.

The Capacity to Cope with Complexity

Hedging is not a low-maintenance strategy. Complexities are inherent in such a strategy. One has to ask—does India have the capacity for flexibility and the ability to cope with complexity that will be required for this to be an effective strategy? Coping with the triangle in and of itself will require attention, resources and careful handling. Trying to do so while keeping in mind the ripple effects on India's broader strategy puts even more demands on India's decision-makers. It requires the ability to calibrate policies across levels, across sectors, across regions; the nimbleness to switch between competition, cooperation and confrontation; the judgment to know when to do so; and the ability to calibrate available means to ends. It also requires the ability to assess the interaction of multiple actors and the interplay of multiple factors; to act, react and anticipate; to estimate the capabilities and intentions of others; to coordinate and implement policy; to communicate policy to the public; to shape the public dialogue; to anticipate consequences and prepare for contingencies; and to assess not just what is desirable, but also what is feasible.

Such a strategy in a complex situation cannot be successful without the institutional capacity, including the expertise and coordinating mechanisms. In terms of the former, the hedging strategy for the triangle especially calls

for increased capacity to understand the dynamics in China and the US—not just in terms of debates about their external relations, but also their domestic imperatives. This could mean enhancing in-house capacity, but should also mean taking advantage of knowledge outside government, including in the non-governmental and corporate sectors. In terms of coordination, there will have to be coordinating mechanisms in the government—especially because as the range of sectors across which China, India and the US interact expands and the lines between domestic and foreign policies blurs, a broader range of ministries and departments are involved in formulating and implementing China and US policy. Beyond the central government, there also needs to be coordination or, at least, communication with the state governments, as well as the private sector and non-governmental organisations, which are increasingly interacting with entities and governments in China and the US.

Increasing India's Importance

Hedging can be criticised for being the safe strategy, and sometimes the safe option brings less return than a more bold strategy. But, given the realities with which policymakers have to deal with, it is also the smart strategy. What India has to guard against, however, is it being merely a reactive strategy—with India responding to the fluid situation, but not taking action to shape the situation, as well as India's options.

India's available options will be determined not just by how India sees China and the US, but by how these two countries conceive of India's role and relative importance in their broader strategies. As of now, China sees its relationship with the US as more important than its relationship with India. Similarly, in Washington, the Sino-US relationship has a relatively higher priority than the US-India one. India needs to ensure that it is not left in a position of always being the suitor and instead is the one that is sought-after. It needs to make itself important to the other countries. How can India do so? One way is for India to invest more in both relationships to make them broader and deeper. It also needs to make both countries increasingly invested in India. Investment comes with risk, but handled well, it can also bring returns. Another way is for India to strengthen its own capacity—and thus its power and influence. The country can indeed use the relationships with China and the US to do this. But India will have to be proactive in making these efforts.

NOTES

1. Francine Frankel and Harry Harding, ed. *The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 322.
2. While in the note I use the terms China, India and the United States, this is neither meant to suggest that the countries are monolithic, nor that there is unanimity about the choices they face.

Dealing with the Endgame:
India and the Af-Pak Puzzle

Rudra Chaudhuri

The US-led NATO war in Afghanistan is the longest that either the US or its allies have fought since the turn of the 20th century. In 2011, the war entered its tenth year. It promises to be definitive in the fight to "stabilise" this conflict-rife country.[1] Demonstrating progress in 2011 is widely considered the key foreign policy objective prior to the US presidential election in November, 2012.[2]

From the outset, the overarching aim starting 2011 is to focus on transiting power and authority from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Indeed, the light—and underdeveloped—approach to transition was the central theme during two international conferences in London (January, 2010) and Kabul (July, 2010). These outlined a draw down strategy whereby ISAF combat troops will be expected to withdraw—in substantial numbers—by 2014-15.[3]

Notwithstanding the said timelines, the strategic momentum underlying the war effort has taken a nosedive. Pessimism amongst Western public is rife, as indicated in frequent pollings,[4] and exacerbated by a fiscal crisis that has a direct impact on Western military expenditure. To be sure, the so-called US military 'surge' of 30,000 troops primarily in southern Afghanistan is intended to condition the eventual exit strategy. As President Obama put it: "This [the surge] needs to be a plan about how we're going to hand it off and get out of Afghanistan."[5]

For most Afghans, as well as regional actors, the current milieu is read as the beginning of the endgame. Dealing with the eventuality of a Western draw down has every potential to further threaten GIRoA-led efforts within Afghanistan, as well as stability in the extended region. For its part, India's approach to Afghanistan needs to be considered in light of the rapid evaporation of Western political will, and the impact of this on India's political and security interests.

This essay outlines the potential benefits of expanding Indian engagement

in Afghanistan. It makes a case for further cementing the idea of India as a political-development actor on the Afghan streets and within its body-politic.

The paper is divided into four parts. First, it briefly outlines how the AfPak-India puzzle might be analytically framed. Second, it traces India's role in the US-led approach to Afghanistan since 2001, and more pertinently, since the Af-Pak encapsulation was produced as a strategic imperative by the Obama Administration in March 2009. Third, the paper offers an assessment of the ISAF-GIRoA campaign in 2010, charting how this campaign may proceed in 2011. Lastly, it lays out end objectives—and the means to achieve them—that India may consider keeping in mind ISAF-GIRoA operational and strategic goals in 2011 and beyond.

An Analytical Framework

One of the key issues in prescribing one actor's (say India's) approach to another (take Afghanistan) is the framing of a level of analysis. The central questions for this are—how *should* policy insiders and commentators go about examining the cost, benefit, and nature of the nation's bilateral engagement with another, and to what extent is such an engagement shaped by grand strategy, strategy, or simply foreign policy? These questions not only serve academic interests—in terms of clarifying the problem at hand—but, importantly, policy imperatives that may seek to explore how particular engagements can inform the political-intellectual persona of the nation-state.

For the purpose of this paper, India's approach to Afghanistan is considered as a foreign policy issue that has every potential to shape the faint contours of what might be considered an emerging Indian grand strategy. Hence, the overarching conceptual framework underpinning this paper and case study seeks to explore the parallel lines of operation between foreign policy—with regard to Afghanistan—and Indian grand strategy. The key argument is that security interests in Afghanistan, where India does not share a border, are best guaranteed by political-economic determinants rather than military imperatives, which are both unfeasible and counter-productive. Hence, foreign policy and grand strategy, rather than strategy per se,[6] serve as the pre-dominant levels of analysis.

Foreign policy is simply taken to mean the "approach chosen by the national government to achieve its goals in its relations with external entities".[7] Foreign policy could be considered a key constituent of a nation's grand strategy. Grand strategy integrates the state's political, economic, and military aims to serve long term interests—both normative and material—including the administration of those interests by way of mapping ends and means.[8] It "deals with the momentous choices that a nation makes in foreign affairs."[9] Hence, grand strategy is about drawing on the nation's resources and the manner in which those resources are deployed to both deter threats

and challengers and at the same time construct a grand picture of self-identity.[10]

India and the US-led Intervention: 2001 to 2010

The Bush Years

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Indian government "communicated to the American mission in New Delhi it would extend whatever support the United States wanted, including military bases, in its global war against terrorism."[11] Within the Indian foreign policy establishment, it was argued that the US declaration of the 'War on Terror' created strategic opportunities for New Delhi. The logic was, that the US would now be forced to pay attention to the terrorist networks within and around Pakistan. This of course was a matter of priority for India, which had faced the wrath of terrorist attacks since at least the early 1990s.[12] Cooperation with countries like India would be important to develop effective counter-terrorism strategies.[13] The government itself was looking to "make a concerted effort to raise India's profile in a global campaign against international terrorism."[14]

Further, the Taliban, supported by the Pakistani military and the ISI, harboured Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda leadership.[15] India, on the other hand, supported the Northern Alliance and their leader Ahmed Shah Masood. Masood was the deputy president and defence minister of the UN-recognised Islamic government of Afghanistan.[16] Following Masood's assassination on September 9, 2001, his forces—the Northern Alliance cadres now led by General Fahim—served as the cavalry in the war that was soon to ensue.[17] This was all good news for India, which had thrown its lot with the right faction in the coming war.

However, the fact remained that for the US, and for any number of reasons, Pakistan, was and continues to be the more important strategic actor in relation to military operations in Afghanistan, not least because Pakistan, and not India, shares a 2250 kilometre border with southern and eastern Afghanistan. As India strengthened its pledge to support any US-led effort to clamp down on terrorist networks, President Musharraf made it clear that Pakistan would not "hesitate to join any effort to eliminate the evil" that was terrorism.[18] As Amir Rana noted: "After 9/11, geopolitical pragmatism being the only sensible course of action," Pakistan "made itself available to the American military machine."[19]

The key to elicit Pakistani support, apart of course from the billions of dollars the Bush administration would have to sanction to the Musharraf regime[20]—most of which remained invisible to the ordinary Pakistani—was making sure that India was kept out of the equation.[21] In the end, barring the Indian Navy which escorted US and coalition transport containers in the Straits of Malacca, the Indian footprint had indeed been diminished. In

Pakistan's case, the War on Terror brought with it economic dividends unavailable since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.[22] Pakistan was now "showered with various forms of assistance", some of which—especially military hardware—"had no relevance to operations in Afghanistan".[23]

Yet, by 2003, with American attention focused on Baghdad rather than Kabul or Islamabad, Musharraf was able to play a worrisome game of cat and mouse that suited both him and the Bush Administration. While Pakistan targeted Al Qaeda, arresting key leaders including Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, the alleged mastermind behind 9/11, it sheltered anti-coalition insurgent groups in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Baluchistan.[24]

For its part, Indian involvement in Afghanistan was reduced to economic engagement. A seemingly Indian friendly regime in Kabul helped to bolster Indian-Afghan ties,[25] welcoming Indian development projects and expertise.[26] By the end of 2008, when Obama was elected president, India's economic footprint on Afghan soil was not only established but had done well to win the support of local Afghans both within and outside of Kabul.[27]

The Obama Administration

On March 27, 2009, President Barack Obama unveiled his much awaited 'Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategy' or Af-Pak. This was the end product of the first sixty-day inter-agency strategic review undertaken by the new administration. The "cornerstone of this strategy" was that it took a regional approach. For the first time since 2001, the US was to treat Afghanistan and Pakistan as two countries "with one challenge in one region":[28] that of degrading the ability of terrorist groups ensconced in the AfPak geography to plan and launch international terrorist attacks.[29] The key task was to craft a "coordinated strategy".[30]

From the outset, the AfPak encapsulation highlighted the central role Pakistan was expected to play in stemming the insurgency tide along the Durand Line. Rather than Iraq, Obama made clear that the US needed to "refocus" efforts on Afghanistan and Pakistan, the "central front" in the war against Al Qaeda.[31]

In May 2009, Obama appointed General Stanley McChrystal as commander of both US forces and ISAF in Afghanistan. The appointment indicated the new administration's emphasis on the AfPak geography. Almost immediately, McChrystal surmised that "stability in Pakistan" was "essential", not the least for Pakistan's sake, but also because it would "enable progress in Afghanistan."[32]

According to McChrystal, "Afghanistan's insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan".[33] This of course is a matter of both conventional wisdom and dilemma. Given that for a whole range of political and strategic reasons large-scale military operations across the border into Pakistan is not an option,[34]

the central issue was: what it would take to convince the Pakistani government, and more pertinently the military, to take action against the militants based in Pakistan? After all, as McChrystal did not hesitate to add, the "senior leaders of the major Afghan insurgent groups are based in Pakistan, are linked with Al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups, and are reportedly aided by some elements of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI)."[35] These include the so-called Quetta Shura (QST), led by Mullah Mohammad Omar; the Haqqani Network (HQN), led by Sirajuddin and Jalaluddin Haqqani; and the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), led by one-time Afghan PM Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

Inducing Pakistan to pay greater attention to insurgent groups undermining the counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in Afghanistan has proven to be both a complicated and multifaceted problem. Between January 2009 and 2010, the US and the UK sought to develop and operationalise a three-pronged strategy. First, development and economic aid to Pakistan was increased. Second, joint US-Pakistani military training programmes were expanded.[36] Third, the key to all this was believed to be improved relations between India and Pakistan.

Indeed, during his election campaign, Obama argued that India and Pakistan should "try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that [Pakistan] can stay focused not on India, but on the situation with those militants [camped on the border with Afghanistan]".[37] This, no doubt, was one of Pakistan's demands.[38] Hence, the Kashmir dispute was placed squarely at the centre of what might be termed the 'AfPak-India' strategy.

It is no surprise that this approach was rejected by New Delhi. Even the AfPak architects seem to have concluded that traction on the Kashmir dispute is perhaps better left to the governments in Islamabad and New Delhi. As the attention paid by the US and the UK to Kashmir receded, a coterie of commentators in both Pakistan and the West shifted focus to a matter of growing concern in Islamabad: Indian presence in Afghanistan.[39] Pakistan's unwillingness to open additional fronts in its war on terror was traced back to India's expanding presence in Afghanistan.[40] The rationale underlying Pakistan's direct or indirect support to groups like the QST was to "hedge" against a US withdrawal from Afghanistan and "Indian influence in Kabul."[41] Indeed, India's increased presence encouraged attacks against its embassy in Kabul (July 2008 and October 2009) and on a guesthouse used by Indian embassy staffers and aid workers (February 2010). According to Afghan officials, the perpetrators were linked to the HQN, who in turn are supported by the ISI.[42]

In the course of 2010, Pakistan sought to mend its so-far fractious relationship with President Karzai. Indeed, President Obama's call for a withdrawal by July 2011 appears to have led to a significant change in Pakistani attitudes. The international conferences in London (January 2010)

and Kabul (July 2010) made clear that 'transition' was the key theme. The loss of Western political momentum, indicated in the withdrawal of Dutch troops, followed by that of the Canadians, has shifted attention to the issue of reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban.[43]

Most experts agree that the Pakistani military have positioned themselves as the key brokers in any discussion between the QST leadership and the so-called High Council for Peace (HCP), a 70-member body created by Karzai to engage the Taliban.[44] There is little doubt that Pakistan's position as a key broker will lead to a re-emphasis on reducing the Indian influence. To be sure, the dismissal of Hanif Atmar, the minister of the interior, and Amrullah Saleh, the head of the National Directorate of Security hinted at India's loosening grip in Kabul. Both Atmar and Saleh were considered to have close ties with New Delhi. Saleh was also a staunch critic of the Pakistani government.[45] At the end of 2010, New Delhi's approach towards Afghanistan appears to be clouded by a central question: how best can India ensure that its investments and reach are protected in a post-NATO Afghanistan? This is especially moot, given that the political direction within the Karzai Administration appears to have moved closer towards Pakistan.

The ISAF-GIRoA Campaign in 2010

All strategies *and* operations lead to withdrawal. This is not only an accepted an mantra amongst policy insiders in Washington,[46] but evident in the loss of momentum amongst key NATO allies—like Canada—that are in the process of withdrawing combat troops. Yet, and contrary to declarations made at the Lisbon NATO conference (November 2010) to transition key responsibilities to the Afghan National Security Force by 2014-15, it is unlikely that Western presence will all but disappear from Afghanistan. Distinct from the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, a dwindling Western footprint is unlikely to mean the loss of Western influence. This is perhaps a key point in any debate on the future of Afghanistan.

The analysis of the campaign in 2010 appears to have been embroiled in the tension between operational and strategic lines of effort. Optimists focused on the operational level, arguing that progress in Helmand and Kandahar was clearly visible, and that the McChrystal-driven COIN effort was beginning to bear fruit.[47] Pessimists pointed to the flailing political direction of the war. They argued that internal squabbling amongst NATO capitals and within the US White House, rampant corruption and mismanagement under Karzai's watch and the fact that insurgent leaders were safely ensconced in Pakistan, sounded the death knell of the war's efforts.[48]

On balance, the existing strategy is best described as coercion. The central idea is to increase pressure on anti-coalition cadres—a key rationale underpinning the surge—whilst targeting insurgent leaders. Hence, 2010 witnessed a dramatic rise in drone attacks across the border into Pakistan and

an increase in special forces' activity within Afghanistan. At the same time, GIRoA-ISAF efforts have focused on bolstering stability-led development projects whilst expanding the reach of governance into 'key terrain districts', most importantly those in the south. The sought after end state is to "degrade"—and not defeat—the Taliban and associated factions (HQN & HiG), providing strategic space for GIRoA-ISAF to negotiate with these groups from a position of strength.

The period between 2011 and 2012—prior to the US presidential election—will determine the viability of the strategy at hand. In this time, the three key 'thrust points' include a drive to shore up governance, reduce corruption, focus on ANSF training,[49] and open further lines of communication with Taliban affiliated factions.[50]

Ends, Means, and Interests: India's Options for the Future

Given the current state of flux, Indian objectives, and the means of attaining those objectives, need to be read in the context of both tangible returns and an assessment of where Afghanistan figures in India's grand strategy. The 'futures' discussion has been divided into two parts: policies to be pursued within Afghanistan, keeping the above mentioned 'thrust points' in mind, and how such a policy may complement India's larger, regional, and international aspirations. Hence, the following discussion seeks to prescribe a road map, all the while oscillating between narrow foreign policy objectives and an emerging grand strategic narrative.

Desired Ends

The primary objective for Indian engagement in Afghanistan was clearly laid out by Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao. The encapsulation of 'endure and invest' crafts an approach that has won the support of both local Afghans and elites.[51] India's hard nosed development footprint has led it to be considered a key stakeholder in the Afghan landscape.[52]

In the following 4-5 years, the MEA could further build on this political-economic advantage.[53] Keeping Indian security and economic interests in mind, the preferred—albeit realistic—end-state in 2015 could take cognizance of the following three objectives, some of which have been highlighted in official MEA statements. Also, these objectives have been outlined keeping in mind the increasing loss of political momentum in the GIRoA-ISAF campaign.

(a) A semi-stable Afghanistan, where: (i) major cities including Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Jalalabad are administered by an elected central government and elected provincial governors that fall under the GIRoA umbrella, (ii) at least 24 out of the existing 34 provinces under the direct control and reach of the ANSF, (iii) ANA

strength in 2014 at 225,000 with combat capability levels at 75 per cent, and (iv) ANP strength at 200,000 with combat capability levels at least 65 per cent.

(b) Freedom of Movement (FoM) along strategic routes relatively free from corruption (read ANP/ABP check posts and harassment) and insurgent activity.

(c) Regional neutrality compact for Afghanistan administered jointly by a concert of regional actors.

Preferred Means

Indian assistance has benefited provinces in different parts of the country cutting across ethnic divides. Indeed, deep engagement with Afghan Line ministries has been strengthened by allowing Afghan ministries to direct Indian monies—in areas of their choice—rather than assistance being tied to political strings being pulled by New Delhi. Admittedly, policy insiders remain apprehensive about further investments among Western calls for withdrawal. However, clipping the existing momentum would be detrimental to Indian interests. Leverage inside Afghanistan is directly dependent upon India's economic footprint within it.

In preparing for the end game, it will be essential to increase economic support at a time when international assistance is expected to reduce year by year till 2015. In sum, Indian identity within Afghanistan needs to be strengthened around existing economic foundations. There are no viable military or paramilitary options available to India that could be sustained in the long-term. To achieve the above-mentioned end objectives in 2015, India's economic drive would need to be considered in tandem with the following points of action.

ANSF Training

A key stumbling block to increasing the capacity and the quality of an emerging ANA and ANP is the sheer lack of Western trainers. In August 2010, the ISAF was short of some 795 trainers. This, according to ISAF commanders accounts for a "strategic shortfall", which could slow transition.[54] India has already provided special training courses to the ANP. Thirty-four Afghan National Army cadets are currently (2010) undergoing training at the National Defence Academy (NDA). Indeed, the recent visit (October 2010) by General Sher Muhammad Karimi, chief of general staff of the ANA to New Delhi is encouraging for Indian-Afghan military relations.[55] India could gradually increase ANP and ANA training in Indian facilities and academies.[56]

To be sure, the ANSF are the best guarantee for a neutral Afghanistan. While much is made of Pakistani unease with Indian offers of training, both Afghan leaders and ISAF personnel argue that a gradual and transparent increase in Indian training and further supply of low tech equipment to the

ANSF might well mitigate Pakistani anxieties. India could consider tailoring short courses for the ANA, such as ISAF's eight-week basic warrior training courses that are taught at five of its Regional Military Training Centers.[57]

Assistance at the Provincial Level

A key complaint amongst Afghan economic advisors and insiders has to do with the increasing 'dependency culture' in Kabul. The central aim for ministries such as the Ministry of Rural Development & Rehabilitation (MRRD) is to take ownership of its programmes. This is especially true for those working on the National Solidarity Programme (NSP). Created in 2003, the NSP aims to buttress local development. India could assist in the same. It is not yet a donor. The NSP could also support and build local connections at the provincial level. A separate development budget can be offered to provide provincial level assistance under the NSP umbrella whilst boosting the self-sufficiency culture. Indeed, the latter point was raised by MoS Preneet Kaur, who argued that the international community should help Afghanistan to "tap into the native genius of its own people". The idea now will be to make a concerted effort to operationalise such assistance.[58]

Dealing with Reintegration and Reconciliation

Reintegration refers to co-option of anti-coalition commanders and supporters by encouraging them to lay down arms and join a government sponsored programme. Since 2001, a number of middle level commanders have chosen to reintegrate. Reconciliation refers to a wider policy of political accommodation with the top layer of the various anti-coalition forces. A range of possibilities could exist in the reconciliation process. This might include appeasement, accommodation, co-option, or simply subjugation.

From the outset, both reintegration and reconciliation are hardly palatable from an Indian point of view. After all, for the longest time, the Taliban harboured the Al Qaeda, which in turn developed relations with anti-Indian groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Yet, that some form of reconciliation with the QST will underlie an eventual ISAF withdrawal is considered highly likely. To be sure, President Karzai has kept the door ajar when it comes to Mullah Omar. In October 2010, Karzai established a 70-member High Council for Peace (HPC) for the explicit aim of serving as a dialogue-bridge between GIRoA and the Afghan Taliban. Importantly, 53 of these members belonged to armed factions of the 1980s and 1990s. Twelve held positions in the Taliban government between 1996 and 2001.[59] There is little doubt that whether through the HPC or by cultivating independent links with former senior Taliban commanders,[60] GIRoA seeks to actively engage in promoting the idea of a political settlement.[61] Indeed, in December 2010, non-governmental experts launched a public campaign endorsing negotiations with the Taliban.[62]

In light of this trend, India will need to seriously think through its own

approach to reconciliation. While in public, the government may choose to reject negotiations, arguing instead that there is no difference between the 'good' Taliban and the 'bad' Taliban, in private, it must seek to engage the reconciliation debate to protect its own interests. First, India needs to apply some pressure on the US, GIRoA, and the senior ANSF leadership that reconciliation will not allow Sunni militant groups recruited in Pakistan's southern Punjab to take refuge in the south or the east. The US, and ISAF in particular, needs to put this condition down under what it calls 'red lines' for engagement. At the same time, it might be understood that anxieties of a 'safe haven' are over-blown. While India needs to make the above mentioned points clearly, the prospects of southern and eastern Afghanistan being used as protected territories is somewhat suspect, especially given that safer havens exist within Pakistan.[63]

Second, India may consider engaging former senior Taliban leaders who have been dropped from the UN blacklist (UNSC 1267). The engagement could aim to explore what the Taliban's approach is with regards to regional actors. In terms of public rhetoric, Mullah Omar's own statements indicate a willingness to reach out to regional neighbours.[64] Whether this is the case, or not, contacting actors close to the Taliban will at least provide a sense of how reconciliation is being read from a non-ISAF perspective, allowing the Indian government space to plan ahead. Indeed, the much touted and so-called Taliban international jihadist association needs to be carefully re-considered in light of emerging research. New research goes a long way in substantiating the fact that the Taliban-Arab jihadist nexus is more dubious than commonly believed.[65]

A Peace Platform

While closer engagement with Iran and Russia appears to be ongoing,[66] the Indian government could simultaneously consider making a case for an intra-regional (SAARC-SCO) approach. India could take the lead, along with other key partners, in working towards a regional compact for neutrality in Afghanistan. Whether within the SAARC-SCO framework or independent of it, a concert of regional actors (Afghanistan, India, Iran, Russia, China, the CARs, UAE, and Pakistan) might enter into both government level and back channel discussions on a neutrality pact akin to the 1988 Geneva Accords.

Working towards such a pact will necessarily mean addressing Pakistani grievances vis-à-vis its threat perceptions with regard to India. The above-mentioned platform might be used to discuss the same along with other regional actors. Indeed, while, the prospects of such a pact invites the scepticism of policy insiders, India's willingness to invest intellectual—and perhaps even material—capital in a regional process has the potential to alter regional attitudes. To be sure, the discussion of a regional platform needs to be complemented by ongoing India-centric projects outlined above.

Generating consensus on a regional compact should only be considered a secondary objective to further cementing Indian roots in Afghanistan as an economic-development actor. Indeed, India should be wary of not getting entangled in a compact where international pressure may be applied on India to reduce its footprint.[67] As argued above, India needs to engage the Afghan government on its own terms, while looking into the possibilities of a regional compact aimed at guaranteeing Afghan neutrality. In some ways, whether via a regional compact or through backchannel discussions, Afghanistan might serve to strengthen Indian-Pakistani relations. Indeed, there is nothing inevitable about expanding Indian-Pakistani rivalry in Afghanistan.[68]

Conclusion: Foreign Policy Interests and Grand Strategy

Returning to what might be considered the broad outlines of an Indian grand strategy; Afghanistan might at best be considered one of many foreign policy issues. While it has been argued that "Afghanistan is now a test case for India as a regional and global power on the ascendant",[69] the utility of prescriptive readings like this are limited. Indeed, if anything, India should stay clear of getting entangled in a discourse trap where over-ambitious and speculative assessments lead to a hyperbole-driven narrative. India's ascendance is far more expansive and nuanced than its role in Afghanistan. This is hardly a matter that needs further substantiation. Indeed, Afghanistan is not a case where India can take the lead in dealing with the current instability. Not the least because such actions have every potential to undermine the existing good will and leverage generated by Indian officials and aid workers.

NOTES

1. For details on stabilisation as part of the current counter insurgency strategy see: Theo Farrell, 'Appraising Moshtarak: The Campaign in Nad-e-Ali District, Helmand' *RUSi Report* (February, 2010), Available at: http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Appraising_Moshtarak.pdf

2. Note: This point is accepted not only in Western capitals, but also at the operational level within the five ISAF Regional Commands in Afghanistan.

3. For officials communiqués for each of the conferences see: (1) 'Afghanistan: The London Conference (28 January, 2010), Available at: http://centralcontent.fco.gov.uk/central-content/afghanistanhmg/resources/pdf/conference/Communique-final (2) 'Afghanistan: The Kabul Conference' (20 July, 2010), Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.af/FINAL%20Kabul%20 Conference%20% 20%20Communique.pdf

4. For details on polling in Europe see: Sarah Kemp, 'Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion' *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6/3 (July, 2010), pp. 191-200.

5. Quoted in Bob Woodward, *Obama's War* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2010), p. 301.

6. Strategy, as defined by Basil Liddell Hart is taken to mean the "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfillends of policy". For a further discussion on the military-centric dimensions of strategy see: Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (London: Macmillan, 1981), p. xvi.

7. Valerie M. Hudson, 'The History & Evolution of Foreign policy Analysis' in Steve

Smith, Amelia Hadfield, & Tim Dunne (Ed.) *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 12.

8. The broad definition is adapted from Liddell Hart. See: Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 1-2.

9. Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 1.

10. Note: whilst traditionalists associate grand strategy with the eventual thinking and ultimate utility of military force, it appears safe to conclude that the definition could be expanded to include the use of power—soft or hard—to achieve national goals. For a traditionalist explanation see *Ibid*, pp. 1-3.

11. Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon*, XI.

12. For a comprehensive review see: Praveen Swami, *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir: 1947-2004* (London: Routledge 2007).

13. C. Raja Mohan, 'Towards a Global War Against Terrorism' *The Hindu* (13 September, 2001).

14. Atul Aneja, 'Govt. Discusses Fallout of US Attacks on the Region' *The Hindu* (14 September, 2001).

15. For a detailed account of Pakistani support to the Taliban during the Afghan civil war in the 1990s see: Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press 2001) Chapter 14.

16. 'Masood Sees no Military Solution', Interview with Ahmad Shah Masood on 13 August, 2001, *The Hindu* (12 September 2001).

17. General Fahim is currently the first vice-president in the Karzai government.

18. Muralidhar Reddy, 'Commanders Back Musharraf,' *The Hindu* (15 September, 2001)

19. Mohammed Amir Rana, *The Seeds of Terrorism* (London, New Millennium, 2005), pp. 34-35.

20. Between 2002 and 2008, the Bush administration provided Musharraf with funds little over $11 billion. For details see: Pakistan Policy Working Group, The Next Chapter, pp. 28-29.

21. Barnett R. Rubin, 'Saving Afghanistan' *Foreign Affairs* 86/57 (2007) p. 69.

22. K. Alan Kronstadt, 'Pakistan-US Relations' *CRS Report for Congress* (Washington DC: February 2009), pp. 92-93.

23. Hilary Synnott, *Transforming Pakistan: Ways out of Instability* (London: Routledge/ International Institute of Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper, 2010), pp. 63-64.

24. Ibid, 145-146 (Emphasis added).

25. Note: The assessment of an Indian-friendly regime was perhaps true till 2008-09. Since then, President Karzai's posture regards India has noticeably changed.

26. For a background see: C Christine Fair, 'India in Afghanistan & Beyond' *The Century Foundation*, Available at: http://tcf.org/publications/2010/9/india-in-afghanistan-and-beyond-opportunities-andconstraints/pdf & ....

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Nation Building in Afghanistan and India's National Strategy

Shanthie Mariet D'Souza¨

India's involvement in the reconstruction of war ravaged Afghanistan since 2001 has drawn immense local appreciation. It is the fifth largest bilateral donor having pledged nearly US$2billion for various reconstruction projects which include infrastructure development, power generation, capacity building, health and education, in sync with the local needs. Unlike aid provided by other international donors who rely on alternate delivery mechanisms, India's aid, mostly delivered through the Afghan government, has hinged on local ownership. Whether it is the high visibility infrastructure projects in the north and west of Afghanistan or the small scale low visibility projects in the south and east, the emphasis has been on local participation and capacity building. In understanding the effectiveness of India's aid, it would thus be useful to explore the 'Gandhian' approach which emphasises local and community participation.

As Afghanistan undergoes a painful transition, India's own experience in nation building including: decentralised forms of local governance, developing electoral processes, the political party system, special rights and representations for ethnic minorities, women and marginalised groups under a liberal and democratic constitutional order would come in useful for political sector reform and the building of an inclusive political order in Afghanistan. Likewise in the security sector, India's experience of building a counter-insurgency grid in Jammu & Kashmir, provisions for dialogue and reintegration in the Northeast and developing balanced civil-military relations will impart important lessons for the development of security institutions. Generating indigenous local entrepreneurship through promotion of crafts and agriculture would be critical in transforming Afghanistan from a 'rentier state' to a self sustaining state. Expansion of an indigenous economic base would provide employment opportunities that could deplete the support base of the insurgents. Thus, the Indian experience given the social and cultural parallels has greater acceptance among the Afghans.

As the search for 'end game intensifies' in Afghanistan, India will be

confronted with some real hard choices in Afghanistan. The choice for India was never whether it should stay engaged in Afghanistan or not, for it is committed to stay put even in the face of repeated onslaughts on its personnel and projects, including its mission in Kabul. India's decade long aid and development policy which has accrued tremendous good will among the Afghans can be sustained with greater Afghan participation and ownership. In shaping the outcome of a regional solution to the Afghan imbroglio, India will need to play the important role of ensuring 'peace and stability' in Afghanistan. This paper will thus explore policy options for India for supporting Afghanistan's nation building efforts and ensuring long term stabilisation of the conflict ridden country.

India's Role in Reconstruction of post-Taliban Afghanistan

Following the ouster of the Taliban by the military action initiated by the US-led coalition in response to the 9/11 attacks, India renewed its diplomatic ties with Kabul which had been disrupted since the beginning of Taliban rule. Steering clear of a military role, India adopted the 'soft power approach'[1] with the objective of long-term stabilisation of the war ravaged country.

India's interests in Afghanistan have centred on supporting the nascent democratic regime, thereby denying space for the return of the Taliban. As a major regional power, with ambitions of extending its influence beyond its immediate neighbourhood, India has worked towards reviving the role of Afghanistan as a land bridge, thereby connecting South Asia with Central Asia to tap the energy resources of the region. With the prospects of linking stability with greater economic integration, India has actively promoted greater trade and economic integration of Afghanistan with South Asia through the regional economic mechanism of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC).[2]

To achieve these objectives, India adopted an ideational role and 'soft power approach', reviving its historical, traditional, socio-cultural and civilisational linkages with the country. A decade later, in the face of enormous difficulties and challenges, this "soft power" strategy has been continued. As the countdown to withdrawal from Afghanistan begins, the international community's decade-long involvement there has come under renewed scrutiny—and the prudence of India's method of engagement has been increasingly appreciated. India's policy in Afghanistan is an extension of its ideational role pursued for decades.[3]

With the establishment of an interim government in Afghanistan under President Hamid Karzai and following India's well received role at the Bonn Conference in 2001,[4] India announced a US$100 million reconstruction aid to Afghanistan. Since then, India has followed a policy of high-level engagement with Afghanistan characterised by political, humanitarian, capacity-building, cultural, economic rebuilding and infrastructure development projects. The

then prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee told the Indian Parliament that India wants to have a 'maximum possible' role in the establishment of a broad-based, non-aligned and fully representative post-Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

In December 2001, India moved in with humanitarian assistance by reopening the Indira Gandhi Children's Hospital in Kabul and sending medical missions to assist in humanitarian work, donating three Airbuses to enable the state run airline Ariana to resume operations, and hundreds of city buses for public transit facilities. Subsequently, India expanded its aid coverage to other crucial areas through both short and long term projects. India's aid has been well received by Afghans and there is good will and support for Indian projects in Afghanistan.[5]

India is the fifth largest bilateral donor country having pledged US$2 billion and has invested in diverse areas including infrastructure, communications, education, healthcare, social welfare, training of officials including diplomats and policemen, economic development, and institution-building.[6] During the two-day visit to Kabul by the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in August 2005, the leaders of both countries reiterated their commitment to the building of a new partnership for the 21st century that included extending bilateral cooperation to areas including development, defence, education, energy, trade, fighting terrorism, and working towards greater economic and cultural integration of South Asia.

The visit was marked by the symbolic gesture of the foundation-stone laying ceremony of the Afghan Parliament building, reiterating that the world's largest democracy envisions a crucial role for itself as a catalyst for rebuilding the youngest democracy. India's ongoing support in training and capacity building of newly elected legislators and parliamentary staff, diplomats, and police officials has helped in rebuilding the political sector.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Kabul in May 2010 appears to have inaugurated an era of decisive and confident Afghan policy, enough to silence critics, encourage optimists and, most importantly, instil confidence among the Afghans that India is a reliable friend.[7]

India's Objectives in Afghanistan

India's interests in Afghanistan need to be viewed within the security paradigm, in the context of India's concerns over the terror emanating from the extremely volatile Pakistan-Afghanistan border and spilling over into the country. A strong, stable and democratic Afghanistan would reduce the danger of extremist violence and terrorism destabilising the region. Since 9/11, New Delhi's policy has broadly been in congruence with the US objectives of decimating the Taliban-Al Qaeda combine and instituting a democratic regime in Kabul. However, a decade later, the Taliban have been able to regroup in addition to further strengthening their links with Pakistan

based anti-India groups. A worrisome development has been expansion of Lashkar-e-Toiba's activities beyond Kunar and Nooristan provinces to other parts of Afghanistan.[8]

While there is no denying the fact that India has a strategic interest in the long-term stability of Afghanistan, India has also invested substantially in power generation and infrastructure development. One of the most visible and strategic projects that has been completed is the 218 kilometre-long Zaranj Delaram highway connecting land-locked Afghanistan to the Iranian port of Chabahar. The road reduces Afghanistan's dependence on Pakistan by providing a potential alternate route connecting Iran to Central Asia. This is of particular significance given the difficult trade and transit arrangements and bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.[9]

One of the crucial foreign and economic policy focuses for India has been the development of a southern trade corridor linking India with Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia and Russia. The signing of a bilateral Trade and Transit Agreement between Tehran and Kabul, leading to the creation of the Chabahar Free Zone Authority (CFZA) in 2002, was an important benchmark for the southern trade corridor. While it provides economic opportunities for India in those countries, it also provides Afghanistan with an alternative route for reducing its dependence on Pakistan for transit facility.

While India's involvement in Afghanistan has accrued huge costs, it has generated tremendous goodwill among the local Afghans.[10] Most of India's aid is delivered through the Afghan government, unlike other international donors, who have relied on their own agencies, provincial reconstruction teams and subcontracting, thereby creating parallel structures of governance while doing little to extend the writ of the Afghan government.

Whereas most of the Western aid resources have thus returned to the donor countries, through the phenomenon of phantom aid, India's wide-ranging assistance programme is designed to maximise Afghan participation both at the government and community levels while maintaining low visibility. In the difficult and insurgency prone areas, India is investing in small development and community projects with greater local participation and in keeping with the local needs. The Gandhian approach of small community projects and development initiatives hinges on building self reliance through the local indigenous and rural base. There has been appreciation and calls for emulating the Indian model of assistance by the larger international community.[11]

Most of India's aid targeted at humanitarian assistance, small development—low visibility projects with community participation, and long-term infrastructure and development projects (power generation, road construction) is currently channelled through the Afghan government, or works in conjunction with the local needs. India's small development projects in the South and East have been well received by the Pushtun communities.

In Jalalabad, there is an increasing demand for more Indian projects particularly in terms of infrastructure development, cold storage, health facilities, information technology and cultural exchange programmes.[12]

Of late, India has been active in reviving historical and cultural ties with Afghanistan. As a part of cultural diplomacy, Indian musicians have been training young Afghans in *tabla* and *sitar*. Such joint musical performances have been occurring both in Kabul and places like Jalalabad, cementing the cultural and historical ties with the region.[13]

Challenges to India's 'aid policy' in Afghanistan

India's "aid policy" has generated intense domestic debate given the vulnerabilities its projects and personnel face in Afghanistan. Despite periodic attacks and threats, India has steered clear of any military involvement in Afghanistan, in spite of interest expressed by Afghanistan. In April 2008, Afghanistan's Defence Minister, Abdul Rahim Wardak visited New Delhi and met his Indian counterpart, A.K. Antony, to discuss possible military cooperation.[14]

While some would want India to send troops, others support the continuation of the present aid policy. While the latter option would be in India's long-term strategic interests, an outright military response, apart from its limited utility, would confirm the propaganda of the Taliban and its sponsor. India's security imperatives need to be viewed, in the context of the terror emanating from the extremely volatile Pakistan-Afghanistan border and spilling over into India. A strong, stable and democratic Afghanistan would reduce the dangers of extremist violence and terrorism destabilising the region.

Post-9/11, New Delhi's policy has been broadly supportive of the US military action against the Taliban and the instituting of a strong and capable democratic regime in Kabul. It would appear that India has relegated the task of reining in the Taliban to the Americans or is 'piggy backing' on American efforts. Though New Delhi's policy has broadly been in congruence with the US objectives in Kabul, the means and ends for achieving these objectives have been at variance. While the US pursues the narrow and limited goal of destroying and dismantling the Al Qaeda infrastructure, India intends playing an important role in the long term stabilisation of Afghanistan. To achieve this purpose, New Delhi adopted a low visibility developmental approach based on Afghan needs and ownership. Most of India's aid has thus generated considerable good will even in the insurgency ravaged south and east Afghanistan. Having steered clear of the military option and provided huge assistance, India is seen as a friendly and neutral country with no ethnic affinities, unlike neighbouring countries who have actively exploited the ethnic affiliations and shared borders to wage proxy wars and encourage subversion.

Indo-Pak Rivalry: Zero sum game?

Geopolitical rivalry continues to shape Pakistan's response to the increasing bonhomie between India and Afghanistan. Western analysts fail to see the expanding India-Afghan relations beyond the prism of a 'zero sum' game between India and Pakistan. While Afghanistan looks towards India for greater cooperation, Pakistan appears determined not to allow such a scenario and is continually in search of ways and means to regain its 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan. It typically sees any Indian presence and influence in Afghanistan, even that acquired through legitimate means, as being inimical to its interests. It views India's developmental assistance and the good will it has generated among the local Afghans with suspicion bordering on paranoia.[15] It would be important to note that compared to India's US\$ 2 billion aid, Pakistan has invested a mere US\$300 million towards the reconstruction and development of its war-ravaged neighbour.[16]

The Pakistan military and intelligence establishment perceives the various wars in and around Afghanistan from the prism of its main institutional and national security interests, 'first and foremost, balancing India.'[17] For Pakistan, an Afghanistan under Pakistani influence, or at least a benign Afghanistan, is a matter of overriding strategic importance.[18] Fearing the increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan and beyond, Pakistan denies any overland trade and transit facilities for Indian goods to Afghanistan thereby compelling India to rely on the Iranian alternative.

The recurring and lethal attacks by the Taliban on Indian nationals and the resultant insecurity makes investing in large developmental projects in insurgency-affected provinces in south and east Afghanistan a risky proposition. The killing of Kasula Suryanarayana, an Indian telecommunications engineer in the Zabul Province in April 2006, and the earlier abduction and subsequent killing of Maniappan Kutty, a driver working with the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) building the Zaranj-Delaram highway in 2005, are some examples. Although such incidents have only been sporadic, they continue to raise concerns about the safety of Indians working in reconstruction projects in Afghanistan.[19]

The gruesome and high profile attacks on the Indian embassy in Afghanistan, in July 2008 and October 2009, highlight the challenges and vulnerabilities of India's involvement in Afghanistan. While the Taliban-affiliated Haqqani network, aided by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was blamed for the July 2008 attack, the Taliban claimed responsibility for the October 2009 attack.[20] Intended apart from serving as a warning to India to downsize its role, these attacks are in a way aimed at raising the costs of the policy of winning the hearts and minds of the local Afghans. After a brief hiatus, India has resumed its much-acclaimed medical mission work in Afghanistan which was scaled down following the February 2010 terror attack in Kabul that left nine Indians dead.[21]

India and the Af-Pak strategy

The Af-Pak strategy of the US raised hopes and expectations among the Afghans of a renewed American commitment and resources to usher change in the war ravaged country. Likewise, Indian policy makers supported the integrated strategy of addressing the issue of coordination and tackling the source of the Taliban-led insurgency. While there seems to be a broad congruence in Indian and American interests in Afghanistan,[22] the US dependence on Pakistan continues to be an irritant in the relationship. The release of 90,000 classified US military documents related to the Afghan war by the whistle blower website WikiLeaks[23] vindicated New Delhi's charge that Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI, has been playing a double game in Afghanistan by providing both supplies and sanctuary to Taliban fighters.[24]

Though the Indian government has indicated that India and the US share the same goal in Afghanistan, i.e. stability of the country, there are divergences on the means to achieve the same. There is a universal acknowledgement that the security environment in Afghanistan is the worst since 2001 even as the Western countries are moving towards a troop withdrawal. As a result, "beyond a general commitment against terrorism, the US notion of 'stability' would look very different from that envisaged by India".[25]

In his December 1, 2009 speech at the US Naval Academy at West Point, President Barack Obama, in addition to renewing his commitment to the Afghan war by increasing the troop numbers, set a deadline of July 2011 for the conditional draw down of forces. This arbitrary time table, however, evoked scepticism and fear among the Afghans. Though there has been subsequent toning down of the talk of withdrawal since then, concerns about the long term commitment of the US in stabilising Afghanistan persist. In the event of US withdrawal or draw down of forces beyond 2014, and a further deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan, there are concerns regarding the conflict spill-over into India. In the Indian policy making circles, debates on post-US exit strategies are gaining momentum.

In the eventuality of US downsizing or exiting, New Delhi's biggest concern is that Pakistan's military might play a major role in reconciliation efforts in a post-US negotiated settlement. Without a clear, integrated and Afghan-led reconciliation policy and adherence to red lines, the danger of subversion of the presently weak Afghan government by radical elements runs high and could undermine India's interest of maintaining a democratic regime.

The return of the Taliban or the civil war like conditions of the early 1990s is clearly not in India's interest. Indian diplomacy wants to avoid such a scenario by seeking a long-term international commitment in Afghanistan and strengthening the hands of the Afghan government that would prevent any future return of the Taliban to the seats of power in Kabul.

The talk of US down-scaling its operations, however, has found resonance

among certain sections of the Indian government and diplomatic circles who view it prudent to wind up India's development activities. There has been scathing criticism of India's aid diplomacy and soft power approach each time the Indian mission or personnel are targeted. At such times, talk of sending in the army, and putting boots on ground, gain credence particularly in the military circles.

There have been calls from various quarters for India to play a more active role. As a "first tier global economic power, India needs to accept the responsibilities and risks that come with that stature."[26] At the other end of the spectrum are analysts who have internalised Pakistan's concerns and call for the downsizing of India's presence to assuage Pakistan's fears and concerns.[27]

India's position on Reconciliation and Reintegration

As the instability and violence in Afghanistan intensifies and the exit strategies of Western nations gather momentum, the Afghan government and international community have initiated various steps to reconcile and reintegrate Taliban commanders and fighters. New Delhi has indicated its support for the Afghan-led reintegration process as a means of finding a political solution to the Afghan war. In an interview with the *Wall Street Journal* on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2009, the Indian External Affairs Minister, S.M. Krishna said that India did, 'not believe that war can solve any problem and that applies to Afghanistan too'[28] since the Indian government itself has been involved in various such dialogue, negotiation and reintegration mechanisms dealing with myriad insurgencies and conflicts.

There have been some recent indications that New Delhi is supportive of President Karzai's recent overtures of reintegration of the tribal fighters. Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao, addressing a closed door international seminar on Afghanistan in October 2009, declared that India would support the process of reintegrating individuals into the national mainstream, code for dialogue with the moderate Taliban who agree to renounce violence. The Foreign Secretary stated, 'the existing process under (Afghanistan's) National Committee for Peace for reintegrating individuals with the national mainstream must be both enlarged and accelerated'. She said: 'We support the Afghan government's determination to integrate those willing to abjure violence and live and work within the parameters of the Afghan constitution'.[29] This change in stance, however, came with a rider. Pakistan, which is widely believed to support the Taliban and provide shelter in Quetta to its leaders would need to cease assistance to the Taliban.

During his visit to Kabul in the summer of 2011, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh even went a step further to state that India's Afghan policy recognised the need for an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process. On

July 14, 2011 New Delhi received the delegation led by Burhanudin Rabbani, head of the Afghanistan government's peace council negotiating with the Taliban. Rabbani is believed to have briefed India on the progress of the reconciliation process.

Setting the Agenda

As the international community seems to be in a rush to bring its ominous gamble in Afghanistan to an end, India has a limited window of opportunity for enabling Afghans to play a lead role in their nation building efforts. If the stated goal of transfer of authority, as set out by the Afghan president, were to be actualised by 2014, there would be opportunities for India to deepen its levels of engagement in aiding the Afghans in their nation building process at various levels.[30]

- **Security Sector**—India can expand its role in training Afghan national security forces (particularly the police and officer corps of the army) and helping develop the justice sector. As the process of reintegration gains momentum, India's experience of building a counter insurgency grid in Jammu & Kashmir and reintegrating the militants could have some important parallels and lessons for security sector reform in Afghanistan.

- **Political Sector**—India's experience of the parliamentary system, political parties, electoral processes, space for opposition, federal system could have important lessons for political sector reform. The past presidential and parliamentary elections in Afghanistan and the present political impasse have brought to the fore the problems of a highly centralised presidential system. As Afghanistan prepares for another conference in Bonn in December this year ahead of transition, India can make significant contributions to political, electoral and constitutional reforms

- **Reconciliation and Reintegration**—While India has indicated support for the Afghan led reintegration and reconciliation process, adherence to the red lines laid down at the London Conference including respect for the Afghan constitution, human and women rights would be crucial to prevent subversion from within. Afghanistan's attempts at reconciliation needs to be supported by larger political and constitutional reforms which would necessitate provisions for dialogue, autonomy and special representation of minorities, women and marginalised groups.

- **Improving Governance**—India could play a critical role in developing decentralised structures of governances based on its own Panchayati Raj system. Promoting grassroots democracy and local self

government institutions can emerge as an alternative to the top down centralised approach of the international community which has proved to be ineffective.

- **Aid Effectiveness**—While India has worked towards shoring up the Afghan government's capacity for aid delivery, improving aid effectiveness would remain a critical goal. Towards this end, the participation of local civilians in identifying and prioritising aid projects would remain crucial. One of the success stories of Afghanistan is the National Solidarity Programme that needs greater funding and support.

- **Economic Opportunities and Alternate Livelihood**—In the economic realm, there is an immediate need for developing of alternate livelihood programmes as well as reviving Afghanistan's traditional artisan and agricultural base. Saffron cultivation in poppy growing areas could be a useful alternate livelihood project. Natural resource exploitation, thermal power generation and industrial development in the relatively stable north and west could provide opportunities for employment for the youth. Moreover, it would help Afghanistan to graduate from being an externally dependent 'rentier state' to a self sustaining economy. Indian business companies could be encouraged to invest in the natural resource sector in the relatively stable north and west.

- **Employment Generation and Industrial Base**—There is also an urgent need to establish industries to spur economic independence and generate employment, which would actively engage the youth of the country. Afghanistan, due to its very low tax regime, is swamped by foreign goods mainly from Pakistan, China and Iran. This inhibits the growth of an indigenous industrial base. India could contribute to establishing small-scale industries like a carpet industry along with ornaments and handicrafts to help artisans, weavers and craftsmen. Follow up studies on these projects, assessing their usefulness and links with the development strategy of the Afghan government, would be extremely critical.

- **Social and Cultural Capital**—India needs to further capitalise on its traditional, historical, social and cultural capital. As part of counter radicalisation campaigns, messages of moderate Islam from the Deoband would be a good way to counter and neutralise the radical Wahhabi messages. There is also a need to further expand cultural, sports and educational exchanges between the two countries. Setting up of Pushtun centres in India and Hindi centres in Afghanistan would help in greater cultural and linguistic exchanges. Cricket is an important sport that needs promotion. The excellent performance

of Afghanistan in the recently concluded Asian Games in China is a case in point.

- **Education**—While there has been an appreciation of the scholarship programme, there is a need to ensure that deserving and meritorious students are awarded. Setting up a board with Afghan and Indian observers for the process could be a step in ensuring that quality and transparency are maintained.

- **Women as Long Term Stakeholders**—India has actively provided assistance to women's groups either through self employment schemes, health and capacity building not only in Kabul but also in the western province of Herat. Being long term stake holders in the rebuilding of the social and economic fabric of the war ravaged society, this mode of aid delivery has proved to be effective in sustaining and even expanding such programmes.

- **Media and Strategic Communications**—Most of the international media puts out pessimistic stories from Afghanistan. It influences not only domestic public opinion but also feeds into the Taliban propaganda. It is crucial to put out positive stories through the radio, television and local print media. In places like Jalalabad, there have been requests for programmes on historical, cultural, educational and sports from India.

These objectives, however, will have to be achieved within a limited window of opportunity of 2-3 years (2011-14). If New Delhi is unable to help the process of 'Afghanisation' and enable Afghans to take a lead role and the Western coalition quits without addressing the issue of stabilisation in the region, the likelihood of the reversal of gains will not be entirely far fetched.

In the event of a US limited engagement in Afghanistan beyond 2014, India could continue and even expand its assistance programme. Even in case of complete withdrawal by the US and NATO allies by 2014, India's assistance programme will not be disrupted given the local participation and ownership of these projects.

The complex and rapidly shifting dynamics of Afghanistan pose a great challenge to policy making. The task of India is even more difficult. The expansion of the economic footprint is in India's long-term strategic interests, but continued vulnerabilities would make the pursuance of such a policy unsustainable. Thus, a lonesome policy of generating goodwill needs a rethink and possible expansion within the next 2-3 years. As developments in Afghanistan will directly impinge on India's security, and the search for the 'end game' quickens, New Delhi will have to strengthen its position as a serious stakeholder in the long term stabilisation of Afghanistan and as a partner in the nation building process.

NOTES

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20. The growing bonhomie between New Delhi and Kabul, coupled with the increased presence of India's development projects in Afghanistan, remains the target of the Taliban-led insurgency, which includes a huge array of insurgent and anti-government forces operating in tandem beyond south and east Afghanistan, with

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Russia in India's National Strategy

Smita Purushottam

Introduction

A preliminary survey is necessary in order to assess the future course of the Indo-Russian strategic partnership, as a purely binary paradigm for analysing the relationship of two major powers like India and Russia would be inadequate in today's complex and globalised scenario. It has also to be borne in mind that both India and Russia have changed enormously since the days of the Indo-Soviet partnership, when the Soviet Union had stepped in to back India during the 1971 Bangladesh war. India is diversifying its relationships and Russia is facing several new challenges. While the pace of global transformation makes the hazarding of long-term projections a risky enterprise—geography and balance of power plays continue as the few remaining constants in international relations; moreover, discernible trends in the future geopolitical landscape are already evident. Thus an attempt to outline a strategy which would hold good in medium-term scenarios is not a wholly fruitless exercise.

Russia's Decline

The last decade of the 20th century witnessed the end of the Soviet Union and the further decline of the Russian economy. The West, not being able to graduate beyond Cold War, bipolar mindsets, attributed the double collapse of their former foe to the success of their "containment" policies. They thus persisted with these policies, while Western advisors proffered grossly inadequate counsel on economic transition policy, which contributed to the Russian economy's collapse. From being a geopolitical pole, Russia was relegated to a midlevel power. The crises, hardships and foreign policy setbacks that Russia experienced neutralised goodwill towards the West— which was now seen as a source of its problems.

A Russian-Chinese Partnership?

It was no wonder then that Russia turned increasingly towards China to

record its opposition to unilateralism, NATO expansion, and the stationing of ballistic missile defences on its doorstep. Russia massively increased exports of military equipment to China, supplying US$22 billion worth of armaments to China between 2000-10. China extended a US$25 billion loan to build a spur from the EPSO II pipeline originally destined exclusively for the Pacific coast—which would deliver 15 million tons of Siberian oil annually for 20 years to China. A friendly Russia was essential for China during the first decade of the new century as it enhanced its control over Central Asian energy resources, transportation networks (including parts of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir), and pipelines, thus reducing its dependence on sea-routed energy supplies and petro-dollars, as part of its strategy to edge the dollar out as the dominant international reserve currency and establish its primacy in the eastern hemisphere.

China and Halford Mackinder's Predictions

China's aim was ultimately to get within striking distance of the Gulf through a combination of overland and maritime routes (from ports in Pakistan and Myanmar)—its insurance against "choke" points in the Malacca Straits and other sea passages. Halford Mackinder's theory of the Geographical Pivot of History and the Heartland—which suggested that those who controlled portions of Eurasia would end up controlling the world, and his hypothesis: "...a great military power in possession of the heartland, and of Arabia could take easy possession of the crossways of the world at Suez"—seemed more applicable to China than to any other power, as China proceeded to build high-speed rail networks, pipelines and roads across Eurasia.

Thus, China's ambitions lay even beyond Central Asia and Russia. China launched a quiet drive to leapfrog Russia into Europe, which weakened by the economic crisis, welcomed Chinese investment and acquisitions of infrastructure assets, technologies, sovereign debt, and a manufacturing presence in Europe. To earn goodwill, China positioned itself as a significant saviour of the euro with its commitments to buy additional sovereign euro debt. China's ambitions therefore lay in expanding its influence and power into Europe, beyond even Russia. Would a genuine Russian-Chinese partnership, overcoming years of mutual wariness, irretrievably tilt the global balance of power in China's favour?

Russian Considerations

China's rise however starkly highlighted Russia's weakening position and options in Eurasia. Because of economic decline (Russia's GDP fell by 7.9 per cent in 2009), Russia entered into an unequal partnership with China: Russia's exports to China are dominated by raw materials and energy resources while China is exporting high technology equipment and machinery to Russia in a major reversal of roles from Soviet times and even from the 1990s, when

Russia was supplying military equipment to China. The demographic depletion in the Russian far east also impairs its ability to withstand the increasing Chinese presence in this region. Hence Russia's military doctrine clearly mentions its threshold for use of nuclear weapons even as it refuses to enter into the next round of arms reduction talks with the United States, as these would inevitably focus on tactical nuclear weapons (in which Russia enjoys numerical superiority) and lead to Russia ceding strategic advantage in its eastern regions without gaining commensurate security in a joint missile defence system with the West.

In addition, Russia's military relationship with China is not without problems. Russian military exports to China have been falling at a rapid rate, declining from a peak of $3.2 billion in 2005 to $410 million only, in 2010 (with few new contracts having been discussed recently). The primary reason is that China reverse engineered many weapons systems and thereafter reduced its imports from Russia. Realising that its share of the Chinese and Indian market is declining, Russia has tried to diversify its arms exports but has found that China is competing with Russia in new markets. The dissatisfaction with this situation has been expressed at the highest levels in the Russian weapons industry. Russia is reportedly examining ways to address the issue of IPR theft with China to enable a resumption of military exports and has recently on April 7, 2011 amended the law on "Military Technical Cooperation with Foreign States" to better protect Russian IPRs. It is also notable that even as China and Russia tout their strategic partnership, they have avoided foreclosing other options, particularly in the energy sphere. China has tied up alternative supplies from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, while Russia has built a spur to China from the main pipeline running to the Pacific Coast, and not a wholly dedicated branch.

Thus while China will play an increasingly important role in Russian foreign policy, Russia cannot but be concerned at the enormous increase in Chinese influence and power, which undermines Russia's traditional domination of Eurasia. Moreover Russia does not visualise its future as China's appendage in terms of supplier of military technology, raw materials and energy resources. Realising that the imbalance in the relationship with China is symptomatic of Russia's weakening economic and technological base, President Medvedev has repeatedly called for technological rejuvenation and emphasised high-tech cooperation with other, primarily Western countries. Russia has proclaimed its desire to adopt a multi-vector, pragmatic foreign policy based on national interest and driven by the imperatives of modernisation. Russia's leaders, who have a vision for restoring Russia to its status as a great power and have proclaimed an agenda for modernisation and technological upgradation, are keen to strike modernisation partnerships with the West, even though the Reset with the West is not proceeding at the desired pace, which leaves Russia vulnerable in the wake of China's rise and reach across Eurasia.

The US-Russia Reset and Modernisation Partnerships

The massive accretion of Chinese comprehensive national power in a short interregnum—enjoined on another country—the United States—to pay greater attention to its security and foreign policy strategies. In 2008, President Obama seemed to have concluded that a Sino-Russian entente dominating the Eurasian heartland would immeasurably boost China's power, while a democratic and friendly Russia would be an asset to the US. The "Resets" were thus undertaken to improve ties with and support democratisation in Russia—to bind it closer to the West.

One of the first measures President Obama took was to postpone plans to deploy ballistic missile defences—which Russia perceived as a threat to its strategic deterrent—in Poland and the Czech Republic. He also suspended the process of NATO expansion, a move which had the quiet support of major Western powers like Germany. President Obama fast-tracked the new START Treaty which reduced deployed strategic warheads by 1/3 to 1550 on each side. Even in Congress with its sizeable Republican presence, the new START passed by a 76-21 vote in the Senate because of unstated assumptions regarding China. At the NATO-Russia Council in November 2010 the two sides declared that they no longer constituted a threat to each other and that their security was intertwined.

But the most potentially game-changing development was their agreement to discuss missile defence cooperation. While wrangling on this issue continues on both sides, further progress would mean that the era of enmity and standoff is over and that Russia and NATO *face other, presumably common threats*. Meanwhile the American National Military Strategy of 2011 referred to Russia in terms of partnership in maintaining security in Asia while expressing oblique concerns regarding China.

In foreign policy, apart from the rapprochement with the West, Russia intensified relations with major Asian partners through a quadrilateral framework that included Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan and other initiatives with South East Asia and South Korea. The only point of conflict was with Japan with which it had a historical dispute over the Kuril Islands.

Assessments

Both Russia and India have to deal with a vastly more powerful China and their mutual relations will be increasingly impacted by this factor. Russia's relations with the West are improving but have not fully healed (and may not do so in the near future). Meanwhile, Indo-Russian relations maintain their intensity, but there are issues that need to be addressed.

On the overwhelmingly positive side, Russia has contributed towards developing India's capabilities in the key strategic, nuclear, defence and space sectors. Russia, which has an advanced, internationally competitive nuclear

industry, has helped develop the civilian nuclear industry in India. It announced its decision to supply the Kudankulam nuclear reactors in 1998 despite the chorus of international disapproval against India's nuclear tests. In 1998, it also signed a ten-year agreement on military and technological cooperation. Russia has supplied nuclear fuel to India and agreed to lease a nuclear submarine to India. Major advances were made during the Prime Minister's visit to Russia in December 2009, Prime Minister Putin's visit in March 2010, during which an agreement on the peaceful uses of atomic energy was signed and a road map on cooperation agreed upon, and President Medvedev's visit in December 2010, during which an MoU was signed between the State Atomic Energy Corporation "Rosatom" and the Department of Atomic Energy concerning broader scientific and technical cooperation, envisaging joint research and development in reactor technology and related fields for peaceful uses of atomic energy by nuclear research institutes on both sides. The Russian side also agreed to discuss cooperation with the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership being set up by India and both sides agreed to consider cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with third countries. Similarly, in defence, Indo-Russian cooperation today encompasses co-production, joint development and scientific research [Brahmos missiles, nuclear submarines, and co-development of Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), Multi-Role Transport Aircraft (MTA) and T-90 battle tanks]. The term of the Indo-Russian Inter Governmental Commission for Military Technical Cooperation has been extended to 2020. The Soviet Union also helped build India's space capabilities. At present India is partnering with Russia on Chandrayaan-2, GLONASS under which India gets access to its military capabilities, and a host of other space projects including Youthsat and a manned space flight programme. Russia's proven lead in space technology has made it a valuable and trusted partner.

In fact, the range and depth of Indo-Russian cooperation in several key programs pertaining to the defence (Arihant, Brahmos, FGFA, T-90 tanks), civil nuclear energy (Kudankulam), and space (GLONASS, Chandrayaan-2) sectors exceeds, in dimension and impact, any other bilateral programme India has with other countries. The two sides are in consultation to add new high-tech sectors to the portfolio on bilateral cooperation.

There is however some turbulence in the Indo-Russian relationship as new avenues for economic cooperation have not shown great promise and India is diversifying its purchases of weaponry, with a visible impact on imports from Russia. India has also started to prioritise development of indigenous defence production capabilities in order to reduce its excessive dependence on imports. Judging by Russian media commentaries, this is causing unease about the direction of the partnership, even as Indian officials across various ministries reaffirm their continued engagement and commitment to the bilateral relationship. Bilateral trade was only around

US$7.46 billion in 2009 and two-way investments were also meagre. The two countries therefore have to seek additional areas for close strategic cooperation and would do well to explore new paradigms and paths for future cooperation.

However, the rise of China and its increasing domination of Eurasia makes it incumbent on India to continue to consolidate its ties with its one reliable partner on the Eurasian continent. Indeed, China already enjoys several advantages over India with Russia as there is no direct route for Russian energy exports to energy-hungry India. A close Russian-Chinese entente in Eurasia would certainly not be in India's interest.

It is imperative therefore that India becomes more pro-active, both in the bilateral context and by seeking out areas of strategic convergence with Russia in Eurasia. A strong and democratic Russia can help to maintain peace and stability in Central Asia, the Pak-Af region, Iran, and in our immediate neighbourhood, where Russia has not played a destabilising role. Russia can also help to further greater Indian engagement in the Eurasian region, from which India risks getting physically cut off, through the SCO, the India-Russia-China and other forums. India and Russia can draw even closer together in Eurasia and bilaterally while making it clear their cooperation is not directed against China. They can involve China in cooperative Eurasian frameworks, although Russia and China already closely cooperate in Eurasian organisations and India is the outsider in this regard—a situation it is trying to correct.

At the same time, since a strong Russia is in India's interest, Russia's partnerships with the advanced economies of the US, Europe and Asia are to be welcomed. But these must yield concrete results in terms of Russian modernisation for it to be effective in maintaining Russia's strategic autonomy. India should take the initiative in forging trilateral dialogue formats to help bridge the gulf between the West and Russia. Greater understanding and mutually beneficial cooperation between India, Russia and the West would be beneficial for all sides and for the cause of peace.

This is indeed what is happening. The two countries continue to maintain their valuable strategic cooperation which has contributed to strengthening India's key capabilities in the defence, nuclear energy and space sectors, while India continues to give priority to its defence purchases from Russia. They are also cooperating in Eurasia by expediting India's more proactive involvement in Eurasian organisations.

New Directions

Both sides have to make an effort to keep their mutual cooperation alive, relevant and strong.

Recommendations

Overall

1. The valuable strategic cooperation with Russia—which has contributed to strengthening India's key capabilities particularly in the defence, nuclear energy and space sectors—should continue to be given utmost priority in India's national strategy.

2. The consequences of diversifying away from Russia in terms of arms imports need to be thought through and appropriate strategies to strengthen defence cooperation implemented.

High-tech Partnership for the 21st Century

3. This is the right time for India to enter into a high-tech partnership for the 21st century with Russia which goes beyond the defence sector to include the civilian sector. Russia has formidable science assets even today, and is very advanced in the nuclear energy, space and defence sectors and in nanotechnology. These are in danger of withering away in the medium term if not given adequate support. Moreover, Russia is the only country that has transferred key strategic technologies to India.

4. Indian defence, scientific and research institutions and Indian private and public sector companies should hire Russian scientists to develop indigenous R&D. Joint ventures marrying Russian R&D with Indian industrial enterprises could lead to the establishment of high-tech industries in India.

5. New joint scientific projects should be launched with the aim of producing patentable, marketable technologies so as to move away from traditional paradigms.

6. Indian companies should invest in Russian defence and technology firms, including in the new technology hubs such as Skolkovo, the innovation city outside Moscow, the brainchild of President Medvedev, which has Ratan Tata on its foundation council and Vivek Wadhwa as a contributor. It has been reported that Russia had proposed cooperation for developing innovation hubs between India, China and Russia. This too can be explored.

Cooperation in Eurasia (Central Asia, Iran, Pak-Af) with Russia, the US and Japan

7. Russia is a leading member of Eurasian organisations like the SCO and the CSTO and is seeking to revive a more active role for itself in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. There is a broad mutuality of interests in Eurasia between Russia and India. India should seek fresh synergies with Russia in areas of strategic convergence in Eurasia and

in Eurasian economic projects, where India's presence is limited and where the two can cooperate bilaterally and with other countries to generate new catalysts for growth and peace.

8. While retaining its leading position in South Asia, India should intensify not only ongoing bilateral consultations on the post American-withdrawal security scenario with Russia, but also a multilateral dialogue on security issues and on forging energy, industrial, commercial, cultural and overland transportation linkages in the region—involving the Central Asian Republics, Pakistan and Afghanistan and even China. Russia has reportedly sought a role in the TAPI project. This should be welcomed.

9. Similarly, Russia's better relations with Iran can be a useful lever for India. India can explore the revival of the North-South transport corridor once relations with Iran improve. It can seek other forms of connectivity through Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia to Russia.

10. Both countries could try to engage China in cooperative frameworks to generate new catalysts for growth.

11. Russia's relations with Pakistan need not be perceived as a zero sum game, although India should keep itself abreast of developments in Russian-Pakistani relations. India can consider joining or associating with Russian led forums such as the Sochi Quad and in finding new ways/forums to engage with Pakistan, whose suspicions of India's intentions can be mitigated by the presence of countries like Russia.

12. As Russia is seeking an active role in the Pacific Rim, India should explore how it can strengthen cooperation and connectivity with Russia's far east in addition to the littoral states along the Asian maritime highways.

13. A Russian-Japanese-India trilateral framework should be considered in this regard. In fact, India should leverage its good ties with both countries to try to bring them together in order to increase the weightage of democratic countries in Russia's external engagement profile.

14. India, Russia and the United States should conduct a regular trilateral dialogue on missile defences and Eurasian security and development. The rapprochement on security issues following the NATO-Russia Council meeting on November 20, 2010, should be used for exploration of synergies despite complications. At present, the US and Russia are at odds over the issue of Euro missile defences, which impedes the development of a closer understanding between the two on security issues. It would be in India's interest if the two sides were able to resolve their differences on missile defenses. India can try to play a bridging role in this debate and bring the two sides closer in

order to impress upon them the need to avoid a fresh arms race which could have destabilising consequences in India's own neighbourhood. India should also consider a trilateral dialogue with Russia and the United States on the possibilities of cooperation in Central Asia.

Cooperation in the Energy Sector

15. It is essential for India to revive efforts to cooperate with Russia in the energy sector. Russia has been pursuing a very successful energy strategy. It should leverage its partnership with Russia in the energy field in view of India's pressing requirements. Russia is also preparing itself to exploit the resources in its northern seas in the Arctic Region as it expects the northern route to open up due to climate change. Its Maritime Doctrine explicitly mentions this new direction in its maritime policy. This will open up huge prospects for exploitation of new energy resources. While India should continue to prioritise its commitment to sustainable exploitation of natural resources, in the absence of multilateral commitments to this goal it should ensure that it is not left out of Russian projects to exploit new sources of energy. Russia is not looking for foreign stakeholders as much it is in need of cutting edge technology to be able to exploit the resources of the Arctic, and India will have to tailor its strategy accordingly by giving Russia greater leverage in its domestic energy and defence sectors or coming up with fresh and innovative ideas for mutually profitable partnerships in other areas. India should also independently pursue a technological upgradation strategy to ensure that it can partner with Russia in challenging fields.

Education Partnership

16. An education partnership should be forged between the two countries. The absence of stakeholders at civil society/entrepreneurial levels has meant that we have failed to impart a more broad-based character to the partnership, despite the existence of mutual goodwill. India thus needs to take proactive measures to strengthen and catalyse people to people contacts, through encouraging English language studies in Russia, and by offering MBA scholarships to hundreds of young Russian students to study in India, possibly in return for training Indian science graduates in Russia's excellent science institutes. India could also consider setting up an Indian business school in Russia. This would garner enormous goodwill and forge contacts with a new generation of talented young Russians. Alternately, it can admit Russian students into MBA programmes of top-notch Indian management institutes.

Institutional Cooperation

17. India is already co-operating and should intensify cooperation in rendering assistance to Russia for reforming the banking, legal and economic legislation sectors to help Russia build a market economy. The Indian and Russian election commissions signed an agreement during President Medvedev's visit. This cooperation can be extended to other political and economic institutions given the priorities of both countries to develop their social sectors, catalyse greater economic growth and induct high technology.

Conclusion

Despite the changed international context, a strong, democratic, modernising and friendly Russia continues to be in India's interest, particularly given the uncertain equations with China, but also independent of it. Russia has proven to be of great help in times of crisis for India and a reliable partner overall. This is a valuable relationship which has served India over the years and is likely to remain so given the factors analysed above. However, India needs to make an extra effort to maintain it at the earlier high levels by exploring new dimensions of friendship which can be highly beneficial to both countries and to the cause of peace in the world. The Indo-Russian strategic partnership and joint efforts for peace can help to leaven the Asian security environment and contribute to lasting amity and economic growth.

CHAPTER 20

Europe in Indian Strategy

Dhruva Jaishankar

Introduction

India is in the midst of re-crafting and reinventing its relations with most major states in the international system. While breakthroughs with the United States over the past decade have had perhaps the greatest impact on Indian strategy, the same period has also witnessed attempts at normalising relations with China and Pakistan, an increasingly close relationship with Israel, promising new partnerships with Japan and Brazil, and a reaffirmation of ties with Russia.

In this light, perhaps the least explored and least developed link India has with a major centre of power, is with Europe. At the very least, Europe appears to be playing a diminishing role in India's strategic thinking, despite its strong relations with individual countries: Britain, France and Germany, in particular. Europe is often conspicuously absent in important discussions of Indian grand strategy.[1] The recent EU-India summit of December 10, 2010 clearly highlighted the constraints present in New Delhi's relationship with Brussels. Unlike other recent summits involving India, the resulting joint statement explicitly called upon Pakistan to bring the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks to justice and promised greater cooperation on terrorism, but contributed little else in strategic terms despite a wide spectrum of shared interests.[2] It is perhaps no surprise that the summit received far less attention in the Indian media than the summits with the United States, China, Russia and even individual EU member states such as France and Britain.

Europe's low profile in Indian strategic priorities is, at one level, unusual. As a single entity, it mirrors India's federal structure with its culturally- and linguistically-distinct constituent entities. European states also generally share India's commitment to liberal democratic values and multiculturalism. The European Union is India's largest trade partner by some distance. Britain and France are important defence suppliers to India's armed forces. And Europe is collectively home to an Indian diaspora that is over 1.7 million-strong and growing, albeit slowly.

The India-Europe link remains weak for several reasons, which can be broadly grouped as: economic, politico-military, socio-cultural, and existential. There have been disputes over disparate issues such as climate change, human rights, and world trade. At the same time, both India and Europe have a history of rising above such disagreements. While certainly not models of problem-free relationships, Europe's ties with China and India's new found partnership with the United States demonstrate the ability of both entities to forge fruitful relations with leading powers despite deep-seated disagreements. In fact, the failure of both India and Europe to take advantage of commonalities and surmount their differences only betrays the strategic short sightedness of policymaking at both ends.

Europe represents an opportunity for India to define a coherent grand strategy, a litmus tests of sorts of India's strategic acumen. As one of the four major concentrations of power in the 21st century, Europe has established itself as a single entity in many regards, particularly trade issues. Indeed, beyond counter-terrorism and trade—two areas of proven cooperation[3]—India and Europe do make for potential partners. They do not promote rival ideologies and, in fact, share a strong commitment to liberalism, democracy, secularism, and pluralism. Nor do they have competing realms of influence. The two economies are in many respects complementary: India's burgeoning market, low costs, service-led growth and demographic dividend dovetail, rather than compete with, Europe's technological aptitude, high standard of living, fiscal inflexibility and aging population. Both wrestle with similar challenges related to sub-national governance, the treatment of minorities, and radical Islamism. Europe also remains a source of investment and technology for India (including technology of strategic significance). It provides leverage for India to optimise its dealings with other states, including the United States, China and Russia.

The arguments made by many in the United States in favour of a significant partnership with India should logically resonate more strongly in Europe: a well-calibrated partnership with India has the potential to sustain European eminence in an era of emerging powers while maintaining a favourable balance of values. In a global environment that is experiencing a rapid diffusion of power, Europe stands out as a potent target for India's multi-polar engagement strategy, a major concentration of power that is not necessarily burdened with the complications often associated with bilateral relations with the United States and China.

Incompatible Models?

India's rise since the end of the Cold War and its concomitant economic development have led to a strategic reawakening, and a renewed engagement with the rest of the world.[4] The rapid growth during this period of other Asian powers (most notably China), an uneven peace brought about by the

introduction of nuclear weapons to the subcontinent, and the relative decline in American power have all shaped Indian thinking in meaningful ways.[5] The end product is a foreign policy marked by characteristics that have included an emphasis on India's economic development, the maintenance of sovereignty, a consideration of the balance of power, a distrust of permanent alliances, and an enthusiasm for omni-directional diplomatic and economic engagement.[6]

Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has moved in much the opposite direction. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the nuclear deterrence that largely defined stability and security on the continent for much of the preceding forty years was rendered irrelevant. The expansion of Europe that came with the inclusion of former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states into the European Union and NATO dampened security competition, despite conflict in the Balkans and a continuing unease with Russia. Instead, Europe renewed its focus on establishing a wider and deeper economic and political union. The advent of the Schengen area, the European Central Bank, and the Euro facilitated intra-European migration, enabled the centralisation of fiscal policy, and established a single European currency. The passage of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 attempted to provide greater political cohesion through the creation of a president of the European Council and a new office of the High Representative that would oversee Europe's external relations.[7]

However, the complex and overlapping governing structure of the European Council and Commission, and the uncertain implications of the Lisbon Treaty on European cohesion, have only further complicated external perceptions, including New Delhi's. Some external observers, particularly in the United States, see Europe as continuing to play an important unitary role in the 21st century and possibly forging a new model of statehood that might enable it to escape from ruinous security competition. Such advocates of the European model see in India a power that is behind times, hobbled by low standards of living, developmental challenges, weak military and diplomatic spending, and unruly minorities.[8]

The two very different orientations of Europe and India are not naturally conducive to cooperation. For India, Europe's post-modern supranationalism appears to be an impractical and romantic vision destined to serve it poorly in an increasingly competitive global order. "We are a nation of Eurosceptics," said one Indian official who deals with Europe. "We will wait to see what the Lisbon Treaty is all about."[9] For Europeans, India has yet to achieve political maturity at home and in its dealings with both smaller neighbouring states and larger powers in its region. European diplomats see fatal weaknesses in India's perceived caution, its fractious democracy and its many regional challenges.[10]

Issues of identity have made themselves felt through important differences over tangible outcomes. At the Copenhagen Climate summit in

December 2009, India's opposition to the thrust of the climate treaty advanced by European states was due in no small part to concerns over sovereignty, concerns that it shared with China.[11] Another realm of conflict stemming from existential concerns is in the matter of upholding human rights, with European activism producing considerable resentment in Indian policymaking circles.[12] According to one former Indian foreign secretary, Europe "is reluctant to get involved in the rivalries and tensions of Asia, except for...humanitarian interventions, as aid-giver or, ironically, for sanctimonious sermonising on human rights which its traders and rulers had so diligently violated in Asia not so long ago."[13] Motions introduced in recent years in the European Parliament condemning the activities of Indian security forces in Kashmir were but one example of an act that unnecessarily annoyed New Delhi for little or no benefit. In fact, the motion and associated report coincided with a period of growing goodwill between India and Pakistan.[14]

Public Disdain and Apathy

The absence of strong socio-cultural relations between Europe and India is, perhaps, primarily responsible for poor overall engagement. Such relations have formed the basis for India's warming relations with the United States, manifested in the extraordinarily large number of Indian students in American universities and admiration for the United States' entrepreneurial spirit.

Few figures reflect social proximity better than the results of public opinion surveys. A 2010 survey of 11 European states found that 54 per cent rated India favourably compared to the 33 per cent who rated it unfavourably. While this spread is reflective of about half the states polled (Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal), India is rated very poorly in France, and—rather oddly—in Slovakia.[15] The continental European survey results are particularly revealing when compared to results in both the UK and the United States, where 74-76 per cent of respondents rated India favourably, while 21-22 per cent held an unfavourable view of India. The results of a 2010 BBC poll were even more stark, with four out of the six European countries surveyed—Germany, France, Spain and Portugal—having unfavourable opinions, and only Italy and the United Kingdom were positive about Indian influence.[16]

In similar polls, Indians show considerable apathy towards Europe. In the BBC survey, the percentage of Indians with no strong opinions on the influence of France, UK, EU and Germany were 46, 49, 57 and 59 per cent respectively. However, those who did respond were on the whole favourably disposed.[17] However, according to a Pew poll also released in 2010, Indians had a negative view of the European Union.[18]

Such surveys do not reveal the reasons for popular European dissatisfaction with India. However, India's low opinion of Europe is because of unfavourable comparisons with the United States, which is still held in

very high regard by the Indian public. Only 10 per cent of Indian respondents saw the EU as the leading economic power in 2010 (only 5 per cent did in 2008), compared to 60 per cent who named the United States.[19] Previous such polls had indicated that a plurality of Indians, unlike others polled, favoured the United States as a land of opportunity compared to individual European countries.[20]

If it is indeed in European interests to take full advantage of Indian entrepreneurial talent, it must begin to compete with the United States as an immigration and educational destination. Europe is well placed to take advantage of this. The recent financial crisis, and protectionist American legislation, has accelerated a movement of highly educated and skilled Indians away from the United States. Indian 'returnees' from the United States, are by and large young (26-35), with professional or masters degrees, and in the United States either to study or on short-term, high-skill work visas. It would be to the advantage of the European economy and to long-term India-Europe relations, if the right environment could be created to attract such entrepreneurial Indian immigrants.[21]

While a prosperous and successful Indian community in Europe can benefit India as much as its counterpart in the United States, there are additional benefits attached to people-to-people exchanges. India has also much to benefit from cooperation with Europe as it rises and prospers, particularly on matters of regional or local governance and social welfare. Europe, for example, is well-situated to provide useful lessons to India on matters of urban governance, and unleashing the full potential of cities.[22]

Moving Beyond Arms Sales?

The strategic relationship between Europe and India, if considered in the narrower terms of politics and security, has been held hostage to other dimensions of the relationship. Many observers have critiqued the inordinate focus of Europeans on short-term commercial and economic gains at the expense of long-term political calculations.[23] Others have noted the absence of strong cultural links between India and Europe, Britain excepted.

In the security realm, India has forged much closer relationships with individual European countries—particularly Britain and France, and to a lesser extent with Germany and Italy—than with Europe as a whole. This is especially true in the matter of big-ticket defence sales. Over the past few decades the Indian air force has purchased Mirage 2000 fighters from Dassault, SEPECAT Jaguars, BAE Hawk trainers and Aerospatiale helicopters. The Indian navy has ordered submarines from German manufacturer HDW and, more recently, French Scorpenes. Additionally, India's only active aircraft carrier, the *INS Viraat*, is a British import and is serviced by British-built Harrier jets. European defence manufacturers have benefited from the notable advantage they have over their competitors in the Indian market. Most

importantly, they have access to leading military technologies and fewer qualms about exporting them, while being free of the unwarranted political baggage associated with American suppliers.

At the same time, competition amongst European suppliers, technological disadvantages vis-à-vis the United States, and the lack of Europe's strategic allure, have also weakened its hand. While the Eurofighter Typhoon, the product of a Europe-wide consortium, is among the candidates to win the lucrative contract for 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft being offered by India, estimated to be worth at least $10-12 billion, it is facing competition from two other European manufacturers: Dassault and Saab. The political benefits of such a contract are seen, to be minimal by India, particularly when compared to India's long-cultivated relationship with Russia and the potential of a broad partnership with the United States.

Defence trade has also been hobbled with corruption endemic to the Indian acquisition process. The HDW was blacklisted in the 1980s following corruption allegations.[24] The infamous Bofors scandal, which saw over $20 million paid in kickbacks by the Swedish arms manufacturer and contributed to the defeat of the Congress government in the 1989 elections, still casts a long shadow over arms trade between Europe and India, reinforced by the involvement in that episode of an Italian middleman. Given the relative success of European manufacturers in the Indian market, joint manufacturing and research and development ought to be more prevalent. Unfortunately, these are held hostage to the slow pace of Indian defence industry reforms The gradual emergence of private-sector defence manufacturers may make collaborations easier in the years to come. In contrast, the failures of Indian state suppliers to complete commissions in time and on budget may lead India to revert to manufacturing in Europe to benefit both Indian defence preparedness and European manufacturers.[25]

A second aspect of the military relationship constitutes military-to-military dialogue and interoperability, with an eye on possible joint operations. Cooperation in this regard has been underwhelming, again, with the possible exception of France. The Indo-French relationship was particularly remarkable in view of the French support for India following its 1998 nuclear tests, when Paris advocated New Delhi's swift return into the nuclear fold and even access to civilian nuclear technology.[26] France and India have also benefited from successful bilateral air exercises, in addition to exercises conducted in the United States with the American and South Korean air forces.[27]

Notwithstanding the minor successes with an autonomously-inclined France, the wider European failure to develop strong military-to-military relations with India can be attributed to two causes, one social, the other structural. The first concern is Europe's transition to a "post-heroic society."[28] The reluctance of European states to deploy and maintain large troop

presences in Iraq and Afghanistan, the latter despite a commitment to NATO, have reinforced the stereotype of European militaries unwilling to fight, and cast aspersions on their willingness to project military power outside their extended neighbourhood. That such an assessment might not be fair, particularly with regard to India's track record of deploying forces overseas, is almost irrelevant.

The second challenge concerns the identification of an appropriate partner. That European militaries could operate under their own national flags, under a NATO rubric, or even possibly as part of a EU rapid reaction force, complicates military partnerships with external actors.[29] In many respects, the nascent EU defence structure, championed by the French, and NATO, which remains US-led, are competitors. So far, in accordance with American wishes, the EU has taken on only small-scale peacekeeping or rule-of-law missions, avoiding direct conflict between the two bodies. Nevertheless, the future of European military leadership remains uncertain.[30] At the same time, the bureaucratic walls between the two institutions reduce their effectiveness.[31]

Dialogue should still persevere despite the inherent limitations to exercises and operations, but India has shown little interest in pursuing sustained conversation on issues of common concern. The absence of serious engagement on military threats has impaired the identification of areas for natural cooperation. For example, both Europe and India treat Iran as part of their extended neighbourhoods and both have active diplomatic relationships with Tehran. Yet there is little evidence of close consultations between the two on how to deal with Iran's nuclear weapons programme, compounded by India's absence from the P5+1 negotiations. Both entities are also involved in anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean, although not in close conjunction with one another. And there are also shared interests in interdicting illicit cargoes in keeping with both counter-proliferation and counter-narcotic objectives. A lot of the heroin being produced in and transported through India and the subcontinent is destined for Europe.[32]

In the realm of political relations, Britain and France once again remain exceptions. The atmospherics however appear to be confidence inducing. In the past three years alone, India has hosted German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, British Prime Minister David Cameron, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and EU High Representative Catherine Ashton. The steady stream of senior European visitors to India appears to have been motivated primarily by its economic potential.

A final strand in the web of strategic relations between Europe and India concerns their places in the key international institutions that lead global governance and reflect the distribution of power. With India rising, and Europe in relative decline, an expectation on the part of many in India, China,

the United States and elsewhere is that Europe must be persuaded to graciously cede some of its privileges to emerging powers such as India.[33] Despite the inclusion of Germany in the G-4 aspirants for permanent membership of the UN Security Council, an expectation is that Europe's vote might be consolidated in the event of the body's overhaul. Even the World Trade Organisation Director-General Pascal Lamy, who is French, has suggested that Europe needs to speak with "one mouth" at international summits such as the G-20 meetings even if it cannot with "one voice."[34]

That India's ascension to various high tables of global governance must come at the expense of Europe makes for a difficult working relationship at international forums, on which three will be no easy compromises. This provides India with an impetus to encourage European unanimity—if not unity—on important issues, be it financial regulation at the G-20, foreign policy and security at the UNSC, or the climate change policy at the annual UN climate change conferences. Secondly, Europe which has invested considerably in various international institutions and nurtured them over time has an incentive to include India, even if it has to sacrifice its own voice, to maintain the relevance and effectiveness of those very institutions.

Untapped Economic Potential

The most successful area of engagement between India and Europe is in the economic and commercial realm. The European Union accounts for 16 per cent of India's trade, worth $74.4 billion. This compares very favourably with India's $60 billion worth of trade with China and its $40 billion in trade with the United States. Indian exports have been in unskilled manufacturing, including textiles and automotive products. European exports to India, meanwhile, mainly consist of machinery, chemicals and gems and jewellery. Some aspects of this trade—dominated on the European side by Germany and Britain—appear both positive and sustainable. The European Union is a destination for 20 percent of Indian exports, and enjoys a trade surplus in its favour of about •2 billion.[35] Despite the financial crisis leading to a sharp decline in 2008, European exports to India have bounced back almost to 2007 levels, bucking a global trend. India's trade as a percentage of GDP is increasing despite its rapid growth rates, as is its manufacturing sector relative to the rest of the economy.

However, these data belie the overall trade potential of the relationship. In a reflection of its low base, India only ranks ninth among the EU's trade partners, behind South Korea, but ahead of Brazil. Total trade also remains one-sixth that of the European Union's with China.[36] Europe has a smaller share of trade in commercial services (•12.2 billion) with India than it does in goods (11.9 per cent), so it is taking less advantage of India's primary strength. Perhaps more revealingly, it is, rather unusually, a net *exporter* of services to India.[37] Current trends also suggest a future at odds with the

seemingly rosy picture today. Two-way investment, never very high to begin with, dropped almost 50 per cent in 2009. And the EU has also seen its share in India's commercial mix decline in favour of China, other Asian economies and the Gulf region. Between 1990-91 and 1998-99, for example, the EU accounted for over 25 per cent of India's trade.[38]

A relationship that can fully exploit comparative advantages will be hard-pressed to overcome perceived differences. The outrage often expressed by the Indian government and media over seemingly protectionist measures by the United States is rarely targeted at Europe, despite the presence of stronger unions and occasionally high barriers to immigration, trade and investment.

Conclusion

To realise the full potential of a partnership with Europe, India needs to embark on a sustained and simultaneous engagement of the major pan-European bodies and individual European governments. The current mechanism of dealing with the office of the High Representative is a base upon which such multipronged engagement can rest, but it must encapsulate the full range of external relations—particularly trade and defence—to be fully effective. A unified and comprehensive approach would help overcome prejudices against European post-modernity. As Europe currently does not follow such a blueprint in steering its relations with other powers, it will be incumbent upon New Delhi to formulate an optimal mechanism for high-level engagement.

The top priority of this engagement should be to replicate the socio-economic fruits of the US-India relationship as a strong foundation for broader cooperation with Europe. This can only be brought about by a liberal immigration regime and the development of higher education institutions that meet the insatiable demands of the growing Indian middle class. The attractiveness of Europe as a destination for highly skilled and educated young Indians will be the ultimate litmus test of the long term relations between Europe and India.

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CHAPTER 21

One World 2020: A Decade-long Vision for India's Relations with the United Nations[1]

Manu Bhagavan

India has long played a central role at the United Nations, if an unheralded one. Indeed, the UN was key to India's foreign policy, and to its strategic vision for the world in the first decades after it achieved independence from Great Britain. That overall vision marks the last time that India had a grand strategy worth the name, and so is a useful point from which to begin looking anew at India's foreign and domestic policy objectives over the coming decade.

Beginning in 1942, in the midst of World War II, Jawaharlal Nehru outlined a plan to help maintain the world's security and progress. His scheme involved some kind of world federation, one that pooled resources, united military power, and worked for the freedom of all peoples. Over the next few years, this idea grew into an actionable plan. With input from Mahatma Gandhi, and the assistance of his own formidable sister, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Nehru defined his ultimate objective as world government, one that put an end to the world of nation-states that had dominated since the 17th century Treaty of Westphalia. Nehru thought that some sovereignty had to be ceded by all the world's states to a larger, federal democratic union. This union would be built on the relatively new concept of "human rights." What this term meant, or encompassed, was still under discussion, but there was virtually unanimous global consensus that an architecture of such human rights had to be created. The Nuremberg Trials helped reveal the level of atrocities committed during the war, and also what might be done to hold criminals accountable. The trials laid the foundation for an international system of human rights law—the revulsion of the horrors committed by the Nazis going far to convince people everywhere that a new global standard had to be created, and a norm accepted, that made such behaviour absolutely unacceptable.

India played a prominent role in advancing the cause of human rights when, as I have discussed elsewhere, she led the fight in the newly created

United Nations against South Africa's Ghetto Act. Not yet an independent country, India's team led a rousing debate within the General Assembly, going head to head with Jan Smuts himself. Ultimately, India secured a two thirds majority vote condemning South Africa for its abhorrent domestic law, which relegated Indians living there to second class status. Smuts and his allies had tried to hide behind Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter, the domestic jurisdiction clause, which was meant to protect the sovereign actions of member states. Internally, many diplomats in Great Britain and to a lesser extent in the US feared any impingement on 2(7), and went all out to prevent the article's erosion. India carried the day, however, in what was seen as the first "Asian victory" and, more broadly, a victory of the oppressed, in the modern world.

While this victory proved complicated—the result was that Jan Smuts was out at the next election and the Ghetto Act became apartheid—India was undeterred. The resolution of the South African question in 1946 laid the groundwork for much later UN action, setting a precedent for the new international organisation to have the authority and ability to engage with the domestic affairs of member states.

Nehru wanted to take this one step further, to essentially creating a global constitution based on human rights that would mitigate the unlimited power of states while maintaining their overall autonomy. In essence, he perceived that there were multiple levels of sovereignty arranged around different organising principles: the individual, groups, and states.

India's representative on the Human Rights Commission, Hansa Mehta, fought hard to make Nehru's vision a reality. She tried to bring human rights enforcement under the umbrella of the Security Council, and led efforts to create strong implementation methods. As the discourse of human rights soon got caught up in Cold War antagonisms, she, along with Nehru and Vijayalakshmi Pandit, did everything possible to bridge the gap. The policy of non-alignment was but one plank in their greater strategy, which was to keep all sides talking and working together. This was best illustrated in India's efforts to bridge the chasm between the frigid warring ideological sides over the emerging concepts of human rights. The International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic and Social Rights exemplified the division in the idea of human rights, but India supported both elements.

Cold War tensions nonetheless successfully slowed down negotiations regarding human rights at the UN and made the creation of international, justiciable rights particularly difficult. The Universal Declaration was seen as a positive first step, while efforts to create what would be the binding covenants remained under discussion. The UDHR was not binding, reflecting the fear and suspicion among countries that pervaded the international arena. Nehru knew that India had to lead by example. He and Mehta saw to it that the Universal Declaration was essentially embedded into the Indian Constitution. Mehta, as a member of the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee,

was keen to ensure that India was bound to work within, build up, and protect the international system of administration and law, by spelling much of this out in Article 51 of the Directive Principles. While the Principles are not enforceable per se, Mehta ensured that the Principles were enshrined as "duties of the state." Together with the specific rights spelt out in the Constitution, India immediately made human rights justiciable, and linked the new postcolonial state with international law and institutions.

Nehru and his team felt that global government—a true, federated union of humankind—was the only way forward, and the only means to prevent future wars while also maintaining a sustainable and just peace. Everything was bound up in this solution: minorities, refugees, migrant peoples, warring or antagonistic states, princely states and notions of domestic integrity, poverty and public health. All of these problems were at once local issues, as well as complicated global ones. Only by understanding the complex network of associations between the local and global, and the inter-connectedness of one issue to another, could the world hope to meaningfully address its problems.[2] Nehru did not live to see his dream realised, but in many ways it remains in progress. The creation of the EU, of the International Criminal Court, and of the European and Inter-American Human Rights Courts all bear the hallmarks of Nehru's vision. And so the dream lives on.

Which brings us to the fork in the road, where India finds herself in 2011. Our world, of course, is not the same as the one that Nehru faced, and the problems are not the same either. Catastrophic climate change; transnational, globalised terrorism; pandemic public health concerns; sustainable development agendas; these are the problems we face at the outset of the 21st century. Nor is the United Nations the organisation that Nehru and his allies had envisaged. It is large and unwieldy. There are 192 member states, and their representatives all too often seek only to protect the narrow interests of their government, many of which do not represent the interests or wishes of their people. The bureaucracy does not attract the best and the brightest. The organisation as a whole is under the sway of Great Power politics, and particularly susceptible to the whims of the United States, at least in terms of its core peace and defence arm, the Security Council. And, in terms of its primary mission of maintaining peace and security, the UN is a body that has failed: the charred corpses in Vietnam, Korea, Cambodia, Iran and Iraq, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and in countless other countries all bear grim testimony to this.

And so it is tempting to say that the UN is an organisation that perhaps should be abandoned, joining its predecessor the League of Nations on the dust heap of history. But with what alternative would we be left? Without the United Nations, in some form or another, we would be left vulnerable to the unhindered whims of nation-states and other networked actors, creating the kind of environment that led to both the First and the Second World War. Regional alliances or organisations like the G-20, while providing a platform

for dialogue and action, also ultimately face any number of limitations—not the least that they are even less representative and just as susceptible to many of the problems currently plaguing the UN.

The challenges we face, as those in Nehru's time, intricately intertwine the global and the local. The international element remains fundamental to solving humanity's problems. And for all its shortcomings, the UN has done much that is good, leading the way, however haltingly or circuitously, on human rights, climate control, and a host of other critical issues.

So, if the United Nations remains key to future progress, yet inversely remains hampered by organisational flaws and Machiavellian motivations, what path does India take, moving forward? The United Nations must clearly be reformed, but the question is how, and to what end? India's position on UN reform must rest on the country's specific agenda, its vision, its Grand Strategy. For too long, India's holy grail at the UN has been the securing of a permanent seat on the Security Council. But again, to what end? Why does India want a seat on the Security Council?

To put it another way, what kind of power does India want to be? Or rather, to what purpose does India wish to wield its power? Today, for the first time in over 50 years, India has the chance to be one of the most influential countries in the world. This is built on the country's increasing economic clout more than anything else, though growing military capabilities closely complement this strength.

Yet it is precisely here that India's efforts in the forties and fifties can offer a useful lesson. India was neither economically nor militarily mighty then and yet it was respected, its counsel courted, its wisdom embraced. India's moral authority and prestige was unrivalled, thanks to Gandhi's eminence, Nehru's stature, and Vijayalakshmi Pandit's command of the international stage. India stood for justice, and that alone lent it a credibility that transcended the military and economic power of other nations. To take its proper place in the United Nations, and to help lead the world, India must again establish itself as the trusted voice of reason and lead in measure by its own example.

Few things undermine an advocate's positional strength as much as charges of hypocrisy, as the United States has recently (and historically) learned to the detriment of its soft power. Relatedly, it was exactly this gap between the stated ideals and actual conditions that Gandhi and others exploited to bring down the British Empire.

Before India can effectively take the lead on the world stage, it must do more to address the gap between its ideals and its realities. So, India must take, in some cases continue to take, immediate and effective steps *at home* to protect the fundamental human rights—civil and political as well as economic and social—of all its people, and to build a green economy that supports sustainable growth while dramatically containing carbon emissions. Platitudes and pleas of "third world" status are flatly insufficient and cannot

be used to shield India from meaningfully addressing these issues. In short, India may limit its commitments while at the international or domestic legislative bargaining table, but then it must do everything it can to go well beyond those commitments in practice. Just because China and the United States compete for the title of "world's largest producer of greenhouse gases" does not excuse India, the world's fourth largest CO_2 emitter, from striving for a zero-emissions economy.[3] In fact, and rather obviously, an India that leads the way in carbon cuts (by exponentially increasing research, development, and deployment of carbon scrubbing technologies and renewable energy—think Francis Moon's wind turbines, urban AirPods, and basic energy efficiency), would increase its technological edge and political influence.[4] Finland does not have to be the first country to build a green highway, especially when India has such a desperate need for roads. Friendly, cooperative competition can help to spur innovation.

Economic growth, in other words, does not have to be at odds with decisive, progressive action. Private companies like *Vestergaard Frandsen* (the makers of the LifeStraw)[5] and *Nutriset* (the maker of Plumpy'nut)[6] can and should be brought into partnership with local companies and government initiatives to help bring clean drinking water and nutritional supplements to India's needy millions, who cannot wait for lengthy development projects to be completed (though this should not be an excuse not to build much needed infrastructure at the same time).

Put more broadly, it is fundamentally in India's national interests to address global climate change and its enduring crisis of poverty. Violent weather, rising water levels caused by warming seas and melting ice caps all pose existential threats to India as hubs like Mumbai, Chennai, and Kolkata are all at high risk from these changes.[7] Migrant and displaced populations moving due to distress caused by disaster, and ensuing public health problems, would be huge burdens to bear.

But India cannot solve problems of such magnitude on its own; for the world in so many ways has never been more borderless. The stands of the US and China on climate change will have environmental repercussions throughout the subcontinent. The recent financial crisis stemming from derivatives markets and multinational banks primarily in the United States has reverberated throughout the world. Bad policy and contagion make for continued economic instability. Unless all countries and peoples act in concert, such threats simply cannot be contained.

The United Nations has tried to address many such internationally interconnected issues, whether in the form of the Kyoto Protocol and follow-ups such as the recent meeting in Cancún, or with respect to the Millennium Development Goals, or with the new Responsibility to Protect initiative. But for all its good intentions, the UN has yet to achieve major success in even one such project. Cancún, while "realist," does not in any way alter our course—we remain headed towards catastrophic climate change in the near

future. The Millennium Development Goals look to go unmet. And R2P, while a major step forward, seems sadly utopian in the era of Sudan and any number of more mundane instances where states have failed to protect their people from harm.

Much of this failure stems from a vacuum in leadership. The United States has dragged its feet on climate change issues, has resisted living up to its funding commitment of .7 per cent GDP to the Millennium Development Goals, and has supported R2P in its selective application while concomitantly attempting to revise norms regarding torture and failing its people in instances like Hurricane Katrina.

Many countries are using this moment to take advantage of US weakness to jockey for positions of power, but this is a self-interested approach that cannot possibly address the above mentioned problems. As I hope I have briefly illustrated, India and the world *needs* these problems to be solved, and in the relative near term. India *needs* the United Nations to succeed, for its own sake as much as for any greater moral principle.

This can only be accomplished by a four-point strategy. The first is to lead by example in the manner I have discussed above. The second is to forge a strong, vibrant partnership with the United States. Third, India must assume leadership in the United Nations. And fourth, India must work to reform the international organisation.

Forging a strong partnership with the United States may seem counter-intuitive, especially given US intransigence on so many matters needing urgent attention. But while some may argue instead for alternative alliances, as with the budding BRICSA coalition, the truth is that virtually nothing of substance can be accomplished—at the UN or anywhere else—without the United States. It is by far the world's wealthiest and most powerful country. This is certainly going to remain true for the next ten years. For its part, the US needs India. It is wary of China and Russia, and can hardly engage the rest of world without cementing neo-imperial perceptions if its only major partner is the EU. India, for all its shortcomings, is the world's largest democracy and shares many, if not all, of the US' ideals. By tightening its alliance with the United States, especially at the state level, but also through private partnerships, India can increase its clout within the world's leading democracy.

Now, this is not for any small purpose, but rather for the noblest of causes. India will add nothing to global progress if it cosies up to the US only to protect certain domestic policies from prying international attention. Instead, again by leading by example, India, in increasing interdependence with the United States, will then be in a position to use moral suasion to convince the US to act in complementary ways.

An alliance with the United States cannot hurt India's chances of securing a seat on the Security Council. This is by far the most powerful arm of the UN, but it is also the one that causes the most bitterness, since it allows a

few select countries to indefinitely control world policy. Adding India to the Council hardly addresses this long-standing grievance. But given India's size, by geography, by people, and by economy, it seems increasingly untenable not to have India take a permanent seat on the Council. While President Obama has come out in support of this, India should not get carried away by the significance of this stand. In the past, the United States has supported Japan for a seat, and that has thus far gone nowhere. Nonetheless, there is increasing support for altering the Council in some way, as a new report from the Council on Foreign Relations reflects.[8] India should certainly, therefore, continue to press its case.

Regardless of whether or not India gets a permanent seat on the Council, and indeed especially if it does, India must simultaneously work towards reforming the United Nations. The United Nations must have an efficient and capable bureaucracy, it must have the resources to carry on its work, and it must get past members pushing agendas solely on the basis of state interest. India can actively take the lead on the first two problems. It must commit to sending its best and brightest to serve in the international institution. And it must increase dramatically the amount of money it sends to support UN activities, must send forces and supporting materials to support UN missions, and must in other ways step up to assume a much greater share of the burden of maintaining this crucial international body.

Altering the nature of representation at the UN is by far the trickiest element of change, but it is also the most critical. There needs to be, as David Held has recently argued, "layered cosmopolitan perspectives" that account for local, regional, and national formations.[9] Thomas Weiss, the scholarly authority on the UN, has concluded that global government, as opposed to global governance, is the only way forward.[10] And so, we come full circle, and return to the wise foresight of Gandhi and Nehru.

How precisely one might build up global government in reforming the United Nations is not surprisingly a matter of some debate. Proposals include weighted voting schemes and the creation of a new, democratically elected global parliament.[11] India must examine these proposals carefully and take a stand in support of a plan that balances the voices of states with voices of people grouped together under a number of varied rubrics. Only by becoming more responsive and representative will the international institution live up to the dreams of its creators and the needs of our time.

An India that leads the way on human rights, climate control, and the fight against poverty and injustice, that assumes greater responsibility in and for the United Nations, that partners with the United States even as it partners with other countries around the world, and that tirelessly works to reform the UN will be an India that the world admires and respects. It will be at the forefront of the creation of a better tomorrow for all of earth's children. Nehru's words echo across the decades: "All this may seem fantastic and impractical in the modern world.... And yet we have seen repeatedly the

failure of other methods and nothing can be less practical than to pursue a method that has failed again and again."[12]

NOTES

1. This paper has benefited from conversations and correspondence with Jonathan Fanton, Jeffrey Sachs, Thomas Weiss, and Joseph Schwartzberg, and from the Fall 2010 Seminar on Human Rights and International Justice at Roosevelt House at Hunter College. I would also like to thank Keyne Cheshire and Sree Bhagavan for their comments.

2. For more details on India's early relations with the United Nations, its work on human rights, and the plan for world government, see Manu Bhagavan, *The Peacemaker: India and the Quest for One World*, forthcoming from HarperCollins India in December 2011. See also Manu Bhagavan, "A New Hope: India, the United Nations and the Making of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." *Modern Asian Studies,* 44(2), March 2010: 311-347; and Manu Bhagavan, "Princely States and the Making of Modern India: Internationalism, Constitutionalism and the Postcolonial Moment." *The Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 46(3), September 2009: 427-456.

3. China has made amazing strides recently, increasing energy efficiency by 20% in the last five years alone: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/09/china-improves-energyeff_n_805168.html. Last accessed 25 January 2011.

4. Indeed, recent research indicates that a 100% renewable energy economy is within reach, attainable as early as 2030 with enough political will: http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-01-percent-renewable-energy.html. Last accessed 25 January 2011.

5. http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/clean-water-at-no-cost-just-add-carbon-credits/?hp. Last accessed 15 December 2010.

6. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/05/magazine/05Plumpy-t.html?_r=2&hp. Last accessed 15 December 2010.

7. http://www2.ucar.edu/news/2251/indian-ocean-sea-level-rise-threatens-coastal-areas. Last accessed 15 December 2010.

8. Kara McDonald and Stewart M. Patrick, *U.N. Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests* (Council Special Report N. 59, U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, December 2010).

9. See Garrett Brown and David Held, *The Cosmopolitanism Reader* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010). For an important critique, see David Harvey, *Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). See also David Held, *Cosmopolitanism* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010).

10. Thomas Weiss, *What's Wrong with the United Nations (and How to Fix it)* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008).

11. See for instance Joseph Schwartzberg, *Revitalising the United Nations* (New York: Institute for Global Policy, 2004). Online at http://globalsolutions.org/files/public/documents/Schwartzberg Weighted Voting.pdf. Last accessed 16 December 2010. See also Schwartzberg's *Designs for a Workable World*, forthcoming. I am grateful to Prof. Schwartzberg for sharing some of the unpublished manuscript with me on very short notice.

12. Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* (Delhi: Government of India Publications, 1961), pp. 182-183.

India and United Nations Peacekeeping: A 2020 Perspective

Satish Nambiar

Introduction

The United Nations Organisation was conceived in London in 1941 as the successor to the League of Nations, which was perceived to have failed in its most important function, that of preventing a second world war. Twenty six countries that had been at war with Germany and Japan met in Washington on January 1, 1942, where they expressed their conviction that the anarchy of international relations must be controlled. The Charter of the United Nations, as signed in 1945, set out a code of behaviour for nations to eliminate aggression, and promote economic and social security. The central aim of the United Nations Charter is to "maintain international peace and security, and to that end, take collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression."

Chapter VI of the Charter on the peaceful pacific settlement of disputes obliges the parties to a dispute that is likely to endanger international peace and security, to seek a solution by "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." Chapter VII of the Charter confers powers on the Security Council to resort to the use of armed force, should the other measures fail, in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. Under this Chapter, member states are also required to provide armed forces and other assistance and facilities for the purpose. In pursuance of this latter provision, in April 1947, the Military Staff Committee (also provided for in this Chapter), apparently produced a report according to which the five permanent members would provide the bulk of the armed forces. But members of the committee were unable to agree on the size and location of such forces and the quantum of contribution, because of the degree of political mistrust that prevailed at the time. The military arrangements suggested in the Charter therefore never became reality, leaving the United Nations without the means of enforcement to achieve its central aim.

Concept and Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

During the early years of the United Nations, while the use of military personnel on a large scale, and under the exact terms of the Charter, was being discussed with diminishing prospects of agreement, their deployment—on a far smaller scale—evolved almost by accident. Small groups of unarmed military observers formed part of the United Nations missions in West Asia (UNTSO) and India/Pakistan in 1949. This became a regular feature of United Nations peacekeeping missions, and continues to this day, even in missions where armed military contingents are deployed.

It is not very widely known that there is no specific provision for peacekeeping in the United Nations Charter. It is an invention of the United Nations Secretary General and the Secretariat, and evolved as a non-coercive instrument of conflict control, at a time when Cold War constraints precluded the use of the more forceful steps permitted by the Charter. During the Cold War, neither of the two super powers was amenable to United Nations intervention against their allies or within their spheres of influence. Hence an improvisation—*peacekeeping without combat connotations*—emerged.

As it evolved over the years, peacekeeping became an extraordinary art that called for *the use of the military personnel not to wage war but to prevent fighting* between belligerents; to ensure the maintenance of ceasefires; and to provide a measure of stability in an area of conflict while negotiations were conducted. To that extent, it is important to distinguish between the concept of "collective security" and peacekeeping in the international environment. Whereas "collective security" is a punitive process designed to be carried out with some degree of discrimination, but not necessarily impartially, "peacekeeping" is politically impartial and essentially non-coercive. Hence peacekeeping was, and has always been, based on a triad of principles that give it legitimacy, as well as credibility, namely, consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality of the peacekeepers, and the use of force by lightly armed peacekeepers only in self-defence.

The premise on which international peacekeeping is based is that violence in inter-state and intra-state conflict can be controlled without resort to the use of force or enforcement measures. Needless to say, there are many theorists, and one may dare say, a few practitioners, who are of the view that force needs to be met with force. An objective analysis of the history of conflicts would probably reveal that the use of force and enforcement measures, particularly in internal conflicts, tend to prolong the conflict rather than resolve it speedily. This is not, however, to suggest that the use of force is to be ruled out altogether; in certain circumstances, use of force may well be a catalyst for peaceful resolution. A quote attributed to Al Capone the notorious Chicago gangster (in the early 20th century) is probably appropriate

in this context—"You can get a lot more done with a kind word and a gun in your hand, than with a kind word alone."

Cold War Era

In the first 45 years of the existence of the United Nations, there were many significant instances where peacekeeping was not used for conflict resolution. In super power confrontations like the Berlin blockade and the Cuban missile crises, the United Nations had only a peripheral role as also in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and some Latin American conflicts. West European nations did not allow any significant role to the United Nations in conflict zones like Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom and Iceland over fishing rights, and the Falklands war. Similarly, the United Nations was excluded from a role in a number of conflict situations in Asia and Africa. The Chinese occupation of Tibet, the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet border conflicts, the war in Indo-China, the Vietnamese action in Kampuchea, the Chinese action against Vietnam, and the conflict in the Horn of Africa. Notwithstanding these exclusions, United Nations peacekeeping operations covered various corners of the globe in furtherance of one of the primary purposes of the United Nations Charter, namely, maintenance of international peace and security.

Post-Cold War Era

With the end of the Cold War, United Nations activities in the maintenance of international peace and security increased considerably, the impact being both quantitative and qualitative. There was a brief period of retrenchment in the latter half of the 1990s due to perceived inadequacies in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Even so, as of January 31, 2011, the United Nations had mounted 64 peacekeeping operations; of these, 13 were undertaken in the 40 years between 1948 and 1988 when UN peacekeepers were the awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and the other 51 have been mounted since. In January 1988, 11,121 military, police and civilian personnel were deployed in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the annual budget for peacekeeping was $230.4 million. In September 1994, at the height of the United Nations peacekeeping commitment in the 20th century, 78,111 personnel were deployed and the annual budget was $3.6 billion. The numbers declined thereafter but started going up again at the beginning of the 21st century. As of January 31, 2011 the total number of military personnel and civilian police monitors deployed was 98,582; the total deployment including civilian staff (international, local and volunteers) is 120,160 in 14 peacekeeping operations. The corresponding figures for the number of countries contributing contingents showed an increase from 26 in January 1988 to 74 in 1994 and which then went down to 37. With the revival in commitment, the number of troop contributing countries now stands at 115. The budget for the period July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2011 is $7.83 billion.

The qualitative change is even more important, in that most of the recent conflicts have taken place, or are taking place, within states, or between elements that were part of unitary states till they began to fall apart. They have not always been fought by national armies, but by para-militaries and irregulars, in which process, civilians have been the main victims (90 per cent today as against 10 per cent two decades or so ago). In many cases, state institutions have collapsed; in a few cases, there are no governments. As a result, humanitarian emergencies have forced the international community to intervene. This is why the demands on United Nations peacekeeping have gone well beyond traditional peacekeeping. They now encompass activities like demobilisation of troops and armed para-militaries or irregulars, promotion of national reconciliation, restoration of effective governments, the organisation and monitoring of elections, provision of broader support to humanitarian aid missions, including protection of "safe areas" and escort of relief convoys, and so on. The focus in the last few years is increasingly on 'protection of civilians' in the mission areas. United Nations peacekeeping operations have therefore become more expensive, more complex, and more dangerous.

India's Participation

In the 66 year history of the United Nations as an organisation, peacekeeping operations have attracted maximum attention, primarily because conflicts make dramatic news and the deployment of an international military force by the Security Council to preserve a fragile peace makes a good story that can capture public interest in this electronic age. Of course, the publicity generated by its peacekeeping activities in the past had, for the most part, been beneficial, especially in times when the Organisation did not otherwise enjoy public confidence or credibility. In recent years, particularly since the deployment of United Nations forces in some intra-state conflicts where there have been perceived inadequacies, even peacekeeping operations have drawn considerable adverse comment. However, India can take pride in the fact that even in the context of such adverse comment on United Nations peacekeeping operations the Indian commitment has been hailed as remarkable for its successful conduct and execution.

As one of the founding members of the United Nations, India's contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security has been second to none. In no other field of activity has this been manifested more than in United Nations peace operations commencing with our participation in the operations in Korea in 1950. The United Nations operation in Korea, led by the USA, was a major military undertaking. India participated militarily with a medical unit comprising 17 officers, 9 junior commissioned officers, and 300 other ranks. We then provided a Custodian Force of 231 officers, 203 junior commissioned officers, and 5696 other ranks under the

command of Major General (later Lieutenant General) SPP Thorat for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission of which the Chairman was Lieutenant General (later General) KS Thimayya. India also contributed significantly to the Indo-China Supervisory Commission deployed in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam from 1954 to 1970; a medical detachment from 1964 to 1968, and 970 officers, 140 junior commissioned officers and 6157 other ranks over the period 1954 to 1970.

The use of armed military contingents was first authorised by the United Nations Security Council for deployment with the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1) in the Gaza Strip and Sinai after the Arab-Israeli war in 1956. From November 15, 1956 to May 19, 1967, eleven infantry battalions from India successively served with this force. A total of 393 officers, 409 junior commissioned officers, and 12,393 other ranks in all. Major General (later Lieutenant General) PS Gyani and Brigadier (later Major General) IJ Rikhye were force commanders in this operation. This operation became a model for many subsequent peacekeeping operations. The success of UNEF 1 apparently led the Security Council to readily accept a request by the Congo in 1960 for intervention on attaining independence from Belgium. The United Nations accepted responsibility for ending secession and re-unifying the country. The rules of engagement were modified to cater for use of force in defence of the mandate, in carrying out humanitarian tasks, and in countering mercenaries. India's contribution to this operation was not only substantial, but most vital. Between July 14, 1960 and June 30, 1964, two Indian brigades comprising a total of 467 officers, 404 junior commissioned officers, and 11,354 other ranks participated. Thirty-six Indian personnel lost their lives in the operation, and 124 were wounded; Captain GS Salaria of the 3rd Battalion the 1st Gorkha Rifles was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra.

The United Nations operations in Cyprus, launched in 1964, saw three Indian force commanders, Lieutenant General PS Gyani, General KS Thimayya, who died in harness on December 18, 1965, and Major General Diwan Prem Chand. Major General (later Lieutenant General) Prem Chand also distinguished himself as the force commander in the United Nations operations in Namibia in 1989, which oversaw that country's transition to independence.

In recent years, India has provided commanders, military observers and staff officers to many of the United Nations missions deployed to keep the peace in various parts of the world—in Iran and Iraq in 1988/90 after the bloody conflict in the region; on the Iraqi-Kuwait border after the Gulf War in 1991; Angola in 1989/91, and again in 1995/99; Central America in 1990/ 92; El Salvador in 1991; Liberia in 1993; Rwanda in 1994/96; Sierra Leone in 1998/2001; Lebanon from 1998 to date; Ethiopia-Eritrea in 2001/2009; the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1999 to date; Cote d'Ivoire from 2003 to date; Burundi in 2003/2006; Sudan from 2005 to date; and the Golan

Heights from 2006 to date. India has also provided police personnel for a number of United Nations missions, as in Namibia, Western Sahara, Cambodia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Congo, Liberia (where it has created history by providing an all-woman formed police unit) and the Sudan.

In addition, sizeable military contingents were made available for the United Nations operations in Cambodia in 1992/93 (a total of 2550 all ranks in two successive battalion groups); in Mozambique in 1992/93 (a total of about 1000 all ranks); Somalia in 1993/94 (a brigade group totalling about 5000 all ranks); Angola in 1995 (a battalion group and an engineer company totalling over 1000 all ranks); Rwanda in 1994/95 (a total of about 800 all ranks); in Sierra Leone in 2000/2001 (a brigade size contingent comprising 131 officers, 163 JCOs and 2613 other ranks together with 14 military observers and 31 staff officers); and in Ethiopia-Eritrea in 2001/2009 (a battalion group). It may also be relevant to mention that in so far as the former Yugoslavia is concerned, the government of India had, at the request of the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, deputed me as the first force commander and head of mission, in which capacity I set up the operation and commanded it from March 3, 1992 to March 2, 1993. For many years since the early 1990s India was the top contributor of military and police personnel for UN peacekeeping operations. We are today, however, in third position after Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Current Commitment

The current deployment of 8680 personnel as on 31 January 2011 reflects the commitment of troops, military observers and staff officers and civilian police from India in 9 of the 14 United Nations missions now in operation. It includes the force commander in MONUSCO in the Congo with a brigade group contingent together with an Indian Air Force team manning attack helicopters, a number of military observers, staff officers and police personnel—a total of 4217. A brigade group together with an Indian Air Force team manning utility helicopters, military observers, staff officers and police personnel is deployed with UNMIS in Southern Sudan—a total of 2514. A battalion group comprising 899 military personnel with UNIFIL in Lebanon, and a contingent of 190 military personnel with UNDOF in the Golan Heights. Military observers and/or civilian police personnel are serving with MINURSO in Western Sahara, UNFICYP in Cyprus, UNMIT in Timor Leste, and UNOCI in Cote d'Ivoire. At present, Atul Khare a career diplomat from the IFS is Assistant Secretary General and Major General Guha is Deputy Military Adviser in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York, as also are a couple of staff officers.

Impact of Participation

India's spontaneous and unreserved participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations over the years has been a clear reflection of the country's commitment to the objectives set out in the United Nations Charter. Not in terms of rhetoric and symbolism, but in real and practical terms, even to the extent of accepting taking casualties (130 fatalities to date). This commitment has been acknowledged by the international community, successive Secretaries General and the United Nations Secretariat. But even more significantly, the effectiveness of such participation and commitment to United Nations peacekeeping efforts has drawn respect and praise from fellow professionals of other countries and many others that have served jointly with our commanders, observers, police monitors and contingents, in various parts of the world. Hence, the image of the Indian armed forces and police in the international arena is that of highly competent, professional, and well-trained forces.

It is important to emphasise that much of our participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations is also related to national security interests. Our participation in the Korean and Cambodian operations was a reflection of our stake in the stability of East and South East Asia. Our vital interests in West Asia, both in terms of our energy requirements and our historical connections, have been more than adequately reflected in our participation in the United Nations peacekeeping operations undertaken in the Gaza Strip and Sinai, the Golan Heights, Iran/Iraq, Iraq/Kuwait, Lebanon and Yemen. Our geo-strategic interests in the stability and well being of the newly emerged states of Africa have been under-scored by our contributions and participation in the operations in the Congo, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia/Eritrea, Sudan, Burundi, and Cote d'Ivoire. It is important to record here that uniformed personnel from India have participated in every peacekeeping operation undertaken by the United Nations in Africa.

Challenges into the 21ˢᵗ Century

The Global Scenario

The international system is passing through a decisive stage in recent history. Though the threat of war between great states or nuclear confrontation between major powers is well behind us and in fact fast fading from our consciousness, new and diverse threats, some clear and present, others only dimly perceived, will test our resolve and question the validity of existing mechanisms. Developments at the international level over the last eight years exposed deep divisions within the United Nations over fundamental policies on peace and security. There have been several debates on how best to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and combat the spread of

international terrorism; the criteria for the use of force and the role of the Security Council; the effectiveness of unilateral versus multilateral responses to security; the notion of preventive war; and the place of the United Nations in a world that has been dominated for some time by a single super power.

These debates follow several years of agonising debate on issues of no less importance, such as our collective response to civil wars; the effectiveness of existing mechanisms in dealing with genocide; so-called ethnic cleansing and other severe violations of human rights; changing notions of state sovereignty; and the need to balance the challenges of peace and the challenges of development. There is little doubt that the restructuring and institutional reform of the UN machinery and its organs to meet the new challenges need to be undertaken without further delay. Changes are required not merely in the functioning of the UN Secretariat and other such administrative details but changes need to focus on the world body's character and ethos.

There is a unanimous view that meeting the challenges of today's threats means getting serious about prevention. Preventing wars between states and within them is in the collective interest of all of us. If the international community is to do better in the future in this context, the UN will need real improvements in its capacity for preventive diplomacy, mediation and conflict management. In this context, the mechanism of preventive deployment is without doubt a most useful tool which unfortunately is not used often enough due to lack of agreement among the major powers. Even so there can be little argument that prevention sometimes fails. And when that happens, threats will have to be met by military means. The UN Charter provides a clear framework for the use of force. States have an inherent right to self-defence, enshrined in Article 51. Long-established international law makes it clear that states can take military action when the threatened attack is imminent and no other means would deflect it, and the action is proportionate. Equally, Chapter VII of the UN Charter gives the international community, represented by the Security Council, the authority to deal with situations where military force needs to be applied against an errant state that resorts to aggression against another member state. On the preventive use of military force by member states to deal with not-so-imminent threats, there is clearly a view that states that fear the emergence of distant threats have an obligation to bring such concerns to the notice of the Security Council for appropriate action. And there is general acceptance that on this specific aspect, the Security Council would need to be more pro-active than before. The use of force should however only be considered after all other options have been exhausted. And the fact that force can be legally used does not always mean that it should be used.

The responsibility of the international community to protect innocent civilians who are victims of genocide is a sensitive issue. State sovereignty is

still a very important issue for most developing countries that have emerged from colonial rule not too long ago. In fact notwithstanding all the developments at the global level, the concept of state sovereignty remains at the root of the international system. Even so, there appears to be some consensus that in the 21st century such sovereignty cannot be absolute. The emerging norm of a collective responsibility to protect civilians from large-scale violence has been endorsed by the international community—a responsibility that lies first and foremost with national authorities. When a state fails to protect its civilians or is incapable of doing so, the international community would appear to have a responsibility to act, through humanitarian operations, monitoring missions, diplomatic pressure, and with force if necessary as a very last resort. The reality of course, is that the international community remains largely indifferent unless the vital interest of one or more of the important players is directly affected. Even when there is consensus that force has to be applied resources are not always readily available or forthcoming.

The Challenge for India

Notwithstanding the internal challenges faced by India and the imperative need to focus primarily on economic growth and the well-being of its citizens who have not yet begun to benefit from that growth, it would be prudent for the governing establishment and the strategic community in the country to dwell on the fact that within the international setting in the first half of the 21st century and probably beyond, India will have a significant role to play—both regionally and globally. A role imposed on us by a number of factors: the size of the country; its geo-strategic location straddling the Indian Ocean; the population of over a billion people with a demographic dividend in its favour; its established democratic credentials; a significant capability in information technology; a large reservoir of scientific talent including in space technology; acknowledged management expertise; proven military capability; and the large market for consumer goods and services. We cannot and must not shy away from this serious responsibility.

Internationally, too, most countries, including major players like the USA, European Union, Russia, Japan, and also possibly some of the regional organisations would, undoubtedly, like to see India play a more active role in promoting democratic values and contributing to stability in the region. Primarily because of the perception that India has the ability to do so, as also because the major powers may not wish to get directly involved in many cases. The only factor that could inhibit the Indian establishment in developing the appropriate military capability to support such a role is perhaps the inability to build a national consensus in this regard.

This presentation cannot discuss India's military force preparedness and operational posture to deal with the possible threats within the complete

spectrum of warfare in the 21st century. It may however be fair to state that if we can get our political, economic and diplomatic acts together in the years to come, and develop a credible defence capability in the three conventional dimensions of warfare, namely, maritime, air space and land forces, the fourth dimension of cyber space, and in the nuclear dimension, we should be able to avoid being drawn into a military conflict by either of our current adversaries or any future ones. There can be little argument that our military capability must be demonstrably built up to the extent of being able to deal with external aggression through the application of conventional forces, limited or otherwise, and strategic nuclear capability if required. The internal situation being what it is, the armed forces will continue to be engaged in managing insurgencies and terrorism in the Northeast and in Jammu & Kashmir. There may well be demands for deploying the military to deal with the problem of left wing extremism; one would however hope that the country's political and military leadership will have the courage and wisdom to resist such involvement as the problem basically relates to governance and policing.

In the immediate neighbourhood, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are all affected by conflict or latent conflict situations that pose a threat to regional peace and security. In the extended region we have the dangers posed to international shipping in trade and energy supplies by piracy off the Gulf of Aden and similar activities around the Straits of Malacca. The current volatile situation in West Asia and North Africa where peoples' movements are shaking long entrenched autocratic regimes, and the tensions over possible moves for acquisition of nuclear capability by Iran, are factors that could contribute to regional instability. Within Africa, notwithstanding all the efforts of the African Union, the continent is plagued by religious, ethnic and tribal conflicts that continue to destabilise many of the countries on the continent.

Given India's growing stature and established expertise and military capability, there is little doubt that we will be called upon by the international community to deal with situations that pose a threat to international peace and security. This could be asked of us by the United Nations for peacekeeping operations, which notwithstanding the limitations posed by the lack of commitment of the developed world to this activity, we are well equipped to undertake. We should continue to contribute to UN peace operations, demand greater participation in the decision making process, including the framing of mandates to missions, and an equitable share in the contracts awarded for the equipping and maintenance of UN missions.

Equally in the current global environment demands may well be placed on India by regional organisations under the aegis of UN resolutions, or by our neighbours on a bilateral or multilateral basis. This could involve the deployment of our military, together with others in a multi-national force,

and possibly taking a lead role, for dealing with what are perceived as threats to regional or international peace and security. This is an aspect that we need to start deliberating on and devoting attention to and to study in detail and evolve a concept for command and control; coordination; operational compatibility, etc together with other like minded countries in the region and beyond.

If India is to play its destined role in regional affairs and be taken seriously at the global level, Indian diplomacy will need to move into high gear, taking into account the fact that in the conduct of foreign policy, there is no place for righteousness and moral posturing; it is to be guided solely by sovereign national interests. In the immediate region, it may be useful to get off the high moral pedestal we have placed ourselves on, shed the patronising approach we seem to have mastered over the years, and evolve mutually acceptable working relationships with our neighbours. There is no gainsaying the fact that India has a vital stake in the developments in its immediate turbulent neighbourhood. Instability and social upheaval will have inevitable adverse "spill-over" effects that will create security problems for us and generate greater stress within our society which is already somewhat traumatised by the terrorist attacks that are repeatedly taking place, orchestrated as they seem to be, by groups based in Pakistan with significant support from some sections of the Pakistani establishment including the Pakistan Army and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).

While there is little doubt that we need to factor in the sensitivities of our neighbours into whatever capabilities we endeavour to develop in the military field, it should be made clear that India would be willing to use its economic and military pre-eminence in pursuance of its supreme national interests, and for the maintenance of peace and security in the region. Conveying such a message will take some effort because we have to first overcome the current lack of credibility regarding our determination to act decisively in pursuit of national security interests. Not too many countries take us seriously, since in the recent past we have invariably indulged more in rhetoric than in action. In this context it may be useful to draw attention to, and take appropriate lessons from the Hyderabad police action immediately after Independence; liberation of the Portuguese held territories of Goa, Daman and Diu in 1960; taking the war across the international border in Punjab and Rajasthan during the 1965 operations on the sub-continent; the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971; the Indian Peacekeeping Force deployment in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s; the operations in support of the government in the Maldives in 1989; Kargil in 1999; and Operation Parakram in 2001.

Creating a Rapid Reaction Capability

In this specific context there is a compelling case for India to develop and maintain a sizeable dedicated rapid reaction force for intervention,

stabilisation or peace operations within the region or beyond; organised, trained, equipped and located appropriately, and under the strategic direction of New Delhi. Needless to say, such a force would also be available for use as additional operational reserves if and when India is forced into war and would also be available for disaster relief situations nationally and regionally. Given the type of regional or global commitments the force may be required to undertake, such a force needs to be multi-dimensional and include the Army, Navy and Air Force, as well as elements from the coast guard, civil affairs officers, civilian police components, personnel trained in human rights aspects, legal affairs personnel and representatives from the diplomatic corps.

It would seem that it is time for the national security apparatus in India to dwell on the desirability of setting up a *Rapid Reaction Task Force*. A possible basis for discussion on such a force should comprise:

- A tri-service corps sized headquarters.
- A land forces component to include an airborne brigade, and a light armoured or mechanised division comprising an air transportable armoured brigade equipped with light tanks and infantry combat vehicles, an amphibious brigade and an air transportable infantry brigade. It should also include army aviation, assault engineers, communication and logistics elements.
- A naval component that should ideally include an aircraft carrier, appropriate surface and sub-surface craft and aerial maritime capability.
- An Air Force component that includes strike aircraft, helicopters and strategic airlift capability.
- A special forces component.
- The civilian component should include diplomatic representatives, civil affairs personnel, civilian police, human rights personnel, etc.

Merit in this suggestion lies in the demands being placed on India to provide troops for UN peacekeeping, and requests that have been made from time to time in the recent past, for us to participate in multi-national military operations.

While the formation of such a Task Force may take its time, it may be useful to set up a nucleus by drawing on existing assets. This can be more than justified from the operational capability point of view given the volatile situation in the neighbourhood, and the possibility that the Indian armed forces may be called upon to act unilaterally in pursuance of our national interests, or to assist in a bilateral context at the request of our neighbours. The sooner we commence work on this, the better.

Cooperation and Coordination

Together with such moves, it is important that we work on a number of

other measures in cooperation with regional and global players. It would be useful for joint working groups comprising diplomats and selected military personnel to interact at the global level at multilateral forums like the United Nations and with organisations like NATO and the AU, to share perceptions about coordination and training, exchange of data on trouble spots on a regular basis, etc. At the regional level, similar moves should be initiated to secure understanding and cooperation from organisations like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), etc. Needless to say, it would be good if similar moves could be initiated within the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), but that may pose some difficulty because of the stand-off with Pakistan. It would be most useful to organise events like the symposium held a few years back by the Indian Navy for Chiefs of the Indian Ocean littoral states. Similar meetings, seminars, symposiums and conferences could be held to discuss the scope and extent of cooperation with like minded countries including the USA, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, Gulf countries like Qatar and Oman, Russia and the Central Asian republics.

While the training of our own personnel from the three services and other components of such a task force should receive focused attention to achieve joint-ness, it is also essential that commanders and staff officers are gradually exposed to operating with their counterparts from other countries either bilaterally or at multilateral forums in order to foster better cooperation and coordination. Equally if not more importantly, training of senior military leadership must focus on the nuances of multi-national operations, particularly in the context of the possibility of India being asked to assume a leadership role. The need to adjust to a "consultative" style of leadership, and paying increased attention to aspects of coordination and liaison at headquarters will need to be understood, as also the methodology to be adopted for assimilating staff officers and sub-ordinate commanders within the system. In this context it would be useful to draw on the experiences of countries like the USA and Russia, and groupings like the EU, NATO, ARF, AU, SCO, etc.

Finally, it may be useful to examine and discuss the desirability or otherwise, and the extent and scope to which, China should be drawn into such moves. This could be discreetly discussed with strategic partners like the USA, Japan, EU and Russia. In so doing we not only would be preparing ourselves for assuming a greater role in the maintenance of international peace and security at the global and regional level but also effectively conveying a seriousness of purpose.

Considerations Specific to UN Peacekeeping

In preparing ourselves for participation in United Nations peacekeeping

operations in the future, it would be appropriate to take stock of the changes that have taken place in the environment in which such operations are being increasingly mounted in recent years, and the manner in which they are being executed. We must take into account the radical change in the nature of the peacekeeping commitment. United Nations peacekeepers are increasingly being sent to regions where civil-war type situations prevail; where there are no agreements, or if there are, these are rather tenuous, or broken without compunction; where the consent or cooperation of the belligerent parties cannot be relied upon; where constitutional authority does not exist in many cases, or if it does, it has limited authority. In such situations, today's peacekeepers are not only required to keep the warring parties apart to the extent they can, but are increasingly called upon to safeguard humanitarian relief operations, monitor human rights violations, assist in mine clearance, monitor state boundaries or borders, provide civilian police support, assist in rebuilding logistics infra-structure like roads, railways, bridges, and to support electoral processes. The Indian Army has practical experience in many of these areas based on the conduct of counter insurgency operations in North East India (Nagaland, Mizoram, Tripura, Manipur and Assam), Jammu and Kashmir (since 1989), and the Punjab, thus giving our forces a marked advantage over most other forces from other parts of the world. This was more than amply demonstrated by the performance of our contingents in Cambodia, Somalia, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda and Sierra Leone and continues to be demonstrated by the contingents deployed in the Lebanon and Ethiopia/Eritrea.

It was to exploit our expertise and experience in this arena that a Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping was set up in September 2000 under the aegis of the United Service Institution of India in New Delhi. This centre, besides overseeing the training of contingents designated for UN peacekeeping operations conducts training courses for our sub-unit commanders, military observers, officers and police personnel. These courses are also being attended by officers from a number of friendly foreign countries. In addition, the Centre conducts national and international seminars and conferences on the subject of peacekeeping. As it matures, the Centre will also become a repository of our experiences in United Nations peacekeeping.

CHAPTER 23

Energy in India's National Security Strategy

Devika Sharma

> *Navigation and game playing required a tactical intelligence that in ancient Greece was known as metis, literally "informed prudence". Metis implied "a complex but very coherent body of mental attitudes and intellectual behaviour which combine flair, wisdom, forethought, subtlety of mind, deception, resourcefulness, vigilance, opportunism, various skills and experience acquired over the years. It applied to situations which are transient, shifting, disconcerting and ambiguous, situations which do not lend themselves to precise measurement, exact calculation or rigorous logic.*
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> —*Tuathail and Toal* 1994: 267

Introduction

Without adequate and affordable energy to underpin the economic growth of a country, its sustenance and indeed its very survival is at risk. Given the fact that energy is simultaneously (either implicitly or explicitly) linked to maintaining social cohesion, the economic well-being of a country and the military might of a state, it is considered to be the *sine qua non* of national security. To that extent therefore, all states, whether developed or developing, rising or declining, energy producing/exporting or energy importing, need energy to survive. Energy therefore is an incredibly important component of national security, understood here both in the traditional and non-traditional sense, where the state and the individual are referents, respectively. However, beyond the fact that energy matters to all states alike in the international system, there are glaring differences in how and when energy becomes a grave security concern for states; what aspect of energy is of more relevance and hence of concern to states; and the strategies that states have at their disposal to manage their energy-related insecurities. These differences largely depend on the resources and capabilities states have at their disposal to address their energy security concerns.

Before we analyse the role of energy in India's national security strategy

and whether it is possible at all to say India has a 'national' strategy on energy, the paper will highlight the fundamental characteristics that make energy a peculiar policy arena for states as they devise and implement strategies to address their energy security concerns. This general discussion is necessary and pertinent before we can attempt to distinguish and locate India's strategy to ensure its energy security—the issue outlined in the second section. The fact that India does not have an explicitly stated, discernible, comprehensive and cohesive national security strategy on energy does not mean that it does not follow certain principles and priorities when it comes to addressing its energy security concerns. To this end therefore, it becomes necessary to identify the various actors involved in delineating the main principles of the country's national security strategy on energy. Secondly, this section will also highlight what the main precepts of India's energy security strategy are, as gleaned from the various policy documents and pronouncements and measures taken by the government. In the third section, the paper will end with identifying the areas that demand greater attention from policymakers. The absence of a cohesive energy strategy raises concerns of its own. The problems arise particularly because energy, being a multidimensional policy arena, requires a holistic and long-term strategy.

I. Energy: Timing, Context, and Security

Energy Security: A 'Common but Differentiated' Concern

Although energy is a concern for all countries alike, the degree to which energy becomes a vital component or even a determinant of a country's national security strategy is a result of other influencing factors. Not least important amongst these 'other influencing factors' is domestic resource endowment. Energy concerns become a security threat primarily when countries cannot or can no longer meet their increasing demand for energy (to fuel economic growth as well as ensure a basic standard of living to their people) domestically (that is, independently), or when they have to depend on other countries for energy resources or the technology to be able to make use of available resources.[1] Therefore, energy becomes a security concern for countries when they do not have access to sufficient energy resources at affordable prices. For energy-importing countries therefore, the loss of independence (of being able to rely on their own resources) is perhaps the first sign of energy becoming a national security concern.

Access to markets (for energy suppliers) and sources (for importers) is only one part of the energy security dilemma. Affordability too is a particularly important aspect of energy security; although again the degree to which it is a security concern for a country depends on the financial ability of the country to access resources at higher prices or opt for alternative sources of energy that imply higher investment/technology costs. Countries with the

wherewithal can bankroll access to energy at comparatively higher costs than countries that are poorer and developing. Nonetheless, the pinch of the high price of energy resources (for example the spike in oil prices in 2009) is felt by almost all energy-importing countries alike. Affordability also determines the extent to which countries have the room to manoeuvre when it comes to choosing between sources of energy. Thus, rather than being only a simple financial consideration, 'affordability' also implies the relative 'ease' with which countries can make the choices they make. That is, countries naturally have to factor into their calculations of 'affordability' not only the comparatively higher prices of renewable energy technologies, or the rising price of oil, but also other costs that make certain choices more 'costly', such as international pressure to cut-back on dirty fossil fuels, domestic and international pressure against going nuclear, civil society activism against big hydropower projects and so on.

Differences in the degree of energy insecurity experienced by countries is to a great extent inherent in the very nature of resource distribution in the world. Given that energy resources are disproportionately apportioned in the world, availability and consumption patterns are rarely co-terminus. As a result, centres of demand are distinct from centres of supply; hence creating what is baldly perceived as a hierarchy of power relations; with energy-rich and exporting countries at the top, transit countries in the middle and energy-deficient and importing countries at the bottom. Another reason for the differences in levels of energy security in the world can be grasped from the financial capability of countries to bankroll access to resources at higher prices, further away, or alternative sources of energy that are comparatively costlier than fossil fuels.

Therefore, although energy is a concern for all countries in the international system, the extent to which energy is a security concern depends on assured supplies (both domestic and overseas) to meet demand or the financial capability to look for alternative sources—if not seek energy independence. This would seem to suggest that energy, given its fungibility, is closely linked to power in the international system. To the extent that energy is critical to not only economic wealth, but also military prowess, energy security can be seen as an important element of state power. However, the linkage between energy and power requires closer study and analysis; an issue we turn to next.

Energising Power in the International System

Maintaining economic growth rates and projecting power without requisite supplies of energy is a serious issue for all countries, particularly for resource deficient countries with rising or high demand. While it is clear that energy is a critical component of state power, there are few studies on the role of energy in the rise and fall of powers in the international system.[2] Interestingly,

in the context of the rising power of China and India, there are several studies/reports that highlight the potential for conflict or competition between the two countries as well as between India and China vis-a-vis the main energy-consuming countries of the developed world (See for example Klare 2001, 2008; Ebel and Menon 2000; Moran and Russell 2009). As countries make efforts to secure energy resources and transit/transportation routes (either countries or sea lines of communication [SLOCs]), they are more and more likely to brush up against each other, given that there are only a handful of countries that have exportable surpluses of energy resources. This is as true for oil and natural gas as much as it is for uranium and rare earth minerals that are important for renewable energy technologies.

Energy therefore is a very useful arena to analyse whether the emergence of new powers in the international system can upset the prevailing balance of power (read: access to energy resources) and/or create potential for conflict.[3] If those who portend that energy geopolitics is essentially zero-sum or conflictual are to be believed, then energy can be seen as a factor that affects power balances in the international system. If we agree that the military and economic power equations that exist between the major powers of the international system depend on the predictability and security of access to energy resources in the world, then the emergence of new powers would naturally imply more pressure on resources that are geo-physically limited in nature. In the short to medium term, the ability of the great and rising powers of the international system to secure sources and routes to energy resources in the world would be competitive, if not conflictual, and would mean a reformulation (and not necessarily a long-term change or shift) of power equations in the world.[4] However, this understanding of energy relations and power equations in the world fails to take cognizance of critical features that are specific to the energy sector: features that are elaborated below.

Co-dependence

For countries that are dependent on energy imports, particularly in the short to medium term (until they push for alternatives that give them more energy independence mostly possible in the medium to long term), ensuring security is not achievable independently of energy exporting or transit countries.[5] What this means is that the notion of power and security in a realist sense is not possible, particularly in the context of energy, that is, through self-help means.[6] Countries need to depend on energy-rich countries for their security. Undoubtedly, emerging and great powers alike seek to secure energy resources by bringing into their strategic fold important energy-rich countries, either through mutually beneficial trade relations or military partnerships. However, energy-rich countries that are trading partners of emerging or great powers in the international system would wield a certain degree of influence

over the latter, given the competitive nature of demand and supply. For example, Russia can threaten the energy security of its Western European buyers if the geopolitical equations between Russia and its Eastern European neighours sour, as in the case of Ukraine in 2009;[7] or America's fear of resource nationalism in Venezuela;[8] even though Saudi Arabia is a key partner of the US, because Saudi Arabia is also a member of OPEC, it is constrained by OPEC decisions to cut production (in order to raise prices) rather than its strategic interests in maintaining close military relations with the US.[9] Similarly, countries that are important for transit (between energy producing and importing countries) can also leverage their power, even though they are merely conduits. As India is learning, good relations in the neighbourhood are critical for the success of gas pipeline projects that have been in the pipeline for long, namely the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) and Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipelines. Therefore, in order to achieve self-sufficiency in terms of energy needs, countries, particularly energy-importing countries, must build mutual stakes that are attractive and beneficial for long-term energy security.

Securing Demand for Energy

Although energy producing and transit countries appear to be more powerful in the international system, it is necessary to ask whether this is indeed so. From the above-mentioned examples, and the simple fact that demand is continuously falling short of supply as new emerging powers, such as China and India, join the market, it would seem that energy-rich countries can play a particularly powerful role in the international system. The reality however is far more complicated than this simplistic inference would have us believe. Notwithstanding the 'resource curse' that several analysts suggest afflicts resource-rich countries, there is another basic reason why energy-rich countries are not and indeed have not been also the most powerful states in the international system.[10] That is, that although energy-deficient and importing countries are definitely in a comparatively dire situation, the fact of the matter is that even energy exporting countries need stable demand. This therefore highlights the need to broaden our understanding of energy security from one that focuses on supply for energy importing countries, to one that also includes the concern of energy-rich countries as well their stake, albeit less 'dire', in ensuring that demand and supply complementarities remain intact. It is only in this light that the following developments can be read. For example, although Russia can threaten to use its energy supplies as a political tool, it is also interested in ensuring that it can export its energy supplies to its importing partners. The fact that bad relations with transit countries (See *The Economist* 2010) could seriously hamper delivery to end markets can be seen as the motivating factor behind Russia's interest to look eastwards. In December 2009, Russia decided to launch the Eastern Siberia-

Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline to capture markets in Asia (hitherto, Russia's pipeline infrastructure was directed westwards—to Europe). The steep drop in oil prices in 2009 (as well as the world financial crisis) intensified Russia's economic troubles, which in turn led to country-wide demonstrations. During the months when oil prices were on a steady rise, it was not only energy-dependent and importing countries that were concerned, but also OPEC countries who were worried about a possible beginning of a shift from fossil fuel imports by key energy-importing countries of the world. Other countries such as the UAE are taking steps to be ready for a world keen on getting off its 'oil addiction'. Dubai for instance has introduced a subsidy for solar panels, in an attempt to expand its oil exports in the future, while at the same time cutting down its own use of hydrocarbons.

What the foregoing analyses and examples seek to highlight is the fact that the link between energy and state power is often not linear or direct. On the one hand, particularly in the short to medium term, energy-rich countries would continue to wield a certain degree of influence over both the great powers of the international system, as well as the emerging powers. Indeed, the greater and diversified the demand for energy, the more influence and power the energy-rich countries acquire. However, this does not mean that being rich in energy resources is a corollary of power in the international system. A trade logic that is built on demand and supply complementarities often trumps energy geopolitics where energy is seen as merely a power game and a zero-sum affair. Also, the importance of transit (between suppliers and consumers) gives transit countries greater importance in the pecking order. What this therefore means is that energy exerts a distinct kind of logic on countries that does not necessarily correspond to a realist understanding of international relations and power equations.

The Multidimensionality of Energy Security

A fact already alluded to above is that energy security is simultaneously a concern for energy importing countries as well as energy exporting countries. The nature of energy resource endowment in the world necessitates a reciprocity that ties together countries that are major consumers and producers. However, energy security is more than just about managing the demand-supply dynamic or energy trade between nations. It is a muddier arena, primarily due to the various levels at which energy security can be and must be addressed, as well as the multiple constraints and pressures countries have to increasingly work within.

Energy security is addressed not merely by managing import dependency and ensuring the security of demand and supply. In reality, countries attempt to address their energy needs in multiple ways at multiple levels. Because energy resources are not unlimited in supply—energy at comparatively cheaper rates is definitely not unlimited in supply—countries need to manage

their demand in a much more efficient and rational manner. Therefore, addressing energy security is equally about putting in place effective domestic regulations and frameworks as it is about energy diplomacy. Furthermore, it is increasingly important for countries to make sure that the two aspects of their energy securing strategy connect with each other. That is, a decision to expand nuclear energy is not only about sourcing uranium and inking civil nuclear energy deals with leading nuclear energy countries, but equally about putting in place a financial plan that apportions priority to nuclear energy infrastructure and mining efforts; a regulatory framework to allow greater foreign and private sector participation and a grievance redressal mechanism that is capable of addressing the consequences of going nuclear in a bigger way.[11] Bringing in energy efficiencies is also an important aspect of reducing losses and making the economy less energy intensive. Similarly, countries have also been keen on building strategic petroleum reserves so that they are not exposed to sudden supply disruptions in international markets.[12]

Increasingly, countries are also working within an environment in which there are multiple constraints and pressures that add to the 'cost' of their energy choices.[13] What this means in terms of strategy is that energy security has to be addressed simultaneously at multiple levels, and that there needs to be greater coordination between the various strategies, the priorities of the government, the demand projection and the resources the country has at its disposal.[14] A holistic understanding and approach to achieving energy security that stresses energy efficiency (in consumption patterns and production) and sustainable development practices has emerged as part of the strategy of several countries; particularly energy importing countries (See Noe and Pring 2004: 431-456).

While putting in place an energy strategy at the national level, almost all countries need to keep in mind this multidimensional and holistic understanding to energy security. We turn to what role energy plays in India's energy security strategy, and to what extent energy can be seen as exerting a structure and imperative of its own to India's national security strategy.

II. India and its Energy Security Strategy: Between Ad hocism and *Metis*

Undoubtedly, energy has become an important aspect of India's domestic and foreign policy over the past few years. At the domestic level, energy is a critical component of India's governmental planning and implementation. On the other hand, in the area of foreign policy, energy diplomacy has emerged as a distinct area of focus. These developments at the domestic and international levels together point out that energy plays a big role in India's national strategy. However, whether this means that India has a clearly enunciated and coherent 'national' 'security' strategy on energy is unclear. Rather, from an analysis of the various government documents, policy

pronouncements and the country's energy diplomacy, we can piece together the chief features and priorities of India's energy security strategy. For analytical purposes, the discussion is divided into its domestic and foreign policy dimensions. While this is largely in keeping with the way the country has expressed its energy security concerns, in several instances, the two do come together, if not in intent, then definitely in purpose. Although here we identify the developments and characteristics of India's strategy in the context of energy at both the domestic and international level, the focus shall be mainly on the latter, while the former will be discussed briefly.[15]

Deciphering India's Energy Security Strategy at the Domestic Level

The last decade has witnessed several vision and strategy documents that *pertain* to the energy sector. The listing of these documents reveals two important features: one, the rising importance of energy in the country—an importance that has emerged in sharp relief only in the last decade; and two, the range of ministries/departments that are simultaneously involved in the energy sector—demonstrating the often disjointed and often overlapping nature of the Indian government's efforts to set the agenda and devise a strategy on energy.

Table 1: Vision and Policy Documents Pertaining to Energy

	Policy Document	*Year*	*Ministry Responsible*
1.	Hydro Carbon Vision 2025	2000-01	Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas
2.	Integrated Energy Policy	2006	Planning Commission
3.	National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC)[16]	2008	Ministry of New and Renewable Energy
4.	National Biofuel Policy	2008	Ministry of New and Renewable Energy
5.	Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM)	2010	Ministry of New and Renewable Energy

Source: Author compilation.

Apart from these documents, there are other ministries that are also involved in work that pertains to the energy sector; and their annual reports or plan documents spell out in detail their plans and agenda for addressing India's energy security. These include the Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Power, the Ministry of Water Resources, the Department of Atomic Energy and the Ministry of Coal. Important acts and policies, such as the Electricity Act of 2003 and the New Exploration Licencing Policy (NELP) (currently in its 9th round) have sought to make the energy sector more transparent, market friendly and efficient. Based on these documents and

policy pronouncements, the institutional structure of India's energy sector can be put together; as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: India's Energy Policy Institutional Structure

Source: Adapted from IEA 2007 and author's compilation.

An analysis of these documents and the projected plans that the different ministries have identified for themselves help delineate the basic contours of India's strategy on energy as well as highlight the country's evolving and expanding priorities in the energy sector. These are briefly:

- A recognition of India's growing demand for energy has brought about a multi-faceted attention to energy that straddles reform in the regulatory sector, inclusion of greater efficiencies in the whole value chain, from mining and exploration, to transmission, distribution and pricing, policy changes to make way for greater private sector participation, deregulation of the energy sector (particularly power and natural gas), reduction of losses and so on.

- The main driver behind all policy pronouncements and governmental action on energy security is providing energy access to the people of the country. About 400 million people remain without access to electricity while a number of households in both rural and urban areas use inefficient and harmful sources of energy.[17] A project carried out by The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) studied household energy transitions, which revealed that there was very little change in the percentage of rural households dependent on firewood and chips (75-78 per cent) given their cheap availability in rural areas (TERI 2010a; Gupta and Sudarshan 2008). The *Integrated Energy Policy* stated the internal 'energy poverty' dimension clearly:

    The broad vision behind the energy policy is to reliably meet the demand for energy services of all sectors at competitive prices. Further, lifeline energy needs of all households must be met even

if that entails directed subsidies to vulnerable households. The demand must be met through safe, clean and convenient forms of energy at the least cost in a technically efficient, economically viable and environmentally sustainable manner (Planning Commission 2006: xiii).

• A major component of India's energy security strategy can be discerned as being about seeking self-reliance and energy independence. It is in this light that several of the vision/mission documents and recent governmental actions can be read. For example, the *Hydrocarbon Vision 2025* document focused on primarily assuring energy security by 'achieving self-reliance through increased indigenous production (and investment in equity oil abroad) (See Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas 2000). This resulted in the NELP, under which exploration in India (through the inclusion of the private sector) has expanded from 11 per cent before 2000 (before NELP was started), to more than 40 per cent (until NELP IX).[18]

• Diversification of India's energy basket has been another major plank of the country's energy strategy. The nation's Biofuel Policy, the Solar Mission and the III-Stage Nuclear Programme seek to implement what the IEP mentions as essentially:

> ... Meet[ing] this vision [providing energy security to all] requires that India pursues all available fuel options and forms of energy, both conventional and non-conventional. Further, India must seek to expand its energy resource base and seek new and emerging energy sources (Planning Commission 2006: xiii).

The Solar Mission and the III-Stage Nuclear Programme are fundamentally about pushing for technologies that India can use on the basis of its resource endowment (ample sunlight and thorium supplies).[19] India plans to target the deployment of 20,000 MWe of nuclear energy by 2020 while the Solar Mission is equally ambitious— hoping to put in place 20,000 MW of solar power capacity by 2020. To achieve this objective, as ambitious as it does sound, would mean the government providing a subsidy of Rs 900 billion over 20 years from the day the mission kicks off (Rao 2010). Natural gas is also being promoted for India's energy security, particularly as a bridge fuel towards shifting to more sustainable energy choices.[20]

• As India becomes a bigger energy consumer, it needs to ensure that energy services are provided in an efficient, transparent and accountable manner. As mentioned above, the Electricity Act as well as several of the more recent stay orders on mining projects by the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF), particularly on the sustainability of several energy projects, is an important development.

Even the debate on the Civil Nuclear Liability Bill must be read in this light—about protecting the people of the country from externalities attached to providing energy from certain sources, such as nuclear energy. Several proposed hydropower projects in the Northeast face similar opposition from local communities due to the negative fallout ranging from the environmental to the socio-economic, to health and geopolitical security concerns (See Mahanta 2010).[21] In the context of both nuclear energy as well as hydropower, it has been pointed out that the Environmental Assessment Reports and the public hearing system put in place have not been carried out properly (See Rao and Ramana 2008: 14-18; Menon 2010).[22] Apart from the sustainability aspect, India has also shown a concern about adequate compensation due to the linkage between lack of compensation for developing local resources and intra-state conflict, particularly in the Naxal/Maoist-affected parts of the country. According to Jason Miklian and Scott Carney, although 'revenues from mineral extraction in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand topped $20 billion in 2008, and more than $1 trillion in proven reserves still sit in the ground', because this 'geological inheritance has been managed so disastrously that many locals—uprooted, unemployed, and living in a toxic and dangerous environment, due to the mining operations—have thrown in their lot with the Maoists' (Miklian and Carney 2010). Carrying the local community along is emerging as an important aspect of expanding India's domestic energy resource base. The opposition that the Indian government (particularly the Uranium Corporation of India Limited [UCIL]) has face for uranium mining in Meghalaya's Khasi hills is a case in point that demonstrates that the government needs to think increasingly about putting in place benefit sharing mechanisms with the local community and make them stakeholders in the development of local energy resources.

India's Energy Diplomacy

Just over the last decade, it is interesting to note that energy has become a critical component of almost all bilateral and regional/plurilateral[23] high level meetings that India has been part of. The IEP portends an increased energy import dependency for India across all fuel types.[24] While India has been importing coking coal for years, it has also recently begun to import thermal coal. Even in the area of nuclear energy, India is going to be dependent on uranium imports. The amount India has been spending on importing its energy needs (oil, coal and natural gas) can be seen from Figure 2. Hence, India's energy diplomacy around the world is a direct result of the growing import dependency that the country is experiencing.

The creation of an Energy Security Cell in the MEA, which was upgraded

Figure 2: India's Total Energy Imports 2000-10 (in US$ million)

Source: Government of India 2010b.

to a full-fledged division in 2009, is a recognition of the importance energy has as a foreign policy concern. Interestingly however, the MEA does not yet have a vision document on the role energy plays in the country's strategic sphere and what the priorities of the division are for the future.[25] Nonetheless, just as it was possible to glean the main elements of India's energy security strategy at the domestic level, it is possible to piece together the main aspects of India's external energy strategy. Some of the pertinent ones are discussed below:

- Most of India's energy imports still come from West Asia.[26] The pre-eminence of West Asia notwithstanding (and Australia, Indonesia and South Africa for coal), India has been making concerted efforts to cast its net wide—looking for energy imports not only from Africa, but also faraway Latin America and a comparatively inaccessible Central Asia. According to the IEP, the Americas and Central Asia respectively accounted for 3.55 per cent and 4.74 per cent of India's oil imports in 2006. However, the figures are not indicative of the pace at which energy diplomacy has become central to foreign policy and the consistency with which energy figures in regional and bilateral meetings and discussions. The most tangible presence for India in Central Asia has been Kazakhstan, when the two countries signed a civil nuclear deal in January 2009 for the supply of uranium and a comprehensive cooperation in civil nuclear energy programme (*The Hindu* 2009).[27] Table 2 illustrates India's current and potential energy partners across the major fuel types.

Table 2: India's Current and Potential Energy Partners

Oil	Natural Gas	Coal	Uranium/ Nuclear Energy	Hydro
Saudi Arabia	Qatar	Zimbabwe	Namibia	Bhutan
Iran	Oman	Mozambique	South Africa	Nepal
Iraq	Iran	South Africa	Mozambique	Myanmar
UAE	Saudi Arabia	Australia	Niger	Sri Lanka (for electricity)
Nigeria	Algeria	Indonesia	Mongolia	
Egypt	Nigeria	Kazakhstan	Kazakhstan	
Angola	Libya	Venezuela	Russia	
Algeria	Vietnam	United States	Tajikistan	
Sudan	Malaysia	Botswana	Canada	
Libya	Myanmar		Brazil	
Gabon	Bangladesh		Ukraine	
Eq. Guinea	Russia		United States	
Malaysia	Uzbekistan		United Kingdom	
Russia	Turkmenistan		Japan	
Kazakhstan	Australia		South Korea	
Azerbaijan			Malawi	
Brazil			Australia	
Venezuela				

Source: Government of India 2010b and news reports on potential energy partners (Also see TERI 2010a and TERI 2010b).

As is evident from Table 2, the diversification of import sources is at the heart of India's energy diplomacy. The diversification of fuels has also led to new energy partnerships for the country. In the context of uranium and nuclear energy for example, in the last two years alone, India has inked civil nuclear agreements with six countries, namely, the US, France, Russia, Namibia, Mongolia and Kazakhstan. While Australia has refused to enter into nuclear commerce with India, countries such as Canada, Brazil, South Africa and Gabon have offered to supply uranium to India in the future (See Sharma 2010b). Energy has been the stimulus for India to build new partnerships with countries while in other cases, it has provided the impetus to reinvigorate old connections, particularly with Russia and some African countries.

- Along with the diversification of sources and imports of energy, technology collaboration and partnerships are equally important if India is to move towards greater energy self sufficiency. India joined the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), which was set up in 2009 to expand the use of renewable energy worldwide.[28] The IRENA membership is seen as a means for enabling India to forge partnerships with other member countries at a multilateral level for accelerating development and deployment of renewable energy

technologies (See *The Hindu Business Line* 2009). The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), which also India is a member of, is a private-public partnership of seven countries to develop and accelerate deployment of cleaner, more efficient energy technologies to meet national pollution reduction, energy security and climate change concerns in ways that reduce poverty and promote economic development.

• Apart from the diversification of sources, India's external energy strategy has also included within its purview the identification of alternative routes, focusing on the possibility of not only pipelines (overland as well as undersea), but also swap arrangements that would circumvent routes considered otherwise unsafe. 'India's energy security depends as much on diversifying its energy partners as it does on ensuring secure and reliable routes for ensuring the supply of its energy imports…transportation routes are open to risks and threats from more than one country, given the transnational nature of shipping lanes and pipelines, as well as physical disruptions caused by natural disasters, accidents at sea and traffic constrictions at maritime chokepoints' (See Sharma 2009). The Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipelines are not only about being able to access the energy resources of Central Asia, but also about accessing that energy in a relatively trouble-free manner, if the region were not riddled by intra-state conflict and troubled political relations. Other pipelines that have been proposed seek to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz that could bring oil from as far north as Iraq—through Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE to the Omani capital of Muscat on the Arabian Sea.[29] Other than pipelines, the Indian government has also mooted the idea of swap arrangements. 'Like laying pipelines and monitoring/patrolling SLOCs, swap arrangements too require a high degree of collaboration between countries. However, unlike the other more proactive measures, swap arrangements can be seen as reactive responses to the insecurity of sea lanes' (See Sharma 2009).

• Closely connected to the diversification of routes and identifying secure ways of bringing energy to India is the recognition that India has to play a bigger role in the maritime security of the Indian Ocean, not least because of its energy security concerns.[30] The Indian Navy has been involved in a 'sea-lane sanitising role'. Countries such as Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia have looked to India as a 'reliable and non-controversial ally' in keeping SLOCs and chokepoints, such as the Malacca Straits, clear of piracy and other anti-state elements. India already has a series of joint patrolling exercises with Indonesia

as 'part of a 200 nautical mile-long energy feeder path' (See Dikshit 2004). The Quadrilateral Naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal in September 2007 were a collaborative exercise geared to enhance maritime security in the Indian Ocean between countries such as India, the US, Australia, Japan and Singapore. In October 2009, India joined Indonesia and the Maldives to patrol the Indian Ocean waters to protect them against sea-based piracy (Also see Sharma 2009). According to C. Raja Mohan, it would bode India well to work within a free but regulated Indian Ocean region and not strive for a narrow and exclusivist interpretation of maritime security (Raja Mohan 2010).

- Much has been written about the growing competition between India and China in Africa, West Asia and Central Asia. This perception is grounded in projections that suggest India and China will account for 43 per cent of the global increase in oil demand between 2005 and 2030, according to the IEA (2010). One region where this perception of a growing competition between India and China is well-entrenched is Africa's resource sector. For instance, in 2006, ONGC India was a contender for a deepwater block in Nigeria for a US$2.6 billion deal that CNOOC eventually acquired with a 45 per cent stake in OML 130 (Goodman 2006). Due to proximity (for example the Central Asia Republics) and historically closer relations (with Myanmar), China has been able to clinch deals in the energy sector, leaving India far behind. India's response to this has seemed to be partly reactive and partly ill thought out. Falling for the rhetoric that pits China against India as if they were at par, has meant that India has ended up trying to outbid a country that has superior financial capabilities and has a different political agenda.[31]

- Equity investments in overseas oil and gas fields have been another crucial aspect of India's energy security strategy. While these are essentially commercial in nature, the government has acknowledged the role they can play in the context of providing a fillip to India's energy security, particularly at a time when there is an international energy-related crisis or a sudden spike in prices.

- Last but not least, corresponding to India's growing role in the energy arena is its growing participation in the various energy-related institutional frameworks—from the regional to the multilateral. Along with like-minded countries, such as the IBSA/BRICs/SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), India has been stressing the importance of energy as an arena where greater complementarities can be identified and developed. India has already been involved in the International Energy Forum (IEF), and is seeking to expand its current interaction with the IEA and the Energy Charter Treaty.

III. A National Energy Security Strategy for India: Plugging the Gaps and Connecting the Dots

Absence of a cohesive energy security strategy for India raises several concerns. The problems arise particularly because energy, being a multidimensional policy arena with cross-cutting issues and challenges, requires a holistic and long-term strategy.[32] It is important to highlight some of the gaps and linkages that need to be addressed (both at the domestic and the external level) in order to move towards a future where India can seek to achieve its energy security in the most efficient and rational manner.

Regional Focus and Prioritisation

As long as India's energy basket is fossil-fuel centric, West Asia's predominance will not wane. According to the New Policies Scenario spelled out in the World Energy Outlook (WEO) of 2010, India will become the third largest spender on oil imports by 2020, thereby implying that although diversification of its import sources will continue to be an objective, the primacy of West Asia will remain a reality (See Sharma and Ganeshan 2011, IEA 2010: 77).[33] What is required is a concerted focus on managing India's dependence on West Asia in the short to medium term, while continuing to press for greater diversification. Also, there is a need for a region-specific prioritistion of India's energy securing strategy, which takes into consideration several important parameters, not least among them, the role of other energy importing countries, developments in the energy sectors of those countries, the need to continually evolve India's own engagement with the country beyond the energy sector and so on. After West Asia, it would appear that South East Asia and Africa would be of immediate importance to India's energy security, while Central Asia and the Caspian Sea can be thought of as more medium to long term interests.

Risk Assessment and Energy Security

At the moment, it appears as though India is trying to source its energy from everywhere. However, there is a need to think of equity investments as well as energy trade in a more enduring manner, taking into consideration the ground-level security threats as well as the larger geopolitical ramifications of that energy partnership. On-ground security threats require an assessment that provides the investing/trading country a real picture of the risks involved. This would help in making assessments and prioritisations, which might not substantially impact India's import options (that is, India, as well as other countries will continue to trade with energy-rich countries that are otherwise politically risky); nonetheless, these inputs are crucial to look at possible alternatives in place before costly disruptions occur.

Developing Mutually Beneficial Stakes beyond the Energy Sector

While it is important not to over-extend the nature of engagement that India seeks to put in place with the energy-rich countries (as China does by offering soft loans, arms sales and so on), it is equally important that India look beyond the energy sector to ensure that its energy partnerships are robust. For example, in 2009-10, energy resources accounted for 96.8 per cent of total imports from the country (Government of India 2010a). India does not figure amongst Nigeria's top five partners, while China, the US, Belize, Germany and Belgium do. Even in terms of energy exports from Nigeria, India accounts for 10 per cent of Nigeria's total energy exports, while the US accounts for almost 30 per cent (ITC 2010). This shows that India ranks quite low in terms of Nigeria's import needs. India must think proactively about building partnerships that go beyond the energy sector.

Renewable Energy: Domestic Regulatory Framework and Security Concerns

Renewable energy, particularly solar energy, is part of India's long-term push for meeting India's energy security concerns. However, there is a need to match the projections on the domestic front with the security and foreign policy implications it will pose for the country, something that the Solar Mission does not do. Therefore, there needs to be better synchronicity between India's solar ambitions and the countries with the technology and the raw material (rare earth minerals) that is necessary to achieve the former. Also, more sustainable energy pathways are not without their geopolitical implications, as Japan is learning from China and over the rare earth exports imbroglio. There needs to be a greater understanding of the geopolitical implications of the energy transitions India seeks to chart. If China, Bolivia and Afghanistan are important for minerals that are crucial for renewable energy technologies, then strategic partnerships need to be put in place accordingly.

Integrated Action Needs to Precede Integrated Planning

The IEP was laudable in its effort to deal with a whole gamut of issues pertaining to energy within one policy document. However, what has been severely lacking is the linkages between the different ministries. This is perhaps the greatest obstacle to devising a national security strategy on energy in India. While the Group of Ministers for Energy set up in June 2010 is a welcome step, it is not enough. The GOM under Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee has been set up to coordinate energy security issues that have an international angle and guide and coordinate the external interface on energy security matters (Jebaraj 2010). More needs to be done in order to integrate the two arms of India's energy security strategy. This means not necessarily creating another institution but bringing the prevailing institutions together

in a decision-making mechanism that includes the strategies and priorities of each ministry, as well as the private sector.

Assessments of India's own Strengths

India needs to be careful about not getting trapped in an unnecessary competition with China. It seems that too much energy is spent in being unduly concerned about China's financial capability to outbid and 'corner' overseas equity investments in the energy sector. India needs to go beyond Western literature on the matter and get inputs from the private sector, academia and civil society organisations working in the energy-rich countries as well as within India. Also, there is a need to accord more 'agency' and 'voice' to the energy-exporting countries, particularly the African countries. Their security lies in being able to leverage the fact that more than one country is interested in them, which allows them to pick and choose their partnerships according to what they seek to get out of them. While learning from other countries' experiences, there is an equal necessity for India to recognise and study closely the perceptions and the ground realities of the countries India imports energy from and work that into the strategy. India needs to be aware of the fact that vis-à-vis energy, China's strategy is not all that state-driven and focused, while India's is not all that confused or ad hoc.

The Weakest Link: the Neighbourhood

A real stumbling block to India's energy security, particularly at the foreign policy level, is the immediate neighbourhood. India's energy security is dependent on a stable region that is conducive to establishing energy links beyond the South Asian region itself, particularly with land-locked Central Asia. Building synergies in the energy sector by putting in place cross-border power grids might go far in tapping the hydropower and natural gas potential of some of India's immediate neighbours. However, even if building demand-supply synergies between India and its neighbours is not possible in the short to medium term (for example, Bangladesh does not want to export its natural gas, anticipating its own rise in demand in the near future), a neighbourhood that is conducive to building energy linkages beyond the region are crucial. Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh all highlight lost opportunities for India. The SAARC Energy Secretariat has been a relative non-starter. At the regional level within the SAARC, there have been several attempts to push for energy cooperation in South Asia (See Mahajan 2008), but they seem to lack vigour.[34]

Energy Governance: Steering the Discussions

'Energy governance is an area that is growing in importance—if not in tangible results, then definitely in terms of rhetoric. As an emerging power, India can ill-afford to not be part of this field and make its mark' (TERI 2010b).

The latest World Energy Outlook of the IEA (2010) flags the importance of governments in the area of energy. Energy governance has emerged as a critical area of research and policy making because energy use and deployment in a sustainable and holistic manner depends on good governance practices.

> India needs to take the initiative and play a larger role in determining any future governance structure or mechanism in the energy sector. The world needs to constantly strive for an understanding of energy security that moves away from a zero-sum approach and that seeks to promote principles and norms that engender long-term energy cooperation, transparency, non-discrimination, accountability and best practices' (TERI 2010b).

Given that several of the challenges that the world will face in the future will spring from the energy sector, it is important for India to not only be a part of these governance frameworks on energy, but also ensure that they reflect its own interests and concerns adequately.

Conclusion

Having a clearly enunciated national security strategy does not necessarily mean that countries will implement them. On the other hand, not having a clearly enunciated national security strategy does not mean that a country does not follow certain precepts and priorities while endeavouring to ensure their national security. India's national security strategy in the energy sphere lies somewhere between these two realities. India's energy security strategy is partly spelt out, and partly needs to be pieced together and gleaned from the various policy pronouncements, regulatory decisions and diplomatic initiatives that pertain to energy. There is nevertheless a dire need for filling the gaps and ironing out the overlaps so that energy security for the country can be achieved in a holistic, sustainable and sustained manner. This is perhaps even more necessary for the energy sector, given the fact that energy is a multidimensional arena where there are cross-cutting issues, constraints and concerns. Just what a comprehensive national energy security strategy must seek to address has been highlighted here. Strategising must be a continuous affair, based on inputs from experts from all walks of life—the private sector, different governmental ministries, academia, research organisations, civil society groups and so on. A well-thought out and broad-based strategy must be sufficiently reflexive, cogent and flexible. Only then can 'informed prudence' be the guiding force for a strategy that seeks to ensure national security in its various aspects.

NOTES

1. Most countries take advantage of their natural resource endowments while charting their energy securing strategies. However, in several cases, countries need to rely on resources that they do not have ample domestic supplies of. This might be due to the nature of demand. For example, mainly oil and natural gas can be used in the transport sector; other sources of energy are not as efficient. Also, once demand exceeds supply, countries have no choice but to take recourse to accessing energy resources that are most proximate and efficient for their needs.

2. Paul Kennedy did study the reasons why great powers rise and fall in the international system (Kennedy 1987). He identified the role of available resources in ensuring countries do not militarily over-reach; the converse being the very reality that befell the Soviet Union. However, apart from singling out energy consumption as one of the measures of strength, there is no real analysis of whether access to energy (domestically or internationally, at affordable prices) or lack thereof, had anything to do with relative power positions in the international system.

3. For Mark and Meredith Giordano and Aaron Wolf, resource conflict at the international level is likely to occur where there is resource scarcity as well as insufficient institutional capacity to address the scarcity (See Giordano et al 2005: 47-65).

4. In the long term, the argument can be made that great powers with the requisite financial backing can push for alternative energy sources and technologies that offer them less chance for conflict or allow them greater energy independence and hence security.

5. In the literature, transit countries are seen as perhaps as crucial as energy exporting countries (See for example Talmadge 2008).

6. While the international system may still be marked by systemic anarchy and countries might still be caught in a security dilemma, some deviations (in the context of energy) that are worth highlighting is: (i) states are not similarly placed in terms of their needs: different countries differ in the degree of their energy demand; (ii) There might be a lack of trust between countries, but in the arena of energy trade and relations, there is a quid pro quo that ties energy-rich to energy importing countries (explained above); (iii) In the short to medium term, countries that import energy cannot seek to rid their energy import dependencies (therefore they cannot easily increase their economic growth and military capabilities independently as the neo-realists would envisage), nor can they externally balance by partnering energy-rich countries as effectively as with other like-minded allies that are strategic from the point of view of ideology and so on.

7. An important means identified for countries to ensure that energy cannot be used as a tool of foreign policy, as the Russians have in the past, is to tie the energy-rich countries in mutually beneficial trade relations. As an example, Russia's dependence on Germany for its goods implied that it was equally in Russia's interest to ensure energy supplies to Germany.

8. Resource nationalism under Hugo Chavez was particularly a threat to the US, given that the fear of Venezuela turning to China and perhaps denying its exports to the US was mainly a result of America's cautiousness towards the centralisation of Venezuela's energy sector (See Stanislaw 2006; Johnson 2007).

9. However, Saudi Arabia did walk out of an OPEC decision to cut production in 2008 in an attempt to raise prices (See Mouawad 2008).

10. The paradox of mineral wealth or the resource curse is the thesis that countries or regions with mineral riches and resources are afflicted by underperformance on a

number of political and economic indicators such as good governance, income equality and democracy (See Faris 2007; Friedman 2006), mainly as a result of resource rents strengthening the reign of despotic rulers. However, it is not merely the fact of resource wealth that is responsible for corruption and an absence of adequate compensation to the local community (and hence gross inequalities and standards of living). Instead, others have pointed out that the link between resource wealth and poor governmental institutions and economic growth is 'counterintuitive' (see Kenny 2010) and in many cases does not hold water as there are cases to point the converse—that that economies with greater resource wealth actually grew faster and were less likely to descend into civil war (See Kenny 2010; Weinthal and Luong 2006: 35-53; Chameides 2010).

11. Consequences such as groundwater contamination, radiation effects, leakages, as well as the fear of theft/terrorist attacks and so on

12. For example, IEA's 90 day-strategic petroleum reserve (SPR), as also other countries such as China and India's efforts to also maintain an SPR. The Government of India too, in order to ensure energy security of the country, has decided to set up 5 million metric tones (MMT) strategic crude oil storages at three locations—Visakhapatnam, Mangalore and Padur. This is the Phase—I of the SPR for the country and it is currently in construction phase. This 5 MMT of SPRs are equivalent to only about 15 days of the petroleum product consumption. The Integrated Energy Policy, Government of India (August 2006), suggests that a 90-day reserve of net oil imports should be maintained to manage both supply disruption and a short-term price volatility.

13. These constraints differ from the energy resource under question. It could be due to growing international pressure on countries to cut back on the use of dirty fossil fuels, foregoing the nuclear option due to civil society pressure against nuclear power plants in their backyards (as well as international pressure on the nuclear proliferation front), similar pressure on building dams without adequate compensation for displacement and resettlement, in the context of natural gas, it's the constraint of putting in place adequate infrastructure, and so on

14. Neoclassical realism offers a more useful school for understanding foreign policy and international politics, particularly in the realm of energy. 'Neoclassical realism posits that there is an imperfect "transmission belt" between systemic incentives and constraints…and the actual diplomatic, military and foreign economic policies states select' (Lobell et al. 2009: 4). In devising strategies to respond to their security concerns, neoclassical realists aver that, in the short to medium term, countries need to take into consideration not only the calculations and perceptions of their leaders, but also the resources a domestic society has at its disposal, the domestic institutions and the pressures exerted by key stakeholders.

15. Although both dimensions of India's energy strategy are important, the external dimension obviously has greater implications for the international system. Without doubt however, there is a need to link the two together. For example, India's nuclear energy diplomacy, which has been in ample display over the last two years in the number of countries India has inked nuclear civil deals with, has emerged from a domestic agenda that has sought to prioritise the expansion of nuclear energy.

16. The NAPCC, while spelling out what India can and must do to address on the climate change front, is essentially about not sacrificing India's developmental constraints. The NAPCC identifies and prioritises 'strategies that promote developmental goals while also serving specific climate change objectives' (Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change 2008: 11). Implicit in the government of India's

(GoI) continued emphasis on rapid economic growth is the need for energy security. Several of India's proposed research priorities as well as policy on clean energy are driven by a concern for meeting the country's spiralling demand for energy, albeit in a more efficient and effective manner (See Sharma 2010a).

17. It is interesting to note that the definition of electrification is liberal enough to include in its ambit any village where just 10 per cent of the houses have an electric connection (See Patni 2010).

18. Until NELP XIII, 87 oil and gas discoveries have already been made in 26 exploration blocks. NELP for the first time allowed private and foreign companies the option to hold 100 per cent equity ownership in projects and is one of the Indian government's principal policies to counter India's external energy dependence (See *The Economist* 2009).

19. Phase III, which would come into play earliest only by 2050, of India's nuclear power programme focuses on advanced heavy-water thorium reactors, which will run on thorium produced in Phase II breeders. This long-termed three-phased nuclear programme has been designed keeping in mind the large supply of thorium India has at its disposal; which exponents of nuclear energy in India suggest will help the country achieve 'nuclear self-sufficiency' (Also see Sharma 2010b: 91-110).

20. Natural gas is seen as more efficient and comparatively less carbon intensive (as compared to coal and oil). However, there are several bottlenecks and obstacles on the way to expanding the use of natural gas, particularly pricing and infrastructural costs (See also Kelkar 2009).

21. There are a total of about 900 small hydropower schemes in the North Eastern region, with an installed capacity of 1,487 MW; along with 62 large schemes, with an installed capacity of 30,416 MW, distributed throughout the North Eastern region (Mahanta 2010).

22. According to MV Ramana and Divya Rao, the clearances given to the Koodankulam reactors for example show that due diligence was not exercised—important environmental and livelihood considerations were ignored and the concerns of the public were ignored.

23. Organisations such as the Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRICs), the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and so on.

24. India's import dependency for oil could go up to 90 per cent by the year 2030, about 50 per cent for natural gas and an upper limit of 45 per cent for coal, if India is to maintain an 8 per cent growth rate (Planning Commission 2006: 45)

25. The MEA's Annual Report for 2009-2010 mentions the functions of the Energy Security Division (ESD) as providing inputs to the government of India on energy security matters in multilateral foras such as UNGA, G-20, NAM, BRIC, ASEM and so on. Along with coordinating with the related energy ministries on strategic energy issues, the ESD also coordinated with the private sector. Foremost in its achievements for 2009-10 however, the annual report mentions the role the ESD played in facilitating India's membership in the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and the International Partnership for Energy Efficiency and Cooperation (See Government of India 2010a).

26. About 70 per cent of India's crude oil imports come from West Asia while about 74 per cent of India's gas imports come from Qatar alone.

27. In 2009, the National Transmission Power Corporation (NTPC), India's power generation company, mooted the idea of setting up power plants in Kazakhstan in

return for importing at least 15 million tonnes of coal per annum (Utpal 2009). India has also tried to expand its energy linkages with the Caspian Sea countries, particularly Azerbaijan.

28. One of IRENA's mission is to become the 'leading international centre of excellence for renewable energy and a platform for exchange and development of renewable energy knowledge', keeping in mind the 'special needs of developing countries (IRENA 2010).

29. The most recent pipeline that is being discussed for India is the under-sea SAGE gas pipeline. The pipeline will stretch for 2000 kilometres from Oman to India's western coast. However, the technical feasibility of laying an under-sea pipeline and the estimated cost of the project are reasons cited for the project having stalled (See Bhaskar 2009; Bhardawaj 2009).

30. Robert Kaplan characterises the Indian Ocean as forming the 'centre stage for the challenges of the twenty first century' (Kaplan 2009).

31. Rather than being confident in what India itself has to offer the energy rich countries, India has become entangled in an outbidding match. For example, it is said that ONGC's decision to buy a stake in Imperial Energy's oil-producing assets in Siberia when crude prices were on a high, was ill-advised, even though the exact circumstances surrounding the deal are unclear.

32. This is not to say that other countries have a broad-based and long-term strategy on energy that they stick to in practice or that the strategy is anything more than a vision document written with the international audience in mind—that is, as a public relations device. China's White Paper on Energy for example is more about making the world aware of its energy needs and the steps the country has taken to ensure its energy security concerns are addressed: such as energy conservation, use to energy technologies, energy sector reform and strengthening international cooperation (See State Council Information Office 2007).

33. India's 'commercial' energy basket is dominated by coal (53 percent); oil (31 percent) and gas (8 percent). Given the limited domestic availability of coal, oil and gas, energy import dependency for India in the future is projected to rise to 70 percent, 94 percent and 24 percent in 2031, up from 14 percent, 74 per cent and 21 per cent for coal, oil and gas respectively in 2001 (TERI 2010a).

34. As summarised by Deepti Mahajan (2008), 'SAARC has deliberated on and proposed the establishment of South Asia Energy Investment Fund to finance large regional energy projects; initiation of resource assessment; establishment of mechanisms for joint procurement of fossil fuels to meet the demand for the region as against individual nations; establishment of South Asia Regional Power Pool to facilitate power trading; exploitation of the full capacity of existing energy infrastructure; formation of joint ventures for exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources within the region and also for taking up equity investments in other parts of the world'.

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CHAPTER 24

Climate Change and India's National Strategy

Sandeep Sengupta

Introduction

Climate change has emerged as a priority issue on the international agenda in recent years. In 2007, the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, declared it to be the 'defining challenge of our age' (UN, 2007). The importance of the issue was further emphasised in December 2009, when 119 world leaders met at Copenhagen—the 'largest gathering of heads of state and government in the history of the UN' (UNFCCC, 2009)—in an attempt to solve this problem.

India, on its part, has been an active participant in the international debates and negotiations on climate change since the late 1980s. Over the years, it has played a major role in the creation of the international regime set up by the international community under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to deal with this issue. In recent years, however, it has come under increased pressure to do more to mitigate its own contribution to the problem, given its rapidly growing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which have resulted from the remarkable economic transformation that the country has witnessed over the last two decades.

Citing the need for prioritising development over environment for the purposes of poverty eradication; its lack of 'historical responsibility' on this issue; and its still very low 'per capita' emissions vis-à-vis the industrialised world, India has so far fiercely resisted the imposition of any legal emission restrictions upon itself, as are currently applicable on developed countries under international law. Yet, facing growing international demands to do more on climate change, and also realising the inherent seriousness of this issue, it has taken some important steps to address this problem at the domestic level in recent years.

In 2007, India established a Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change (PMCCC) to evolve a coordinated national-level response to this issue and provide oversight on key policy decisions. In 2008, the government launched a National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC), containing 'eight

national missions', with the aim of addressing climate change in a manner that would also generate development 'co-benefits' (GoI, 2008). More recently, in 2010, the Planning Commission constituted an Expert Group to prepare a strategy for a 'low-carbon economy' for India that could feed into its Twelfth Five Year Plan process (GoI, 2010).

These efforts mark a heightened awareness and prioritisation of this issue within the country. However, a case can be made that India still lacks a coherent national strategy to deal with the multiple and complex challenges that climate change has thrown up today. Despite the above recent initiatives, there is limited systematic examination and articulation of how the various strands of this issue, domestic and international, 'hang together'; and of how policy choices and decisions made at one level impact the other. The government's responses have often been reactive, ad hoc and piecemeal in character rather than derived from a systematised intellectual process that carefully analyses and weighs the costs and benefits of each individual decision/action against the bigger picture. Interest determination and policy formulation on this issue, similarly, has also been largely top-down, formulaic or personality-driven, triggered more by external events, rather than internally and institutionally aggregated from the bottom-up. Most critically, perhaps, human and organisational capacity to study and critically engage with this problem, especially its strategic dimensions, has also been inadequate.

At a time when international climate negotiations are becoming more complex by the day, and the stakes are ever rising, maintaining the status quo is clearly not enough for a country of India's size and stature. There is a pressing need to address this issue more comprehensively and skilfully, mobilising capabilities and assets that are greater than what is currently on offer. While what is needed, ultimately, are institutional reforms that can ensure a more dynamic, inclusive and strategically-oriented decision making process, with appropriate consultative mechanisms and checks and balances in place, some specific factors that may be useful for developing a coherent national strategy for India on climate change are highlighted in this paper.

The paper begins by identifying some of the key threats and challenges that climate change poses to India at the domestic, regional and international levels respectively. Drawing on India's past and more recent policy behaviour on this issue, it then identifies some of the potential conflicts, trade-offs and choices that the country presently faces, especially in terms of its international engagement on this issue. Overall, the paper stresses that India's national strategy on climate change must not be formulated in isolation or in a technocratic manner, but has to be derived logically from a larger national grand strategy development process that articulates a clear vision of what the country's core domestic and foreign policy interests and priorities are, across different time-scales, and of how India's policies and actions on climate change can help to advance these, and thereby enhance the country's overall welfare and security.

Domestic Threats Posed by Climate Change

In 2007, the Fourth Assessment Report released by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) categorically stated the threat of climate change to be 'unequivocal' (IPCC, 2007, p. 2). In a chapter on Asia's vulnerability, the IPCC report noted that rising temperatures would have significant adverse effects on the continent, including in terms of declining crop yields, reduced fresh water supplies, rising sea-levels, increased frequency of floods and droughts, and greater risk of spread of diseases (Cruz et al, 2007).

The specific impacts of climate change on India have also been examined in recent years. In 2004, India's 'Initial National Communications to the UNFCCC', prepared by the government, provided the first systematic assessment of the country's vulnerability to climate change across a range of sectors and regions (MoEF, 2004). However, a finer-grained analysis of the expected impacts of climate change on the country was presented more recently, in November 2010, in the form of a 4x4 assessment conducted by the newly launched Indian Network for Climate Change Assessment (INCCA) under the Ministry of Environment and Forests. This study looked at the effects of climate variability in four particularly climate-sensitive regions of India (Western Ghats, Coastal India, the Northeast, and the Himalayan Region) and across four predominantly climate-dependent sectors (agriculture, water, forests and human health) using a 2030 time horizon (MoEF, 2010). While various uncertainties and regional and sub-regional variations remain in this assessment, the overall picture that it paints is one that is fairly troubling.

The INCCA assessment confirms that there is an all-round warming over the Indian subcontinent associated with increased GHG concentrations. It notes that seasons may become warmer by around 2.0°C by the 2030s, and could, at the extreme ranges, even by 1.0-4.0°C. It also projects annual precipitation to increase in each of the four regions studied, compared to the 1970s, with the intensity of rainy days rising, even though their frequency is expected to decrease. Similarly, it also predicts cyclonic disturbances to become more intense, though less frequent, along coastal regions, inducing, in turn, an increased risk of storm surges in inland areas. On sea-level rise, the study notes that the sea level along the Indian coast has been rising at a rate of about 1.3 mm/year on average over the last 20 years, and that this trend is expected to continue over the next several decades as well.

With regards to the expected impacts of the above climatic changes on the four sectors that are examined, the study notes the following. In the agriculture sector—which contributes to about 15 per cent of India's national GDP and accounts for over half of its total workforce—crop yields of maize are expected to fall significantly across the board, with up to 50 per cent losses predicted in some areas. The picture is more mixed in the case of rice

production. Although yields of both irrigated and rain-fed rice are predicted to drop in most regions by 4 to 35 per cent, they are expected to rise in some locations due to higher anticipated levels of local precipitation. Other crops are also expected to be similarly affected. For example, apple production, which is an important source of local income and employment in Himalayan states such as Himachal Pradesh, is expected to be adversely affected. Livestock, another important source of local income and nutrition throughout the country, is also expected to be negatively impacted in all regions due to increased temperature and humidity stresses.

In terms of its impact on fresh water supply, the 2004 National Communications had noted that rising surface temperatures, sea-level increases, and melting of glaciers would adversely affect water balance and ground water quality in various parts of the country. The more recent INCCA assessment predicts a greater variability in the water yields of different regions, ranging from a 50 per cent increase in water yield in some parts of the Himalayan region (in certain areas of Jammu & Kashmir and Uttarakhand) to an up to 40-50 per cent reduction in some coastal areas of West Bengal, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh, and in parts of the Western Ghats. In general, an increased frequency of droughts is predicted in areas that have a projected decrease in precipitation and/or enhanced levels of evapo-transpiration. However, moderate to extreme droughts are predicted in the Himalayan region as well, despite the overall increased precipitation expected there. The risk of floods is also expected to rise by between 10-30 per cent in most regions compared to the 1970s, with implications for existing infrastructure such as dams, bridges, roads, etc.

Similarly, climate change is expected to impact natural ecosystems too, with shifts expected in the boundaries of forests, species mix, etc., with consequent socio-economic implications for forest-dependent communities and biodiversity. On human health, the INCCA study notes that morbidity and mortality are both likely to increase with warming temperatures and variable precipitation, both as a result of direct factors such as heat stress, and indirect factors such as rise in vector-borne and water-borne diseases, malnutrition, etc. The transmission window for malaria, for example, is shown by the study to expand in various regions by 2030.

What these assessments reveal, as a whole, is the considerable threat that climate change poses to the food security, water security, coastal security, environmental security, and to the overall health and economic well being of the country at large. Especially vulnerable are the rural poor, who comprise the overwhelming bulk of India's population, and who are heavily dependent on natural resources such as agriculture, livestock, forests, and inland and coastal fisheries for their daily livelihood and survival. Equally, high-density and poorly planned urban areas and infrastructure also face significant risks from climate change.

It is important, however, to note that most of these anticipated impacts of climate change will be gradual and incremental in their manifestation rather than occur through any sudden single-episode events (though the latter may not be ruled out either). But what climate change will invariably do is add to, and exacerbate, the multiple developmental challenges and natural hazards that the country already faces at present. Moreover, given the monsoon-dependent and rain-fed nature of most of India's agriculture; the fact that most of the country's important river systems originate in and depend on Himalayan glacier flows; and a densely populated 7,500 km long coastline—all combined with the high levels of national poverty and inequality—it is clear that India is particularly vulnerable to climate change. This is further complicated by the fact that much of India's energy security and economic development is fuelled by the use of coal, which contributes to over 50 per cent of its total energy mix, but the extraction and burning of which, especially from forested areas, will only worsen the problem of climate change and the threats posed by it.

Regional Challenges of Climate Change

In addition to these domestic-level threats, climate change also poses a number of security challenges for India at the regional level. Most of the adverse effects of climate change that India can expect to face in the future are applicable, in large measure, to the wider South Asian region as well. Indeed, the threat posed by climate change to some South Asian countries is arguably much more serious than that posed to India.

Bangladesh and the Maldives are perhaps the two most obvious examples of this. In the case of the Maldives, over 80 per cent of the country's total land area is less than 1m above mean sea level (MSL). Moreover, no part of this Indian Ocean island chain is over 4m above MSL. In the worst-case scenario of sea-level rise, the entire land area of the Maldives, including its 300,000 strong population, could face the risk of submergence (MEEW, 2007). Bangladesh is equally seriously vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Essentially a low-lying river delta, the country faces severe risks from sea-level rise, saline intrusion, coastal erosion, floods, droughts and other extreme weather events. An estimate made by the Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (BCAS) predicts that a 1m rise in sea level could inundate about 17.5 per cent of the country's total land area and displace around 11 per cent of its population (cited in Alam, 2003).

Again, it is likely that these changes will happen slowly and incrementally over long periods of time rather than as any single catastrophic event. Also, in the first instance, it is likely that climate change will result in greater numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) rather than external refugees as such. Yet, in both the cases of Maldives and Bangladesh, the risks of climate-induced transboundary migration to India are considerable, and can

only be expected to become more salient with time. This will have serious security, developmental and moral implications for India in the future. This is especially true in the case of Bangladesh, given its vast population of 160 million; the extensive and porous land borders that India shares with it; and the underlying social, political, economic, ethnic and religious tensions that already exist between the two countries (despite recently improving relations), even before climate change is taken into account.

Similarly, there are other regional-level threats emanating from climate change as well. These include tensions that may arise with Pakistan, China and Nepal over the management and sharing of Himalayan river resources, and from shifting coastal and maritime boundaries that may potentially result from sea-level rise, for e.g. in Sir Creek. It is worth repeating here, though, that climate change poses a *common* threat to all the countries of the region. If the Maldives and Bangladesh face the risk of submergence and inundation from sea-level rise, then the same applies in almost equal measure to the vulnerable coastal regions and cities of India too. Indeed, in the worst case scenario, climate change could have significant deleterious effects on the Lakshwadeep and Andaman & Nicobar island chains of India, and consequently on its ability to project power in the wider Indian Ocean region from these strategic locations. However, the core point to note here is that given the various institutional and political weaknesses of its neighbouring states, India, whether it likes it or not, will need to be prepared to bear a greater proportion of the regional burden on this issue over time.

International Dimensions of Climate Change

In addition to the domestic and regional threats highlighted above, climate change also poses significant challenges to India at the international level, especially to the conduct of its foreign policy on this issue. The last couple of years, in particular, have witnessed significant upheavals in India's foreign policies on climate change, the logic and rationale for which have not always been readily apparent. As international negotiations on this issue now enter even murkier waters, there is a pressing need for India to consider its international position on this issue carefully, taking into account—in a balanced manner—both its own history and its future national and global ambitions.

As noted in the introduction, India has been a key player in international negotiations on climate change since its earliest days. Its core position on this issue over much of the last two decades has rested on the argument that since the developed world had produced the bulk of GHG emissions that caused climate change, through their early industrialisation, they had to be the ones to bear the primary responsibility of addressing it. Developing countries and late industrialisers like India, which had historically contributed little to the problem, and whose emissions needed to grow in the future to meet their

legitimate development needs, could not be expected, it argued, to bear the additional burden of combating climate change, unless they were provided with financial and technological resources by the West to do so. Furthermore, at a more normative level, India stressed that every human being had a right to an equal share of the Earth's atmosphere, which, it noted, had been disproportionately occupied by industrialised world emissions. It argued, therefore, that the only equitable long-term solution to climate change was for developed countries to reduce their per capita emissions and for the per capita emissions of developing countries to simultaneously rise, until they all converged at the same level (Dasgupta, 1994; Rajan, 1997).

At the climate negotiations in the early 1990s, India played a key role in forging a common Southern consensus around some of these arguments and worked closely through the G-77 and China coalition to get them incorporated into the UNFCCC that was signed at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. The UNFCCC thus acknowledged that countries needed to act on this issue on the 'basis of equity', and in accordance with their 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities', and that developed countries had to 'take the lead' in addressing climate change given that they contributed to the 'largest share of historical and current global emissions' (UNFCCC, 1992). It also explicitly noted that developed countries would need to provide developing countries with 'new and additional financial resources' to meet the 'agreed full incremental costs' of any climate mitigation or adaptation actions that the latter took; and that the extent to which developing countries acted on climate change would depend on the fulfilment of the financial and technological commitments made by the developed world.

Unlike developed countries, which were called upon to stabilize their GHG emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000, the UNFCCC exempted developing countries from any specific climate mitigation obligations, noting that their per capita emissions were still relatively low, and that their share of global emissions would need to grow in the future to meet their social and development needs. Under the Kyoto Protocol adopted in 1997, developed countries further agreed to accept legally binding quantitative targets to reduce their collective GHG emissions by 5 per cent below 1990 levels over a five-year commitment period of 2008-12 (UNFCCC, 1997). The Marrakech Accords adopted in 2001 established various rules to operationalise the Kyoto Protocol, including specific penalties for non-compliance by developed countries (UNFCCC, 2002). Developing countries, however, remained exempt from undertaking any uncompensated mitigation commitments under the Kyoto Protocol as well, which entered formally into force in 2005.

India's foreign policy on climate change from the 1992 Rio Earth Summit right up to the 2009 Copenhagen Summit essentially focused on preserving the 'differentiated' architecture of the climate regime that it had helped to embed within the UNFCCC. Opposing any fresh legal obligations for

developing countries like itself, it insisted that industrialised countries first deliver on their existing commitments under international law i.e. the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Developed countries, on their part, have since 1992 consistently tried to undo and revise the original terms of the Rio deal in various direct and indirect ways, including by arguing that climate change is a 'global problem', which required 'broad international participation'; mitigation commitments from the 'more advanced' developing countries; 'new categories' beyond the developed/developing country dichotomy; 'voluntary commitments', 'peaking years', and 'global goals', among various other formulations. Highlighting the growing current and future emissions of large developing countries, particularly China and India, they also demanded greater transparency and accountability from them on the measurement, reporting and verification of their national emissions.

Until Copenhagen, India had consistently and successfully resisted these efforts, both by using legal and normative arguments, and by building alliances with other like-minded developing states (especially China) and sympathetic civil society groups (Agarwal et al, 1999). At the 2009 Copenhagen Summit too, despite a concerted effort by a largely-unified developed world, led by the US, to do away with the Kyoto Protocol altogether, and erase the foundational principle of 'differentiation' itself, India worked closely with Brazil, South Africa and China, through the newly-formed BASIC alliance, to ensure that the core principles and provisions of the UNFCCC were referred to and retained in the Copenhagen Accord. However, India's efforts in this regard were only partially successful. Since then, the push by the West for a more symmetrical international climate regime that erodes the 'differentiation' between developed and developing countries has continued to gather pace. The most recent Cancun Agreements of 2010 succeeded in averting the disintegration of the entire multilateral negotiating process on climate change, as was feared by some, and provided legal anchorage to the Copenhagen Accord. But the price that was paid by developing countries, including arguably India, was the considerable weakening of the original UNFCCC/Kyoto regime (Rajamani, 2011).

India's foreign policies on climate change have undergone a remarkable transformation over the last two years. From a position where India refused to accept any uncompensated or quantified mitigation actions whatsoever, it agreed, first, to work towards limiting global temperature rise to '2 degrees C' at the L'Aquila meeting of the Major Economies Forum (MEF) in July 2009, including through the identification of a 'global goal' to reduce 'global emissions by 2050' (MEF, 2009). Then, in the months leading up to Copenhagen, its new environment minister, Jairam Ramesh, suggested that India would venture beyond its traditional 'per capita convergence' position and adopt a new 'per-capita plus' approach, whereby 'performance targets' would be assigned to specific sectors of the country to reduce their emissions.

Finally, in December 2009, just before the Copenhagen Summit, Ramesh announced in Parliament that India would voluntarily reduce the 'emissions intensity' of its GDP by 20-25 per cent by 2020 compared to its 2005 level through domestic mitigation actions (Lok Sabha, 2009). In Cancun, in December 2010, India seemed to move even further, with Ramesh suggesting that 'all countries must take binding commitments under an appropriate legal form' (Menon, 2010). Likewise, there has also been a tangible shift in India's international position on the question of external review and scrutiny of its domestic mitigation actions, from total refusal in 1992, to conditional acceptance in 2007, to offering 'international consultations and analysis' in 2009, including through more frequent and detailed national communications to the UNFCCC.

Making Sense of these Shifts

Now, a strong case can be made that there were valid reasons, other than Western pressure, for India to make these shifts. First, it may be argued that the two-decade long North-South negotiations on climate change were not yielding any tangible results, and only resulting in perpetual deadlocks. Given the inability of developing countries, including BASIC, to force the developed world to deliver on their past promises, it was therefore arguably time for a change in tack. Second, it can be argued that this was made even more necessary given the growing scientific knowledge of the risks posed by climate change, where lack of timely global action would only hurt a vulnerable developing country like India in the long run (as shown earlier in the paper). Third, it can also be argued that India is now an economically more powerful country compared to what it was 20 years back, and could therefore afford to take greater unilateral action to combat climate change on its own. Linked to this are also the enhanced expectations that the international community, especially its more vulnerable Southern partners from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), now had of India as playing a responsible role as an emerging global power. Fourth, it could be argued that the concessions that India offered at Copenhagen were those that it was any way on track to achieving, and not particularly burdensome. Fifth, early efforts to combat climate change could also present Indian businesses with new economic and technological opportunities for growth, and not just be viewed as a constraint on its development. Finally, it may be argued that deeper geopolitical realignments, such as the growing bilateral relationship between the United States and India, and the opening up of other bilateral opportunities for collaboration and mutual gain, also made it less logical for India to just pursue a line of unidimensional opposition to the West.

Yet, on the other hand, the recent shifts in India's foreign policy on climate change also raise a number of troubling questions. First, as the 2009

Copenhagen Accord and the 2010 Cancun Agreements demonstrate, the stage has now been set to ensure the ultimate unravelling and demise of the Kyoto Protocol, and a weakening (perhaps fatal) of the core principles and provisions of the UNFCCC, even while continuing to pay lip service to them. It may be argued, as various Western commentators have, that these were anyway flawed treaties that needed to be modified and replaced by more effective, universally applicable, international agreements that spread the responsibility for tackling climate change more equally among all the major emitters, developed and developing alike, recognising the realities of the 21st century. However, in response to this, one could argue that that the key reason why these treaties failed in the first place is precisely because developed countries consistently refused to honour the commitments that they had made under international law, despite signing on to and (in most cases) ratifying them on their own accord.

Thus, by failing to hold developed countries to account on their prior commitments, and by accepting, even enabling, their revisionist efforts, it can be argued that India has now made itself complicit to this process of undermining international law. This contradicts, and stands in sharp contrast to, its long-held aim of promoting a predictable rules-based international order, and could have unforeseen consequences for it in the future. Moreover, the deviations that have now been allowed from the agreed provisions of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, and legitimised as a consequence of the Cancun Agreements, have, it can be argued, rendered these treaties substantively hollow, from the point of view of safeguarding the core interests of developing countries, and left the status of critical provisions legally uncertain. For instance, under the UNFCCC, it had been explicitly agreed that the undertaking of any mitigation or adaptation actions by developing countries with 'incremental costs' would be conditional to the provision of 'new and additional' financing and technology from developed countries. However, by seemingly agreeing to unilaterally and voluntarily accept domestic mitigation actions and targets without any clarity on who will finance them, or other alternative guaranteed reciprocal gains, the basic logic of this provision itself may have now been undone to a large extent by these recent policy shifts.

It is true that India is materially better off today than it was two decades back. But, on the other hand, it cannot yet be called a rich country by any means, and has a range of other important development priorities to simultaneously address. At a time when the costs of climate mitigation and adaptation are highly uncertain, to offer unilateral concessions that undermine the basic understandings of cost-sharing that had been agreed to at Rio and reaffirmed subsequently, it may be argued, have now left the country on a weaker, not stronger, negotiating position than before.

Similarly, if the Kyoto Protocol is allowed to be expediently set aside by

the US and other developed countries at no cost to them, reputationally or otherwise, and with no benefits in exchange for the developing world (as is looking increasingly likely), then it does not reflect well on the negotiating or alliance-building skills of the latter. Indeed, unless India now takes appropriate steps to secure the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), from which its industry made significant gains in accessing foreign investment and technology for mitigation in recent years, it could very well lose its hitherto beneficial access to this Kyoto flexibility mechanism. But the challenge will be to do so in a way that does not undermine its overall position on this issue.

At a more general level, the UNFCCC today represents one of the very few international regimes today that are configured in favour of the developing world. If weakened under Northern pressure, or through poor negotiating on the part of the South, there is no guarantee that the latter will be able to ensure a similarly advantageous deal in the future again. Nor is there any assurance, more importantly, that whatever replaces these treaties will be any more successful in combating the threat of climate change, or in helping the developing world, and especially its most vulnerable members, to cope with its adverse and unequal effects.

Finally, India's recent foreign policy behaviour on climate change also raises serious questions about its management of alliances. Historically, India's foreign policy has rested on a legacy of championing the interests of weaker states in the international system, and demanding a fairer and more equitable international order. While this policy may be legitimately criticised on some grounds such as being overly moralistic, it is also true that it won it a degree of respect, credibility, trust and leadership, especially in the developing world. In addition to serving its own national interests, India's positions on climate change (and on other international issues, such as trade, for example) have traditionally also powerfully captured and articulated legitimate Southern concerns about global justice and equity. In attempting now to play a new bridging role between the North and South, as it visibly sought to at Cancun, it will be necessary for India to ensure that, in its endeavour to be viewed as a more helpful and pragmatic interlocutor by the North, it does not unwittingly lose its historical credibility and reputation among its Southern partners, any more than it is actually willing to.

The emergence of the BASIC group at Copenhagen signalled, to some extent, the rise of the emerging powers, including India, in the international system today. However, the irony here is that rather than the BASIC states setting the terms of the climate change debate, and leveraging their collective power to ensure an effective and fair long-term solution to climate change that can help its most vulnerable partners, it is the more unified North that seems to be effectively striking side-deals and playing off different members of the hopelessly fragmented South, including BASIC, against each another. Properly understanding, and resolving, this paradox will be a key challenge for India in the future.

Conclusion

Negotiating an effective and equitable long-term global agreement on climate change continues to remain an extraordinarily difficult challenge for the international community today. For India, in particular, it has thrown up a set of important competing arguments and priorities, which this paper has made only a very initial (and partial) stab at capturing. However, if it to be effective in defending its national interests on this issue, India's policymakers will need to consider and navigate through some of these aspects in much greater detail and depth.

What is clear is that India today faces a number of key trade-offs and choices on climate change, not all of which are easily reconcilable. It is in this challenging context, therefore, that it is vital for it to have a coherent national strategy on climate change that is based on a clear understanding of what its ultimate domestic and foreign policy interests and ambitions are. Some of these trade-offs will be particularly hard to resolve, such as: (1) the need to ensure adherence with existing international law versus the need to revise it in order to make it more effective; (2) the need to maintain a balance between *interests* and *values* while determining and managing the country's old and new alliances on this issue; and (3) the need to be flexible, open-minded and accepting of greater responsibility, on the one hand, with the need to being prudent, tough and alone, if necessary, on the other, to defend legitimate positions and principles that are right and serve the greater good.

Invariably, any decision that the government finally takes will be intensely scrutinised, debated and contested, as it should, in a democratic polity like India. However, the risks and costs of making mistakes and missteps will be significantly reduced if there is a systemic institutional process in place, ahead of time, that requires policymakers to strategically analyse and assess the various choices and options available before them, using the best evidence and talent available, before any decision is finally taken, or any commitment formally made. Ultimately, only sound arguments and solid reasoning, rather than either dogma or whim, should shape the decisions that are taken by the state. It is to facilitate all of these that a national strategy on climate change is an imperative today.

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Water Diplomacy and India's National Strategy

Medha Bisht

Does India have a national strategy in place in order to engage her neighbours on shared water resources? The paper while attempting to answer this question, aims to craft a strategy for India's water diplomacy. The paper adopts a backward-upward approach, i.e. rather than delineating a national strategy for India's water diplomacy at the very outset, it arrives at it by assessing the key factors that have so far governed (successfully or unsuccessfully) India's regional cooperation. The paper is divided into four sections.

The *first section* defines the concept of national strategy exploring the linkages between policy and strategy. The *second section* identifies three structural factors which govern state responses as they take water policy decisions. How have these factors (geography, climate change and economics) impacted state in the past and how have the concerned states responded to these factors within the existing negotiated agreements is what this section attempts to explore. The *third section* delineates the present limitations of India's water diplomacy. The analysis is based on the changing national priorities of the neighbouring countries. An attempt has been made to highlight the needs and interests of the South Asian countries, by studying their water visions and policy documents. The *fourth section* crafts India's national strategy. What are the gaps in the existing frameworks and what are the choke points which need to be addressed in India's water diplomacy with Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Pakistan and China, is the thrust of analysis for this section.

Defining Strategy

The word grand strategy was coined in the 1960s by Liddell Hart, who used the concept to imply that all military activity must be subordinated to politics and its grander scheme. Emphasising the need for a 'longer' and 'wider' view,

Hart suggested that grand strategy was policy in execution.[1] Identifying the political objective was the starting point for conceptualising a grand strategy.

Andre Beaufre defined grand strategy as a method of thought. The object of a grand strategy, he stated, was to codify events, set them in order of priority and then choose the most effective course of action. Beaufre thus defined grand strategy as total strategy, which laid down the object for each specialised category of strategy—political, economic, military and diplomatic—and the manner in which all should be woven together. On a similar note, some scholars have also defined strategy as tactics[2], which could include the political, social, psychological and economic tools/instruments for achieving a desired objective.

John Lewis Gaddis conceptualises strategy as ends-ways-means. He writes that grand strategy is the calculated relationship of means to larger ends. While focusing on how parts relate to the whole, Gaddis defines grand strategy as an ecological discipline, which requires an ability to see how all of the parts to a problem relate to one another and therefore to the whole thing.[3] Meanwhile, Colin Gray in an article 'Schools of Strategy' complements Gaddis's argument by stating that strategy can be approached within the triad of ends, means and ways (note the order of preference). According to Gray any definition of strategy unambiguously must convey the idea that it is about direction and the using of something to achieve a selected purpose.

The departure point for this paper is to explore the relationship between ends—ways—means. However before it is assumed that there is an essential link between strategy and diplomacy, it is important to understand the distinction between strategy and policy. Strategy, as broadly understood, implies a long term view of issues in both time and space. As rightly put by Liddell Hart, it is indeed policy in execution with a "longer" and a "broader" view. Also while the long term view is important, strategy also "guides" policy. While policy might be issue specific, strategy is the policy package or the blueprint which guides policy towards a particular political objective. Types of diplomacy, techniques of negotiations, problem solving and bargaining thus become important entry points for directing policy towards an envisioned strategy. In an effort to explore India's national strategy, the paper primarily raises three research questions:

1. What are India's political objectives in the neighbourhood and do the Indian plans/programmes regarding the optimal utilisation of these trans-boundary rivers meet those political objectives?
2. What are the means employed to achieve these political objectives?, and
3. What are the ways in which India engages with its neighbours in order to guide its policies to achieve the penultimate objective?

Diplomacy is one such tool which either facilitates or impedes the policy objectives identified at the national level. The domestic-external interface thus

becomes important. The conflict between policy and strategy, thus has to be mitigated by diplomacy—water diplomacy in this context.

The following sections will elaborate some of these aspects. The second section identifies critical factors which shape water policies of South Asian states. The third section identifies limitations and develops insights on linking the conflictual triad of policy-strategy-diplomacy.

Structural Factors Governing State Behaviour

Geography: Geography is an important leverage in water negotiations. It not only defines the state's riparian status vis-à-vis a downstream/upstream neighbour, but also the inherent bargaining power that a state can exercise in negotiating water agreements. While Spykeman and Rollin[4] argue that the control of headwaters gives a strategic advantage to the upper riparian, Willam Zartman,[5] emphasises that the geographical location of the state provides a veto advantage to an economically weak neighbour. Geography thus not only limits unilateral action but also changes the power equations, determined by material and conventional aspects of power. It would therefore not be an exaggeration to state that geography is one of the basic determinants of the structural power a state might exercise while negotiating water agreements.

Economics: Economic needs in the near future will also determine state postures. Three factors which could potentially drive water diplomacy in South Asia are energy security, food security and export/import of hydro-electricity. While rapid industrialisation and rising demographic pressures could both increase demands and impact the quality and quantity of available water, revenue generation through the export of hydro-electricity could also drive the smaller states towards active water cooperation. An important role played by water resources in economics is the relative advantage it gives to the upper riparian states. Though the upper riparian might have an asymmetrical relationship both in terms of size and economic power, it can deprive the powerful state of the much needed resources necessary to meet its domestic demands. Financial support and compensation are factors which can influence the economic calculus facilitating cooperation between lower and upper riparian.

Climate Change: Impact of climate change is critical to the South Asian context as most rivers emanate from glaciers, and also carry a high volume of sediment load. Global warming thus could have disastrous consequences for most of the countries. As a consequence of glacial melting, the initial impact could be manifested in seasonal variations of river flows; also, rivers at lower altitude could dry up leading to frequent droughts in the region. Given that the vegetation coverage in the Ganga Brahmaputra-Meghna and Indus water basin is just 20 per cent and 39 per cent respectively, climate

change could further exacerbate the health of existing eco-systems, aggravating the already existing problems of sedimentation and water logging being witnessed by many countries in the region. This could have a significant impact on lives and livelihood in large parts of northern South Asia. Studies of the impact of climate change also envisage rise in sea-level which would increase the salinisation of groundwater and estuaries, thus leading to a decrease in freshwater availability for humans and ecosystems in coastal areas.

In view of these factors, it would be useful to see how various South Asian countries have reacted to these variables in the existing negotiated agreements.

A Primer: Water Diplomacy in South Asia

Water agreements between India and her neighbours are governed by bilateral treaties and frameworks. While partitioning of rivers into western and eastern rivers prominently defines the framework for Indus Water Treaty, the sharing of river waters is the defining element of the Ganges Water Treaty and Teesta water sharing between India –Bangladesh. Meanwhile, development of water resource projects to meet irrigation and energy needs have largely shaped India-Nepal relations. Similarly, India-Bhutan relations are largely determined by an element of 'diffused' reciprocity directed towards construction of hydel projects. India and China do not share any bilateral water agreement, though both countries have a joint expert level mechanism in place, established in 2003, to discuss issues relating to trans-boundary rivers. A Memorandum of Understanding for providing hydrological information (water level, discharge and rainfall) on Brahmaputra was also signed by both countries in 2002.

India-Bangladesh Water Engagement

The India-Bangladesh water engagement revolves around the sharing of Ganges waters, sharing of Teesta waters and the Tipaimukh dam. These three issues have been negotiated between both countries at various points of time with India adopting a bilateral framework and Bangladesh insisting on a multilateral framework. Differentiated national positions primarily stem from the geographical locations as occupied by these countries in the sub-continent—with India being the upper riparian and Bangladesh, the lower riparian. Around 54 rivers flow into Bangladesh and both the countries form a part of the larger GBM basin.

The negotiations between Bangladesh and India over the River Ganges have resulted in two MoUs and two treaties signed between both countries in 1982 and 1985, and 1977 and 1996 respectively. Allocation of river waters and augmentation of flows in the dry season has been the central point of dispute between both the countries. Though many have considered the Ganges water treaty between Bangladesh and India as a success story, many

claim that the treaty lacks the flexibility of the 1977 agreement, which assured a minimum guarantee or an alternative water agreement in case the river flow reduces. Also it is said that the treaty lacks the vision for a long term solution in case of potential water scarcity. Bangladesh also claims that the treaty lacks a long term solution and does not explore means to engage other co-riparians. This is considered to be the major shortcoming of the treaty.[6]

Indo-Bangladesh relations are also strained over the issue of Tipaimukh dam which is proposed to be built in the state of Manipur in order to generate 1500 MW of hypro power and enhance flood control. Sections of the Bangladesh population are opposed to the construction of the dam as they argue that this would lead to the drying of two main rivers the Surma and the Kusiyara, which fulfil much of the irrigation needs of northeastern Bangladesh. Meanwhile, in India the Tipaimukh is being opposed as experts have suggested that apart from displacing the population, the dam would have an adverse seismic impact on the region. These controversies for long have stalled any decision on the subject and progress has slowed down since March 2007.

Sharing of the Teesta waters is the third issue in the Indo-Bangladesh water engagement. The Teesta river flows through the states of Sikkim and West Bengal, to Bangladesh. The plans to generate 3635 MW of power from hydel projects on the river has been criticised by environmental groups on account of forest clearances and the social cost of population displacement. Meanwhile, Bangladesh on its part has created a Teesta barrage primarily to cater to its own irrigation needs. Equitable allocation of water is one of the disputes between both countries. According to Bangladesh, India's water withdrawal upstream has been detrimental to land fertility and has increased soil salinity as less water is being discharged into the delta.

The Structural Factors in India-Bangladesh Relationship

An analysis of the Bangladesh-India water engagement reveals that *securing equitable water allocation* plays a primary role in shaping the element of reciprocity between both countries. Disputed claims and constraints on water allocation stem from increasing *domestic demands in India, electoral politics*, and *assuring a minimum flow* to Bangladesh during the lean season. Thus, while *economics* determines the *demand side*, *geography* determines the supply side. The supply side meanwhile is increasingly being hampered by dam building interventions in Northeastern India. Uncertainties of climate change and sea level rise appear as one of the key reasons in aggravating the lower riparian fears of Bangladesh.

India-Bhutan Water Engagement

There are four major rivers in Bhutan: the Torsa (Ammochu), Sankosh (Punatsangchu), Wangchu (Raidak) and the Manas.[7] The major rivers flow

through the country in a north-south direction before finally joining Brahmaputra and have an estimated potential of 30,000 MW of hydro power. The Master Plan developed with World Bank assistance, estimates that these four rivers alone have the potential to generate around 20,000 MW of hydroelectricity—and that too economically.[8] The residential sector accounts for about 48.7 per cent of the total energy consumption in the country[9] and since the country's electricity generation is significantly higher than the maximum domestic demand of 130 MW,[10] Bhutan exports most of the electricity. It is precisely for this reason that cross-border, hydro-power projects are a classic example of a win-win situation for both India and Bhutan. The Chukha Hydro-power Corporation Ltd contributes 336 MW to the installed capacity (71.69 percent); the Kurichu hydro project offers 60 MW while the Tala has added another 1020 MW to the existing capacity. As per the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2009, Bhutan plans to generate around 10,000 MW of power by 2020. The hydel projects will be built with Indian help and India has also signed a guaranteed buy-back agreement from Bhutan. The economic model followed by India and Bhutan has been highly successful. Pay-off structures, the nature of the projects and side payments have played a major role in giving a fillip to Indo-Bhutan relations.

The Structural Factors in India-Bhutan Relationship

As the joint projects are run on river projects, energy concerns dominate the relationship. Economics is thus the driving factor. Geography has played a minimal role, given the friendly relations shared by both countries. While both countries do have early warning mechanisms for flood forecasting, control and disaster management, so far issues related to climate change have not been factored into bilateral relations.

India-Nepal Water Engagement

The India Nepal water engagement has broadly revolved around four trans-boundary rivers: the Kosi, the Gandak, the Mahakali and the Karnali. The framework for cooperation has primarily revolved around optimal utilisation of water resources to meet the energy, flood control and irrigation needs of both countries. Beginning with the Sarada barrage in 1920, the history of Indo-Nepal water engagement has been marked by Nepal accusing India of negotiating unequal, non-reciprocal agreements. The Kosi Agreement, primarily designed to mitigate the scourge of floods, on which it failed miserably, was later expanded to include power generation and irrigation. Given the nature of Nepali grievances, disputes have revolved around unfair compensation packages, inequitable distribution of water for meeting irrigation needs and unfair power sharing arrangements. The location of the barrage on the Indian side rather than in Nepal has also been an irritant for the Nepalese. The Gandak Project, was meant to serve multi-purpose roles

of flood management, irrigation and power generation. However Nepal criticised the distribution of waters for irrigation in command area, with India irrigating almost 13,40,000 hectares in Bihar and 5,00,000 hectares in Uttar Pradesh, leaving 63,000 hectares for Nepal. The vision of the project included enhancing facilities for riverine traffic and inland water navigation in Nepal. However both these proposals—as the Nepalese point out—have not been actioned adding to the Nepalese grievances regarding Indian highhandedness.

The Mahakali Treaty was signed in 1996. Its main provisions were: integrated development of the Mahakali river focused towards benefit sharing accruing from the Sarada, Tanakpur and Pacheshwar barrages. As per the treaty, Nepal was provided with a supply of 1000 cusecs of water in the wet season and 300 cusecs in the dry season and an annual 70 million kilowatt hours of energy on a continuous basis, free of cost.[11] India was also supposed to construct the head regulators and water ways, and transmission lines up to the Nepal border at its own expenses. But all this has not taken place on account of the domestic opposition in Nepal and in view of its indirect socio-economic costs. Some even claim Mahakali is a worse treaty than the Kosi and Gandak as it delimits the water rights of Nepal, and was used as a strategy to legalise the Tanakpur barrage.[12]

The Structural Factors in India-Nepal Relationship

The structural factors shaping Indo-Nepal relations reveal that there are different priorities which guide both countries. While both countries depend on agriculture, India is more driven to meet its irrigation needs (Uttar Pradesh and Bihar) from the transboundary waters, Nepal on the other hand is driven by energy as well as irrigation needs and also expects Indian support for construction projects, navigation facilities and transmission lines as side payments. Compensation has emerged as one of the grievances, along with the social costs of the displacement of the Nepali population. Being a lower riparian, India on the other hand is driven more by geography and therefore has refused to accept the demand of Bangladesh to build storage dams in Nepal. Climate change, however, has not figured in the Indo-Nepal talks.

India-Pakistan Water Engagement

Pakistan and India signed the Indus Water Treaty in 1960. Primarily a partition treaty, three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) were given to Pakistan while three eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas, Ravi) were given to India. Popular literature has broadly defined the Indus Water Treaty as a successful confidence building measure. Notwithstanding these claims, the hydel diplomacy between India and Pakistan has witnessed sporadic skirmishes. These are most epitomised in disputes revolving Wullar, Salal, Dulhasti, Baglihar and Kishenganga. The recent Indian decisions to build a series of

dams on western rivers have also been opposed by the Pakistani establishment. While India argues that it has the right to build run on the river projects under the Indus Water Treaty, Pakistan claims that these upstream dams will have an adverse environmental, security and downstream impact on Punjab and Sindh.

The Structural Factors in India-Pakistan Relationship

Given the tensions in the India-Pakistan relationship, water diplomacy between both countries is driven by confrontation rather than joint cooperation.

The economic calculus stems more from domestic needs rather than the optimal utilisation of waters through bilateral cooperation. As 97 per cent of the available water in Pakistan is meant for agricultural. Usage, water security will be a national priority for Pakistan in the coming years. The bulk of the 6,460 MW of electricity produced by the Indus system comes from two dams—the Mangla on the Jhelum and the Tarbela on the Indus. Thus, energy and water will be the most critical issues facing Pakistan in the coming years. The former Finance Minister Shahid Javed Burki writes that energy availability is expected to increase at the rate of 5.75 per cent per year from 2005 to 2020. Stating that the present rate of power generation will not only reduce the growth rate of GDP by 1.25 per cent per year, but also adversely impact the GDP per capita income of Pakistan. His projected calculations are that Pakistan's GDP per capita with adequate supply of energy could double by 2020, going up from $700 to $1,400 in constant terms. He further writes that without any efforts to increase energy supply, the GDP per capita would possibly only go up to $1175, which would amount to a loss of average income of $225 per head in 2015, significantly affecting the incidence of poverty, distribution of interpersonal income and distribution of regional incomes.[13] With the command head waters located in India, Pakistan's territorial aspirations towards Kashmir could gather pace in the years to come. The economic discourse thus can give a fillip to territorial aspiration.

As far as climate change is concerned, India and Pakistan have no agreement to jointly work on the issue. This is primarily because when the IWT was signed, it was driven by technical and functional issues. Climate change and impact of global warming was a non-issue in the 1960s, a factor which also explains the lack of cooperation at the bilateral level.

Inside-Out: Assessing the Water Visions

While the contours of India's water diplomacy were highlighted above, the next section will focus on how India should formulate its national strategy in response to the stated perceptions/priorities of its South Asian neighbours. What should be India's strategy given its own constraints, to better accommodate demands of its neighbours. However, before one undertakes

such an analysis, a brief discussion of each nation's water vision perhaps becomes imperative.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh's water vision[14] can be gauged from the objectives given under the Water Policy Plans. These plans hinge on two factors—(a) managing surface and groundwater resources, and (b) developing a coastal development strategy. Some water challenges as identified by Bangladesh are:

1. Coping with floods
2. Guaranteed water supply during the dry season
3. Attending water needs of a growing economy and population
4. Controlling river sedimentation and preventing bank erosion

Quality management of water and maintenance of the eco-system are two areas which have been identified as the overarching goal. Also the National Water Policy underlines the need to develop riparian cooperation in the GBM basin. Thus geography seems to direct Bangladesh's long term plans.

As far as economic factors are concerned, to address the growing demands, water infrastructure in the form of barrages and multi-purpose dams has been proposed. These include taking a balanced overview of irrigation facilities, fisheries, navigation, forestry and aquatic life. The private development of groundwater irrigation for promoting agricultural growth, along with surface water development has been encouraged. Inland navigation has also been defined as an economic priority, primarily because the various watercourses in Bangladesh provide the cheapest means of transportation. Desilting to improve navigability has been identified as an economic priority, along with the preservation of fisheries, which support a large section of the population in Bangladesh.

Some other measures include, developing early warning and flood proofing systems to manage natural disasters like flood and drought. Prioritising flood risk zones and contingency plans for each region during flood and drought periods has also been highlighted. The Coastal Development Strategy[15] has been identified as a national economic policy, as much of Bangladesh is economic progress and stability is dependent on the protection of its coastline. As basin wide development has been declared a long term priority, consultation and engagement with India on afore-mentioned issues will be a foreign policy priority for Bangladesh in the years to come.

Bhutan

As per the Water Policy of Bhutan, 2003, the per capita availability of water is 75,000 cubic metres[16] which is the highest in South Asia. Sustainable water use and encouraging public education programmes to value and conserve water in all its forms has been encouraged. Creating institutions for enabling

people's participation and development of hydro-power along with industrial development has been identified as an effective pathway to attain socio-economic development. The national adaptation strategy for tackling climate change, including a national flood management and mitigation strategy, has also been identified as a national priority.

Therefore climate change along with economic needs appear to be the key variables in Bhutan's national priorities in the water sector.

Nepal

The theoretical power generation capacity of Nepal is 83000 MW. While the economically feasible capacity is 44,000 MW but the existing capacity in Nepal however is just 600 MW. The water vision of Nepal can be gauged from various policies and frameworks formulated over the period of years. Nepal, being a low income country is overtly dependent on external funding to build hydel projects. With lack of electrification at the domestic level, emphasis has been given to rural electrification as well as agricultural production.[17]

Given the variables identified above, Nepal's hydel power policy has been predominantly shaped by economics, whereby water resources have been largely perceived as a means to increase the revenues of the state. Non-reciprocity in economic terms has been one of the main grievances of Nepal. As far as climate change is concerned, no bilateral mechanism has been established for mitigating the impact of climate change. Nepal's rivers are fed by Himalayan glaciers and in the future will be prone to glacial lake outburst floods, which can potentially endanger India and Bangladesh. Being in a fragile seismic zone, it is also prone to earthquakes. Nepal ranks eleventh, amongst countries at risk from earthquakes, thirteenth from floods and is twentieth on the list of the most hazard prone countries in the world.

Pakistan

Pakistan's Vision 2025 is a comprehensive document regarding integrated water resource development. According to this, Pakistan aims to build various storage sites (big, medium and small dams) with a total capacity of 65 MAF (80.2 BCM) and develop a hydropower capacity (viable) of 40,983 MW.[18] The present generation and storage capacity of Pakistan is 5039 MW and 19.2 BCM respectively. The programme is proposed to be implemented in three stages. The estimated investment is pitched at $50 billion till 2025.

The National Water Policy (draft) in Pakistan proposed in 2004 envisaged the following water reforms[19]: strengthening domestic institutional arrange-ments, facilitating public-private partnerships, encouraging public education programmes, and promoting run on the river projects inside PoK.

Pakistan's water vision places an overt emphasis on water infrastructure in terms of barrage and dam construction stemming from engineering solutions to meet water shortages. Given that most of proposed dams/

barrages sites are in Punjab, inter-provincial faultlines emerge. Climate change has not figured in Pakistani discourse, except for the linkages provided to the run on the river projects being built on the western rivers. The impact of deforestation, loss of fisheries and increasing salinity in coastal Sindh are some other issues linked to climate change. Opposition to dams and diversion canals have primarily stemmed from the lower riparian concerns of Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Meeting the domestic energy and irrigation needs however seems to guide Pakistan's water vision.

Diagnosis: Towards India's National Strategy and Water Diplomacy

A comparison of the existing frameworks and individual water priorities of South Asian neighbours—except for Bhutan—reflects a mismatch between domestic needs and the negotiated water agreements. While most of the issues have been mentioned or taken into account in India's water diplomacy, prioritising seems to be a missing factor.[20] In the context of these limitations, which reflect the status-quoist relationship between India and its neighbours, the water diplomacy should consist of three basics. These are (a) Revisiting the political objective, (b) Explore the means to undertake water engagement, and (c) Identify the ways to bridge the gap between means and ends.

Revisit the Political Objective

Water being a finite resource can either facilitate cooperation or aggravate conflict. As trans-boundary rivers flow across national boundaries, linking the South Asian neighbours into one ecological unit, conflicts over water are bound to have a spill over effect on regional stability. Thus the first political objective identified for national strategy in relation to India's water diplomacy is its direct linkage to regional stability. According to some water experts, conflicts are more likely to occur on the local and regional level, particularly in developing countries where common property resources may be more critical to survival and less easily replaced and supplemented.[21] These research findings, though they do not bode well for the South Asian region, nevertheless underlines the necessity for initiating preventive measures.

Starting from river basin priorities and then working the individual initiatives of respective countries can be an effective route to determine India's national strategy. This 'other' to 'self' approach would serve a dual purpose. First, it brings about some order in competing inter-state priorities and second it would also bring South Asian rivers into harmony with nature.

Once the political objective is identified, the means for achieving it need to be delineated. Balancing the competing inter and intra-state priories within a broad framework thus needs to be at the centre of India's water diplomacy.

Identifying Means and India's National Strategy

While intra-state water management can be left to individual countries, inter-state water diplomacy needs to be redefined in broader terms. The first is resolving the *needs vis-à-vis rights debate*; the second is *emphasising responsibility vis-à-vis ownership claims* and third is *reconciling costs of techno-centric models with that of socio-economic paradigms*. These three issues are particularly relevant to South Asian water diplomacy, primarily because they govern the postures for cooperation or defection.

Assessing Needs vis-a-vis Rights

The needs vis-à-vis rights debate has witnessed a historical 'clash of wills' between upper and lower riparians across the world**.** Notwithstanding, competing claims by the lower riparians, in hindsight, it appears that in South Asia a need based approach has in fact helped resolve conflicts rather than the extreme assertion of right based positions.[22]

Therefore an effective means to take the riparian relationship forward in South Asia is to adopt a need based approach. Reverting to a rights based approach will foment conflict in relationships. Needs can emerge from growing domestic demands of energy, agriculture and population. As the needs of different countries might vary in consonance with their national priorities, multilateralism can be encouraged. Side payments, or making the deal attractive by financial compensation or rewards in other sectors, which resonate with the priorities of a particular country, could be helpful. In the case of Bangladesh, help for desalination of rivers to facilitate better navigation or providing support for coastal defences can be some side payments. In Nepal developing water navigation and transmission lines and providing Nepal access to the sea can help expand the zone of agreement. With Pakistan undertaking joint dredging activities, selling power and afforestation can help build confidence between nations.

Responsibility vis-à-vis Ownership Claims

The second point following from the first one is developing the responsibility factor. Mechanisms for cooperation on rivers already exist, however developing and protecting the water basins for the benefit of all can be jointly taken up by all the neighbours.

For instance, as far as Indo-Bangladesh relations are concerned, substantial progress has been made on mechanisms of flood management.[23] Of late India is providing flood data regarding Farakkha for Ganga flood forecasting methods, Bangladesh has also given its consent to joint dredging by the two countries to facilitate river navigation along the Kolkata-Haldia and Karimganj river routes.

Flood control is an area where India and Bhutan have also made

systematic plans to contain future eventualities.[24] The Joint Group of Experts (JGE) on flood management is a network of 44 hydrometeorological/meteorological stations located in Bhutan and is being maintained by Bhutan with funding from India. The data received from these stations is utilised in India by the Central Water Commission for formulating flood forecasts. Cooperation on this front is making good progress.[25]

Nepal and Pakistan do not share any such cooperative mechanism and can learn from the Bhutan and Bangladesh example.

Encouraging Socio-centric vis-a-vis Techno-centric Solutions

The present approach to the optimal utilisation of water resources in South Asia seems to be driven by engineering solutions. Thus, taking the ecology, societal and cultural factors into account is essential for increased water cooperation. Informing water policies with an interdisciplinary knowledge base, which is non-partisan and legitimately justifies the construction of projects has been proposed by some scholars, as a starter to manage water resources. Encouraging people to people contact across borders, while creating legitimate stakeholders in the process, who can participate in joint management and protection of river basins can also be an effective way of facilitating cooperation. Improving internal management and maintenance policies is another way to address socio-cultural needs. Institutions at multiple levels which correspond to the regional policy of basin wide management of rivers need to be created and crafted simultaneously as regional initiatives take place.[26]

The report of the World Commission on Dams, released in 2000, suggests some effective ways of addressing decision-making on water resources. A major highlight of the report was the rights and risks approach. Public acceptance of proposals, which recognises rights and addresses risks, thus safeguarding entitlements was one suggestion. The report also said that, "for projects to be socially legitimate and produce positive outcome" the greater involvement of parties should be mandatory. It further states, "that instead of exacerbating existing inequalities, projects should be opportunities for achieving high level of equity." Too much emphasis on design and structure obviating the needs of the people and the environment can only be a recipe for disaster in the years to come.[27]

Given the constraints and convergence of interests, the engaging of co-riparians thus becomes important. The two ways for engaging neighbours is either to adopt a bilateral approach or a multi-lateral one. While multilateral approaches can prove effective in increasing the zone of agreement and foster cooperation with some countries,[28] bilateral agreements can be signed with other countries, dependent on their individual need. Thus, a combination of multilateral and bilateral approaches can be used. In Nepal, India can provide aid for building small dams, which can take care of Nepal's domestic energy needs. Meanwhile barrages and link canals can be built to supply water to

the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. A multilateral relationship between India-Bangladesh-Nepal and India-Bangladesh-Bhutan in some areas could prove effective, in addressing the needs of the concerned countries. It can also create the necessary precedent for engaging China in regional water diplomacy.

China is an untamed riparian having control of trans-boundary rivers flowing through Nepal, India and Bangladesh. As of now, China does not have a water sharing agreement with any of the South Asian countries. Though in 2002, India and China did enter into a MoU for provision of hydrological information on Brahmaputra river, not much progress has been made. Another MoU was signed in 2005 for supply of hydrological information on Sutlej. A follow-up memorandum for hydrological information regarding the Brahamaputra river in the flood season from China to India for the period between 2008-2012 was also signed. Given the Chinese plans to divert the Brahmaputra, political tensions downstream are bound to rise. Thus a multilateral approach to include China into South Asian water diplomacy should be top priority for all the South Asian countries, especially India, who should take the lead as a framework of cooperation already exists.

The above analysis thus suggests that while ingredients for cooperation are already present, a holistic vision to translate them into a grand strategic design is perhaps missing. Recasting the essential ingredients though a triad of ends-means and ways can thus become an effective roadmap for crafting water diplomacy and India's national strategy.

NOTES

1. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, Dehradun, Natraj Publishers, 2003, p.335.
2. Colin S Grey, Schools of Strategy: Teaching Strategy for the 21st Century Conflict, November 2009, at: http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ , p. 7.
3. Lewis Gaddis, What is Grand Strategy, Yale University, February 26, 2009, the keynote address for a conference on "American Grand Strategy after War," sponsored by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies and the Duke University Program in American Grand Strategy.
4. N Spykeman and A. Rollins, " Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy II,"*The American Political Science Review,*32, 1958, 591-614.
5. Cited in Shlomi Dinar, *International Water Treaties: Negotiation and Cooperation along Transboundary Rivers,*London, Routlege, 2008, pp. 47.
6. M.M Rahman, "Water Conflict an Cooperation between Bangladesh and India," *Asteriskos,* 1/2 2006, at http://www.scribd.com/doc/13264275/Ganges-Water-Conflict.
7. Manas is formed from Tongsa chu, Bumthang chu, Kuri chu and the main Manas tributary.
8. Nepali Times, 30 August to 5 September 2000, at: http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/nepalitimes/pdf/Nepali_Times_007.pdf
9. Bhutan Electricity Authority, Ministry of Economic Affairs, at: http://www.bea.gov.bt/index.php?subaction=showfull&id=1190702278&archive=&start_from=&ucat=&

10. "Vibrant trade marks India, Bhutan ties", *Financial Express*, March 30, 2009, at: 2009http://www.financialexpress.com/news/vibrant-trade-marks-india-bhutan-ties/350823/0

11. T. Upreti, *"International Water Courses Law and its Application in South Asia*, Kathmandu: Pairavi Prakashan, 2006, p. 43.

12. "Indo-Nepal Mahakali Treaty has not been properly ratified," *Kantipur Daily*, Novemner 30, 2009, at: http://www.ekantipur.com/2009/11/30/Oped/Indo-Nepal-Mahakali-Treaty-has-not-been-properly-ratified/303605/

13. Shahid Javed Burki, "The Weight of History: Pakistan's Energy Problem", in *Hathaway et al (eds.), Fueling the Future: Meeting Pakistan's Energy Needs in the 21st Century*,Washington: : Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2007, p. 47.

14. Ministry of Water Resources, Bangladesh, at: http://www.mowr.gov.bd/

15. Coastal Zones include 19 districts in Bangladesh, facing or having proximity with the Bay of Bengal and exclusive export zones.

16. Bhutan's Water Policy, 2003, Royal Government of Bhutan, Thimpu, at http://www.moa.gov.bt/moa/downloads/downloadFiles/MoADownload8uv5955mb.pdf

17. Govt. of Nepal, Nepal Electricity Authority.http://www.nea.org.np/acthydro.php

18. http://pakistanhydro.com/include/download/vision2025.pdf

19. National Water Sector Profile, Pakistan's water sector strategy, Ministry of Water and Power, Office of Chief Engineering Advisor, Vol. 5. October 2002, at http://202.83.164.26/wps/wcm/connect/ac9132004199c949bf26ffc5b4dad69b/Pakistan+Water+Sector+Strategy+Volume+5.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=ac9132004199c949 bf26ffc5b4dad69b&CACHEID=a c9132004199c949bf26ffc5b4dad69b&CACHEID=ac9132004199c949bf26ffc5 b4dad69b&CACHEID=ac9132004199c949bf26 ffc5b4d ad69b

20. In Bangladesh, assured water supply in the dry season and equitable sharing of transboundary waters appears to be the central lynchpin of the negotiated agreements. Assessments stemming from the domestic vision reveal that quality and quantity of water for navigation purposes as well as coping with floods, droughts and upgrading coastal defences are important priorities. In Bhutan needs and priorities go hand in hand and are well reciprocated in India's water diplomacy and thus seems to follow a positive trajectory. In Nepal, apart from the institutional reforms which are emphasised to strengthen the water sector, policy vision seems to be driven by an overt prominence on harnessing Nepal's hydel potential. Reaping good economic pay-offs thus improving the economic status, has been underlined. At the bilateral level, however, these priorities seem to be challenged by India's growing demand for water to meet its irrigation needs primarily in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Thus while irrigation appears to be the Indian priority, export of electricity is the Nepali priority. Apart from this India's reluctance to give command and control of dams to Nepal seems to be a irritant in expanding the bilateral engagement to a multi-lateral one. In Pakistan domestic demands and equitable distribution of water seems to guide its overt emphasis on water engineering solutions. However, internal incompatibilities and opposition to dams stemming from lower riparian fears of Sind, K. P. and Balochistan are the main reasons for challenging this approach. The geographical factor, of water command areas in the Kashmir valley, seems to guide Pakistan's water diplomacy towards India.

21. P.H. Gleick, "Water and Conflict," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 1, Summer 1993, 83.

22. Aaron Wolf, "Criteria for Equitable Allocations: The heart of international water conflict," *Natural Resources Forum* Vol. 23, No. 1, 1999. For instance, in the Indo-Pakistan case Western rivers were given to India, while Eastern to India. Given that

much of the Punjab and Sindh depended on the Indus river which constituted around 80 percent of the flow, the Indus Water Treaty underlines a need based approach. With financial aid being given to Pakistan, to built huge diversion infrastructure, the claiming tactics of states diffused in the process. Similarly in the India-Bangladesh framework the Ganges water treaty was primarily successful both in 1977 and 1996, because it took into account the Bangladeshi needs of an assured water supply during the dry season. The focus was on needs of the lower riparian rather than on the rights. Indo-Bhutan example is clear example of emphasising a need based approach. The pay-offs to both countries are well reflected in the reciprocal relations which the two countries have been able to establish over the period of years. The Indo-Nepal water engagement is also a pointer on how negotiated agreements fail when they do not respond to the needs of the concerned countries. Failure of the Gandak, Kosi and Mahakali are just few examples. The Mahakali Treaty though was hailed as a better treaty has however witnessed rough waters due to domestic opposition in Nepal. Assertion of water rights over the Mahakali river has emerged one of the main reasons for blocking any progress in negotiations.

23. A meeting of Indo-Bangladesh Experts on Flood Forecasting and Warning System took place in August, 2000 in which the two countries discussed the issues of strengthening and expanding the existing co-operation for improving the Flood Forecasting and Warning SystemIndo-Bangladesh Cooperation, Ministry of Water Resources, at http://wrmin.nic.in/writereaddata/linkimages/CHAPTER%20-%2071809012297.pdf

24. A Joint Group of Experts (JGE) on Flood Management has been constituted between India and Bhutan to discuss and assess the probable causes and effects of the recurring floods. Recently the Union minister has also announced a scheme called "Comprehensive Scheme for Establishment of Hydro-Meteorological and Flood Forecasting Network" on rivers common to India and Bhutan in order to prevent threats of floods in near future "Bhutan hydro projects not responsible for Assam floods", Times of India, March 2, 2009, at : http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Guwahati/Bhutan-hydro-projects-not-responsible-for-Assam-floods-/articleshow/4209437.cms

25. India-Bhutan Cooperation, at: http://india.gov.in/sectors/water_resources/international_corp.php

26. Jayanta Bandyopadhyay, Nilanjan Ghosh, "Holistic Engineering and Hydro Diplomacy in the GBM Basin, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 44(45), 2009, pp. 50-60.

27. Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision Making, World Commission on Dams, 2000, p. 213.

28. To just give an example, while Nepal and Bhutan might be interested in exporting power to Bangladesh and getting access to port facilities via Indian and Bangladeshi territory, India can help in building transmission lines to facilitate transfer of power. The side-payment for India might be developing good relationship with its neighbours, which could take into care of anti-Indian perceptions in neighbourhood. Also this would not only help Nepal to expand its revenue base, but would also diversify its energy market. This can have an indirect impact on easing out Nepali postures towards meeting irrigation needs of India.

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