

# **Integrated Theatre Commands**

## **Creation of Integrated Theatre Commands will Increase the Operational Efficiency of Indian Defence Forces**

**A Dissertation Submitted to the Panjab University, Chandigarh for the Award of  
Master of Philosophy in Social Sciences, in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement  
for the Advanced Professional Programme in Public Administration (APPPA)**

**BY**

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**47<sup>th</sup> Advanced Professional Programme in Public Administration**

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**CERTIFICATE**

It is hereby declared that this submission is my original piece of work and to best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by any other person. I am aware of the University's norms and regulations regarding the plagiarism including the disciplinary action that it may invite. Any use of the works by any another author, in any form, is adequately acknowledged at their point of use or in the Bibliography.

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I have the pleasure to certify that Brig Vanguru Raghu, has pursued his research work and prepared the present dissertation titled “Integrated Theatre Commands : Creation of Integrated Theatre Commands will increase the Operational Efficiency of Indian Defence Forces “ under my guidance and supervision. The same is result of research done by him and to best of my knowledge; no part of the same has been part of any monograph, dissertation or book earlier. This is being submitted to the Panjab University, Chandigarh, for the purpose of Master of Philosophy in Social Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Advanced Professional Programme in Public Administration (APPPA) of Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA), New Delhi.

I recommend that the dissertation of Brigadier Vanguru Raghu is worthy of consideration for the award of M. Phil degree of the Panjab University, Chandigarh.

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**Abstract****Integrated Theatre Commands****Creation of Integrated Theatre Commands will increase the Operational Efficiency of Indian Defence Forces**

1. India is an emerging power. Armed forces are an important instrument of national power. Planning and conduct of battles within compartments of services i.e. Army, Navy or Air Force is not an ideal method of planning and fighting a battle. Thus there exists a requirement to restructure the defence forces to achieve greater integration. The only method of achieving a close integration is by placing the resources of Army, Navy and Air Force under one Commander.

2. All major defence forces have Integrated Theatre Commands combining all the resources of defence forces under one commander. However, copying organisations tailor made for other countries may not be the best solution in our context. There is a need therefore to undertake a detailed study on the efficacy and contours of an Integrated Theatre Command to arrive at an optimised plan for our Defence Forces.

3. The research aims to carry out a critical appraisal of the existing structures of the Indian Defence Forces in the backdrop of current and future roles. Thereafter, the rationale behind establishment of an Integrated Theatre Command are analysed to arrive at the need for creating such a structure in the Indian context. Various models of achieving an Integrated Theatre Command is analysed to arrive at various recommendations to restructure various formations and headquarters. The main sources of material for the research are drawn from unclassified interactions with



various Army, Navy and Air Force personal, personal reflections and open sources available on the internet.

4. Integration or lack of it is the most discussed facet of armed forces in recent times. The three services have been engaged in finding common ground on the integration aspects and have introduced a number of measures for the same. The increase in the number of tri-services organizations and reenergizing of the joint organizations has been a few of them. However, if the present status is critically and un-emotionally analysed, these changes have been more cosmetic than actually bringing about a change in mindset. Jointness has been created through new organizations such as HQ Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS), Strategic Forces Command (SFC) and Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC), leaving the parent services largely untouched. A variety of factors contribute to this cosmetic attitude, turf war and mutual distrust to name a few. The implementation of the more important measures announced by Kargil Review Committee tabled in parliament in 2000 which led to commissioning of Arun Singh led Task Force, and later the Naresh Chandra Task Force on National Security in 2012 has been continuously relegated to a later date. Whether they were not implementable or they were not implemented due vested interests needs to be studied in greater detail.

5. The basic premise of the study is the compelling requirement of further integration in our armed forces. Whether it can be achieved through creation of integrated commands and consequently a change in the Higher Defence Organisation (HDO) needs to be examined through this study. The study therefore traces the subject under three broad headings. These are analysing the Integrated Structure, the Higher Defence Organisation to support it and finally whether we as a country are ready to

accept it. Towards this, the hypothesis has been analysed in following sequential steps:-

(a) Historical dimensions of jointness in the context of Indian Armed Forces, India's national aspirations, corresponding responsibilities and challenges and the role that its armed forces will need to fulfill in pursuance of the same.

(b) Analysis of following concepts and principles and their relevance to management of national security and application of military power in the Indian context:-

(i) The concept of 'Levels of War', and corresponding levels of 'Command and Control' structure.

(ii) The concept of 'Natural Theatre' at strategic level.

(iii) The principle of 'Unity of Military Command' and their relevance to synergistic application of military power.

(c) Appraisal of existing structures for management of security at the national level (Higher Defence Organisation) through analysis of their existing rationale and suitability for addressing aspirations and concerns of the emerging future.

(d) Identifying the shortcomings in the structure for application of military power at the strategic level and establishing the need for synergistic restructuring.

(e) Study of the integrated theatre models including the command and control aspects in respect of other countries are analysed if they can be applied in the Indian context.

## **CHAPTER I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

*"Nothing is stronger than an idea whose time has come."*

*Victor Hugo*

#### **Introduction**

1. Organisational structure of any establishment has a major bearing on its ability to deliver the result in an efficient and timely manner. Indian Armed Forces are charged with the responsibility of ensuring the sovereignty of our nation when called upon to do so. They inherited the organisational structure from the British and though there have been changes, the basic structure remains the same.

2. Over time, India has evolved from a third world nation to one of the leading nations of the world. Historically, '*strong nations always had strong defence forces*'. Indian Defence Forces have evolved from a purely colonial construct into one of the important defence forces of the world. However, there appears to be a lot of scope for improvement in the field of integration and joint-manship between the three services within the armed forces. In today's world, even the thought of employment of any one Service of the military i.e. either the Army or Navy or the Air Force in isolation appears ridiculous.

3. The basic rule applied in designing any organisational structure is that forces or capabilities that are to be applied in an integrated and synergised manner work under one command or commander. In India, the three wings of the military that is the Army, Navy and the Air Force work in tight and compartmentalised environments with only

formal interactions. Such a construct may have been found tolerable and even somewhat desirable in the yesteryears. It however appears suicidal in the modern day battlefield environment. Thus, there is a need to institute structures that encourage an integrated approach to conduct of battles.

4. During the British era, India was perhaps the only country in the world having a single Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) for all the three Services. In 1947, this arrangement was discarded and each Service came to have its own C-in-C, independent of each other. There is no doubt that the three services are proficient in planning and conduct of operational art in their own individual spheres and have acquitted themselves exceptionally well in individual service specific operations. However, when it comes to formulation and conduct of joint operational art, there are serious inadequacies. There is no agency that links all elements of military during the planning and conduct phase. This is a serious handicap for the defence forces and in fact for the country. It is only by integration of three services at a functional level that the Indian defence forces can hope to be prepared for the future conflicts.

5. The Indian Armed Forces have come a long way since independence wherein, from almost nothing, the three services have grown into formidable organizations and are a force to reckon with. They are one of the main policy arms of the government in achieving the national security objectives and have been exercised in this role a number of times. In these conflicts, all the three services displayed professionalism of the highest order. However, post all the conflicts, a debate always ensued about the 'jointness' and its adequacy in these operations. Of course, going back into history, the concept of the Army, Navy and Air Force coming together and synergizing their operations to maximize their individual capabilities has always been there. From as far

back as Normandy landings through both the Gulf Wars till the recent anti- Taliban ops in Afghanistan, the joint concept as the key to ensure success in future conflicts has been regularly displayed. Then why have we got left behind?

6. War remains a joint endeavour and it involves not just the armed forces but the entire nation in what is together termed as Comprehensive National Power (CNP). In today's technologically complex environment amidst a wide spectrum of new challenges, it is but essential that the entire nation fights as a cohesive unit in general and armed forces as a 'Single' service in particular. The era of land forces, air force and maritime forces, operating as independent arms is long over and has led to what is now called as '**Concept of integrated operations**'.

7. If that is so clear a principle, how does it become the common lesson to be learnt from all the committees that have been formed over the years to look into the reforms needed in the armed forces structure? When all the major powers around the world have adopted a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or a similar organisational structure, why have we been reluctant to embrace it?

8. Alongside, a lot needs to be done to improve the management of national security in India. The first and foremost requirement is for the government to formulate a comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS), including internal security, so that all the stakeholders are aware of what is expected of them.<sup>2</sup> Such a document would then lead on to various organisational as well as doctrinal changes and bring the debate of cohesion between armed forces to national level. Most importantly, the services can then go beyond a cosmetic joint doctrine into a deeper document, bringing 'real' integration in future operations.

9. India has an inescapable global role. As per US intelligence report 'Global Trends 2025', the international system as constructed following the second world war will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing economy and transfer of relative wealth and economic power from west to east. The indications are already there. The economic crisis in the west, relatively higher growth rates of China and India, rapid globalization and increase in non-state actor activity round the world is a confirmation to the ibid report. We are drifting into a leading position and willing or not, India would be required to play a much greater role in the new world order.

10. The emerging status would guide us to shape the new strategy and India would have to be prepared to undertake challenges, especially security related, from Malacca Straits to Gulf of Aden. Needless to say, 'Jointness' or 'Integration' would hold the key to handling these new challenges. It would require skilful integration of the core competencies of the three services into an integrated force structure capable of adapting to varying situations. The integration would alongside be essential for defending own territorial integrity along with any Out of Area Contingency (OOAC) arising in this area of interest. These areas or zones (both within and outside the country) could be called as '**Theatres**' and the operations so conducted jointly could be termed as '**Integrated Theatre Concept Operations**'.

11. In formulation and consequent pursuance of our national policies, the quality of military advice available to the political hierarchy is also questioned. The appointment of CDS and his subsequent non-inclusion in the National Security Council meetings has been suggested by many to be the panacea of this problem. However due to

varying reasons, it has still not been implemented. It needs to be understood that restructuring of the high level military hierarchy and maybe the inter-twinning of civil bureaucracy in military structure may be one of the critical steps for implementation of any theatre concept of battle.

12. Another aspect related to jointness and also to an integrated way of looking at fighting future wars is the procurement of equipment for all the three services. With HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) taking on this responsibility of at least the common equipment, the issue has partly been addressed. A change in the organisational structure may be instrumental in complete optimization of procurement process as well as intelligent expenditure of defence budget. Inter-operability, one of the basic prerequisites for undertaking joint ops, is also likely to be better with an integrated procurement approach. It will also lead to better utilization of capital budget wherein the common equipment could be procured together bringing down the associated costs.

13. It stands clearly demonstrated by the history of contemporary military operations the world over that no service can win wars on their own. In today's battlefield environment, long range weapons and advances in C4I<sup>2</sup>SR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, interoperability, surveillance & reconnaissance) have brought about transparency, vastly accelerated the speed of battle and made conventional paradigms irrelevant. Under these conditions, victory will come easily to a side that would effectively harness the synergy of the three services. 'Jointness' can be explained as the conduct of air-land, air-maritime and tri-service campaigns with a common military strategy in pursuance of national interests/national security objectives. Various professional armed forces round the world have been achieving jointness through appropriate changes in their inter service organizations as



well as own structures. The Indian armed forces have also come a long way since independence and have achieved a degree of jointness, however; it remains short of the level that such a modern force aspires to have. Presently, whether it is a question of strategic, operational or tactical doctrines or training, equipment procurement, operational functions and logistics, each service tends to go its own way. The result of this is that there is no common agreed strategic plan to counter our potential adversaries, no common accepted joint doctrine for the Land-Air battle or for that matter the Sea-Air battle, leave alone any joint approach to training, equipment procurement, intelligence gathering or logistic support. Military operations today, as well as in the future would require a much higher deal of synergy which would allow not just operational effectiveness but also act as a force multiplier and above all a measure of economy and efficiency. Consequently, an integrated approach and a truly joint force, is not just desirable but an imperative. The essential elements of a future war will be deeper and wider combat zones due to increased reach of surveillance (including space-based systems) and firepower resources. Ascendency of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and conduct of operations under the glare of media further highlights the need for increased synergy between the three services. Information Warfare (IW) permeates all boundaries and has the ability to affect the entire war-fighting effort near simultaneously. In Indian context, besides the non-conventional and conventional threats, our adversaries continue resorting to proxy war and fanning insurgencies to achieve their goals. Integration at all levels is therefore the only inescapable solution that we as a nation have to achieve in general and armed forces in particular.

## Chapter II

### Literature Review and Research Methodology

1. Literature review for formulating the Research Proposal has been carried out by study of relevant books on the subject and references given in writings about previous wars, study of archival records, articles published in various defence journals like CENJOWS, IDSA, and CLAWS. Some of the documents utilised for carrying out literature review are listed as under:-

S No	Year	Author	Obj & Issues Discussed	Findings	Research Gap Identified
(a)	Jan 2003	Lt Gen (Retd) SK Sinha, " <i>The Chief of Defence Staff</i> ," Journal of Defence Studies, IDSA, Vol 1, No 1,	Requirement of Integration and leadership	Optimal application of combat power	Structure of ITC
(b)	Oct 2007	Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, Higher Defence Organisation : A Case for CDS and Theatre Commands in India, Pinnacle	Requirement of ITCs in Indian Context	Exists	Scenarios for application of ITC
(c)	Apr- Jun 2006	Gp Capt A S Bahal, Requirement of CDS and Joint Structures', Indian Defense Review, Vol 21, 2	Requirement of ITCs in Indian Context	Exists	Role and charter of CDS on formation of ITC

(d)	2020	CENJOWS - Structures and Contours of Integrated Theatre Commands and Joint Commands	Structure of ITC	Critical Analysis	Organisational Structure of ITC
(e)	2019	CENJOWS - Historical Retrospect and Integrated Theatre Commands In the Indian Context	Unique borders Multi spectral threats Three borders and IS situation	Two and half front	Scenarios for application of ITC
(f)	2020	CENJOWS - Northern Command as a theatre command test bed	Uniqueness of NC	Two and half front	Handling of multiple threats

2. **Research Methodology.** The Research Methodology will be Qualitative and Descriptive. The primary sources of data will be Surveys amongst the serving officers attending the course and posted in various service HQs, Questionnaire, focussed group discussions amongst the participants of APPPA 47 and interviews with the various eminent speakers at IIPA. Secondary source of data will be books and journals which have published relevant articles on the subject.

### **CHAPTER III**

#### **METHODOLOGY OF DISSERTATION**

##### **Statement of the Problem**

1. Analysis of the projected threat scenarios makes close integration amongst the various arms of the military i.e. the Army, Navy and Air Force a necessity. Case for integration of the defence forces at the highest level has been accepted at the political level, which has led to the creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). In addition, a synergised application of a force comprising the combined services can only be feasible with integration of various services at the Command or Theatre level. The research will seek to examine the relevance of Integrated Theatre Command in the backdrop of our current threat scenarios, war fighting concepts and critically examine the importance of Integrated Theatre Commands in achieving synergy in application of the armed forces in the contemporary and futuristic battles thereby increasing their operational effectiveness.

##### **Justification for the Study**

2. India is an emerging power. Armed forces are an important instrument of national power. Planning and conduct of battles within compartments of services i.e. Army, Navy or Air Force is not an ideal method of planning and fighting a battle. Thus there exists a requirement to restructure the defence forces to achieve greater integration. The only method of achieving a close integration is by placing the resources of Army, Navy and Air Force under one Commander. Recent developments in the region which include overt nuclear status of Pakistan, India's declared proactive

strategy against Pakistan and the possibility of a military confrontation with China in future necessitate a study of integration of Indian Army, Navy and Air Force and the need to restructure the same to arrive at capable, mission oriented formations and headquarters. Such integrated organisations are essential since the post of CDS or any other similar combined organisation is established at the highest level.

3. All major defence forces have Integrated Theatre Commands combining all the resources of defence forces under one commander. However, copying organisations tailor made for other countries may not be the best solution in our context. There is a need therefore to undertake a detailed study on the efficacy and contours of an Integrated Theatre Command to arrive at an optimised plan for our Defence Forces.

### **Approach**

4. The research has carried out a critical appraisal of the existing structures of the Indian Defence Forces in the backdrop of current and future roles. Thereafter, the rationale behind establishment of an Integrated Theatre Command has been analysed to arrive at the need for creating such a structure in the Indian context. Various models of achieving an Integrated Theatre Command will then be analysed to arrive at various recommendations to restructure various formations and headquarters. The main sources of material for the research have been interaction with various army, navy and air force personal in the course and the service HQs, from outside environment and personal reflections.

### **Hypothesis**

5. (a) **Null Hypothesis** - Integrated Theatre Commands are not required in the current threat scenario and will not increase the operational effectiveness of the Indian Defence Forces.

- (b) **Alternate Hypothesis** Integrated Theatre Commands are required in the current threat scenario and will increase the operational effectiveness of the Indian Defence Forces.

### **Scope**

6. The scope is restricted to the organisational structures which will directly be involved in war fighting. Existence of Integrated Theatre Command in some ways presupposes the existence of an Integrated Defence Services HQ and Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) at the national level. However, details of the same are not being discussed as that is a subject of a separate study. The main emphasis of this dissertation is the need for establishment of integrated theatre commands and the various structures at the Integrated Theatre Command level.

### **Research Methodology**

7. In addition to various books, journals, periodicals and previous research projects by scholars on related issues, views of eminent speakers visiting IIPA and views of field commanders gathered during visits to various headquarters are taken into account. The research methodology will be Qualitative.

### **Structure of Dissertation**

8. The dissertation has been structured as under:-
- (a) **Chapter I** Introduction.
  - (b) **Chapter II** Literature Review and Research Methodology.

- (c) **Chapter III** Methodology of Dissertation.
- (c) **Chapter IV** Contours of Future Wars and the Need for Integrated Theatre Commands.
- (d) **Chapter V** Role of a Theatre Command and its Relationship with other Service and Integrated Staff Headquarters.
- (e) **Chapter VI** Data Analysis and Assessment and Hypotheses Testing.
- (f) **Chapter VII** Proposed Integrated Theatres.
- (g) Conclusion.

## CHAPTER IV

### CONTOURS OF FUTURE OPERATIONS AND THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED THEATRE COMMAND

1. This chapter has covered the following aspects:
  - (a) **Changing Nature of Warfare.** The attrition based wars of the industrial age are giving way to a new kind of war based on information superiority. Future wars will be based on information technologies.
  - (b) **Joint-ness: The Indian Story.** The Indian armed forces have a long and chequered history of joint operations. This section discusses the historical perspective of joint-ness in the Indian Armed Forces starting from the 47-48 operations till peacekeeping missions.
  - (c) **Do We Need Integrated Commands?** The section analyses five possible military scenarios that India might face to study the need for integration of the three services.
  - (d) **Arguments Against Integrated Theatre Commands.** The section studies the various arguments against the establishment of Integrated Theatre Commands, the concerns of various stakeholders and the difference between “Jointness” and “Integration”.
  - (e) **An Idea Whose Time has Come.** The concept of integrated command can be applied in a number of areas. This section analyses the various areas where it can be applied.



2. History is witness that there can be no strong nation without a correspondingly strong military or defence force. India with nearly a sixth of the world's population, inheritors of the legacy of one of the oldest civilizations, occupying a strategic location on the southern tip of the Asian landmass and dominating the Indian Ocean and with a large concentration of natural resources, a strong human resources base and a vibrant soft power will sooner than later attain or be thrust into a position of power. Thus for India the need for a strong military is essential.

3. In an emerging global order India will definitely have a greater role to play. As an aspiring regional and in time a global player India can ill afford to neglect configuring its military to suit its employment under all conditions. Indian Foreign policy will have to mould itself to the complexities of 21<sup>th</sup> Century politics for furtherance of own national interests. India will have to calibrate all its responses to ensure a stable South and SE Asia by restoring the balance of power in Asia wrt Indian position vis a vis China.

4. **Changing Nature of Warfare.** There have been profound changes which are altering the nature of wars and warfare. The attrition based wars of the industrial age are giving way to a new kind of war based on information superiority. Future wars will be based on information technologies. Wars will comprise integrated campaigns employing all components of national power including land, naval and air forces. Such warfare would call for real time coordination amongst the various components of the forces waging the war. The stress would be on the paralysis of the enemy's command and control means and his war fighting capabilities rather than his total destruction. Such warfare would demand emphasis on combined and joint operations. Therefore, our armed forces must prepare to fight such wars. Changing international security environment along with other diverse factors have accentuated our security concerns

and compel us to re-examine how the defence of the country should be conducted. Future wars will need to be fought by all the three services and in fact by the whole nation as a single entity. It is rightly said that it is not the military which goes to war but the whole Nation. Defence of the nation can never be considered to be the responsibility of a single service or even a single entity. It is only by close cooperation amongst the various arms of the nation can a successful defence of the nation be planned. The concept of all the services coming together to fight a war is not new. This idea reached its zenith during the World War 2 with its massive Normandy landings. The recent Gulf Wars and other engagements by the US forces lay greater emphasis on this truth.

5. Most significant to modern day warfare is the recognition of the dominant role that air power must play in any military environment. On land or at sea, control of the air space in the operating area is essential to the successful conduct of battle. Whether provided by shore based aircraft or from those launched from aircraft carriers at sea, air power has become a determining factor. While it cannot replace boots on ground, its impact on warfare has become overwhelming.

6. The other major change is in the increasing dimension of concerns at sea. The sustained growth of economy, a key national interest, requires security of overseas trade and energy, both almost entirely seaborne. Safety of sea lanes and offshore assets has also assumed importance. The ability of seagoing forces to impact the war on land has also increased. For example, facilities on the coast as well as in the hinterland of the adversary can be better attacked from the sea than from land or air bases. Cruise missiles of longer range, which could be in our inventory in the next ten years, will further enhance this capability. Finally, no expeditionary or out of area activity can be carried out without the closest possible synergy amongst the three wings of the

military. Along with these operational imperatives, military hardware has also become extremely costly and it is essential that its induction should follow critical analyses of inter se priorities and cost benefit considerations which is possible only under an integrated planning system. For all these reasons, it has become important that plans of the three Services are developed and then executed in an integrated fashion and under one common Theatre Command. This is not to suggest that there will not be glitches even if changes are made in the way we do things; some of them might even be damaging in their effect, but overall, the likelihood of their occurrence will be much less and the ability of the organisation to respond to them effectively, much greater.

7. If we examine the principles of war, inter-service cooperation stands out as a time-tested principle. Unity of effort contributes towards an efficient and effective end product which brings us closer to achieving our aim of value for money. The future battlefield with hi-tech weapons and support systems would lend itself to be best exploited by joint and integrated operations. Do we possess the required joint-ness and integration between the three Services at strategic, operational and tactical levels? Is it adequate to achieve the desired synergy in operations?

#### **Jointness: The Indian Story**

8. The Indian armed forces have a long and chequered history of joint operations. Study of the wars since independence indicates that our experiences of joint planning and conduct of operations of our three Services in any conflict have been mixed. It appears that though the strategic and geographical compulsions strongly recommended a synergised and joint action of the three services however this was not always the case. The first conflict with Pakistan in 1947-48 did not offer any scope for large scale joint operations. It was a limited war and the role of Air Force was restricted to transportation of troops and materials into Kashmir Valley. It is however recorded that

maintenance and transport support provided by the Air Force was crucial, timely and efficient. IAF was instrumental in providing effective air defence over Srinagar, Leh and Poonch. During Sino-Indian war of 1962, the Air Force was not used (except in supply and transport duties) when it would have been very profitable to use ground attack missions against the Chinese troops which lacked air cover. The reason for not calling the IAF has not been substantively elaborated upon in any of the official or unofficial versions of the war. A reference has however been made that this may have been done to avoid bombing of the various cities in India by Chinese Air Force in retaliation.<sup>1</sup> However, this could have been an indication of lack of joint-ness in planning and conduct of war among the services.

9. Indo-Pak war of 1965 was the first operation where all three services took part. The services were yet to learn to plan and conduct integrated land-air operations. A substantial part of air support was directed towards strategic and air defence tasks. There was a general belief in the Army that adequate effort for close support was not provided. Lt Gen (Retd) Harbaksh Singh VrC in his book War Dispatches is quite critical of the efforts of the IAF. “Close Air Support was neither very effective nor timely for a variety of reasons. “ But the IAF missed a rare opportunity to demonstrate more fully to the Army that it exists otherwise than as a fighting service for its own good – that it has a vital role to play in massive and visible ( and not only indirect) support of the Army which can be decisive”<sup>2</sup>.

10. During the 1971 Bangladesh campaign the services did exhibit certain amount of joint-ness and integration. Lt Gen JFR Jacob writes in his book ‘Surrender at

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<sup>1</sup>Maj Gen D K Palit , War in the High Himalayas, Hurst & Company, London and St Martins Press, New York 1991.

<sup>2</sup> Lt Gen (Retd) Harbaksh Singh, VrC, War Dispatches Indo Pak Conflict 1965, Lancer International 1991. pp.165

Dacca<sup>3</sup> that there was no suitable machinery for direction of war at the highest level. There was no effective Chiefs of Staff Organisation, nor a Chief of Defence Staff. Air Chief Marshal PC Lal in his book 'My Years with IAF'<sup>4</sup> writes "As defined by the Chiefs of Staff and by each respective Service Chief, the objectives of 1971 war were to gain as much ground as possible in the East to neutralise Pakistani forces there to the extent we could and to establish a base as it were for a possible state in Bangladesh...It was feared that a delay of even two or three weeks would inevitably bring the UN Security Council and compel two sides to come to some sort of ceasefire such as in Kashmir. With that basic understanding between the three Services, the Army, Navy and the Air Force, they were then left to plan their activities as they thought best." These remarks are indicative of lack of an agreed strategy or coordinated control of operations by the Chiefs of Staff. 1971 operations did teach us, especially in the Eastern theatre, the rewards of close cooperation between the Army, Navy and Air Force. Capture of Sylhet was facilitated by heliborne operations. Another heliborne operation across River Meghna, in the Rajpura-Narsingdi area, with the aim of causing disorganisation and panic in the enemy ranks, resulted in early capture of Dacca. It has to be emphasised that attainment of air-supremacy by the IAF contributed greatly to the conduct of heliborne operations which would have been almost impossible without it. Army, Naval and Air Force Commands in the East did execute their tasks competently but this should also be viewed in the context of the fact that the air and naval power available with East Pakistan was not worth much and reinforcements from the West were impossible due to the distances involved.

11. Our defence forces have also operated together in peace support and peace keeping operations like Somalia and Sri Lanka, however, the opportunities for

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<sup>3</sup> Lt Gen (Retd) JFR Jacob, Surrender at Dacca, (New Delhi, Manohar Publishers) pp.160-161

<sup>4</sup> Air Chief Marshal (Retd) PC Lal, 'My years with IAF', Lancer International, 1986

practicing joint-ness have not been exploited and their tasks have been confined to their respective services' classical roles.

12. There are some other factors which have contributed to the military's mind set. These have been brought out quite succinctly by P S Das in his article 'Jointness in India's Military'<sup>5</sup> "First, almost all conflicts that India has fought have been essentially land wars in which the Army has been the predominant player. The threats faced by the country have been focused across the land border. Insurgency and low intensity conflict have also been in the domain of Army. In fact, while the air and naval forces have found it possible to have long periods of peace interspersed with a few weeks of war, the Army has been continuously engaged, either in military conflict or in low intensity operations. There is, therefore, the feeling, not unreasonable, that Army is the main, if not the only, armed force. Secondly, its size itself creates a feeling of self-importance and as a consequence, a defensive mind set in the others. Third, the Air Force, traditionally seen only as a supporting arm, has consistently sought an independent stature, partly by refusing to get conjoined with the others, principally the Army and partly by stressing the strategic role of air power. The Indian Navy has a more fortunate position, operating as it does in a domain in which others can play only supporting roles."The Armed Forces, it appears are quite happy with the existing arrangements in which each Chief operates and develops his own Service almost autonomously without any involvement with the others. The political leadership too has found it useful not to disturb this unsatisfactory arrangement.

### **Do We Need Integrated Commands?**

13. India is facing the strategic environment of the twenty-first century with its armed forces structured largely as they were during the Second World War. The

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<sup>5</sup>P S Das, Jointness In India's Military , Journal of Defense Studies, Vol 1 No 19

reduced likelihood of a big conventional war means that our complacency in not restructuring the armed forces is unlikely to be punished in the battlefields in the near future. What is more likely is that the outdated structure will eat our armed forces inside out, through corruption, cronyism, indiscipline and inefficiency. Ossified structures seldom reward initiative, risk taking and integrity.

14. Some are of the opinion that the Indian Strategic environment call only for single services employment. However this does not appear to be the case. To further amplify the case, certain possible military scenarios<sup>6</sup> that India might face can be analysed to study the need for integration of the three services:-

(a) **Scenario 1: Cold Start / Proactive Option.**

(i) **Probability.** Likely.

(ii) **Description.** Due to the chaotic political situation in Pakistan and the increasing radicalisation of the civilian population, terrorist outfits in Pakistan spread like wildfire. In a follow-up of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, another large-scale terrorist attack is launched on a major Indian city, resulting in hundreds of deaths. The attacks are traced back to Pakistan, and, facing enormous public pressure, the Government of India (GoI) authorises surgical strikes on terror camps. Expecting a military response from the Pakistan Armed Forces, the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force launch pre-emptive strikes. Utilising the "Cold Start / Proactive" doctrine, the Indian Army's Strike Corps launch blitzkrieg -style incursions into Pakistan, especially in the Rajasthan-Sindh area, while large numbers of Indian troops are

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<sup>6</sup>civfanatic, India's Future Military Scenarios, defenseforumindia.com

airdropped behind enemy lines, cutting off Pakistani lines of communication and paralysing their command structure. The Indian Army's advances are facilitated by the IAF's establishment of air superiority over the battle space, and the Indian Navy's blockade of Karachi. At the end of 72 - 96 hours of conflict, the IAF has eliminated most Pakistani terror camps, and the Indian Army has advanced about 50 miles into Pakistani territory. The captured land is used as a negotiating tool to bring an end to the conflict, with terms of peace heavily favouring India.

(iii) **Need for Inter Services Cooperation.** The essence of own response in this scenario is 'Lightning Speed'. The paralysis of the Pakistan's establishment and nation can only be brought about by integrated planning and conduct of the war by all the services. It will require a closely interlinked forces planning with a common picture of the battlefield and conducting operations on a common command and control network.

(b) **Scenario 2: Kargil 2.**

(i) **Probability.** Somewhat likely.

(ii) **Description.** With the backing of the ISI and Pakistani Army, self-styled "freedom fighters" infiltrate Kashmir in an attempt break Indian control of the region. The infiltrators occupy strategic points in Kashmir, and attempt to communicate with Kashmiri "separatist" groups to stir up a greater rebellion against Indian rule.



- (iii) **Need for Inter Services Cooperation.** In such a situation all the services will have very less time for preparation at the beginning of the war. The services will then have to be greatly dependent on each other for assessment of ground situation. At this juncture getting on to a common picture for planning and conduct of operations assumes great importance. Close cooperation will also essential for minimising collateral damage as such situations will involve actions in close proximity of own troops and civilians.
- (c) **Scenario 3.** A Second Indo – China War.
- (i) **Probability.** Unlikely
- (ii) **Description.** Faced with a lack of international support over its illegitimate claims on Arunachal Pradesh, and increasing Indian assertiveness over the matter, China launches a limited offensive against India. The objectives are to capture and hold onto most of Arunachal Pradesh, which China considers to be ‘South Tibet’. Of particular interest is the culturally important Tawang Valley, which has historically had a very strong Tibetan presence, and is the birthplace of the Dalai Lama; China hopes that these territorial gains will please Tibetans and increase the popularity of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) amongst them. Like the 1962 war, it is also likely that the war will escalate into multiple fronts once started, including Ladakh and Sikkim. The Indian Navy might also get involved by intercepting Chinese shipping in the Indian Ocean, though this might also escalate the conflict into uncomfortable levels.

- (iii) **Need for Inter Services Cooperation.** This situation though highly unlikely, it is essential that the nation builds capabilities for countering and emerging victorious against this situation too. The essence of preparation and conduct of war effort for this situation lies on long term planning based on a common understanding of the war and the national aim. To maximise the capabilities of all the services and to achieve synergy it will be essential that the services build up capabilities that complement each other. This can only be achieved by a common understanding of the future battle scenario and the effort required in countering such a threat. This demands a common and clearly delineated command and control system. During the conduct phase of the battle great reliance will have to be placed on superior communication and other data networks and synchronised fires and manoeuvres to achieve the desired effect on the adversary.
- (c) **Scenario 4: Doomsday in South Asia.**
- (i) **Probability.** Very Unlikely
- (ii) **Description.** Taliban and other Islamist outfits have secured control over much of the Pakistan Armed Forces, and thus, the entire state of Pakistan falls into the hands of fundamentalists. Terrorist attacks against India reach an unprecedented high. In response, India launches surgical strikes against terrorist camps; this time, however, the response is an immediate nuclear salvo against India. India responds with its proclaimed massive retaliatory strike.

- (iii) **Need for Inter Services Cooperation.** This situation though highly unlikely, will test the effectiveness of our strategic nuclear assets and the will of the nation to prove its response to a nuclear strike. All the elements of nuclear triad will have to be utilised for giving a befitting reply in such a situation. This would call for a very effective and balanced inter services cooperation. Any artificially created command and control structure will not stand the test under real time stressful situations.
- (d) **Scenario 5: India to the Rescue.**
- (i) **Probability.** Unlikely.
- (ii) **Description.** In a situation similar to what happened in the Maldives in 1988 and Sri Lanka in the 90s. Unstable governments in South Asia face the threat of being overthrown in violent coups, revolutions, or secessionist movements; weak and desperate, they ask the India to help them out. The two South Asian countries that are the most unstable and the biggest candidates for political upheaval in the next 10-15 years, besides Pakistan, are Burma and Nepal. India has great relations with both countries, and it is possible that either government might turn to India for assistance. Doing so would greatly increase our reputation and influence in the region.
- (iii) **Need for Inter Services Cooperation.** This situation though highly unlikely, it is essential that the nation builds capabilities for smooth conduct of such a situation. The essence of preparation and conduct in such a situation lies on long term planning for building

compatible capabilities based on a national understanding of the nature of task. An ability to work together for furtherance of a common mission will prove essential for such a mission. Interoperability amongst various components of the three services will also prove essential. Such a capability can only be possible in case the services are used to working in a joint environment as time will be of utmost importance.

15. Thus we see that, in all the above scenarios it is very much essential that the three services have an institutionalised mechanism to plan and conduct operations in a synchronised manner.

16. There is a broad understanding in the Services that no single service by itself can win a war. All the services have their own single service doctrines. However, due to different perspectives and differing service legacies, they reflect the respective services' prejudices on strategy and tactics. These, at times, hinder the application of total force in a synergised manner. Concept of joint operations basically implies enunciation of ways and means to conduct a joint and integrated battle. This concept envisages the conduct of air land, air maritime and tri-service operations to achieve military and national security objectives.

17. Consequent to the submission of the Kargil Review Committee report, a task force led by Mr Arjun Singh<sup>7</sup> was constituted by the group of ministers (GoM) headed by Deputy Prime Minister L K Advani to analyse the functioning of the Higher Defence Organisation in India. Among the major recommendations of this task force was the creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff with a tri services planning HQ.

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<sup>7</sup>Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, Higher Defence Organisation : A Case for CDS and Theatre Commands in India, Pinnacle (Oct 2007)

The GoM accepted the recommendations. However, while the tri services HQ Integrated Defense Staff( HQ IDS) was finally constituted in 2002, approval of a four star post of Chief of Defense Staff was deferred by the Cabinet Committee on Security pending further consultation due to lack of consensus in the political circles and also within certain sections of the armed forces.

18. With the establishment of the Integrated Defence Staff, joint cohabitation exists to a certain degree in New Delhi, and in the triservice command in Andaman and Nicobar Islands and in the evolving Strategic Forces Command, but joint-ness has not permeated to all levels. It is understood that creation of a CDS alone will not in any way be the panacea in ensuring seamless plans and conduct of tri services operations. The forces need to be integrated at the functional level, which is the Command level. It is only when a Commander has under his command all the elements of the force that he wishes to employ in operations that he can be expected to fully realise their potential.

#### **Arguments Against Integrated Theatre Commands**

19. The main opposition to formation of integrated theatre command are the three services themselves as each fears that the formation of CDS and integrated theatre command will result in greatly reducing the relevance of the individual service heads. It is felt that we already have 'Jointness'. However, we must understand that Jointness and Integration are different. As clearly brought out by Gen Deepak Kapoor, "It should be fairly clear that 'Integration' is a step ahead of 'Jointness' in ensuring a synergised approach to operations. While in 'Jointness', the consent of the parent Service for allocation of a resource is mandatory, in the case of 'Integration', resources from all

the three Services already stand allocated to the appropriate commander. In 'Jointness', the employment of a resource is a subject of debate and discussion at a crucial time, while in 'Integration', its employment is immediate, and done on the commanders appreciation of the operational situation.<sup>8</sup>

20. **Domination by Land Forces.** The Indian political and military psyche has historically always been dominated by land centric philosophies. The Air and Naval forces thus have the fear of being over whelmed by the land forces once the three services have been totally integrated. However, this need not be the case. As we will see in the later portion of the dissertation, once the distinction between the services is removed the very basis of such a premise vanishes. In addition by the very nature of our boundaries and national interests and threats thereto, it is but natural that there is enough space to bring out the best in each individual service in the various Integrated Commands. In addition it is not the interests of the three services that should be kept foremost, what is important is to identify which is the military model that best serves the national interest. Integration of the three services is not something that can be done internally by the services or the MOD; it requires the attention of the nation and nothing short of an act by the parliament would be required to give it the necessary impetus. It therefore is not surprising that while addressing a combined Armed Forces Commanders' Conference on October 26, 1998, Defence Minister George Fernandes<sup>9</sup> stressed on the need for systemic changes rather than tinkering with the existing system. He also called for a strategic defence review and reforms in the armed forces. He highlighted the need for "transcending single-service boundaries" and said that "the fighting capabilities of the future will involve use of assets of the three Services under integrated direction and commands." These aspects refer to proposals

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<sup>8</sup>Gen Deepak Kapoor, Need For Integrated Theatre Commands

<sup>9</sup>Times of India, October 26,1998

of integration of Service HQS and MOD, creation of a permanent Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and integrated theatre commands. While proposal of integration of Service HQ with MOD has broad acceptance among defence analysts and strategic community, the prime resistance to it appears from civilian bureaucracy.

21. There is a thought that the concept of Integrated Theatre Command is best suited for isolated and out of area contingencies and when the resources available (especially, in terms of air force and naval assets) are more than adequate. In our case, with the limited air assets available, the flexibility of Air Force's long range can be best exploited by using them centrally rather than by dividing them between theatre commands. Centralisation would result in economy of effort and decentralisation would be against this principle. The synergies in operation can be best achieved by imparting impetus to the present joint structures at Army and Air Force Command levels and below.

22. Views against the integration of all three services can at best be considered short sighted and parochial. Their proponents fail to realise that wars cannot be fought with the three services pulling in three different directions. Unity of effort which is one of the basic principles of warfare cannot be left to the whims and fancy of inter personal relations of the three chiefs of respective services. Joint war fighting is not about fighting the war with equal opportunity but about recognising the unique competencies and capabilities of each arm and service, to make each entity interoperable and utilise the strong points of each service for the combined operational benefit to achieve military objectives. This is where the crux of operational planning lies. Eisenhower<sup>10</sup> in a memorandum had written "The many organisations.... cannot

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<sup>10</sup>Gp Capt A S Bahal, Requirement of CDS and Joint Structures', Indian Defense Review, Vol 21, 2 Apr-Jun 2006

possibly operate at maximum efficiency and effectiveness as long as “co-operation” alone dictates their employment, no matter how sincere a purpose may inspire the co-operative effect”. In a senate hearing later, he further stated that “co-ordination by co-operation is ineffective and in my conviction the only team that could have won the European war was a unified command”. The Indian working ethos is essentially hierarchical; unless there is a hierarchical structure that facilitates forcible joint planning, it is difficult to achieve it by co-operation alone. The hierarchical orientation highlights the need for a CDS and a Joint Theatre commander.

23. Security of the nation cannot be entrusted to the goodwill between the chiefs, it must be ensured by institutional means. It must be kept in mind that very often ‘*One bad General in command is better than three good ones*’. Joint Theatre Commands are needed to provide a single point advice on defence matters concerning military threat perceptions, strategies, force levels, equipment and manpower policies. The Joint Theatre commanders would also issue joint military operational, training and logistics directives and policies. There are various reasons why the concept of Integrated Theatre command must be treated as an idea whose time has come.

### **An Idea Whose Time has Come**

24. The concept of integrated command can be applied in a number of areas. Andaman and Nicobar islands are isolated from mainland and the prevalent security concerns are well understood by the three Services. It is therefore no wonder that the Andaman and Nicobar Islands were chosen to form the Joint Integrated Theatre Command. The other area where this concept is being exploited is in the Strategic Forces Command for command and control of nuclear and other strategic weapons. To start with, the delivery means for nuclear weapons are likely to be aircraft and surface to surface missiles, which may later on include submarine, launched nuclear capable



missiles. The warheads or components of warheads may themselves be kept under different agencies, to be assembled when authorised to do so by the supreme political authority. All this would require elaborate command, control communication and surveillance network. A joint organisation in the shape of a Joint Strategic Command with components from all services and involved civilian agencies is required to achieve synergy.

25. **Comprehensive Strategic Planning.** Application of force should not be based on individual aspirations of one service. The strategic decision, the determination of clear military and political end state and the planning for strategic and joint operational art needs an interface between the political establishment, bureaucracy and the armed forces and also at the functional level. The present arrangement in which all three services plan and conduct operations independently albeit with a level of integration and joint-manship does not have institutional backing. In the present environment, the individual services carry out operational planning at the Command HQ level. The plans rather than being joint, are based on single service appreciations to achieve the stated objectives and overlaying the application of the other service to suit own requirements. Hence the plans are based more on creating a feeling of “mutual co-operation” to achieve strategic objectives rather than based on a jointly appreciated integrated course of action. It is for this reason that more often than not the plans are focussed mainly towards gaining real estate and territorial accretions quickly, as leverage tools rather than focussing on achieving strategic objectives in the most optimal manner, even if it implies employing out of box techniques. This procedure is unlikely to stand the test of combat. This integration can only be carried out by a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and a Joint Theatre Commander of Joint Integrated Theatre

who is not inhibited by his own service tasks or loyalties and assisted by integrated operational staff structures.

26. **Shorter OODA Loop.** Wars and operations today are being fought under a high degree of informationalised and network centric environment. In such an environment it is essential that each of the services have access to a common intelligence, surveillance and decision support assets and network. Creating assets and networks separately for the three services is not only uneconomical; it also defeats the basic tenets of network centric warfare. In addition, assets like logistics support units and installations, cyber and info warfare and special operations efforts are assets which require the contribution from each of the three services and are also essential for operations of all the three services. It therefore makes perfect sense to integrate the three services under a common theatre command for effective utilisation of all the assets and to achieve network centricity and seamless operations. The long ranges of the weapon systems and their inherent overlaps with the operations of platforms belonging to the other two services would entail the requirement of an integrated environment to manage them efficiently and optimally and to reduce the probability of fratricide. Thereby, reiterating the need for a unified structure to create an interoperable integrated environment. Effective targeting and manoeuvre can only be conducted with real time integration of surveillance, firepower and manoeuvre assets of all the three services. It is only then can the OODA loop of the enemy be surpassed. Real time integration cannot be held hostage to the archaic procedures and protocols of sharing information and assets which exists amongst the three services.

27. **Peacetime Synergy.** Integrated Theatre Commands in conjunction with Chief of Defence Staff will assist in better implementation of the peacetime functions of the

military like communication, training, procurement, maintenance and administration due to better integration amongst the Services.

28. **Utilisation of Space and Space Based Systems.** Satellites are now becoming central to the existence of any modern military. Satellites surmount line of sight limitations and extend the range of voice and data transmissions crucial to a fast and responsive command and control system. Surveillance satellites provide vital inputs to be acted upon by a number of agencies including surface and aerial weapon platforms. Such systems will be required by all the services in the near future, since any of the services may be called to be employed anywhere across the globe. Aerospace is a field which calls for close cooperation between all the services. This points towards the development and use of space based assets. The Nation has the wherewithal in satellite technology. There is a need to expedite the development of military satellites which have a tremendous force multiplier effect for our armed forces. The moot point is whether space based sensors, which will be exploited by all the three services and perhaps a number of civil agencies, need to be organised under a joint structure. Dramatic developments taking place in fields of technology, the ongoing revolution in military affairs and onset of information age dictate to us the need for establishing a joint organisation to exploit the scarce space based assets to achieve economy and unity of effort and to facilitate synergies in operation.

29. **Intelligence Agencies.** The present intelligence system in the defence services with each Service having its own intelligence directorate inhibits optimal exploitation of available resources. It suffers from the absence of coordinated tasking of intelligence resources. At times, there is a duplication of effort with each Service doing its own country and area studies and analysis. Moreover at the strategic level the distinction between Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence actually fades. This

compartmentalisation however creates impediments to free flow of information and analysed data between the intelligence agencies due to attitudinal barriers, information hoarding, procedural delays and obsolescent methods of exchanging information. In the absence of a National Security Strategy each Service has its own perception of threats and opportunities. This results in lack of centralised prioritisation and rationalisation of intelligence thrust areas and action plans. There are regular interactions between the three Services where information is exchanged however these are not sufficient. There is also a lurking suspicion that in a joint organisation the needs of a specific Service may get a lower priority. This however is not true, it is only by integrating the resources and by joint planning can the correct operational picture emerge at the functional level.

30. **Command Control and Communication Systems.** Future wars will seek to exploit information technology and an integrated reconnaissance, surveillance and C4I2 (Command, Control, communications, computers, intelligence and interoperability) systems. Different Services today have multifarious systems with lack of commonality. There is a need to interface our communication systems and make these joint. An integrated systems approach to the electronic spectrum utilisation as well as optimal utilisation of a common electronic communication infrastructure would promote synergy in operations. In our Services we have digital and analogue systems in use over a variety of media and communication networks which are not interoperable. The present system is not best suited for establishing a common Command Information and Decision Support System (CIDSS). In a nuclear environment, it is the optical fibre which would provide secure survivable communications. The DOT (Department of Telecommunications) is planning to cover maximum locations in the country with optical fibre network. A tri-service

organisation is necessary to plan integrated defence communication requirements in a coordinated manner to achieve value for money.

31. **Logistics Infrastructure Bonding.** All future operations are likely to be joint operations rather than a single service operation. Logistics support for a future war would not only require a joint services effort but it would also require the effort of entire nation in terms of industrial back up, research and development, material support, infrastructure and manpower. In the present context, each Service plans for their respective Service requirement in isolation without concerted action or a joint approach. Some of the logistical functions, which are static in nature and do not really affect combat efficiency, have already been integrated. The medical services, postal services, MES works, Embarkation headquarters, Defence Lands and Cantonments Organization and Canteen Stores Department are providing support to all the three Services. The Navy and the Air Force are also dependent on the Army for common use items such as armaments, ammunition, vehicles, general stores and clothing. These arrangements have resulted in economy of effort and unity of purpose. Yet, there are a number of areas in the present logistic support system, which are open to integration and joint-ness to achieve synergies in operations. Arun Singh Committee is believed to have recommended setting up a Defence Logistics Support Agency.<sup>11</sup> An agency like this at the highest level would formulate a logistics doctrine, oversee activities of various committees and coordinate mobilisation of national defence and industrial resources. In addition a joint defence logistics systems organisation based on restructured and integrated operational logistic directorates of the three services could be the ideal agency to coordinate and carry out functions to achieve commonality and standardisation in the equipment of the armed forces. Joint integrated logistics

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<sup>11</sup> Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand, Achieving Synergies in Defence, Strategic Analysis, 01/1999

infrastructure would be a force multiplier. Tailor made logistic organisation for executing jointly planned operation would cut down flab and promote efficiency. Our armed forces have been taking part in UN peacekeeping activities. However, we have no organisation for provision and coordination of such support to our future UN contingents. Therefore, a revamp of our logistic organisations at various levels is needed to meet the requirements of a future war and to achieve economy.

32. **Long Term Acquisitions.** Today we have reached a stage where threat based approach for procurement of assets is not likely to yield the required results. The approach therefore has to be directed towards building capabilities that can be exploited in the future. Such an approach requires that all new acquisitions of weapon systems and equipment need to be processed jointly by the services by evolving joint qualitative requirements. Such a process will lead to optimisation in terms of budgetary support as well as R&D effort which would influence 'make or buy' decisions. It would also ensure inter-operability and commonality of systems and lead to easy integration. This concept can be applied to development of helicopters, aircrafts, radar and missile systems and electronic warfare systems. The Services are using a large variety of equipment being sourced from multiple agencies, both domestic and foreign. A systems approach to logistic support design would help in controlling inventories through standardisation and codification, especially of items of common use in the three Services. Jointness in equipment management will result in cost benefits. The introduction of different versions of the same air defence guided missile system with little change in technical specifications dictates to us that the design, development, production and in-service management should be undertaken jointly to avoid duplication of effort. Exploiting the power of information technology jointly for logistics management concepts, techniques and procedures would also assist us in

vastly improving our capabilities essential for successful conduct of joint operations. Constitution of Integrated Theatre Command would greatly help in development of a common picture as to our operational requirement at the functional level.

33. **Training Issues.** Each service has its own training year and there appears little effort in making joint training possible. At times, attitudinal issues prevent the participation of troops from one service in the exercise of other. Priceless opportunities are lost for practicing joint training due to lack of coordination between the Services. Joint training is an important ingredient for winning a war in the future battlefield milieu. Integrated Theatre Command will ensure that meaningful joint training is carried out and that too by the troops and formations which are to go into combat together. Lt Gen Katoch rightly points “Meagre resources available with each Service have precluded any meaningful level of joint training, thereby affecting implementation of any joint concept. There are few organisational structures in place, which could meaningfully formulate or impart the desired level of joint training. The essential ingredients of a joint training system (joint training philosophy, joint training infrastructure and joint training processes) need to be implemented.”<sup>12</sup>

34. Notwithstanding the strong case in the favour of constituting Integrated Theatre Command, there is bound to be great opposition, just as in the case of formation of the Andaman and Nicobar Command in 2001-2002. The incidence of attitudinal divergence among the services can be reduced by frequent dialogue and joint training of officers and other personnel. However, Joint Theatre Commands will have to be constituted keeping with the best interest of the nation in mind.

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<sup>12</sup>Lt Gen( Retd) Prakash Katoch, Integrated Theatre Command, Indian Defense Review, Vol 28.3, Jul – Sep 13

## CHAPTER V

### ROLE OF THEATRE COMMAND AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER SERVICES AND INTEGRATED STAFF HEADQUARTERS

1. This chapter has covered the following aspects:
  - (a) **Joint Theatre of Operations** This section analyses the case study of US and Chinese Defence Forces, how they have established Theatre Commands and the drawbacks of their system.
  - (b) **Options for Unified Theatre Command Structures.** The various options for establishing Integrated Theatre Commands as given below along with their advantages and dis-advantages have been discussed.
    - (i) Geographical Integrated Theatre Commands.
    - (ii) Super Theatre Commands.
    - (iii) Integrated Theatre Commands with a Common Purpose / Function.
    - (iv) Joint Theatre Command HQ with forces allotted as per requirement.
  
2. The Indian Armed Forces have been quite slow in realising the importance of joint operations. In spite of an early start evident by establishment of joint organisations like the National Defence Academy and the Defence Services Staff College, the Indian Defence Forces did not cover much ground in the field of jointness. The creation of Integrated Defence Staff, the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), and the Strategic Forces Command has been steps in the right direction but



they are not enough. The fact still remains that joint-ness and integration amongst the three services in India is conspicuous by its absence. The bottom line is – All the services think, plan and act quite differently in all military affairs.

3. Though there have been much talk about taking many steps to promote joint-ness among the services, it has to be realised that constitution of Integrated theatre Command is the only step that can lead to the kind of integration that's essential to fighting a war in the present or future times. The concept of integrated theatre command should not be seen in the context of the pattern prevailing in the United States alone. While it is understood that the US is a global power with power projection capabilities and its security concerns and contingencies lie outside its immediate land or sea boundaries and that our national security requirements are different. We also require the three services to be integrated and constitution of Integrated Theatre Command appear to be the only way at present to achieve the required level of integration. The Chinese, with similar needs have a well-established theatre system.<sup>13</sup>The concept of Integrated Theatre Command should be viewed in the context of our requirements. The historical dimension of the functioning of India's Armed Forces has been discussed in the previous chapter. At this stage, it might be useful to consider how the Indian military operates. The three Service Chiefs, despite having been converted from Commanders-in-Chief of their respective wings into Chiefs of Staff in 1955, continue to act in their former roles and are, therefore, responsible for conduct of operations. They do this by issuing directives to their respective commanders. Where any assistance is required from another wing, say air support from the Air Force for the Navy, this has to be arranged through the Maritime Air Operations (MAO) authority in Mumbai, an Air Force institution, acting as the

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<sup>13</sup>Brig Gurmeet Kanwal, Higher Defence Organisation : A Case for CDS and Theatre Commands in India, Pinnacle (Oct 2007)

link. The MAO interacts with the appropriate Air Force Command headquarters which, in turn, issues instructions to the IAF station holding the relevant air assets. Often, Air Headquarters itself may have to be approached. The arrangement is about the same as far as the Army is concerned. All operational Army Commands have Air Force elements attached to them, not as subordinates but as advisers. They, in turn, interact with their own superiors to arrange the desired support through Air Force stations. In brief, the inter-Service interaction is through several tiers, both laterally and vertically. The desired air support might not be provided, possibly for good reasons and even if it is, may not be in the form and strength requisitioned. Thus, the person responsible for execution of a task does not have control over all the forces that are deployed; on the other hand, the authority providing supporting forces is not responsible for successful achievement of the operation. The shortcomings of this system are readily apparent. A change is therefore essential.

4. Gp Capt A S Bansal in his article ‘Requirement of CDS and Joint Structures’ presents a study of the experiences of the US and Australian Defence Forces in raising Integrated Commands<sup>14</sup>. Care must be taken in drawing lessons from their experiences as both have a Defence Force which primarily functions outside their own national boundaries.

### **Joint Theatre of Operations: Case Study of US and Australian Defence Forces**

5. **US Commands.** The term theatre of operations is defined in the American field manuals as land and sea masses to be invaded or defended including areas necessary for administrative activities incident to the military operations. In the western concept, the European Theatre of Operations was used to refer to all military activity in Europe

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<sup>14</sup>Gp Capt A S Bahal, Requirement of CDS and Joint Structures’, Indian Defense Review, Vol 21.2 Apr-Jun 2006

whilst Pacific Theatre of Operations was related to the Pacific Ocean. Hence, the inherent meaning of Theatre of Operations relates to large contiguous land or sea areas where synergised operations take place. A Unified Command is a command which operates under a single commander and is composed of two or more services. The US Regional Combatant Commands have geographical areas of responsibility. They conduct the strategic direction of all US military operations within their designated AOR. The five regional unified commands are US Atlantic Command, Central Command, European Command, Pacific Command and Southern Command. In addition, they have functional commands such as US Space Command, Special Operations Command, and the Strategic Command. For Special Operations, a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) is formed to plan, rehearse and execute operations regardless of their geographical location. In 1986, the US Govt brought the Goldwater Nichols<sup>15</sup> amendment to ensure complete joint-ness despite Joint Chiefs of Staff being in place since 1947. The organisation thus caters for permanent forces under the theatre commander for conduct of independent self-contained operations.

6. **Australian Theatre Command.** HQ Australian Theatre (HQ AST) was established in June 1997. The aim was to separate the Australian politico strategic level planning and conduct of operations from war fighting, discontinue the adhoc approach to co-ordination and control of operations, institute unity of command at the operational level and provide a standing capability for planning campaigns, operations and specific activities. HQ AST does not have any forces permanently assigned to it. Appropriate forces are allocated to the Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST) by the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) for specific operations. The CDF maintains full command over the Australian Defence Forces (ADF). However, the service chiefs

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<sup>15</sup>Goldwater-Nichols, US Department of Defence Reorganisation Act of 1986

command their respective services and are responsible to raise, train and sustain them. When the CDF orders the conduct of an operation or a campaign, he directs the service chiefs to assign appropriate forces at a specified level of capability to COMAST. The AST has component commanders from the individual services. They provide expert advice concerning the operational employment of the assigned forces. This arrangement ensures appropriate theatre focus with emphasis on initiation, sequencing and manoeuvring series of joint operations. HQ AST houses component commanders' along with adequate number of permanent staff. This organisation is permanently available under the Theatre Command. The HQ AST is also supported by the Australian Joint Intelligence Centre (ASTJIC) and the 1st Joint Movement Group that is responsible to secure civil strategic lift assets. The ASTJIC provides fused intelligence picture of the theatre. The organisation thus caters for a permanent planning and coordinating staff however the actual forces are allotted as per requirement of the task at hand.

7. **Analysis of US and Australian Theatre Commands.** Analysis of the two command structures highlights some commonalities. Both are structured for joint application of force generally for Out Of Area Contingency (OOAC)'s and in support of the multinational forces rather than for homeland defence. The aim is to provide a unified command for operational employment of joint forces. Though the appointments and staff for planning and conduct of operations are permanent in the Australian model, the forces are allotted by the individual service HQ based on a joint appreciation of the impending threat. Whilst Americans have global aspirations, the ADF is employed more in support of multinational forces. In both cases, the meaning of theatres relates to large contiguous masses that translate itself to the size of continents. In our context, our war is fought generally within our country and our most

immediate concerns relate to homeland defence. Hence, we need to look at structures that take care of threats ranging from asymmetric to conventional wars fought in a nuclear environment and focussed more to our subcontinent.

8. **Limitations of Western Concept.** Even with the employment of Theatre Command concept, the problems between Lt Gen Clark and Lt Gen Short affected campaign planning in Kosovo operations<sup>16</sup>. In Op Anaconda too, senior Army Commanders were widely criticised by their air and naval counterparts for not co-ordinating with them effectively during the weeks preceding the commencement of the conflict. Thus clearly highlighting that unified structures can only facilitate forcible co-operation but the true test of actual joint-manship lies in dismantling established mindsets. Some US articles lament that Air power is undervalued in the US joint doctrines and war plans. Land forces dominate the Theatre Commands (TC) with strong influence. The belief is wide spread that “boots on ground” are more important than precision strikes. The ground forces definition of a joint operation is one in which they are supported by air power, the notion that air power might achieve anything alone or with land or sea forces in support is not widely accepted. Own structures would need to find solutions for these limitations.

9. At present, Indian Army is divided into six operational commands, the Northern Command (NC) at Udhampur, Western Command (WC) at Chandimandir, South Western Command (SWC) at Jaipur, Eastern Command (EC) at Kolkata, Southern Command (SC) at Pune and Central Command at Lucknow. On the other hand, IAF currently has five operational commands, namely Western Air Command (WAC) at Delhi, South Western Air Command (SWAC) at Gandhinagar, Southern Air

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<sup>16</sup>Gp Capt A S Bahal, Requirement of CDS and Joint Structures’, Indian Defense Review, Vol 21.2 Apr-Jun 2011

Command (SAC) at Trivandrum, Central Air Command (CAC) at Allahbad and Eastern Air Command (EAC) at Shillong. Indian Navy is deployed under three area commands; Western Naval Command (WNC) at Mumbai, Southern Naval Command (SNC) at Kochi and the Eastern Naval Command (ENC) at Vishakhapatnam. Thus, the operational commands of the three services are not co-located. Further, the area of responsibility (AOR) covered by Western Air Command equates to the combined AOR's of NC, WC and SWC of the Indian Army. Thus the three services presently have 17 single Service Commands. The Commands have considerable duplication and need streamlining. The geographical zones of responsibilities of various Commands of the three Services have little commonality. In most cases, the command of one Service overlaps or is linked with two or more Commands of sister Services. None of the Commands are collocated leading to lack of coordination in intelligence sharing, planning and execution. In addition, there are two Tri-Service Commands i.e. Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) and Strategic Forces Command (SFC). The Navy's Western Command, responsible for the entire western seaboard, has to interact with two Commands of the Air Force, Southern and South Western and two of the Army. The same is the case on the eastern seaboard. Similarly, the Southern Command of the Army must interact with the Southern as well as South West Commands of the Air Force. The structure, as can be easily imagined, is not only cumbersome and inefficient but also wasteful in resources. Training, maintenance and logistics continue to be individual Service functions. Looked at dispassionately, there is just no reason why these functions cannot be combined in dedicated Commands with components covering all three wings. Operationally, there could be four to six theatre commands structured geographically; within them, unified commanders could be appointed for

specific operations whenever these become necessary. Other integrated Commands for Space, Special Forces, Logistics, Training and Maintenance can also be put in place.

10. **Options for Unified Theatre Command Structures.** The options for unified command structure comprise developing Joint Theatre Commands at the Army Command HQ level or developing geographically based Theatre Command structures or evolving a Theatre Command at the national level that provides a unified command structure that integrates the operational employment of the three services as part of India Strategic Theatre (IST). Ideally, the chosen structure should be such that it requires bringing about minimum changes to the existing organisations and yet achieves the desired integration to co-ordinate a jointly evolved strategic art at the operational level. The following options emerge:-

- (a) Geographical Integrated Theatre Commands.
- (b) Super Theatre Commands.
- (c) Integrated Theatre Commands with a Common Purpose / Function.
- (d) Joint Theatre Command HQ with forces allotted as per requirement.

11. **Geographically Integrated Theatre Commands.** Theatre Commands can be delineated as per existing or reworked command boundaries. This would entail the theatre, for example, NC/WC/SWC (Army) to be restricted to an AOR of 150-200 Km by 150-200 Km on both sides of the border. This implies that the all assets including air assets would be distributed in within these Commands within their AOR.

- (a) **Advantages.**
  - (i) This would make each Integrated Theatre independent with respect to assets of services as per requirement. The Integrated Theatre

Commander can then plan the employment of the resources under his command for furtherance of his task.

(ii) Tasks which require only single service can be assigned to respective service by the Integrated Theatre Commander. In this manner tasks such as Counter Insurgency / Counter Terrorism can be given to Army component of the Integrated Command along with the optimum component of Air / Naval forces under command as per requirement.

(b) **Disadvantages.**

(i) During the initial stages of the war, the primary air campaign is Counter Air Campaign. This campaign ensures that land and naval operations are carried out unhindered. These operations are executed centrally at the present IAF Command level to optimise employment of limited resources. Distributing scarce air assets between several Integrated Theatre Commands may result in significantly degrading the overall combat potential of the Indian Air Force.

(ii) This option would also cause substantial Air Space Management issues as several missions of an Integrated Theatre would have to over fly other Integrated Theatres due to location of targets or for tactical routing purposes to cater for the long reach of modern Air Superiority Fighters. This reach has been further enhanced with Air to Air Refuellers that themselves are centrally controlled by Air HQ and are based at deeper airbases. In addition, the strategic fighters such as Su-30 aircrafts too are likely to be based outside the AOR of Integrated Theatres to incorporate survivability aspects.



(iii) During the course of the war, the focus may change from one theatre to the other and there may thus be a need to employ higher quantum of air effort centrally towards tackling emergent situations. If the assets are under different Integrated Theatres, it would be difficult to co-ordinate and employ these air assets.

(iv) Sumit Mukherji in his article reflects “Existing army commands appear to be too small for optimum employment of air assets. How does one cater to high value assets like Flight refuelling aircrafts, the airborne Warning and Control Systems, the heavy lift strategic transport aircraft like C17 and the IL 76 in a theatre environment when these assets perform have to be centrally controlled?”<sup>17</sup>

12. **Super Theatres.** The second option visualises the formation of five geographically based Super Theatre Commands, viz combining Army’s two or more commands say NC, WC and SWC as Western Theatre and create a joint Integrated Theatre HQ overseeing these three Army Commands and Air HQ say, HQ Western Command. Airpower assets employment could be co-ordinated more effectively in this arrangement; however this would thus result in creation of a large No of additional HQ.

13. **Integrated Theatre Commands with a Common Purpose.** This option envisages letting the existing commands of the three services to remain as hitherto fore. Joint Theatre Commands be created as per specific functional requirements e.g. Cyber Command for control of cyberspace, Aerospace Command for control of Aerospace assets etc.

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<sup>17</sup>Sumit Mukherji , Nature of Modern War and Theatre Command, CLAWS Summer 2013

(a) **Advantages.**

(i) This options entails minimum turbulence and the existing arrangement can be utilised with changes to incorporate more 'jointness'.

(ii) The role of the individual service head does not change. The tasks requiring joint control of assets can be controlled by the CDS / HQ IDS or any other similar joint organisation.

(ii) Tasks which require multiple services can be identified and joint theatre structures be made for the same.

(b) **Disadvantages.**

(i) The issue of close integration amongst the three services in combat is not addressed.

(ii) There is likely to be clashes of interest between allotment of assets to the joint theatres from the single services.

14. **Joint Theatre Command HQ with Forces Allotted as per Requirement.**

Another option is to create a unified command structure at the national level akin to the Australian model. It would need to consider the entire Indian subcontinent as a theatre and could be named as India Strategic Theatre. Located at say, HQ IDS, it would have a standing capability of the three components (land, air and sea) with their planning staff under the CDS. The forces would not be permanently attached but could be allocated to this Joint HQ based on the requirement originated jointly appreciating an imminent threat. This arrangement would thus provide flexibility to tackle threats that encompass the entire conflict spectrum from asymmetric to NBC warfare.

(a) **Advantages.**

(i) This options entails minimum turbulence and the existing arrangement can be utilised with additional changes to incorporate more 'Jointness'.

(ii) The role of the individual service head does not change. The tasks requiring joint control of assets can be controlled by the CDS or any other similar Joint Organisation.

(ii) Tasks such as Out Of Area Contingency (OOAC) which require multiple services can be identified and joint theatre structures be made for the same.

(b) **Disadvantages.**

(i) The issue of close integration amongst the three services is not addressed.

(ii) There is likely to be clashes of interest between allotment of assets to the joint theatres from the single services.

15. **Option Best Suited to Indian Conditions.** All models have their limitations, but a dispassionate review of these models would highlight that a combination of the first and the third option would centralise strategic and operational art whilst retaining the decentralised structure for execution. Integrated theatres can be formed on geographical lines and certain central integrated command e.g. Cyber command can be formed.

## **CHAPTER VI**

### **ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF QUESTIONNAIRE AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING**

1. Based on the various issues raised by the research during literature review and secondary data analysis in relation with problem identified, the research aimed at collection of data by a Survey Questionnaire. The major characteristics of survey are given below:-

(a) **Population and Sample.**

(i) **Population.** The research involved measuring the awareness, attitude and response of stakeholders from participants of APPPA 47 which has the ideal mix of all the three services of the requisite seniority and with a mature outlook. In addition civil servants from the government are also available in the course to give a balance to the sampling procedure.

(ii) **Target Sample Size.** Samples of approximately 100 officers of the ranks of Brigadiers, Air Commodores and Commodores and of the rank of Joint Secretary, Directors will be approached through questionnaires to obtain their views..

(b) **Sampling Technique.**

- (i) With Cross-sectional Design to have a snap shoot view of respondents, the sampling techniques used were Simple random Sampling for the purpose of collecting primary data.
- (ii) Questionnaire based on LIKERT Scale, has been circulated to all participants of APPPA 47 and serving and retired officers from the defence forces..

### **Approach to the Problem**

2. The research work progressed keeping in mind the problem statement which read “*Creation of Integrated Theatre Commands will increase the operational effectiveness of the Indian Defence Forces.*” The factors which were included in the survey were a mix of knowledge gained from the literature review, interaction with general officers who have/are commanding various formations in Indian Army, Indian Navy and Indian Air Force.

3. **Research Methodology and Data Collection.** Based on the various issues raised by the research during literature review and secondary data analysis in relation with problem identified, the research aimed at collection of data by a Survey Questionnaire. The questionnaire addressed four major constructs. The Questionnaire is attached at **Appendix A**. To ascertain the validity and understanding of questions by target respondents it was sample tested by a pilot survey with 25 respondents and further refined. The major characteristics of survey are as discussed below:-

(a) **Population and Sample.**

(ii) **Population.** The research involved measuring the awareness, attitude and response of stakeholders from participants of APPPA which has the ideal mix of all the three services of the requisite seniority and with a mature outlook.

(ii) **Target Sample Size.** Samples of approximately 90 officers of the ranks of Colonels, Captains and Group Captains and Brigadiers, Commodores and Air Commodores were approached through questionnaires to obtain their views. The replies received and with viable inputs were 90.

(b) **Sampling Technique.**

(ii) With Cross-sectional Design to have a snap shoot view of respondents, the sampling techniques used were Simple random Sampling for the purpose of collecting primary data.

(ii) Questionnaire based on LIKERT Scale, was circulated to all participants of APPPA and other service officers in other forums.

**Factors / Variables & Constructs**

4. **Questionnaire Design.** Refer Appendix A. The questionnaire has 19 questions which can be divided into five major constructs. The constructs identified were further confirmed using factor analysis method of SPSS. The relevance of

construct and questions to gain input on the construct are analyzed in the following paras :-

(a) **Integrated Theatre Commands will Enable Achievement of Strategic Objectives with Optimal Utilisation of Resources.** Q7 and Q9

were directed to assess whether Integrated Theatre Commands are the way forward to achieve strategic objectives and optimally utilise the scarce resources to achieve enhanced operational effectiveness. The aim of the construct was to assess the importance of effectiveness of Integrated Theatre Commands. The mix of all three services of Indian Armed Forces provided a rich picture view with varied inputs and points of views.

(b) **Integrated Theatre Commands can be Commanded by any of the three Services and are Applicable within the Country also.** Q5, Q6, Q12

and Q14, were used to obtain opinion on the suitability of any particular service to head the Integrated Theatre Commands and whether turf wars are responsible for lack of integration. The aim of the construct is to assess the mindset of the three services to integration and whether any conflict exists for the same.

(c) **Command and Control of Integrated Theatre Commands.** The main component of this construct is to gauge as to the views on under whom the Integrated Theatre Commands should function i.e. HQ and appointment. Q10 and Q15 were designed to assess the view of the sample respondents.

(d) **Organisation and Functioning of Integrated Theatre Commands.**

Q11, Q13, Q16 and Q19 were used to assess the construct. In this construct, opinion of the environment was sought to analyse the suitability of foreign models to Indian context and the functions to be carried out by Integrated Theatre Commands.

(e) **Options for Integrated Theatre Commands.** Q 18 (a)-(d) were

used to assess the options for establishment of Integrated Theatre Commands

### **Data Analysis Techniques**

5. The following methods were used :-

- (a) Simple excel tools to give figurative assessments on the responses.
- (b) SPSS software to carry out descriptive, ANOVA and Chi square analysis.

### **World View**

6. Primarily, descriptive statistics has been used to obtain world view. The usage of three methods to arrive at the inferences is related to the peculiarities of tools in descriptive statistics as under :-

- (a) Mean includes extreme values.
- (b) Skewness represents symmetry (normal =0, negative value means to the left and right is positive).





(c) Kurtosis gives complete dispersion perfect being = 0, negative value indicates peak is normal, maximum dispersion and positive value means high peak minimum dispersion.

**Analysis of the Constructs**

**7. Construct 1- Integrated Theatre Commands will Enable Achievement of Strategic Objectives with Optimal Utilisation of Resources.** As discussed earlier,




two questions were raised. The aim of the construct was to assess the importance of effectiveness of Integrated Theatre Commands in increasing the operational efficiency of Indian Armed Forces. The highlights of analysis of the questions are as follows:-



	<p>strongly agreed while balance 53% agreed.</p>	
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

8. **Construct 2 – Integrated Theatre Commands can be Commanded by any of the three Services and are Applicable within the Country also.** Four questions were raised to the participants. The aim of the construct is to assess the mindset of the three services to integration and whether any conflict exists for the same. The statistics that emerged is as follows:-

<p>Q5.</p>	<p><i>Turf wars between the three services is one of the hurdles in creation of Integrated Theatre Commands</i></p> <p>49% of the respondents strongly agreed while 35% agreed and 16% were neutral.</p>	<p><b>Bar Chart</b></p> <p>Turf wars between the three services is one of the hurdles in creation of Integrated Theatre Commands.</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Service</th> <th>3</th> <th>4</th> <th>5</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>IA</td> <td>4</td> <td>22</td> <td>24</td> </tr> <tr> <td>IN</td> <td>5</td> <td>4</td> <td>11</td> </tr> <tr> <td>IAF</td> <td>5</td> <td>6</td> <td>9</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Service	3	4	5	IA	4	22	24	IN	5	4	11	IAF	5	6	9
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





9. **Construct 3- Command and Control of Integrated Theatre Commands.**

The main component of this construct is to gauge as to the views on under whom the Integrated Theatre Commands should function i.e. HQ and appointment. Q10 and Q15 were designed to assess the view of the sample respondents. The statistics that emerged is as follows:-



10. **Construct 4 – Organisation and Functioning of Integrated Theatre Commands.** Q11, Q13, Q16 and Q19 were used to assess the construct. In this construct, opinion of the environment was sought to analyse the suitability of foreign models to Indian context and the functions to be carried out by Integrated Theatre Commands. The statistics that emerged is as follows:-





**Testing and Validation of Hypothesis**

11. Techniques of inferential statistics have been applied for hypothesis testing. To prove the above hypothesis questions 7 and 9 have been selected The Null & Alternate Hypothesis for Construct 1 are as follows:-

(a) **Null Hypothesis:H0.** Integrated Theatre Commands will Enable Achievement of Strategic Objectives with Optimal Utilisation of Resources.

(b) **Alternate Hypothesis:H1.** Integrated Theatre Commands will not Enable Achievement of Strategic Objectives with Optimal Utilisation of Resources

12. **Question 7** - Integrated Theatre Commands will enable achievement of strategic objectives in a synchronised and synergized manner. The chi square test for goodness of fit has been carried out and the test results are enumerated as under:-

Integrated Theatre Commands will enable achievement of strategic objectives in a synchronised and synergized manner.

	Observed N	Expected N	Residual
4	46	40.5	5.5
5	44	49.5	-5.5
Total	90		

Test Statistics

	Integrated Theatre Commands will enable achievement of strategic objectives in a synchronised and synergized manner.
Chi-Square	1.358
df	1
Asymp. Sig.	.244

From the above table it can be seen that  $\chi(1) = 1.358$  and  $p=0.244$ . As  $p>0.05$  it can be said that there is no enough evidence to reject the hypothesis.

**Decision** - *Integrated Theatre Commands will enable achievement of strategic objectives in a synchronised and synergized manner*

13. **Question 9** Integrated Theatre Commands will enable optimal utilization of all the resources of the military in the theatre. The chi square test for goodness of fit has been carried out and the test results are enumerated as under:-

**Integrated Theatre Commands will enable optimal utilization of all the resources of the military in the theatre.**

	Observed N	Expected N	Residual
4	47	45.0	2.0
5	43	45.0	-2.0
Total	90		

**Test Statistics**

	Integrated Theatre Commands will enable optimal utilization of all the resources of the military in the theatre.
Chi-Square	.178
df	1
Asymp. Sig.	.673

From the above table it can be seen that  $\chi^2(1) = 1.78$  and  $p=0.673$ . As  $p>0.05$  it can be said that there is not enough evidence to reject the hypothesis.

**Decision** - *Integrated Theatre Commands will enable optimal utilization of all the resources of the military in the theatre*

14. Anova test to ascertain the homogeneity of constructs was conducted. Results reveal that the p value is more than LOS i.e. 95% of CL. Hence there is no bias/variance expressed by the three service respondents.

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Construct1	Between Groups	1.280	2	.640	1.338	.268
	Within Groups	41.620	87	.478		
	Total	42.900	89			
Construct2	Between Groups	7.070	2	3.535	2.273	.109
	Within Groups	135.330	87	1.556		
	Total	142.400	89			
Construct3	Between Groups	4.956	2	2.478	2.175	.120
	Within Groups	99.100	87	1.139		
	Total	104.056	89			



## **CHAPTER VII**

### **PROPOSED INTEGRATED THEATRE COMMANDS**

1. This chapter has covered the following aspects:
  - (a) **Suggested Model for Integrated Theatre Command** The section lists the various factors that must be taken into account while drawing up the various options for Integrated Theatre Commands.
  - (b) The recommended model for formulation of Integrated Theatre Command.
  - (c) Issues related to introduction of Integrated Theatre Commands in the place of the existing arrangements.
2. Joint Operations philosophy has to be either strategy specific or terrain specific or even a combination of both. As discussed In the previous chapter a combination of strategy specific and terrain specific joint organisations appear to be suitable in our context as our military philosophy is biased towards territorial integrity with Out of Area Contingency (OOAC) Operations being a rarity. Therefore constitution of terrain specific integrated commands with certain mission oriented integrated Theatre Commands appears to be a suitable option.
3. Formation of Integrated Theatre Command pre supposes existence of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as such organisations cannot work under any one service chief. It is recommended that the Integrated Commands be headed by a three star general, the respective service chiefs be four star generals and the CDS can be the first among the equals with a four star rank. However, Integrated Theatre Commands can function

under HQ IDS with guidance from the CDS. At the Theatre level, a single commander or C in C will command all the combat, combat support and services elements of all the services as per requirement. The service HQ under such a scenario will receive orders or directions from the CDS or the Chairman, COSC and will be responsible for providing personnel and material to the Integrated Theatre Command together with service specific HR functions.

#### **Suggested Model for Integrated Theatre Command**

4. Working within the framework of the option chosen in the previous chapter, many models can be worked out for formulating Integrated Theatre Commands along with the various combinations of the constituent services. The various factors that must be taken into account while drawing up the various options are as follows:-

- (a) Need to integrate the services as required for operations.
- (b) Threat perception, concept of operations and the role of the individual services in that theatre.
- (c) Size of the theatre of operations.
- (d) Area of specialisation of respective services and the lead service in the theatre.

5. The recommended model for formulation of Integrated Theatre Command is as follows:-

- (a) **Northern Theatre.** The theatre can cover the geographical area of existing Army Northern Command to include Indo Pak and Indo China borders. The theatre can have elements from Army and Air Force. Theatre

Commander could be nominated from either Army or Air Force. A separate commander be nominated by the theatre commander from the army to look after the CI / CT ops suitable beefed up with elements of Air Force and Navy as per requirement. The option of separating the Indo Pak and Indo China borders into two separate commands was also considered, however it was felt that separating them would not be in the best of the national interest. When seen at the strategic level, it is felt that the issues of concern between India and China and those between India and Pakistan in the regions of Leh, Ladakh, Siachen, Aksai Chin and such areas cannot be spilt and deserve a holistic look.

(b) **Western Theatre.** The theatre can cover the geographical area of existing Army Western, South Western and Southern Command to include the states of Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat. The theatre can have major elements from Army and Air Force with certain elements of the Navy for the Kutch Sector. Theatre Cdr could be nominated from either Army or Air Force. The main focus of the theatre would be Indo Pak borders (IB Sector). The region though appearing to be large will benefit from the confluence of all the surveillance and firepower efforts and the inherent flexibility of employment of the three Strike Corps.

(c) **Southern Theatre(Indian Ocean Region: West).** The theatre can cover the geographical area of the Western portion of existing Army Southern Command along the Western Coast to cover the states of Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka and Kerala and the AOR of the Naval Western Fleet. The island territories of Lakshadweep to be also included. The theatre to have major elements from the Navy with elements from the Army and Air Force. Theatre

Commander could be nominated from Navy. Army elements especially for the purpose of amphibious operations to be integrated into the organisation.

(d) **Southern Theatre(Indian Ocean Region: East).** The theatre can cover the geographical area of the Eastern portion of existing Army Southern Command along the Eastern coast to cover the states of Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu and the AOR of the Naval Eastern Fleet. The island territories of Andaman & Nicobar Islands to be also included. The theatre to have major elements from the Navy with elements from the Army and Air Force. Theatre commander could be nominated from Navy. Army elements especially those for the purpose of amphibious ops and OOAC to be integrated into the organisation. This theatre command can also form the nodal command for OOAC operations and hence should be suitably staffed and equipped.

(e) **Eastern Theatre.** The geographical area of existing Army Eastern Command, to cover the states of West Bengal, Sikkim, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura and Nagaland. The theatre will major elements from Army and Air Force with certain elements of Navy. Theatre commander could be nominated from either Army or Air Force. The main focus of the theatre would be Indo China border and also Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar borders.

(f) **Central Theatre.** The geographical area of existing Army Central Command to cover the states of Himachal Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Bihar and Jharkhand. The theatre will have major elements from Army and Air Force. Theatre Cdr could be nominated from either Army or Air Force. The main focus of the theatre would be Indo

China borders and also Indo Nepal borders. This Joint Theatre Command will also be nominated as the nodal command for Disaster Management operations. Naval assets where necessary will be made available from the respective Indian Ocean Region Command. Necessary staff for the purpose of Disaster Management however should be built into the organisation of this Joint Theatre Command.

(g) In addition to the geographical commands, there would be a requirement to create certain Integrated Functional Commands for carrying out certain essential operational functions. The Theatre Commander of these commands could be appointed from Army, Navy or Air Force. The commands are as follows:-

(i) **Strategic Forces Command.** This command will be responsible for command and control of all strategic national assets including the nuclear weapons and their delivery means. In addition this command will hold all the assets which are capable of being applied across theatre e.g. certain long range conventional vectors and aircrafts. Theatre Commander could be nominated from Army, Navy or Air Force.

(ii) **Aerospace Command.** This command will be responsible for command and control of all national aerospace assets including navigational and surveillance systems and weapons. Theatre Commander could be nominated from Army, Navy or Air Force.

(iii) **Cyber Space Command.** This command will be responsible for command and control of all cyber space assets including offensive and defensive capabilities. It will also control the backbone networks on

which all services and Theatre Commands are networked. The Theatre Commander could be nominated from Army, Navy or Air Force.

(iv) **Special Forces Command.** This command will be responsible for conduct of all Special Operations. It should control Special Forces of all three services including Para (SF), Garuda and Marcos. The Theatre Commander could be nominated from Army, Navy or Air Force.

(v) **Training and Doctrines Command.** This command will control all training assets including single service and joint training assets. It will also serve as the single source of all studies related to doctrines. The theatre commander could be nominated from Army, Navy or Air Force.

(vi) **Maintenance Command.** This command will control all maintenance assets including single service and joint assets. The theatre commander could be nominated from Army, Navy or Air Force.

(vii) **Logistics Command.** This command will serve as a one point solution for all procurement and distribution of logistics including ordnance and medical services. Facilities and organisations for trials and inspection should also be built into the organisation of this command.

6. Having recommended the formation of these integrated formations, there are certain issues that need considerations. These are the issues which have been responsible to some extent in these formations not being formed. Let us now consider

the various issues related to introduction of Integrated Theatre Commands in the place of the existing arrangements. The following issues deserve attention:-

(a) **Management of Regions / Operations Demanding Single Service**

**Attention.** One of the main causes of concern for the detractors against constitution of integrated theatre commands is management of regions / issues which have traditionally been handled by single services e.g. Counter Insurgency / Counter Terrorism which have traditionally been handled by the Army. It must be realised that at the level of Integrated Theatre issues which concern even single services like Counter Insurgency take strategic hues and can be looked after perfectly well by the Joint Theatre Commander of any service who has the access to advice of a Joint and Special staff. At the levels lower than that of the Joint Theatre i.e. at the Army Corps level these issues are recommended to be handled by single service HQ as done hither to fore. Such an arrangement will ensure that at the tactical / operational level the issue is handled by single service officers who are specialist in that field and at higher levels the issue is handled by staff and commanders who have a larger, holistic and strategic view on the issue.

(b) **Channel of Command and Control.**

(i) The Joint Theatre Command should ideally be commanded by the CDS and the HQ IDS. The respective service chiefs should retain their right to give additional advice as and when required. A simple system of command and control with a joint commander at the theatre level with a joint staff capable of looking after all matters concerning the joint theatre will be sufficient. What is of concern however is whether the Joint Theatre commands should be under the direct control

of a CDS or should these be controlled by the civilian ministry? In the US defence Forces<sup>18</sup>, although the office of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is considered very important and highly prestigious, neither the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body has any command authority over combatant forces. The Goldwater-Nichols Act places the chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense directly to the commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands (equivalent to the proposed Joint Theatre Commands). However the chiefs do have authority over personnel assignments and oversight over resources and personnel allocated to the combatant commands within their respective services. The Chairman may also transmit communications to the combatant commanders from the President and Secretary of Defense as well as allocate additional funding to the combatant commanders if necessary. Therefore the following options emerge:-

- (aa) Joint Theatre Commands can function directly under an Integrated Ministry of Defence suitably upgraded to include service personnel as technical advisors.
- (ab) Joint Theatre Commands can function under the CDS and HQ IDS.
- (ac) Joint Theatre Commands coexist along with existing single service commands with the CDS and HQ IDS commanding only the joint theatres and rest of the single service commands maintaining status quo.

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<sup>18</sup>Wikipedia, 10 Nov 2013



(ii) Formations of the level of Army Corps / equivalent of other services and below may be single service albeit with a much higher degree of representation from other services. The single service formations (Corps and below) can follow a double channel of command and control with operational control being exercised by the Integrated Theatre Command and technical control being exercised by respective services branch at the Integrated Theatre level and the respective services head at the Service HQ.

(c) **Colour of Uniform of the Joint Theatre Commander.** The commander of the Joint Theatre Command can be nominated from any of the major services that the command is comprised of. Gen Deepak Kapoor highlights that “...irrespective of the colour of the uniform, two main considerations should dictate the answer to this question. Firstly, the tasks that a command is expected to carry out should be the determining criteria. Secondly, merit and professional competence and not the colour of the uniform should be the important factor in conjunction with the first criteria”<sup>19</sup> A related aspect would be acquisition of the rights set of skills to be able to command / perform staff duties in a joint establishment. This will require much emphasis and can be done in the joint training establishments. In addition, tenantry appointments at joint training establishments and headquarters should become mandatory for promotion to senior ranks.

(d) **Judicious Employment of Scarce Assets.** Scarce assets especially the long distance Air and Naval assets should be employed beyond the theatre, at the recommendation of the Single Service HQ, by the CDS/ HQ IDS. This

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<sup>19</sup>Gen Deepak Kapoor, Need For Integrated Theatre Commands

should be considered something akin to central utilisation of artillery / engineer / armour assets as being done presently. In any case employment of assets of one theatre in another theatre depending on the situation and requirement is something which can always be done.

(e) **Role of Respective Service HQ and IDS.** The Integrated Theatre should report to the CDS and the HQ IDS on all operational matters. However, the individual service HQ should be responsible for all single service issues like raising, training, technical issues, and maintenance. The arrangement can be something similar to the existing arrangement between the various arms and services heads and the General Staff wherein the general staff is responsible for all operational matters while the single arm / services heads are responsible for raising, training and maintaining the individuals arm / service. The service HQ should on explicit orders of the CDS shall cater for the requirements of the Theatre Command.

(f) **Cadre Management.** Responsibility for Cadre management of the three services and the Joint Theatre Command will need to be split between the IDS and the respective service HQ. Experience of tenantry Joint Staff and Command assignments will need to be given its due importance for personnel who are inclined and have the calibre for tenantry higher joint appointments both in staff and command. Issues related to distribution of higher ranks/ appointments between the various services must be decided amicably. The following issues must be looked into while deciding:-

- (i) Requirement of service specific skills for the appointment.
- (ii) Equitable distribution of higher ranks to all services.

(iii) Need to promote joint-ness amongst the services.

(g) **Promoting Integration.** There exists a case to take specific steps to increase the feeling of camaraderie amongst the services. The services must get a feeling of belongingness to one common defence force. This will take time, however there are certain step which if taken can accelerate the process. These are:-

(i) A common uniform and rank structure will go a long way in creating a feeling of belonging to a common defence forces. Service specific combat uniforms can however still be worn for appropriate occasions.

(ii) Presence of officers and men of different services at the functional levels e.g. posting of Army personnel on board ships , posting of Air Force personnel at brigade HQ or Divisional HQ level and cross attachments. This will increase the level of interaction amongst the services and will benefit the organisation in the long run.

(iii) A common corps/cadre and assets for communication and logistics in addition to the already integrated medical services, postal services, MES works, Embarkation headquarters, Defence Lands and Cantonments Organisation and Canteen Stores Department.

(h) **Air Defence and Air Space Management.** Presently the management of Air Defence and Air Space Management leaves much to be desired. With the constitution of Integrated Theatre Commands both Air Defence and Air Space

Management can be integrated under the Air Force elements of the Integrated Theatre Command. This will greatly simplify these issues.

## CONCLUSION

1. India needs to urgently rework on its doctrine. As a country we appear to be too land power centric to be viable. Airpower centric response options that graduate up the escalation ladder and set the stage for a meaningful limited air-land war to inflict severe cost on the adversary, needs to be formulated. India must realise that it is only by integrating all the services that an effect can be created on the adversary. India's failure to respond militarily is encouraging Pakistan to extend the scope of its asymmetric assault. This may lead to many more Mumbai-like attacks and the loss of innocent lives. Such unchecked terrorist actions in India will make Indian claim of being a regional/global power hollow. An asymmetric war cannot be countered by defending each and every target in India. The onus of conventionalising the conflict lies on India. On the other front, our efforts in countering China can only succeed by combining the might of all the services.

2. Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta in their book 'Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernisation', have pointed out that, "The Indian military modernisation process lacks political support and guidance, is haphazard and bereft of strategic and organisational changes."<sup>20</sup> If India wants to remain relevant in the geo strategic arena, it will have to modernise its armed forces. Modernisation of the armed forces has to commence from integration of the three services especially at the functional level. While releasing the Joint Doctrine 2007, Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, the then Defence Minister, had remarked that "there is a need to evolve a road map

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<sup>20</sup>Cohen, Stephen P and Dasgupta, Sunil, 'Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernisation', New Delhi: Penguin & Viking, 2010

towards furthering the process of joint commands so as to make resources available for modernisation.”<sup>21</sup>

3. Modern warfare demands close cooperation between all the constituents of the force. Warfare has become so fast and demanding that one can ill afford to get caught in red tape and procedures for coordinating the effort of all the services. The necessity for having a common war fighting procedures for all the services cannot be underestimated. One will have to grow out of the habit of narrow service specific needs and goodies and will have to work towards the common good of the country. If India is to assume its rightful place in the comity of nations, its defence forces will need to be integrated. The services must be given a common focus and coordinated planning, thinking and training for operations must be ensured. This can only happen if all the combat forces which have to fight together are rallied under a common commander. This however should not be construed as in any way diluting the present level of competence and effectiveness of the individual services.

4. There is no escaping the military logic of creating suitably constituted integrated theatre commands and functional (non-territorial) commands for the Armed Forces as a whole. Whether integration of MoD and Services Headquarters comes into being or not, yet there is an adequate scope for development of joint integrated structures and a common ethos under the present arrangement too. The issue of CDS has been hanging fire since long. It appears unlikely that the Indian Government and the Indian Armed Forces will take any revolutionary step in making a CDS anytime soon. It is a well-known fact that our Higher Defence Organisation too need massive overhaul however that too might take time. In the meanwhile it might be worth the

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<sup>21</sup>Integrating the Indian Military: Retrospect and Prospect, Vinod Anand, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 2 No. 2, Winter 2008

effort to start with constituting Integrated Theatre Commands. It is absolutely essential that the three services be integrated and bi service / tri services theatre commands be raised. This would result in optimum utilisation of resources, better procurement of systems and weapons, better utilisation of defence budget and better implementation of the joint doctrine. Workable interoperability amongst the three services as required for modern warfare cannot be possible unless Joint Integrated Theatres are made operational. One such model of Integrated Theatre Command has been recommended and analysed in this study.

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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR A DISSERTATION ON CREATION OF “INTEGRATED THEATRE COMMANDS” IN THE  
ARMED FORCES

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**Background** An analysis of the projected threat scenarios makes close integration amongst the various arms of the military ie the Army, Navy and Air Force a necessity. Case for integration of the defence forces at the highest level i.e. the creation of the post of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and other similar structures are already under consideration at the highest level. In addition, a synergised application of a force comprising the combined services can only be feasible with integration of various services at the Command or Theatre level. One of the methods of achieving a close integration is by placing the resources of Army, Navy and Air Force under one Commander. My research aims to carry out a critical appraisal of the existing structures of the Indian Defence Forces in the backdrop of current and future roles

**Objective** My research will seek to **examine the relevance of Integrated Theatre Command** in the backdrop of our current war fighting concepts and critically **examine the importance of Integrated Theatre Commands** in achieving synergy in application of the armed forces in the contemporary and futuristic battles thereby **increasing their operational effectiveness.**

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**Scale** - Each question has been graded between 5 to 1 (**Strongly Agree – 5, Agree – 4, Neutral – 3, Disagree – 2, Strongly Disagree – 1**).

**Pl tick against appropriate responses. Question 18,pl rank order**

Ser No	Questions	5	4	3	2	1
1.	I am aware of the history of joint operations of the Indian military.					
2.	The 1971 operations were a shining example of jointness in the Indian Military.					
3.	Future wars will have to be fought by all the three services as a single entity.					
4.	It is essential to develop joint plans to execute operations to achieve the common goals.					
5.	The Air Force and Navy fears domination by Army in any integrated force HQ.					
6.	The concept of Integrated Theatre Commands is applicable for only Out of Area Contingencies.					
7.	Integrated Theatre Commands will enable achievement of strategic objectives in a synchronised and synergized manner.					
8.	Integrated Theatre Commands will enable a shorter OODA loop for field commanders.					
9.	Integrated Theatre Commands will enable optimal utilization of all the resources of the military in the theatre.					
10.	Integrated Theatre Commands can be the successor to the government's appointment of CDS.					
11.	The concept of theatre commands as in the US military is not suitable /applicable to the Indian Armed Forces.					
12.	The commander of the Integrated Theatre Command can be of any of the three services.					
13.	Certain functions of the three services like cyber warfare, logistics and special forces should be combined to create integrated functional commands.					

14.	Turf wars between the three services is one of the hurdles in creation of integrated Theatre Commands.					
15.	Integrated Theatre Commands should function under HQ IDS, headed by the CDS for all operational matters.					
16.	Role of the service HQs should be on issues of raising, training, technical issues and maintenance.					
17.	In the existing organisational setup, the theatre commander does not have control over the resources of other services deployed in his Area of Responsibility.					
18.	<b><u>Proposals for Integrated Theatre Commands.</u></b> Four options for creation of Integrated Theatre Commands are listed below. Pl rank order them in the order of priority with 1 being Priority 1.					
	(a) <b>Geographical Integrated Theatre Commands</b> - Re-worked Army theatre commands					
	(b) <b>Super Theatres</b> – Combine Army’s two or more commands with Air Force/Navy e.g. Western Theatre					
	(c) <b>Joint Theatre Commands</b> - Status Quo with joint theatre commands for specific purpose e.g. Cyber Command, Space Command.					
	(d) Integrated Theatre Commands with <b>forces allotted as per requirement</b>					
19.	Special forces and space commands should be combined with the Integrated Theatre Commands					