

# **AIR POWER IN UN PEACEKEEPING** **A REVIEW OF INDIAN AIR FORCE** **EMPLOYMENT AND ITS EFFICACY**

A dissertation submitted to Punjab University, Chandigarh for the award of Master of Philosophy in Social Sciences, in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the 45<sup>th</sup> Advanced Professional Programme in Public Administration

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**INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION  
NEW DELHI**

**45<sup>TH</sup> ADVANCED PROFESSIONAL PROGRAMME IN PUBLIC  
ADMINISTRATION**

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## CERTIFICATE

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I have the pleasure to certify that **Air Commodore Pemmaraju Maheshwar** has pursued his research work and the present dissertation titled “**Airpower in Peacekeeping: A Review of Indian Air Force Employment and its Efficacy**” under my guidance and supervision. The dissertation is a result of his own research and to best of my knowledge, no part of it has earlier comprised any other monograph, dissertation or book.

The dissertation is being submitted to the Punjab University, Chandigarh for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Social Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Advanced Professional Programme in Public Administration (APPPA) of the Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi.

**Approved by Guide: Dr Nupur Tiwari**

I recommend that the dissertation of **Air Commodore Pemmaraju Maheshwar** is worthy of consideration for the award of M Phil degree of the Punjab University, Chandigarh.

**( Dr Nupur Tiwari)**

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Mar 2020

Air Cmde P Maheshwar

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The concept of World peace is as old as the recorded history of Mankind. There are many theories about how it could be achieved, of which Non Violence or absence of War remains one of the most widely accepted one across the centuries. At the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> Century, after the two World Wars, “*Non Violence*” as an Anti-war sentiment became the anthem. These sentiments, in the backdrop of failure of “League of Nations” to prevent Second World War, led to formation of United Nations in 1945. India is one of the original members of UN. The initial 50 member states have now grown to 193 member states and 2 observer states.

The concept of Peacekeeping is regarded as a measure to be taken in aftermath of war (or conflict) in order to assist the implementation of peace agreement. It also addresses issues of conflict resolution and a peaceful settlement of conflict. In addition, it has also been used to for conflict prevention. Over the years, the concept of Peacekeeping has been modified and expanded significantly. The Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and VII (Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of Peace, and Acts of Aggression) are at the core of UN Charter to maintain Peace.

The spectrum of conflict, when derived on the basis of level of Violence vs level of Combat, places the Peace support operations on the lower end, which is typically referred as Spectrum of Peace as against the spectrum of combat. Peacekeeping is a part of Peace support Operations, which also includes Peace enforcement, Humanitarian, Peacebuilding, Peace-making and Conflict Prevention operations. These are generally undertaken during unstable peace conditions with an aim to convert it into a stable peace condition. Thus these operations would typically require a robust defence capability with a latent offensive ability.

Air power was born in the crucible of World War I, but came of age in the conflagration of World War II. One of the Modern doctrines defines Air Power as "the ability to project power from the air and space to influence the behaviour of people or the course of events." The fluidity and flexibility with which air power can be employed and the long ranges over which it can operate, along with the fact that it does not occupy terrain

as surface forces do, make the dynamics of air power employment tactically and strategically distinctive.

If one is to understand Airpower, or any instrument of power, one must understand the assumptions that underpin the mechanism linking its use to the achievement of a particular political end or goal. At this point, we have more than 100 years of experience with Airpower as a military instrument, and this historical record has given us a strong sense of where theories have either aligned with or departed from expectations.

Typically, Air power has often been viewed as an Offensive option (Kinetic), yet at the strategic level Airpower has often favoured the defence, a pattern that began in World War I, where the massive defensive power of artillery was multiplied by aerial observation, and reconnaissance aircraft revealed enemy forces massing for attacks in time for defenders to shift forces to meet them.

While Peace has to be achieved on ground, however contextualising Peacekeeping as a prerogative of land forces operations entirely, would be parochial. The role of Aerial Assets (Airpower) in Peacekeeping has been predominantly in support of the efforts underway on “Terra Firma”. This very approach could lead to an employment philosophy which is either restrictive in nature or ineffective in applicability.

The concept of Peacekeeping has evolved over the last 75yrs from its traditional application of monitoring Ceasefire Mechanisms to the contemporary Multi-Dimensional application involving Peacemaking, Peace enforcement and Peace building. The Mandates have similarly progressed from a few to multiple, covering complex set of requirements. However, this evolution has not changed the fundamental principles of Peacekeeping : Consent, Impartiality and Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.

The changing Geopolitics of late 20<sup>th</sup> Century (ending of cold war) and emergence of new fault lines in 21<sup>st</sup> Century (Economic and Religious Fundamentalism) have resulted in conflicts which are more complex and multi-dimensional. This complexity, while retaining the constancy in principles of Peacekeeping, has eventuated many reviews and reforms in the way Peacekeeping Operations are undertaken. Most notably has been the “Brahimi Report” of 2000 and the HIPPO report of 2015 (High-Level Panel on Peace Operations).

Similarly the concept of Airpower (or use of Aviation assets), after both the World Wars, has matured over many conflicts in 20<sup>th</sup> Century (Korean, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo etc.) While most of these were on the higher level in spectrum of conflict, there were few which were Low Intensity conflicts/insurgencies, leading to failure of state and subsequent UN led mediation resulting in a Peacekeeping Operations. Consequently, these Peace operations also have witnessed use of Airpower as means to address its defined mandate. Aviation assets in UN led Peacekeeping ranged from Helicopters and Transport aircraft at one end to even Fighters on the other (ONUC 1960s), though the latter is an exception.

If one is to understand Airpower, or any instrument of power, one must understand the assumptions that underpin the mechanism linking its use to the achievement of a particular political end or goal. The study tries to understand these underpinnings by exploring the evolution of the concept of “Airpower” and its context in UN Peacekeeping Operations while questioning that whether “Airpower sub optimally utilised in UN Peacekeeping Operations”. Towards this it also attempts reinterpret the certain basic tenets on airpower for peacekeeping. As a part of the study an attempt is also made to review the Indian Air Force participation in UN Peacekeeping operations. In addition a survey in form of a questionnaire was also undertaken. The responses were collated and analysed so as to seek answers to answers to the questions raised.

The study confirms that airpower in peace operations is highly visible component and there is a dominance of Non Kinetic use of Airpower in UN Peace Operations. However, these must be backed by a “Robust” Rules of engagement for a Kinetic application of the Airpower as coercive deterrence which should be **perceivable when required**. The Airpower’s application would be driven more by political requirements rather than military. Thus, it is a STRATEGIC TOOL IN UN OPERATIONS.

In the end the study suggest certain recommendations under three broad categories of Training, Doctrine/Policy and Operational.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATION

|                |  |
|----------------|--|
| <b>A4P</b>     | <b>Action for Peacekeeping</b>                         |
| <b>AA</b>      | Anti Aircraft  |
| <b>AAG</b>     | Anti Aircraft Gun                                      |
| <b>ADA</b>     | Air Defence Artillery                                  |
| <b>AF</b>      | Air Force  |
| <b>AFV</b>     | Armoured Fighting Vehicle                              |
| <b>AH</b>      | Attack Helicopter                                      |
| <b>APC</b>     | Armoured Personnel Carrier                             |
| <b>AT</b>      | Anti Tank  |
| <b>ATGM</b>    | Anti Tank Guided Missile                               |
| <b>AU</b>      | African Union  |
| <b>AU</b>      | African Union  |
| <b>C3I</b>     | Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence        |
| <b>CAP</b>     | Combat Air Patrol                                      |
| <b>CAS</b>     | Close Air Support                                      |
| <b>CASEVAC</b> | Casualty Evacuation                                    |
| <b>CEP</b>     | Circular Error of Probability                          |
| <b>COTS</b>    | Commercial-Off-the-Shelf                               |
| <b>DDR</b>     | Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration          |
| <b>DFS</b>     | Department of Field Support                            |
| <b>DPA</b>     | Department of Political Affairs                        |
| <b>DPKO</b>    | Department of Peacekeeping Operations                  |
| <b>DPO</b>     | Department of Peace Operations                         |
| <b>DRC</b>     | Democratic Republic of Congo                           |
| <b>DSRSG</b>   | Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General |
| <b>DZ</b>      | Drop Zone  |
| <b>EOTS</b>    | Electro Optical Tracking System                        |
| <b>EU</b>      | European Union   |
| <b>FAARP</b>   | Forward Area Arming & Refuelling Point                 |
| <b>FARP</b>    | Forward Area Refuelling Point                          |
| <b>FARRP</b>   | Forward Area Rearming & Refuelling Pont                |
| <b>FLIR</b>    | Forward Looking Infra-Red                              |
| <b>FOB</b>     | Forward Operating Base                                 |
| <b>GA</b>      | General Assembly                                       |
| <b>GBAD</b>    | Ground Based Air Defence                               |
| <b>GPS</b>     | Global Positioning System                              |
| <b>GW</b>      | Guided Weapon  |
| <b>GWOT</b>    | Global War on Terror                                   |
| <b>IAF</b>     | Indian Air Force                                       |
| <b>ICRC</b>    | International Committee of the Red Cross               |

|                |  |
|----------------|--|
| <b>ICV</b>     | Infantry Combat Vehicle  |
| <b>IDP</b>     | Internally Displaced Person  |
| <b>IED</b>     | Improvised Explosive Device  |
| <b>II</b>      | Image Intensification  |
| <b>IIR</b>     | Imaging Infra-Red  |
| <b>IR</b>      | Infra-Red  |
| <b>ISR</b>     | Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance                       |
| <b>JOC</b>     | Joint Operations Centre  |
| <b>KE</b>      | Kinetic Energy   |
| <b>LMG</b>     | Light Machine Gun  |
| <b>LOS</b>     | Line of Sight  |
| <b>LZ</b>      | Landing Zone   |
| <b>MG</b>      | Machine Gun  |
| <b>MINURSO</b> | United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara        |
| <b>MLH</b>     | Medium Lift Helicopter   |
| <b>MMG</b>     | Medium Machine Gun   |
| <b>MONUC</b>   | United Nations Mission in Congo                                    |
| <b>MoU</b>     | Memorandum of Understanding  |
| <b>NVD</b>     | Night Vision Device  |
| <b>NVG</b>     | Night Vision Goggles   |
| <b>NVS</b>     | Night Vision System  |
| <b>OCHA</b>    | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| <b>OMS</b>     | Office of Mission Support  |
| <b>ONUC</b>    | United Nations Operations in Congo                                 |
| <b>PCC</b>     | Police Contributing Countries                                      |
| <b>PoC</b>     | Protection of Civilians  |
| <b>PSO</b>     | Peace Support Operations   |
| <b>QRF</b>     | Quick Reaction Force   |
| <b>R2P</b>     | Right to Protect   |
| <b>ROE</b>     | Rules of Engagement  |
| <b>ROF</b>     | Rate Of Fire   |
| <b>RPG</b>     | Rocket Propelled Grenades  |
| <b>RPV</b>     | Remotely Piloted Vehicle   |
| <b>SAM</b>     | Surface to Air Missile   |
| <b>SDS</b>     | Strategic Deployment Stocks  |
| <b>SF</b>      | Special Forces   |
| <b>SFOR</b>    | Stabilization Force  |
| <b>SLAW</b>    | Shoulder Launched Assault Weapon                                   |
| <b>SLR</b>     | Self Loading Rifle   |
| <b>SMG</b>     | Sub Machine Gun  |
| <b>SOFA</b>    | Status of Force Agreement  |
| <b>SOP</b>     | Standard Operating Procedure                                       |

|                |   |
|----------------|---|
| <b>SRS</b>     | Special Representative of the Secretary General         |
| <b>TCC</b>     | Troop Contributing Countries                            |
| <b>TTP</b>     | Tactics, Techniques and Procedures                      |
| <b>UAS</b>     | Unmanned Aerial System                                  |
| <b>UAV</b>     | Unmanned Aerial Vehicle                                 |
| <b>UN</b>      | United Nations  |
| <b>UNAMIR</b>  | United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda            |
| <b>UNAMSIL</b> | United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone       |
| <b>UNDP</b>    | United Nations Development Programme                    |
| <b>UNHCR</b>   | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees           |
| <b>UNICEF</b>  | United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund  |
| <b>UNMIS</b>   | United Nations Mission in Sudan                         |
| <b>UNMISS</b>  | United Nations Mission in South Sudan                   |
| <b>UNOSOM</b>  | United Nations Operations in Somalia                    |
| <b>UNPCRS</b>  | United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System |
| <b>UNSAS</b>   | United Nations Standby Arrangements System              |
| <b>WFP</b>     | World Food Program                                      |

# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

The concept of World peace is as old as the recorded history of Mankind. There are many theories about how it could be achieved, of which Non Violence remains one of the most widely accepted one across the centuries. At the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> Century, after the two World Wars, "*Non Violence*" as an Anti-war sentiment became the anthem. These sentiments, in the backdrop of failure of "League of Nations" to prevent Second World War, led to formation of United Nations in 1945. India is one of the original members of UN. The initial 50 member states have now grown to 193 member states and 2 observer states.

The present day concept "*Peacekeeping*" originates in the Preamble of Charter of United Nations and is further elaborated in Chapters VI, VII & VIII. Further, the terms "*Peacekeeping*" and "*Peace Enforcement*" are often used by many practitioners while referring to UN Charter chapters VI and VII. There is a difference between interventions authorised by UN and UN authorised Peacekeeping missions. The Department of Peace Operations(DPO)(erstwhile DPKO) oversees these missions. Since its inception UN authorised 71 UN Peacekeeping missions(Aug 2019) which 57 are completed and 14 are currently deployed.

While the Humanity was battling the scourges of War, early 20<sup>th</sup> Century saw birth of "*Aeroplane*". Soon enough this new tool found a Military utility, which was exploited in First World War and then theorised as a doctrine of "*Airpower*" towards its application in Second World War. The Airpower doctrine since then has been elucidated by many scholars and has been applied in variety of scenarios which cover the entire spectrum of conflict. One of the Modern doctrine's, defines Airpower as "*the ability to project power from the air and space to influence the behaviour of people or the course of events.*"

The earliest two missions, the “UN Truce Supervision Organisation”(1948) (UNTSO)” and “UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan” (1949)(UNMOGIP)<sup>1</sup>are still ongoing. These two missions have often relied on critical support from an Aerial platform through these years. Presently there are as many as 110 helicopters in support of the 13 peacekeeping operations, which includes 72 Military Helicopters.

The Indian Aviation contribution in this regard has largely been from Indian Air Force, while there have been participation of Aviation assets of Indian Army (UNOSOM II & MONUC) and Indian Navy (UNITAF & UNOSOM II)<sup>2</sup> too in some of the missions.

Indian Air Force has participated in five UN Peacekeeping missions between 1960-2010, all of which have been in Africa. The last three of these were spread over a decade. The IAF contribution, in terms of Aviation assets, was at its peak during 2005-2010, with nearly 23 Helicopters at a time. This included 08 Attack Helicopters (Mi25/35). Amongst these, IAF’s participation in Peacekeeping in Democratic Republic of Congo was the longest(1961-62 & 2003-11) and the largest (18 Helicopters/4 locations). Since 2011 the IAF participation has been reduced to Military Aviation Staff in UN Peacekeeping Missions.

## **1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

If one is to understand Airpower, or any instrument of power, one must understand the assumptions that underpin the mechanism linking its use to the achievement of a particular political end or goal. At this point, we have more than 100 years of experience with Airpower as a military instrument, and this historical record has given us a strong sense of where theories have either aligned with or departed from expectations. Unfortunately, even generally sophisticated doctrinal writings have been prone to committing the error of failing to distinguish clearly between the application of force and the political consequences of that application.

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<sup>1</sup> [www.peacekeeping.un.org/en](http://www.peacekeeping.un.org/en)

<sup>2</sup> Hiranandani GM, Vice Adm (Retd), Apr 2011, *The Emerging Role of the Indian Navy in the New World Order – I, Book Excerpt: Transition to Guardianship: The Indian Navy 1991-2000*



The role of Aerial Assets (Airpower) in Peacekeeping has been predominantly in support of the efforts underway on ground. This very approach could lead to an employment philosophy which is either restrictive in nature or ineffective in its applicability . Hence, there is a need to examine the Airpower doctrine in context of Peacekeeping operations. In view of this, the question being

### **Are Aerial assets in UN Peacekeeping operations Sub Optimally Utilised?**

In this context, it is proposed that a study of employment of Indian Air Force assets specifically in various Peacekeeping missions may postulate certain guidelines for future employment of Airpower in UN Peacekeeping missions. While the study intends to analyse Indian Air Force employment in Peacekeeping, it would also attempt to study and compare them with the current practices of UN Peacekeeping Aerial assets.

### **1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

The broad objectives of the study is to review relevant literature so as to develop a comprehensive understanding of concept of Peacekeeping as well as theoretical perspective of Airpower and its context in this century. The specific objectives of the study are as under:

- To Understand the concept of Peacekeeping and the emerging trends in it.
- To study the traditional and contemporary discourses on Airpower.
- To Study employment of Airpower in UN Peacekeeping.
- To analyse the various IAF deployments in UN Peacekeeping in the context of their employment as Airpower tools.
- To provide suggestions for future employment of IAF assets in UN Peacekeeping operations.

### **1.4 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY**

Peacekeeping in the post-cold war era has seen a paradigm change due to rise in acceptance in Hybrid nature of Conflict. Further the Peacekeeping's traditional definitions have too evolved to accept the Multi-dimensional aspects of Peacekeeping and are often now referred as Peace

Operations. In this context UN Peacekeeping has often come under criticism and scrutiny. Many High level reviews and reports have been tabled and accepted. Most Notable was the “Brahimi Report”<sup>3</sup> in Aug 2000 which flagged the issue of responsive capacity building. Aviation assets are key enablers that give any peace operation the mobility and agility and hence are the force multipliers that enhance the effectiveness of operations. They are essential to make peace operations robust enough to deter armed elements threatening civilians and UN personnel. All of this, in turn, allows missions to implement their mandates, which includes protection of civilians, which is not possible without strong aviation element. Hence it is reasoned that the study would also provide basis for better force structure planning for future participation.

## **1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

Q 1- Can Airpower Doctrine be reinterpreted in context of Peacekeeping operations?

Q2- Is Airpower in UN Peacekeeping operations Sub Optimally Utilised?

Q3- Were the Indian Air Force assets effectively utilised?

## **1.6 SCOPE/LIMITATIONS/DELIMITATIONS**

Scope of this dissertation is to examine and analyse the Indian Air Force deployments and their employment in UN Peacekeeping Operations from a perspective of postulates of “Airpower” doctrine . Towards this, the study intends to also examine various reports and articles written on the subject of Aviation in UN Peace Operations.

Further, throughout this study the terms conflict and war will be used interchangeably. They both refer to a prolonged armed conflict between states and/or intrastate. A similar approach is used for the terms mission and operations. Both terms refer to UN’s organized intervention in areas of conflict. Further it would be an endeavour to clarify that the terms Peacekeeping and Peace Operations are not mutually exclusive as would be the case for Peace enforcement and Peace Operations.

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<sup>3</sup> [www.undocs.org/A/55/305](http://www.undocs.org/A/55/305)

## 1.7 RESEARCH DESIGN

The study is based on both Primary and secondary sources. It would use an inductive approach to the research to find answers and derive a conclusion before suggesting few recommendations. The endeavour would be to analyse the Indian Air Force deployments over the years in Peacekeeping.

Primary sources based on:

- Survey data obtained through research using a questionnaire to personnel with either experience in peacekeeping or airpower.

Secondary source based on

- Primarily consisting of books, articles and reports published by UN and other research institutions would also be undertaken.
- Archival studies & Media Analysis.

## 1.8 ARRANGEMENT OF CHAPTERS

The research is broadly divided into two parts. The first part of the thesis is allocated to a brief description of evolution of Peacekeeping and Airpower. These chapters intend to serve as the framework to understand the Indian Air Force deployment in the various Peacekeeping missions till date. The second part reviews the IAF peacekeeping efforts.

**Chapter I – Introduction.** This chapter provides the preamble to the research as it provides background and put forth the statement of problem, the objectives of study and the rationale of study. While generating the hypothesis it raises few research questions which would need answering during the course of research.

**Chapter II- Review of Literature.** In this chapter relevant literature related to the concept of Peacekeeping, Airpower and Indian Air Force Deployment in Peacekeeping would be analysed. The points of agreements and disagreements would be highlighted to identify the gaps in the literature and their place in the research.

**Chapter III- Peacekeeping.** The term Peacekeeping has been widely used, however there is need to understand theoretical aspects of peace before understanding peacekeeping. The chapter would endeavour to seek a theoretical perspective of peace and thereafter understand the evolution of the concept of peacekeeping from United Nations perspective. It would then contextualise peacekeeping in terms of its understanding in 21<sup>st</sup> century.

**Chapter IV- Airpower.** The term Airpower is unique in its application and is not so widely prevalent outside Military studies. This chapter would be an attempt to understand the evolution of this term over the last century. In this process an attempt would be made to contextualise Airpower in terms of Peacekeeping/Peace Operations.

**Chapter V- Indian Air Force Deployments.** Indian Air Force has taken part in five Peacekeeping operations starting from 1960s till 2011. While compared to the contribution of Indian Army its very small, however the accolades won by their professional conduct during these missions are a testimony to their effectiveness. The chapter intends to understand the conditions in which these aircraft took part in Peacekeeping missions as well as their equipment profile and their deployment philosophy.

**Chapter VI- Analyses of IAF employment.** While the IAF has not been actively contributing to Peacekeeping missions in form of aircraft for over a decade, its contribution at one time was significant. This chapter intends to analyse these deployments in context of Airpower in Peace Operations as contextualised in Chapter IV and also analyse the data from the questionnaire so as to seek answers to the questions raised at the beginning of the research. In this regard, the chapter would also review any documented assessment of UN Aviation.

**Chapter VII- Recommendations.** Having analysed the IAFs deployments in Peacekeeping Missions and answered the questions raised as a part of the study the endeavour would be to put forth certain recommendations which may find acceptance either at UN Department of Peacekeeping or at the Air Headquarters for future employment/deployment of any aerial system as a part of Airpower in Peace Operations

## CHAPTER II

### LITERATURE REVIEW

There was a dramatic increase of interest in United Nations peacekeeping in 90s, a conflict management approach largely moribund and discredited a decade earlier. The academic literature includes a large number of books and articles on the subject, mostly analysing on the new roles assumed by UN peacekeepers in the post-Cold War era or individual case studies of those operations. Peacekeeping as choice of International relations has developed many “Flavours”, and its method implementation or application remains a choice of the State(s) which is steering the Peace.

Airpower’s employment specifically in support of UN operations is little researched and thus less understood, which maybe a reflection of the primacy of land forces in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian operations. Hence Literature on Airpower in UN Peacekeeping is scant and limited to mostly Western thought process (or North, in the North-South dialogue) in its origin. In addition, most of the literature discusses “Peace Operations” more as a regional collation led military operations (typically NATO).

However, **Walter A Dorn in “Airpower in UN Operations: Wings of Peace”** highlights that Airpower has had a long history in support of the full spectrum of UN military missions. In his book A. Walter Dorn, has brought together eclectic collection of articles untold earlier by scholars and practitioners, to consider how the UN has used both kinetic and non-kinetic Airpower as a tool for peacekeeping operations.

The book benefits from its uniqueness as it is the first book to deal specifically with the subject. It lays the foundation for what is an increasingly relevant area of research “Airpower in UN Operations”. The book examines the use of Airpower by the UN since 1960 through to the air operations over Libya by NATO in 2011, which enforced UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973. Various chapters deal with a range of novel yet important aspects of UN Airpower, such as command of multinational forces; the control, coordination and integration of different national air and ground elements; the provision of leased aviation solutions; and the potential of remotely piloted aircraft systems as a key feature of future UN

missions. The chapters are split over six thematic areas: The UN's First 'Air Force'; Airlift; Aerial Surveillance; No-Fly Zones; Combat and evolving capabilities. These are subjects that present significant barriers to the effective and efficient employment of UN Airpower, as well as offering potential solutions to challenges faced by UN military officials.

The book illustrates that UN air operations cover the broad spectrum of roles readily identifiable in modern Airpower doctrine: control of the air; attack; situational awareness and air mobility. It is believed that, to meet the ends desired by the UN, – the cessation of violence between, states, groups or organisations – it is often necessary to utilise Airpower's various capabilities to moderate and influence the behaviour of the parties involved. Therefore, Airpower offers a toolkit to try to support the enforcement of UN Resolutions.

The book highlights the many challenges concerning the application of Airpower in the context of peacekeeping operations. It considers both some of the practical challenges of deploying Airpower into the theatre to the many diplomatic considerations that affect the use of Airpower as a policy tool for the UN. Clearly, Airpower is not always the answer; however, as part of a toolbox of political, diplomatic, economic and military means, Airpower can provide the ways to achieve the ends sought by the UN if applied correctly.

The book, while laying the foundation to study "Airpower" in context of Peacekeeping Operations, highlights that Airpower plays an important role in the effectiveness and efficiency of UN military missions. It is unlikely that the UN's white aircraft will ever achieve the iconic status of the blue helmet. Even the most ardent Airpower theorists acknowledge that the substitution of aircraft for boots on the ground is not a viable option for the vast majority of UN military operations. However, as an Airpower theorist, there is need to investigate more closely and redefine these roles. To this end, Airpower in UN Operations provides a useful compilation of potential avenues of research worthy of further investigation.

In the book **Peacekeeping and Protection of Civilians: The Indian Air Force in the Congo** the Air Commodore Rajesh Isser draws from his personal experience as a Commanding Officer of a Helicopter Unit in MONUC (Democratic Republic of Congo-DRC). In Part I of his book he vividly acquaints the readers to Peacekeeping operations specifically to the time period of 2003-04 in DRC. During this process many of his narratives ascribe to the classical "Airpower" roles. In Part II of the book he deliberates over the role of India in UN

Peacekeeping. The book, while limited to description of events related to IAF employment in MONUC during the specific period, succinctly brings in Role of Airpower. The Author reiterates the relevance of Airpower in Peacekeeping and thereby reinforcing the need to a closer examination of Airpower in context of Peacekeeping.

The Book **“Ganesha’s Flyboys: The Indian Air Force in the Congo 1960-62”** is an attempt to archive the events surrounding the first IAF employment in UN Peacekeeping operations. The Authors narrative emerges from a collection of articles and possibly the diaries of account of the unit or personal who were part the deployment. While the book is does not have any direct reference to Airpower, however it provides a good source for information about the events for an Airpower theorists to infer and draw lessons.

In the article **Airpower and Peace Enforcement**, author distinguishes Peace Enforcement differently from Peacekeeping in US Forces. He also brings out the doctrinal vacuum in Peace Enforcement operations, while acknowledging the complexities of Peace enforcement operations and the difficulty of application of Airpower. The author brings out that there is a need to modify the Airpower doctrine to suit the complexities and offers few ideas that might serve as starting points for doctrinal study and change.

**Keeping Watch : Monitoring, Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping**, is an attempt by the author to make a case for brining technology of UN Peacekeeping in 21<sup>st</sup> century. He argues out the need to monitor as an essential function of Peacekeeping and thereafter build up a case for Aerial Surveillance as the need of the hour. He also enumerate some of sensing technologies which could be used in Peacekeeping operations.

The paper by Alexandra Novosseloff **Keeping Peace from above : Air Assets in UN Peace Operations** is an exposition on the force enabling characteristics of Aircrafts specially in Peace operations. She goes on argue that aviation is often the “Achilles heel” or vulnerable point of UN Peacekeeping due to they are expensive and scarce relative to the large size of territories they cover. The paper examines, How missions’ air assets are organised, generated, managed, tasked, controlled, and commanded. The paper while acknowledging the steps taken to strengthen management of air assets in UN Peacekeeping over the last few years, implores implementation of these changes and admits that often there is a reluctance to use them. One

of the many recommendations is also about taking a more strategic approach to deploying air assets. Further she also suggests sharing of air assets among missions.

**The Quest for Relevant Airpower** by Christian F. Anrig, is an analysis of Continental European Response to the Airpower Challenges of the Post–Cold War Era. The Author analyses the French Air Force, German Air Force, Royal Netherlands Air Force and Swedish Air Force are trying to adapt to the Uncertainties Created by Shifting Defence and Alliance Policies, Responding to the Challenges of Real Operations and New Intellectualism in Airpower.

**Peacekeeping at the Speed of Sound** is an article by John Hillen in Airpower Journal of US Air Force Airpower Journal (Winter 1998). The article contextualises Peace Operations in the US military doctrine as Operations other than War (OOTW) and discusses Airpower specific to Peace Operations.

**Airpower and Warfare: A Century of Theory and History** by Tami Davis Biddle is a monograph on century-long experience of Airpower as an instrument of warfare. The Author also draws upon the US experience and Doctrinal positions to postulate certain future trajectories for Airpower usage.

**The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations** is a report by William Durch and Victoria Holt, with an aim to assist both experts and generalists to deepen their understanding of how the UN and its peacekeeping department have worked to implement significant changes in its practices proposed by the “Brahimi Report”.

**The War in the Air 1914 - 1994** book contains the proceedings of a conference held by the Royal Australian Air Force in Canberra in 1994. It is published by the Royal Australian Air Forces’ Airpower Studies Centre and has become a widely used reference at universities, military academies and other educational institutions around the world.

The article **Airpower** by Karl P Mueller for RAND Corporation is an encyclopaedia article which surveys the subject of airpower as an area of research in international security studies. It addresses the evolution of military airpower and classical theories about its use, the



strategic employment of airpower for coercion, airpower in counterinsurgency warfare, legal and moral issues in air warfare, and the relationship between air and space power.

**The Role of United States Airpower in Peacekeeping** by Major Brooks L. Bash of US Air Force is a thesis presented to the faculty of the school of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The Study while building upon the US military peacekeeping involvement, concludes that employment of Airpower is a natural consideration. It further discusses peacekeeping and constructs a comprehensive framework to categorize and analyse the role of airpower in peacekeeping.

**United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order** is a Volume with articles edited by the researchers who worked on High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) in 2014. It generates a dialogue about UN approaches to peace by examining challenges and opportunities that the organisation is facing in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The volume **Annual Review of Global Peace Operations: 2013** by Centre of International Cooperation is a set of reports reviewing the work of field-based political missions and peacekeeping operations in a single volume thus offering an opportunity to nurture knowledge within and between different types of missions.

## **UN Documents**

The mandates for all the five missions where IAF aircraft were deployed were studied. Further the UN Charter, specifically Chapter VI, VII and VIII were read and assimilated. In addition following reports & documents were analysed:

- An Agenda for peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace- Keeping- A report by Secretary General (1992)
- Brahimi report
- A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping
- UN Peacekeeping Operations : Principles and Guidelines
- Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
- Report on High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)
- Guidelines: Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS)

- Guidelines: The Rapid Deployment Level of the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System
- Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations
- Action for Peace (A4P) Declaration
- UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Aviation Manual (2015)

### **Research Gaps in Literature**

Large number of gaps still exist in the material read. There is no open source information available on the details of the various operations undertaken by Indian Air Forces deployments in UNOSOM II, MONUC Night Operations and UNMIS. Further there is a lack of clarity with regard to generation of Rules of Engagement specifically for Airpower. While the self-defence capability of Ground Troops is well defined and often discussed, self-defence capability requirement of an aerial platform is rarely even acknowledged. Also the challenges of managing Civil Aviation alongside Military Aviation assets remains unspoken, at least in print.

## **CHAPTER III**

# **PEACEKEEPING**

### **3.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

The Charter of the United Nations was signed, in San Francisco, on 26 June 1945 and is the foundation document for all the United Nations work. The United Nations was established to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”<sup>4</sup> and one of its main purposes is to maintain international peace and security. Peacekeeping, although not explicitly provided for in the Charter, has evolved into one of the main tools used by the United Nations to achieve this purpose.

Two of the most significant achievements of the post-World War II were the establishment of the United Nations and the emergence to freedom and independence of the Asian and African peoples. The United Nations was born out of a compelling necessity and it represents a major effort to achieve the goal of a better world through an international organization of states. The maintenance of international peace and security constitutes the most important single objective of the United Nations because on that hinges not only the possibility of advancement in the economic and social fields for all the people but the very survival of mankind.

The first UN peacekeeping operation, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), was launched in 1948 to monitor the ceasefire agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours in the wake of the Israeli war of independence that same year. UNTSO, which remains an active operation, involved unarmed military observers. The other early UN peacekeeping operation was in 1956, which came to be known as the UN Emergency Force (UNEF). It was about facilitating the disengagement of British, French, and Israeli troops from Egypt following the Suez Crisis and stationing of a multilateral armed force to help keep the peace until a political settlement could be reached.

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<sup>4</sup> Langholtz, Harvey J, 2010, Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations, Peace Operations Training Institute, New York

While the first forty years, from 1948 until 1988, saw establishment of 13 UN peacekeeping operations, post thawing and end of cold war, in the next thirty years from 1988 to 2018, saw the UN launch 50 new operations. For their “decisive contribution” to the resolution of conflict around the globe, UN peacekeeping forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988. Although the UN General Assembly had established the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations back in 1965, Peacekeeping was institutionalized within the United Nations with the establishment of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 1992.

**Fig 3.1 : Peacekeeping Data**

**Global peacekeeping data (as of 31 January 2020)**

**Total number of personnel serving in 13 peacekeeping operations: 95,423**

**Countries contributing uniformed personnel: 121**

Sum of Total. The data is filtered on Mission , which keeps 13 of 24 members.



**71 Peacekeeping operations since 1948**

**13 Current peacekeeping operations**



**1,119 Experts On Mission**

**8,756 Police**

**2,053 Staff Officer**

**69,638 Troops**

**12,607 Civilian Personnel**

**1,250 UN Volunteers**

\*Civilian personnel as of May 2018.

**(Source : <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data>)**

As of today, with 83,331 uniformed personnel in the field (up from 14,000 in 1998), the United Nations is second only to the United States in the number of deployed armed forces under its command. However the surge in global peacekeeping activity has not been limited to the United Nations as the number of peacekeeping operations undertaken by regional organizations doubled between 1995 and 2005.

The growth in the number of peacekeeping operations was accompanied by an expansion in the mandated tasks that UN peacekeepers were expected to perform. From observing, monitoring, and supervising ceasefires, peacekeeping operations they were now required additionally to support the delivery of humanitarian aid; protect civilian populations; assist with the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former armed combatants; supervise and assist with the organization of elections; assist in the restructuring and reform of armed forces and police; promote respect for human rights and investigate alleged human rights violations; help to facilitate the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons; and strengthen the rule of law, including assistance with judicial reform; among other tasks.

These expanded operations are complex, multi-dimensional, and are referred as multi-functional peacekeeping to distinguish them from traditional peacekeeping. In a few exceptional cases (e.g., UNMIK in Kosovo and UNTAET in East Timor), the United Nations has even served as the *de facto* governing authority of a state or territory. There has also been a limited proactive use of UN peacekeeping forces for the purpose of preventing the eruption of armed conflict (e.g., UNPREDEP in Macedonia). While UN peacekeeping forces have often executed many of these new tasks well, others have been more problematic. UN peacekeeping forces have sometimes been expected to carry out these tasks in hostile environments where the consent of the warring parties has not always been assured. In such cases peacekeeping has often required actions more in line with peace enforcement, and the success of these operations has been very variable as a consequence. In the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the mid-1990s, the limitations of UN peacekeeping were especially evident and the perceived failure of the United Nations in these cases resulted in the attenuation of international support for UN peacekeeping. These difficulties had been anticipated by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who in 1992 called for the establishment of “peace-enforcement units” to deal with challenges that exceed peacekeeping, but such units have never been created.

### 3.2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE (PEACE STUDIES)

*“A situation or a period of time in which there is no war or violence in a country or an area”*

*- Peace, Oxford Dictionary*

While the above stated definition may appear a straightforward explanation, however there has been the lack of a unanimous and authoritative definition of “Peace”. From the Greek and Roman point of view which informs Western civilization, peace can be easily thought of as "the absence of war." Many Western philosophers have viewed a peacemaker as one who makes and honours a treaty. However the concepts of peace differ according to cultural values, crusade vs. pacifism, coercion vs. persuasion, or strength vs. love have been the competing strategies for obtaining peace in all the cultures. In India, the Sanskrit word “*shanti*” refers to "peace of mind," or a well ordered inner state of the self. While Indians have engaged in war and used “*samdhi*” to refer to no hostility, the divine peace taught by the religion had nothing to do with the political order. The Chinese word for peace “*ho fng*” or “*fng ho*” has cosmological significance, even if there is no belief in God. It refers to obedience to the cosmic order. As such, it can either refer to a social order in which "right relationships" are observed, or it can refer to a harmonious state of mind. In either case, peace is a dynamic and living process, not a tranquil state of being. The Japanese word “*heiwa*” is similar to the Chinese “*fng ho*”. It has been applied by both samurai warriors whose profession involved killing for heaven and Buddhist monks who renounced the sword but devoted their lives bravely for others.

The rise of science and the use of scientific methods of study have led to empirical insights into human nature which were forcefully asserted against traditional ideas. Sociologists currently engaged in peace research often make the distinction between "**negative peace,**" or the Western view of peace as the absence of war, and "**positive peace,**" or that state of relations idealized by a social cosmology, which would be a result of overcoming the Social Injustice. While positive and negative concepts of peace, as distinguished above, have been with Western civilization from the beginning, the terms were popularized by Johan Galtung, director of the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), and he defined **negative peace as the absence of personal violence and positive peace as the absence of structural violence.**

It is intuitive to view peace and war as inherently opposite categories. Peace is routinely defined as the freedom from organised collective violence, or as the ‘absence of war’. Conversely, war is generally conceived either in Clausewitzian<sup>5</sup> terms as organised violence to achieve political ends or as a moral or legal condition defining the permissible limits of organised violence. And yet, one of the founding tenets of contemporary peace and conflict studies has been to reject this binary ‘negative’ concept of peace as merely the ‘absence of war’ by asserting a positive concept of peace that refers to consensual values and the ‘integration of human society’. The enduring aspiration of how to achieve peace can be summed up with the phrase ‘peace through peaceful means’. While this field has remained normatively grounded on sustaining a prohibition on the resort to violence—peace through peaceful means—it has also grappled with questions of how, how much or in what way, military force ought to be deployed in contemporary challenges such as humanitarian interventions, complex emergencies and stabilising post conflict societies. Strategic and security studies have also been grappling with a widening and deepening security agenda which has opened up questions about the utility of force to respond to so-called non-conventional threats and in responding to non-state actors.

While the definition of Peace as “Negative Peace” is mostly related to generic Peace studies in Military Institutions and the other phrase “Peace Through Peaceful means” is prescriptive definition and has found acceptance specifically by UN as an agenda for Peace. The Peace studies related to “Peace Through Peaceful means” definition are mostly related to Human Rights, and new political practices in International Relations specifically dealing in crisis management, which in turn relates to Conflict management or mediation. This latter definition finds its application specifically in Peace Making (PM), Peacekeeping (PK) and Peace Building (PB) interventions. This emerged rapidly at the end of the Cold War, and was encapsulated in the report of then-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “*An Agenda for Peace*”. Many scholars however, have advocated a more "emancipatory" form of peacebuilding, based upon a "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P), human security, local ownership and participation in such processes, especially after the limited success of liberal peacebuilding/ state building in places as diverse as Cambodia, the Balkans, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nepal, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

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<sup>5</sup> Clausewitz Carl Von, Principles of War. He was a Prussian General and a Military theorist. His essay **On War** “Vom Kriege” in 1832, is usually referred to as the “Principles of War”. He stressed on the “moral” and political aspects of war.

Finally, peace and conflict studies debates have generally confirmed, not undermined, a broad consensus (western and beyond) on the importance of human security, human rights, development, democracy, and a rule of law (though there is a vibrant debate ongoing about the contextual variations and applications of these frameworks). At the same time, the research field is characterized by a number of challenges including the tension between "the objective of doing critical research and being of practical relevance". For decades, **The West has been obsessed with finding a cure for failed states, believing that best way to prevent international problems is to solve domestic ones.**

### 3.3 “IN PURSUIT OF PEACE” – UNITED NATIONS

The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, and came into force on 24 October 1945. **The Preamble to the Charter in itself calls for maintenance of Peace and International security** <sup>6</sup>. While peacekeeping is the most widely term used, is just one tool used in trying to cope with a conflict at hand. It is a concept problematic to define as it is not mentioned in the UN Charter.

Within UN, **Security Council is charged with responsibility of International Security and Peace** (Chapter V, Art 24-26, UN Charter). The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII<sup>7</sup>. While **Chapter VI deals with “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, Chapter VII with “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”** (Annexure 1) and Chapter VIII “Regional Arrangements”, the Chapter XII was about “International Trusteeship System” (Trusteeship Council stands suspended since 01 Nov 1994). These **powers include the establishment of Peacekeeping operations** and international sanctions as well as the authorization of military actions through resolutions.

The **Department of Peace Operations (DPO)** is a department of the United Nations Secretariat which is charged with the planning, preparation, management and direction of UN peacekeeping operations. It was formerly known as the **Department for Peacekeeping**

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<sup>6</sup> <https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html>

<sup>7</sup> *ibid*



**Operations (DPKO)** before 1 January 2019. Along with DPO, The **Department of Operational Support (DOS)** provides operational support to the missions. It was formerly known as the **Department of Field Support (DFS)** before 1 January 2019 (Annexure 2).

At the conclusion of the 3046th meeting of the Security Council, held at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 in connection with the item entitled "The responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security"<sup>8</sup>, the President of the Security Council made the following statement:

*“The members of the Security Council consider that their meeting is a timely recognition of the fact that there are new **Favourable international circumstances under which the Security Council has begun to fulfil more effectively its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.**”*

The Statement **recognised that’s its “Time of Change”** and there is **need for “Commitment to collective Security”**. They further added the need to **strengthen the ongoing “Peacemaking and Peacekeeping”** efforts and invited the Secretary General to prepare, for circulation to the members of the United Nations by 1 July 1992, his analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making them more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter, the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for Peacemaking and for Peacekeeping. They also **recognised the responsibilities** of other organs of the United Nations in the fields **“Disarmament, Arms control and Weapons of Mass Destruction”** and reaffirm the crucial contribution which progress in these areas can make to the maintenance of international peace and security.

In response, on 17<sup>th</sup> Jun 1992, the then Secretary General Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali presented the report **“Agenda for Peace- Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping”**<sup>9</sup>. The report brings out that:

Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, over 100 major conflicts around the world have left some 20 million dead. The United Nations was rendered powerless to

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<sup>8</sup> A Note by President of Security Council, S/23500 dated 31 Jan 1992

<sup>9</sup> Report of Secretary General, An Agenda for Peace, S/24111, 17 Jun 1992

deal with many of these crimes because of the vetoes - 279 of them - cast in the Security Council, which were a vivid expression of the divisions of that period. With the end of the cold war there have been no such vetoes since 31 May 1990 and demands on the United Nations have surged. Its security arm, once disabled by circumstances it was not created or equipped to control, has emerged as a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace. (Hence) Our aims must be:

- To seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results;
- Where conflict erupts, to engage in Peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflict;
- Through peacekeeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers;
- To Stand ready to assist in peacebuilding in its differing context: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war;
- And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression. It is possible to discern an increasingly common moral perception that spans the world's nations and people, and which is finding expression in international laws, many owing their genesis to the work of this Organisation.

The report in this context goes on to define “Preventive Diplomacy”, “Peacemaking” and “Peacekeeping” and explains that they are integrally related.

**Preventive Diplomacy** is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

**Peacemaking** is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.

**Peacekeeping** is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties consent, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well, Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.

It also elaborates on the concept of **Peace Building**, which is to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve dispute before violence breaks out. Peacemaking and Peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict Peace Building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples. These four areas for action, taken together, and carried out with the backing of all Members, offer a coherent contribution towards securing peace in the spirit of the Charter.

The report also mentioned the term **Peace Enforcement (PE) units** as a tool of Peacemaking process, wherein it is taken as a measure to ensure “International Peace” if the peaceful means fail. Further it clarifies that use of **Military force as an option exists only in Chapter VII from Article 42 onwards as a Coercive option**. However, in 1995 the position paper titled “**Supplement to an Agenda for Peace**” acknowledged the rising intra state conflicts in this interim period. It admitted that Peacekeeping operations in this context is far more complex and more expensive than when it was mainly to monitor cease-fires and control buffer zones with the consent of the States involved in the conflict. The Peacekeeping tasks now involved constant danger and was more complex especially as it was now multifunctional, also involving Humanitarian Operations. However, the paper while referring to the Enforcement Action (Peace enforcement) admits its inability due to undertake such missions in view of the resource shortage and acknowledges the role of group of member states (Organisations like NATO) in filling this void. It also refers to the enforcement action as a post conflict activity wherein there is either a breakdown of Peace process or Peacekeeping mandate is under threat, thus moving it away from Peacemaking process.

Meanwhile the Security Council noted reports from the Secretary-General Kofi Annan concerning the situation in Africa and the **protection of civilians (POC) in armed conflict**. The Security Council condemned the intentional targeting of civilians during armed conflicts and adopted unanimously on 17 September 1999 UN Security Council resolution 1265, first such resolution to address the topic. All concerned parties were called upon to respect international humanitarian law. The resolution expressed willingness to examine how peacekeeping mandates addressed the harm of armed conflict on civilians and to respond to situations where civilians were deliberately targeted and humanitarian aid obstructed.

The next notable review of Peacekeeping happened in 2000 when the then **UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan convened “ A comprehensive review of the whole question of Peacekeeping operations in all their aspects”**. It is now recognised as the **“Brahimi Report”**<sup>10</sup>. The Secretary-General Kofi Annan highlighted five key areas in implementing the Brahimi report:

1. **Enhancing rapid deployment of peacekeeping operations;**
2. Strengthening the relationship with Member States and legislative bodies;
3. **Reforming the management culture of peacekeeping operations;**
4. **Reforming the peacekeeping operations relationship with field missions;**
5. Strengthening relationships with other United Nations bodies.

It also **introduced a new term ‘Peace Operations’** which were meant to reflect the new multidimensional post-Cold War UN operations that were tasked with supporting the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements.

*“a key feature of the post-Cold War security environment has gained new dimensions with the rise of illegitimate non-state actors”*

A **High Level Panel in 2004**<sup>11</sup>, under the Chairmanship of Anand Panyarachun, former Prime Minister of Thailand, assessed the current threats to international peace and security and evaluated the existing policies and institutions in addressing those threats.

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<sup>10</sup> “Brahimi Report”, S/2000/809, dated 21 Aug 2000

<sup>11</sup> Report by High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565, dated 02 Dec 2004

The report emphasised on **development as the indispensable foundation of a new collective security** and went on to state that *it is essential that due attention and necessary resources be devoted to achieving the Millennium Development Goals*. It acknowledged the **rising threat from Non-State actors** in addition to States, and to **Human security** along with state security. In this context the Panel commented on **Collective security** and **recommended criteria for the use of force**. It further went on to emphasise that *The Security Council is fully empowered under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to address the full range of security threats with which States are concerned*.

The report also commented upon the **prevalent confusion of Peacekeeping as “Chapter VI mandate” and Peace enforcement as “Chapter VII mandate” based on “Consent” versus “Coercion” and clarified that these characterisations is to some extent misleading**. It further observed that both kinds of operation need the authorization of the Security Council (Article 51 self-defence cases apart), and in Peacekeeping cases as much as in Peace-enforcement cases it is now the usual practice for a Chapter VII mandate to be given (even if that is not always welcomed by troop contributors). This was on the basis that even the most benign environment can turn sour — when spoilers emerge to undermine a peace agreement and put civilians at risk — and that it is desirable for there to be complete certainty about the mission’s capacity to respond with force, if necessary. On the other hand, the difference between Chapter VI and VII mandates can be exaggerated, however there is little doubt that peacekeeping missions operating under Chapter VI (and thus operating without enforcement powers) have the right to use force in self-defence — and this right is widely understood to extend to “defence of the mission”. It acknowledged that the **real challenge, in any deployment of forces of any configuration with any role**, is to ensure that they have

- (a) an appropriate, clear and **well understood mandate, applicable to all the changing circumstances that might reasonably be envisaged**, and
- (b) all the **necessary resources to implement that mandate fully**.

The report proposed five basic criteria’s for ensuring legitimacy to authorize or endorse the use of military force:

- (a) **Seriousness of threat.** Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use of military force? In the case of internal threats, does it involve genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended?
- (b) **Proper purpose.** Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other purposes or motives may be involved?
- (c) **Last resort.** Has every non-military option for meeting the threat in question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that other measures will not succeed?
- (d) **Proportional means.** Are the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question?
- (e) **Balance of consequences.** Is there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction?

In 2008, DPO & DFS issued a **Capstone Document “United Nations Peace Operations : Principles & Guidelines”**<sup>12</sup>. It was first of its kind by UN and was based on combined experience on the subject over the previous 60 years. This document sets out the guiding principles and core objectives of UN peacekeeping operations, as well as the main factors contributing to their success in the field. It also provides a basis for the development of training materials for military, police and civilian personnel preparing to serve in the field. The document draws on peacekeeping practices; seminal documents such as “An Agenda for Peace” (A/47/277-S/24111), “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace” (A/50/60-S/1995/1) and the “Brahimi Report” (A/55/305-S/2000/80), as well as internal lessons learned materials, external research and academic commentary. It reiterated that Peacekeeping is one among a range of activities undertaken by the United Nations and emphasised that it is important for

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<sup>12</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping Operations : Principles and Guidelines, DPKO & DFS, Jan 2008

practitioners to understand how it relates to and differs from Conflict prevention, Peacemaking, Peace enforcement and Peacebuilding.


- **Conflict prevention** involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. Ideally, it should build on structured early warning, information gathering and a careful analysis of the factors driving the conflict.
- **Peacemaking** generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiate agreement.
- **Peacekeeping** is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.
- **Peace enforcement** involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.
- **Peacebuilding** involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development.

*“Multi-Dimensional aspects of sustainable peace have changed peacekeeping to a very multi-disciplinary approach. As a consequence, peacekeeping missions are tasked to take on more than they are mandated, trained and equipped for, and remain in the mission area longer than required”*

The Capstone document lists three basic principles which have traditionally served and continue to set United Nations peacekeeping operations apart as a tool for maintaining international peace and security:

- Consent of the parties
- Impartiality
- Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate

**Fig 3.2 : Linkages and Grey Areas**



**(Source: UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines)**

It emphasises that these principles are inter-related and mutually reinforcing, thus it is important that their meaning and relationship to each other are clearly understood by all those involved in the planning and conduct of United Nations peacekeeping operations, so that they are applied effectively.

While United Nations peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed to support the implementation of a cease-fire or peace agreement, they are often required to play an active role in Peacemaking efforts and may also be involved in early peacebuilding activities. United Nations peacekeeping operations may also use force at the tactical level, with the authorization



of the Security Council, to defend themselves and their mandate, particularly in situations where the State is unable to provide security and maintain public order. These increasing linkages and blurred boundaries between Conflict prevention, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and Peace enforcement have found growing recognition amongst the member nations, (Figure 2).

*“United Nations **peacekeeping operations have traditionally been associated with Chapter VI of the Charter.** However, the Security Council need not refer to a specific Chapter of the Charter when passing a resolution authorizing the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation and **has never invoked Chapter VI.** In recent years, the **Security Council has adopted the practice of invoking Chapter VII of the Charter when authorizing the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations into volatile post conflict settings where the State is unable to maintain security and public order.**”*

Although the line between **“robust” peacekeeping and peace enforcement** may appear blurred at times, there are important differences between the two. While robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the consent of the host authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict, peace enforcement may involve the use of force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2 (4) of the Charter unless authorized by the Security Council.

These Guidelines also described the difference in **“Traditional” Peacekeeping** (1<sup>st</sup> Generation) and **“Multi-Dimensional” Peacekeeping** (2<sup>nd</sup> Generation Peacekeeping). Nevertheless, as peace operations are a practice highly reactive to events in the field, their boundaries do not always correspond to the clean distinctions dictated by purely academic precision. The Traditional Peacekeeping (prevalent 1945-88) missions were undertaken after belligerent parties agreed to cease-fire, based on consent, political impartiality and permitted the use of force only in self-defence. However, the Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping evolved in the post-Cold War era with the rise of Intra State conflicts. These were characterised by **deployment of a mix of Military, Police and Civilian resources, employing methods such as preventive peacekeeping, electoral assistance and delivery of humanitarian aid to support a comprehensive Peace Agreement.** These Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Missions remain process driven Politically. These operations are characterized by the addition

of civilian tasks related to political transition from conflict, without an accompanying increase in permission to use military force.

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) phrase and acronym were coined by the United States military during the 1990s, but it has since fallen out of use. It focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises. The UK military equivalent or alternate term is peace support operations (PSO). Both MOOTW and PSO encompass peacekeeping, Peacemaking, peace enforcement and peace building. MOOTW not involving the use or threat of force include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. MOOTW also involves arms control and peacekeeping.

### 3.4 CONTEXTUALIZING PEACEKEEPING FOR 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY

Ensuring international peace and security remains a daunting challenge for the United Nations. Despite efforts over the past 75 years, conflict and violence continue to pose a threat to Member States and peoples; freedom from fear and want remain elusive for many. Accordingly, the United Nations continues to search for effective responses to address insecurity based on its Charter. In this regard two related central themes have emerged.

- The first is that **security, human rights and development are interdependent and mutually reinforcing conditions for sustainable peace.**
- The second is the recognition that these **fundamental elements can be achieved only within a broad framework of the rule of law.**

This has led to a further categorisation of our understanding of Peacekeeping. **Third-generation peace operations, or peace enforcement operations**, are characterized by increased permission to use force to impose the aims of a mission's mandate, without significant departure in the nature of that mandate from the classic transitional tasks of second-generation mandates. These missions are typically dispatched under Chapter VII. The particular developments that led to the emergence of a new type of peace operation can be found in the three great failures of peacekeeping in the 1990s: the missions in Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia. Attempts to find an equilibrium between non-intervention and human rights reached their apogee with the concept of the **“responsibility to protect” (R2P).**

The **fourth generation** of peace operations consists of “**robust**” **Peacebuilding** operations that **combine elevated permission to use force with enhanced civilian tasks that are more intrusive in terms of their effect on local autonomy than in the second generation**. These missions are sometimes described in both national doctrines and analytical literature as Peace Support Operations. An extreme form of peacebuilding is the transitional administration, wherein the exercise of sovereignty over a given territory is effectively transferred to a UN peace operation and all executive, legislative, and judicial authority temporarily rests with the head of the UN mission. To date only two such administrations have been set up, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Both were established in 1999; UNTAET was transformed into a political mission after Timorese independence and UNMIK continues with reduced tasks. No further transitional administrations have been dispatched since. Though it falls short of formally exercising sovereignty, the Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haiti (MINUSTAH) has typical fourth-generation tasks.

The **fifth generation of peace operations are Hybrid in character**—these missions deploy troops and police personnel under mixed command, with both the United Nations and various regional organizations deploying troops to the same missions under separate chains of command and distinct forms of mandate. Differently from a Chapter VIII mission and its time-limited “farming-out” of primarily peace-enforcement, high-use of force mandates, hybrid missions involve the simultaneous deployment of UN troops and those of a regional organization. These missions reflect a growing shift in the division of labour in the global system of peace operations. Differences in attitudes towards intervention—particularly with regard to peace enforcement and interpretations of sovereignty—led to the translation of this increasingly divided provenance of troops into a growing division of labour within peace operations. Broadly speaking, the trend is toward NATO states and others in the North and West—who have largely internalized the notion of using force to protect civilians and uphold human rights—to engage in either robust interventions outside the UN, such as the invasion of Iraq, the UN-endorsed International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, by military means; Southern states, reticent to endorse the use of force in the name of human rights and protecting civilians, yet possessing great internal experience with development, institutionalization, and poverty reduction, would focus on the “root causes”- related aspects of peacebuilding missions.

Certain other factors that contribute to the prospects for a peacekeeping operation's success. One of them is **financing**. Peacekeeping is expensive, and it is critical to adequately fund the supplies, equipment, salaries, and administrative costs of an operation. A second consideration is **geography**. More successful operations occur on flat, desert terrain in sparsely populated areas, where it is easier to observe military movements. Mountainous, jungle, or urban environments greatly complicate the monitoring mission of peacekeepers. Third, **mandates for peacekeeping operations must be clear, and rules of engagement must be realistic relative to the situation**. Fourth, peacekeeping forces need a **centralized command and control system to facilitate efficient, effective policies**. Finally, the **peacekeeping forces must be neutral and not work to the benefit of either party in a dispute**. Drawing forces from nonaligned countries works toward this end. In all cases the disputants' desire to peacefully solve their differences is critical to the success of any peacekeeping operation.

In June 2015, the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) report recognized that “the ability of field commanders to ensure performance is severely hampered by caveats and national controls”. The report’s language was strong and it said that after deployment “any further caveats beyond those national constraints accepted at the outset, cannot be condoned”. Undeclared national restrictions, it stated “should be treated as disobedience of lawful command”. The HIPPO report maps the continuum of UN peace operations as of today: It ranges from peacekeeping operations to special political missions, good offices, and mediation initiatives. The report identified that the **full spectrum of peace operations must be used more flexibly to respond to changing needs on the ground**.

The September 2015 Secretary-General’s report on The future of United Nations peace operations called on every contributor to communicate during negotiations over possible deployment of those national caveats that would apply to their military or police contingents. The UN Secretariat would take these caveats into account, including whether to proceed with deployment. “Additional caveats beyond those explicitly agreed by the Secretariat cannot be accepted after deployment”, the report said.

*“The world order that has restructured international politics since the end of WW II is fracturing. Revisionist powers, such as China and Russia, want to Reshape global rules to their own advantage. Emerging powers, such as Brazil and India, embrace the perks of*

*great-power status but shun the responsibilities that come with it. Rejectionist powers, such as Iran and North Korea, defy rules set by others. Meanwhile, international institutions, such as UN, struggle to address problems that multiply faster than they can be resolved.”*

---Daalder,Ivo H., Lindsay, JamesM. “The committee to Save the World Order : America’s Allies must Step Up as America Steps Down”, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2018, Vol 97, No. 6




In September 2018, more than 100 UN member states signed a Declaration of Shared Commitments as part of the secretary-general’s **Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative**. As the United Nations prepares to celebrate its 75th anniversary, multilateralism is in crisis. UN peacekeeping, the most visible conflict management tool at the disposal of the multilateral system, has, however, proven particularly resilient and to some extent sheltered from attacks on multilateralism and rising global disorder. Peacekeeping mission mandates continue to be adopted largely by consensus, and an overwhelming majority of member states supported the Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations (A4P). Since September 2018, 152 member states <sup>13</sup>(Including India) and four multilateral organizations have signed onto the declaration, which includes forty-five commitments in eight thematic areas with an aim to refocus on the challenges (Fig 3.3) faced by Peacekeeping .

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<sup>13</sup> <https://www.un.org/en/A4P/>

**Fig 3.3 : A4P : Peacekeeping Challenges**



(Source: <https://www.un.org/en/A4P>)

## CHAPTER 4

# AIRPOWER

### 4.1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Airpower emerged as an important element of military power virtually as soon as aviation itself came into existence in 1903 and its concept got accelerated by the occurrence of World War I. Although interest in the potential of airpower materialized even earlier when HG Wells used the expression 'Airpower' in the novel 'The War in the Air' in 1908, the first official record of the use of aircraft in actual combat was made in 1911 by the Italians in the Libyan campaign.

At the outbreak of WWI in 1914, military aviation consisted of light wooden bi/tri planes and there may not have been any Airpower doctrine, but there was no shortage of alarming speculations about strikes from the sky. Britain was amongst the pioneers in developing its Airpower.

*“Air Reconnaissance was now in the nature of routine insurance against surprise”*

*Jones HA (1914)*

WWI ended in 1918. During the war, all subsequent roles of airpower had either been established or attempted, and the doctrines of command of air and support to surface forces had been firmly established. For the surface forces, roles such as close air support, transport support, reconnaissance, interdiction, artillery spotting, anti-submarine warfare, convoy escort, search and rescue and maritime strikes become vital contributors to the existing land and maritime strategies.

*“While the role of air weapon in the Great War was a modest one, the role of the Great War in the rise of airpower was anything but modest”*

*Lee Kennett*

The next phase of rapid development in Airpower concept was the WW II. Though the inter war period also saw some development, Airpower found its affirmation in WWII which

confirmed its pivotal role in any War fighting strategy. Airpower, as a truly critical factor on the battlefield, came to full fruition during the Second World War. But despite the tremendous impact that airpower had during the course of the war it failed to become the overwhelming battlefield force that had been predicted by various theorists during the interim period between the First and Second World Wars. This is not to say that airpower did not become a dominant factor in World War II, it certainly did, but it failed to become the sort of omnipotent weapon that the interwar theorists generally envisioned it as becoming. While the interwar period saw acceptance of Independent Air force, the concept of Strategic bombing lost to Tactical Bombing.

*“For good or ill, air mastery is today the supreme expression of military power. And fleets and armies, however necessary and important, must accept subordinate rank. This is a memorable milestone in the march of man.”*

*Winston Churchill (1949)*

#### 4.2 TRADITIONAL VIEW

The American Naval Historian of 1890s, Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan’s definition of Naval Sea power provided the initial framework for understanding the Airpower—the **ability to go where you wish, when you wish and prevent the enemy in doing likewise**. The interwar period was the era of the ‘**classical**’ theorists, the most important of whom were **Trenchard, Douhet and Mitchell**. They presented the British, Italian and American perspectives on the developing concept of Airpower.

*“Airpower had been peripheral between 1914 and 1918. In the Second World War it dominated most theatres and in at least two was decisive.”*

*Tony Mason (Airpower-A centennial Appraisal)*

Many important, complex and contentious issues were raised by these three major theorists and their contemporaries. There was one, however, which was of over-riding at that moment: the **belief that offensive airpower through the form of bomber aircraft would dominate future wars, to the extent that it alone could decide the outcome**. That proposition was in **direct contradiction to the conventional Clausewitzian wisdom**, dominant in strategic thinking for almost one hundred years, that **defence was the stronger**



**form of warfare**, and that an enemy's army was his centre of gravity. Now, the imperative would be to take the war direct to the heart of the enemy homeland and population. In addition to popularising the **airman's belief in the offence**, Trenchard was the driving force behind the novel concept of 'substitution', known also as 'Air Control' and the 'Air Method'. The idea was simple: that **in many circumstances Air forces could be substituted for Land or Naval forces and do the job effectively at far less cost in terms of casualties and cash**. By definition, strategic bombing theory challenged the pre-eminence of Armies and Navies. Doctrinally, Trenchard was committed uncompromisingly to the notion of the offensive. However, **Substitution was not always successful, particularly when rugged terrain and/or nomadic peoples made targets difficult to find and attack**. However, when geography and demography were favourable, the concept could be highly effective. Part of the **appeal of substitution for airmen was the fact that the concept best suited forces which could be rapidly deployed and change roles, and which placed few friendly lives at risk**. In other words, the **concept applied far more to the employment of airpower than it did to either sea or land power**.

Meanwhile Douhet's central thesis was unequivocal and was presented under the pretentious heading '**The Extreme Consequences**': '**To conquer command of the air means victory; to be beaten in the air means defeat and acceptance of whatever terms the enemy may be pleased to impose**'<sup>14</sup>. In Douhet's opinion that was not an assertion but an axiom. From that axiom came two corollaries:

- In order to assure an adequate national defence, it is necessary - and sufficient - to be in a position in case of war to **conquer the command of the air**, [and]
- All that a nation does to **assure her own defence should have** as its aim procuring for herself those means which, in case of war, are most effective for the conquest of the **command of the air**.

Douhet accordingly concluded that **air forces were destined to become the dominant arm of the military**, to the extent that they should gradually be strengthened at the expense of the other services. **Airpower** had introduced a '**new character to war**', which emphasised the '**advantages of the offensive**' and would make for 'swift, crushing decisions on the battlefield'. General Douhet took his argument even further in his definition of the 'battlefield'.

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<sup>14</sup> Douhet Giulio, Translated by Ferrari Dino, 1983, *The Command of the Air*, The office of Air Force History, Washington DC

Because of the **aircraft's range, speed, relative invulnerability and unparalleled striking power, and its predicted ability to create fear and panic among the enemy's population**, it was logical, he stated, for aerial bombardment to be directed primarily at population centres and the national infrastructure. In consonance was Mitchell's perception of the **continually increasing technical superiority of the aircraft over other machines of war, and the fragility of civilian morale**.

At the risk of over-simplification, the main point which statesmen, strategists and military leaders of that time drew from the Airpower theorists was their **belief that civilian morale would be fragile and national infrastructures vulnerable in the face of irresistible strikes from the sky**, to the extent that **offensive airpower would dominate future warfare**. However, **the theorists' faith in offensive airpower was not based on any kind of operational analysis**. The gap in the respective capabilities of the offence and the defence was not recognised in British doctrine, and the Air Ministry held fast to its belief that the air weapon was essentially offensive.

During WW II, employment of airpower in the North African desert by Royal Air Force was founded upon three principles still singled out by many of the modern Air Forces. These are **-no division into 'little packets', 'no boundaries on land and sea' and 'unity of command'**. The Second World War also saw major advances in the technologies of close air support, air interdiction, logistic support and naval aviation.

In the immediate post WW II period, after the establishment of UN, one of the earliest UN driven Missions was in Korea (UNC:1950-53). In spite of the lessons drawn during the WW II, a USAF historian wrote, *"In the absence of the joint headquarters staff... the full force of United Nations airpower was seldom effectively applied against hostile target systems in Korea"*. This theatre also saw the **rising conflict between "Strategic" versus "Tactical" application of Airpower, between traditional Land Forces and the newly formed "Independent" Air Forces**. The **primary missions from the Air Force point of view were air superiority and interdiction or Control of Air**.

Post Korean Conflict, **development of Doctrinal issues on Airpower remained biased towards its employment in an Offensive role**, which was sensed as an escalatory step in Conflict resolution (and still is). The Subsequent conflict in Vietnam saw similar conflict of

interest for supremacy of Airpower versus Land power to resolve the conflict. It has been often commented that- *constraints on the use of airpower were often observed at several levels of the structure which ran the war in Vietnam.* Further, **lack of trust between the Political Heads and their Military advisors** due to Korean experience (General MacArthur's UN offensive deep into North Korea), had convinced a later generation of American politicians to distrust the judgment of their military advisers and keep them on a short leash. Some of these could also be noticed in the Indo China conflict of 1962. At this stage attributes of Airpower consisted of 'virtues' associated with airpower, most from the beginnings of air warfare - speed, range, flexibility, precision, and lethality. A **sixth attribute** of airpower is its **duality, for both combat and humanitarian purposes.** At the same time the **limitations of airpower: gravity, expense, impact of weather, brevity of presence, and the inability to come to sustained grip with an enemy.**

During this period the UN deployed an International Emergency Force (UNEF-1956) to secure an end to the Suez Crisis. The UNEF troops constituted 250 personnel from Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) along with aircrafts for Casevac, Reconnaissance and other Transport (Logistic) duties. This reliance on Airpower continued into 1960s with UN mission in Congo (ONUC) adding a prominent Air arm in its Mission force structure.

By the end of cold war, Airpower's ability to contribute to the joint battle had increased. Not only could modern airpower arrive quickly where needed, it had become far more lethal in conventional operations. while there was always a need for joint combined arms forces to function in a war-fighting environment, surface warfare traditionalists were engaging in wishful thinking by proclaiming the dominance of older forms of sequential power-projection forces. In particular, air's ability to enter a crisis quickly and to employ high-leverage force against an enemy's centres of gravity meant that military power had, at last, entered what might be termed the 'post-Clausewitzian era'.

In Mid 1990, USAF came out with ten propositions<sup>15</sup> posited by Colonel Phillip Meilinger to instil appreciation of Airpower, which were:

1. Whoever controls the air generally controls the surface.

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<sup>15</sup> Mellinger Philip S, 1995, 10 Propositions Regarding Airpower, US Air Force History and Museum Program

2. Airpower is an inherently strategic force.
3. Airpower is primarily an offensive weapon.
4. In essence, Airpower is targeting, targeting is intelligence, and intelligence is analysing the effects of air operations.
5. Airpower produces physical and psychological shock by dominating the fourth dimension-time.
6. Airpower can conduct parallel operations at all levels of war, simultaneously .
7. Precision air weapons have redefined the meaning of mass.
8. Airpower's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by airmen.
9. Technology and airpower are integrally and synergistically related.
10. Airpower includes not only military assets, but an aerospace industry and commercial aviation.

Quick definitions of land and Airpower will be useful here. Power means the same thing for both terms. Power is the ability to do work or, in the military context, to make someone or a group do things that they were not intending to do otherwise. Land power and Airpower share the same objective then -compelling enemies to do things and differ only in their means and methodologies. Land forces compel enemies through manoeuvre, fire, and presence operations by forces that move on the surface of the Earth, or by its Air arms that move above the surface but whose operations largely are oriented to the movements and positions of their parent land forces. Airpower forces compel enemies through manoeuvre, fire, and presence operations by forces that move above the surface of the Earth, or by auxiliary surface forces that likewise orient their operations to exploiting the military opportunities of movement through the airpower. In simple terms, **air and land forces do similar things in different mediums**. This simple relationship is useful because it makes comparisons of land power and airpower easier than often is understood. It is from their different mediums, and only secondarily from their derivative technologies, that each mode of fighting draws its distinct operational-level advantages and disadvantages in peace operation.

The salient advantage of land forces in peace operations is that, by operating on the surface of an intervened state, they are there and, compared to airpower forces, it is difficult to extract them from there. As any soldier will tell you, land forces do their job most decisively in close quarters with the enemy, even if that "enemy" is uncooperative policeman unwilling

to enforce the law. So, to keep or enforce the peace, armies seek to deploy as widely as the security situation permits to engage in eyeball-to-eyeball cultural interaction with the locals. Close contact is the *sine qua non* of armies, and it gives them unequalled ability to come to grips with local conditions, distinguish between allies and enemies, and execute schemes to shape social and political developments. Soldiers walk the streets and enter buildings, sometimes without destroying them first. They talk to people, read posters, and otherwise plumb and characterize the “atmosphere” of a place. So, in peace operations, land forces seek to deploy as widely as the security situation permits. Given the capabilities of modern weapons, command and control systems, and tactical mobility platforms, intervening armies also have the ability to spread out and “cover” larger areas. Last, since armies are not easily moved out of conflict environments, their presence can be seen as, in the words of two senior American doctrinalists, “an irreducible bonafide of alliance commitment, especially for the nation claiming leadership of that alliance”.

The salient disadvantage of land forces in peace operations is that, by operating on the surface of an intervened state, they are there, and, compared to Air forces, it is difficult to extract them from there. In close quarters with the citizens of foreign cultures, peacekeepers often find their duties characterized by confusion, frustration, and boredom laced with frequent moments of anxiety and fear. Soldiers in peace operations are vulnerable, as casualty figures from Somalia and Bosnia attest. Death or injury can come to them from bombs, bullets, the clubs and knives of a mob, or a thousand other ways. And peace soldiers do become the targets of attack, particularly when their duties call on them to coerce and/or kill locals. When peace soldiers kill or are killed, the relationship between interventionist and intervened will change. Consequently, interventionist “investment” and liability may increase, and the mission likely will creep or plunge toward greater or lesser involvement. The direction of movement often is unpredictable. In other words, armies find both power and vulnerability in close-quarters interaction with intervened societies. Close-quarters interaction gives intervention governments an indispensable ability to shape events, and it also exposes them to liability and mission creep. As many people have pointed out, these vulnerabilities can be minimized by proper education and training of troops to conduct themselves effectively in unexpected circumstances. But such vulnerabilities cannot be eliminated.

The salient advantage of airpower forces is that, by operating above the surface of the intervened state, they normally are not there, and, compared to armies, it is easy—indeed

routine—to extract them when they do overfly there. As any airman will be glad to tell you, the speed, range, agility, and elevation of their aircraft and space systems, combined with the unprecedented lethality of their weapons and the capabilities of their information, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems allow them to exert great effect from afar. Consequently, airpower forces do not need emotional or physical nearness with intervened states or cultures to do their primary jobs of observing, holding at risk, or destroying their resources and people. Indeed, close contact for airmen can be counterproductive. Part of their psychological effect in peace operations has been their ability to observe and attack in something like unsuspectingly. Because they can be nearly invulnerable to the defences of disputing factions, airmen in modern Air forces have opportunities to time and structure their operations in ways that are systematic, unstoppable, dispassionate, and enormously useful to their governments. Such operations also can shape conditions to let ground forces spread out and do their jobs more effectively and at more bearable cost. Further, air operations often produce minimum friendly and enemy casualties, which in turn reduces the generation of overwhelming pressure to change the political cohesion and mission focus of an intervention.

As by now must be obvious, the salient disadvantage of peacekeeping forces is that, by operating above the surface of the intervened state, they normally are not there, and, compared to armies, it is easy—indeed routine—to extract them when they do overfly there. The distance between airmen and intervened cultures prevents them from doing some things as well as their Army brethren. Professional airmen do not look their opponents in the eye. They don't negotiate with local commanders, warlords, civil servants, or refugees. They do not watch, interrogate, or arrest people. In short, airmen have limited ability to build detailed pictures of what is going on at the human level or to shape local events or developments in positive ways, except in conjunction with activities by forces, diplomats, and nongovernmental workers on the ground. In broad terms, then, the comparative utilities of land and airpower forces in peace operations are obvious and mirror imaged. Land forces are as good an instrument as we in broad terms, then, the comparative utilities of land and airpower forces in peace operations are obvious and mirror imaged. Land forces are as good an instrument as we have to undertake the positive military aspects of peace operations, such as reconstruction and confidence building. But if used to accomplish the negative aspects of peace operations, such as coercion and combat against factions, land forces are likely to be very expensive instruments in terms of costs, casualties, mission creep, and liability to the intervening governments and forces. Air forces, in contrast, can be used to accomplish the negative functions in ways that minimize those costs.

On the other hand, their utility in the positive aspects of peacekeeping generally is limited to providing mobility, information support, and providing latent coercion to help keep disputants in line. In general, then, strategists should consider land and airpower as complementary tools, useful in ways that offset each other's weaknesses and maximize their strengths and combined synergy. At the core of such a strategy probably should be an appreciation that airpower power should be the tool of first recourse in peace enforcement, while land power retains pre-eminence in peacekeeping and as the tool of second recourse in peace enforcement. This idea that airpower power leads in peace enforcement and that land power leads in peacekeeping commends itself on at least two accounts. First, intervening states can use airpower to enforce the peace and to set the conditions for a peaceful insertion of land forces as the anticipated costs and liabilities of land-power-based peace enforcement simply may not be acceptable. Second, a division of peace enforcement and peacekeeping duties between the land and air arms could offer an interesting opportunity to play "good-cop-bad cop" in a peace operation. As many observers have pointed out, it is very difficult to conduct peacekeeping and peace enforcement in the same situation simultaneously. The passions and distrust engendered by peace enforcement operations can, at least in the short term, undermine the work of peacekeepers, humanitarian relief workers, and others trying to patch things together.

#### 4.3 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY AIRPOWER: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE

A cautionary assessment of Airpower in the mid 90s concluded that 'Airpower dominated the Persian Gulf War as no other conflict since World War II .... In the end airmen were probably correct in their belief that this war marked a departure'<sup>16</sup>. What does all of this say for the future? The easy answer, of course, is that it is situational, and depends upon what one is trying to do and what the circumstances surrounding the use of airpower are.


In the last quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century most of the Airpower doctrinal postulates emerged from USAF personnel with Boyd, Warden and DePupla dominating the thinking. While **John Boyd's approach sought to resurrect the idea of the adaptive, creative warrior**, he introduced the intellectual construct for which he is best known: **the observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop**. In contrast, John Warden circulated a paper articulating a targeting

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<sup>16</sup> Cohen Eliot A., *The Mystique of U.S. Airpower*, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1994

theory based on five principal categories, envisioned as five concentric rings <sup>17</sup>(like rings in a bull’s eye) that increase in value as they approach the centre. The focal point—his designated “centre of gravity”—was enemy leadership. Just outside of that, in the position of second priority, were the enemy state’s energy sources, advanced research facilities, and key war-supporting industries. In the third ring was enemy infrastructure, such as transportation systems. The fourth ring was comprised of the enemy’s population, and the fifth ring designated the enemy’s fielded military forces. **Warden was focused mainly on disrupting leadership and decapitating the state.** David Deptula saw parallel warfare as part of the Revolution in Military Affairs that could offer alternatives to the “attrition” and “annihilation” strategies of older styles of warfare<sup>18</sup>. The specific effects that Deptula highlighted were the new objects of war, achievable through “effects-based operations” (EBO).

Fig 4.1: Spectrum of Conflict



(Source: Army Vision 2010, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington D.C.)

<sup>17</sup> Biddle Tami Davis, 2019, AIRPOWER AND WARFARE: A CENTURY OF THEORY AND HISTORY, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, Carlisle

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.



As the end of the twentieth century approached, airmen were confronted with two different but not mutually exclusive visions of future warfare. The first, stemming from the Gulf War, which perceives **airpower dominating modern mechanized warfare**. The second discerns modern mechanized warfare—especially as demonstrated in the Gulf War—as a thing of the past. In the latter view, the **future of warfare increasingly lies in the ill-defined realm of low intensity conflict (LIC)**. Both visions may be accurate; if so, the truth of the first vision has a great deal to do with the truth of the second. After all, **if airpower dominates “conventional” warfare, then countries that cannot field superior air forces must employ “unconventional” means (LIC) to gain military success**. In broad terms, the **incidence of armed conflict has declined in both number and intensity since the end of the Cold War**, with particularly **sharp declines in interstate and higher-intensity conflicts**.

### **Airpower and Counter Insurgency**

Low-intensity conflict, insurgency, guerrilla and revolutionary war are terms used to describe the **limited politico-military struggle of an aggrieved group against recognized authority with the aim of achieving certain political, social, economic, or psychological objectives**. It is a conflict in which one or more parties are prepared to limit their political will and resources, and it falls in intensity between peacetime competition and conventional war. Such conflicts are generally protracted affairs and require inglorious, patient day-to-day work on both sides. They are usually confined to the Third World, and are **characterized by constraints on weaponry, tactics, and violence**. This form of conflict dominates the modern spectrum in that while there have been few conventional wars in the recent past, there have been numerous unconventional or irregular wars. **Counter Insurgency (COIN) is inherently land centric in nature**. But this geostrategic and tactical fact does not mean that the varieties of airpower that support the ground effort can accurately or helpfully be described as being only of minor importance. **In COIN today, airpower cannot be the leading edge to the military dimension, but it will always be quite literally essential** (Fig 3). This observation along with emergence of COIN ops saw a rising requirement of tactical airlift, special operations, ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), close air support, and tightly integrated action with ground forces. Inter- and intra-theatre transport of personnel and equipment is always a critical mission for airpower in COIN/LIC. The **growing need of ISR resulted in rapid evolution of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)**. However, with growing ISR there is a tendency for the Commanders at “Strategic” level to resort to reactive approach

and take “Tactical” level decisions of using force instead of exercising caution, care, and intentionality.

### **Rise of Remotely Piloted Aircraft**

In 21<sup>st</sup> Century there is also a growing **fallacy that the twenty-first century is the missile, space, and cyberspace age(s)**; airpower is one of yesterday’s revolutions. However, the twenty-first century continues the air age that began in December 1903. The serial appearance of ballistic missiles, spacecraft, and computer driven cyber power has not and does not threaten to oblige us to retire the airplane. In addition, as the first decade of the 21st century surely called attention to the expanding need for ISR resources and platforms, this new century would be friendly to UAVs [or sometimes referred as Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) or Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS),] but this condition does not mean that manned aircraft are facing, or will face, bloc obsolescence as yesterday’s technology. **The manned aircraft simply is too useful, too adaptable and flexible, to be abandoned. The future of manned aircraft is completely secure, even though some of its roles in some political and military contexts increasingly will be assumed by UAVs.**

### **Politics of Coercion through Air**

Another fallacy that was laid to rest in this century was that we can reach to Airpower to solve Political problems especially in the context of Insurgencies. In the same context it has also raised to the surface many of the **issues and complications associated with the strictly independent use of airpower in conflict resolution.**

*“...even high-tech firepower has serious limitations against low-tech but determined enemies who control the people on the ground through close-up violence. ... especially when the multilateral action is based on protecting civilians, rather than defeating one side, a dictator willing to mix ruthless fighters with innocent non-combatants poses serious challenges to limited applications of precision airpower.”*

*- Stephen Biddle,*

*The Libya Dilemma : The Limits of Airpower,  
Washington Post, 25 Mar 2011*

While the military application of Coercion is through threat of punishment or “Deterrence by Punishment”, the political purpose would be influencing the beliefs or ideologies thus aiming at “Deterrence through Denial” (of a belief or ideology). Failure of deterrence leads to compelling the adversary, for which communication of the coercive intent and the credibility of the coercer would be the final arbiter to decide whether adversary would abide or not to abide by the coercer’s edict. Towards this the requirement to have good and timely intelligence of the adversary’s values is important so as to craft an appropriate strategy to coerce him successfully.

“Deterrence” is the practice of discouraging or restraining someone, and in context of Airpower it has been often interpreted as coercion by fear of punishment (kinetic), however as discussed earlier, there is a need to appreciate latent coercion by means of mobility and information support. Failure or success of deterrence depends upon the perception created and thus it is different from compelling somebody.

#### 4.4 CONTEXTUALIZING AIRPOWER FOR PEACEKEEPING

The role of **airpower in peacekeeping is secondary and its use should ultimately improve the chances for success**. Specifically, **airpower must support both the general peacekeeping principles and the specific objectives of an operation**. A review of the peacekeeping principles reveals that the contributions of airpower fall under the principles of “international approval and support” and “effective military support.” Further, **the two fundamental principles of international law that govern the use of airpower (and other force), embodied in the Hague Conventions, are discrimination and proportionality**.

There are several fundamental changes in the peacekeeping environment that also suggest the need for an in-depth evaluation of the potential role of airpower. The **first change is the increasing availability of technology to the UN due to end of the cold war**. As the means of waging war/conflict over the past four decades increased, the technological aids for peacekeeping remained static. Therefore, as combatants or aggressors gain technological access, there will be a need for a commensurate advance in peacekeeping technology.

**Table 4.1 : Data On going Peacekeeping Missions (as on 31 Jan 2020)**

| MISSION | Place                    | Date   | Chapter | Mandate components | Aircraft | Rotary Wing | UAS | Personnel |
|---------|--------------------------|--------|---------|--------------------|----------|-------------|-----|-----------|
| UNTSO   | Middle East              | May-48 |         | 2                  | 0        | 0           | N   | 371       |
| UNMOGIP | India & Pakistan         | Jan-49 |         | 1                  | 0        | 0           | N   | 116       |
| UNFICYP | Cyprus                   | Mar-64 |         | 4                  | 0        | 3           | N   | 1009      |
| UNDOF   | Golan                    | May-74 |         | 2                  | 0        | 0           | N   | 1139      |
| UNIFIL  | Lebanon                  | Mar-78 |         | 10                 | 0        | 7           | N   | 11090     |
| MINURSO | Western Sahara           | Apr-91 |         | 8                  | 2        | 3           | N   | 431       |
| UNMIK   | Kosovo                   | Jun-99 | VII     | 7                  | 0        | 0           | N   | 348       |
| UNAMID  | Darfur                   | Jul-07 | VII     | 15                 | 2        | 12          | N   | 9170      |
| MONUSCO | DR Congo                 | Jul-10 | VII     | 18                 | 10       | 29          | Y   | 18399     |
| UNIFSA  | Abyei                    | Jun-11 | VII     | 10                 | 2        | 4           | N   | 4021      |
| UNMISS  | South Sudan              | Jul-11 | VII     | 18                 | 8        | 20          | N   | 19180     |
| MINUSMA | Mali                     | Apr-13 | VII     | 19                 | 8        | 25          | Y   | 15441     |
| MINUSCA | Central African Republic | Apr-14 | VII     | 18                 | 5        | 7           | Y   | 14708     |
|         | Total                    |        |         |                    | 37       | 110         |     | 95423     |

(Source: [www.peacekeeping.un.org/en/data](http://www.peacekeeping.un.org/en/data))

A second fundamental change involves the very nature of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping missions today have broadly expanded roles and objectives, thus increasing the need for a stronger and more versatile force. Peacekeeping is marked by diversity, not only in terms of cost and scale, but also in terms of specific tasks (Table 1). The operations have ranged from with just one mandate for missions like UNMOGIP in India & Pakistan (authorised 1949) with a deployed strength of 116 personnel to 19 mandates for MINUSMA in Mali (authorised 2013) with 15441 deployed personnel. This changing scope, scale, and number of peacekeeping operations naturally invites exploration into new activities, including the potential of airpower.

Finally, the recent explosion of peacekeeping efforts brings to the forefront reoccurring operational problems which inhibit the efficiency of peacekeeping forces. Perennial difficulties in information gathering, communications and rapid deployment are exacerbated as a result of the foregoing changes. Consequently, financial concerns are forcing peacekeepers to achieve efficiencies through the integration of high-technology

**equipment.** Clearly the new world order has generated a need to explore the increased use of airpower in the peacekeeping context.

In the context of Peace operations, which are primarily devolving to a Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping, political process would want to achieve aims and protect interests within the international system. In such a scenario they typically turn to **diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools.** Among military planners, this set of tools is typically referred to as the “DIME.” Within each subcategory, there are theories for how to maximize the utility of each instrument. As we evaluate any military subcategory, we must ask ourselves: What leverage does it offer those who employ it? What are its primary strengths and limitations? How does it interact with other instruments of power (both military and non-military)? Can it be used independently? What are the advantages and risks of doing so?

**In Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Missions, Military instruments typically work in the background, reinforcing other tools and being called into play if those tools fail to achieve desired results.** Land power, sea power, and airpower—with the recent addition of space and cyber power—all bring different types of leverage to the table. The strategist must understand them all and must understand how they interoperate.

The **damaging impact of the misuse and genuine misunderstanding of “strategic” is that it encourages underappreciation of airpower’s non kinetic impact upon the course of history.** Most people recognize that airpower is a concept and material descriptor that embraces everything that flies, rotary and fixed wings, but the **abuse of “strategic” leads to undervaluation of airpower’s many non-kinetic roles.** Airpower’s kinetic capabilities provide several important advantages: offensive attack, deterrence, and shaping of the combat environment to achieve “a” desired effect, thereby allowing military commanders to shape the environment, destroy or even annihilate targets, and/or deter adversaries from conducting their preferred courses of action. In contrast, the non-kinetic methods like Intelligence, Surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), helps in a quick response to a variety of internal security, safety, and disaster situations, which may produce a combination of effects perceived as an more efficient method. It must also be accepted that perceptions play a crucial role in building legitimacy. Thus, the **proper appreciation of airpower’s strategic value requires final abandonment of the old dogma that it is inherently a strategic instrument.**

*“A weapon, a capability, or a project is strategic only in its consequences.”*

*- Anonymous*

Aviation assets (fixed-wing aircraft, utility and attack helicopters, and unmanned aerial systems) are **key enablers that give any peace operation the mobility and agility it needs to deter and prevail against hostile actors**. Beyond enablers, **air assets are also force multipliers that enhance the effectiveness of operations**. They are essential to ensure that peacekeepers have the support and mobility they need on the ground, to enable casualty evacuation (Casevac) and medical evacuation (MedEvac), to gather information, and to make peace operations robust enough to deter armed elements threatening civilians and UN personnel. All of this, in turn, allows missions to implement their mandates, including the protection of civilians, which is not possible without strong aviation capacities. Airpower can also provide added credibility to peacekeeping in the eyes of the disputing parties. **Improved effectiveness in observation and reporting can reduce mistrust among the disputing parties and foster the confidence building necessary for the long-term resolution of differences**.

However, **aviation assets can also be seen as threats or viewed with suspicion by the host country or the parties to the conflict**, which can lead governments to restrict air movement, even for medical evacuation. Moreover, missions have had to adapt their approach to aviation to face increasingly challenging environments with harsh climatic conditions and asymmetric threats. Aviation assets are also expensive, accounting for the UN’s second biggest expenditure after personnel.

As of January 2020, the UN had a fleet of 147 aircraft (37 fixed-wing aircraft, 110 helicopters) and in addition it had 50 unmanned aerial systems (UAS) as of 2017. Military aircraft are deployed through letters of assist with member states (seventeen of which currently contribute air assets), while civilian aircraft are obtained through commercial contracts. Missions continue to rely on the use of air transport to ensure uninterrupted critical support to operations and to fulfil United Nations responsibilities with respect to the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers and staff. The UN Military aircraft are primarily tasked with the following<sup>19</sup>:


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<sup>19</sup> Dorn Walter, Maj. Linden Filip Van Der & Cross Ryan, 2011, UN Aviation: Some Basics

- Deterrence
- Air cover and close air support
- Troop insertion and extraction
- Armed patrols, reconnaissance
- Armed escorts and response
- Resupply and air drops under hostile conditions
- Logistics
- Casualty evacuation (Casevac)

But these numbers hide the fact that aviation is often the “Achilles’ heel” of UN peacekeeping, as these expensive resources (Fig 5) are scarce relative to the large size of the territories covered and often lack all the required capabilities. Aviation assets are second largest financial outflow after personnel for UN in Peace missions. There is a chronic shortage of military air assets, and the pressure to cut costs is likely to push missions to further rationalize and reduce the use of air assets. Moreover, UN aviation assets are managed by a mix of civilian and military personnel who come from different countries and aviation cultures and who often do not understand the policies and procedures of UN in place.


**Fig 4.2 : Civilian and Military Air Assets in UN Peace Operations (2017)<sup>20</sup>**



<sup>20</sup> Novosseloff Alexandra, 2017, Keeping Peace from Above: Air Assets in UN Peace Operations, International Peace Institute.



**Fig 4.3 : Aviation Expenditures in UN Peacekeeping Operations<sup>21</sup>**



### Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)

The Kinetic use of UAS: **Armed UAS (UCAVs) have an inherent appeal:** they seem to allow the user the opportunity to strike in ways that are relatively precise in comparison to other military tools, and that pose no immediate risk to military personnel. The work is carried out quietly and off the front pages of newspapers. This means that it has **little immediate political cost**. Thus, the strikes can have the appeal of a silver bullet—a low-cost, almost magical way to dispatch enemies. However, dangers lurk in this seductive appeal. One first-order question is simply about due process of law. Using RPAs for the targeted killing of enemies concentrates vast power in a few hands—and this sets up a situation that can be quite readily abused if it is not overseen and monitored for compliance with domestic and international law. There is also a concern about mission creep. How high on the enemy leadership chain need one be to qualify for an UAS strike? **What evidence must that person reveal of intent to do harm? How imminent and clear must that threat be?** In view of these

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

questions, controversies and debate ethical use of armed UAS, UN Peace Operations are limited to using unarmed UAS.

There are several international and domestic trends further modifying the character of peacekeeping and re-quire greater participation—in the form of airpower. The first international trend is the **proliferation of technology and weapons among the less-developed nations of the world**. As weapons and technology become cheaper and easier to obtain, peacekeepers will find their job more difficult. The ability of peacekeepers to effectively monitor accords will de-crease as disputing parties increase their tempo of operations through improved mobility and communications. Peacekeepers will, in turn, be exposed to greater risks due to the increased range, accuracy, and lethality of today’s weapons; eventually resulting in an erosion of operational effectiveness. Accordingly, **peacekeepers will need advanced military equipment, including airpower, to help offset the negative consequences of this trend**.

The next international trend is the **increased responsiveness and mutual cooperation of the international community towards conflict resolution and peacekeeping**. More and more, the international community is using economic and political pressure to coerce disputing parties to begin peace negotiations and accept peacekeeping forces. The consequences of this trend are threefold.

First, as the **number of peacekeeping activities increase, the range of operational tasks also increases, thus putting a premium on flexibility and enhancing the potential for airpower** (Table 4.1). From simple observation missions to complicated disarmament operations involving over 20,000 peacekeepers, the **tasks of peacekeeping are becoming greatly diversified**.

A second consequence of increased international cooperation is the origination of peacekeeping accords earlier in the conflict resolution process. As a result, the **duration of peacekeeping operations may be longer while the disputing parties work out their differences** (Table 4.1). Peacekeeping will need to be increasingly efficient in future operations or the already spiralling cost will become unbearable.

A third consequence of increased international interest is a **demand for greater responsiveness**. One recent criticism of the UN is the failure to respond quickly due to a lack of effective coordination between the numerous participating members. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali had earlier commented: “One of the lessons learned during the recent headlong expansion of UN peacekeeping is the need to accelerate the deployment of new operations.” Consequently, the Security Council recently requested UN members to express their willingness for short-notice response of peacekeeping missions. This **increased emphasis on responsiveness will ultimately place a greater dependence on air mobility assets**. Peacekeeping contributions will necessarily rely on versatile assets, such as airpower, that are readily compatible with the military peacekeeping functions.

One final international trend is the **weakening concept of national sovereignty, which may allow the increased use of intrusive airpower technology**. The recent repression of sovereignty is summed up well by the UN Secretary-General: “The centuries old doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands and was in fact never so absolute as it was conceived to be in theory”. The Westphalian principle of state sovereignty is under debate and a contrary position that individuals and groups within nation-states have international rights in some cases, such as when atrocities are committed against them, supersede the sovereign right to govern and assert an international right to intervene in such instances. Consequently, **as the absolute right of sovereignty becomes less sacrosanct, the arguments against intrusive technology lose force**.

Another trend—**risk aversion**—will have direct implications for the use of, and **will ultimately limit, ground forces in peacekeeping**. To ensure this, policymakers are likely to first consider lower risk airpower options. Although land resources are an obvious peacekeeping choice, they offer few unique capabilities beyond existing UN peacekeeping resources. Airpower, on the other hand, has both the flexibility and unique capabilities to offer something new to peacekeeping and minimize the negative consequences of the changing nature of peacekeeping.

Despite these benefits, there may also be associated unfavourable results of using airpower. These must be considered in the context of the specific peacekeeping situation.

These consequences include philosophical concerns, economic restrictions, and unpredictable utility.

First, traditional peacekeeping argument has been that airpower and high technology have little utility in dealing with problems rooted in ethnicity, philosophy, and politics. However, use of airpower not suggestive of it replacing the personal interaction required by the ground peacekeeping force. **Airpower in peacekeeping is simply a tool to enhance the efforts of the peace builders to achieve a long-term resolution of hostilities.** Furthermore, this argument is closely related to the issue of national sovereignty discussed earlier. Suffice it to say that this is a major concern and may inhibit the use of airpower if the disputing parties reject intrusive technology. Nevertheless, this issue will be resolved prior to a given operation and will therefore not directly inhibit its chances for success.

The next issue is the **negative perceptions by disputing parties in face of destructive potential usually represented by the kinetic use of Airpower.** However, it is not unique to air assets but rather a larger philosophical debate concerning the use of force/kinetic. It could be argued that negative perceptions among disputing parties may be justified if the UN continues to reduce the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. In such a scenario, airpower could magnify these negative perceptions, thus the **use of airpower must remain perceptive to the fundamental peacekeeping principles.**

Next, there is a justifiable concern for **the financial implications of airpower operations.** Accordingly, UN officials are extremely cost conscious. These costs will have to be weighed against the potential contributions of airpower towards the success of peacekeeping and the conflict control process in general.

Last but not the least is the fundamental question of airpower's operational utility. Policymakers while deciding on a given political course of action, must have a sense of the potential utility for Air assets. However, the **benefits of airpower will not be constant due to numerous variables such as the scope and length of the operation, geography and weather.** The combination of these variables and others within the unique peacekeeping paradigm make it **extremely difficult to isolate the specific benefits of airpower.** Consequently, a general assessment of airpower capabilities is required to provide policymakers with a sense of its operational utility.

By the end of 20<sup>th</sup> century and beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century , UN had re of Airpower in Peacekeeping after its disastrous application in 1994 in Somalia UNITAF (Blackhawk Down incident) and lack of it in Rwanda (UNMIR) the same year

#### 4.5 RE-INTERPRETING TENETS OF AIPOWER IN PEACEKEEPING

To examine the role of the military and specifically Air forces, we may consider their employment in the context of the basic tenets proposed by Col Phillip Meilinger and correlate them with functional/operational tasks as envisaged Peace Operations (with specific emphasis on Peacekeeping).

1. *Whoever controls the air generally controls the surface.*
2. *Airpower is an inherently strategic force.*
3. *Airpower is primarily an offensive weapon.*

The conditionality of “Consent” by major parties to the conflict for conduct of Peace Operations (and Peacekeeping) has a direct bearing on the control of air and hence consensuses in its character. In its absence, any Airpower usage would be tantamount to an offensive act and would be viewed suspiciously. Universality of consent becomes even less probable in volatile settings, characterized by the presence of armed groups not under the control of any of the parties, or by the presence of other spoilers. The peacekeeping operation should continuously analyse its operating environment to detect and forestall any wavering of consent. A peacekeeping operation must have the political and analytical skills, the operational resources, and the will to manage situations where there is an absence or breakdown of local consent. In some cases this may require, as a last resort, the use of force which would mean **employing methods of coercion**. Such **Coercion strategy or operations especially in context of “control of air must” be limited through “Denial” methods than one achieved through “Punishment” (Offensive)**.

The **politico-military environment in most of the Multi-Dimensional Peace operation confirm to a low intensity conflict (LIC) largely**. In such conditions, the Peacekeeping Military operations would be Land centric operations with limitations

on weapons and tactics. The **Air elements instead of being strategic in nature would adopt a supportive role characterised by Mobility and flexibility.**

Similar to the strategic connotation of Airpower, **the Offensive nature of airpower in Peacekeeping (or Peace Operations) is not always an implied status.** Only when the **Mission mandate is under chapter VII, would the elements of Airpower may imply an offensive action to wield an coercive power by the way of deterrence.**

4. *In essence, Airpower is targeting, targeting is intelligence, and intelligence is analysing the effects of air operations.*
5. *Airpower produces physical and psychological shock by dominating the fourth dimension-time.*
6. *Airpower can conduct parallel operations at all levels of war, simultaneously .*
7. *Precision air weapons have redefined the meaning of mass.*

These particular propositions would remain true in the entirety of conflict spectrum. However, it is of utmost importance to define the effects desired and the consequently seek intelligence to identify the appropriate target. The definition of effect in the context of Peace operations should not be limited in terms of physical “annihilation” and but must consider the psychological aspects. In this context, having decided the “where” it is also important to decide “when”, that’s **the time** and for “How long”, **dimension of time**. The Peace Operations must leverage accurate/reliable intelligence inputs in time to address the mission mandate at all levels in a manner that that they influences masses. The definition of a (precision) weapon in context of Peace Operations must be broadened to include tools or methods which are neither kinetic nor destructive or annihilate as an effect. For example use of an Airborne loud hailer or an Airborne search light maybe more effective than presence of an Attack helicopter in certain situations.

**8. *Airpower's unique characteristics necessitate that it be centrally controlled by airmen.***

Only through understanding the limitations and practising the employment philosophy of this highly flexible and mobile element of military power would one be competent enough to wield it properly, hence this tenet would continue to hold truth even in Peace Operations. Towards this its important to have an “Air Minded” (Airmen) staff in the controlling formations.

**9. *Technology and airpower are integrally and synergistically related.***

While the above proposition may be an absolute truth in the higher spectrum of conflict, its relevance towards the lower end has an adverse psychological effect. Use of a very high end, technologically superior equipment, would first escalate the cost of mission, secondly it may have an adverse impact on the consent of the disputing parties as well as the neutrality of Peace Mission. Hence of technology especially in context of Airpower has to be judiciously applied, like in the case of unarmed RPAs. They have proven very successful in monitoring and surveillance, providing information for the protection of civilians (PoC) and the prevention of conflicts breakouts. The main advantage RPAs in conflict-affected countries is their cost-effective provision of imagery from remote locations which otherwise would have been impossible to access in a timely manner. The increasing financial outlay for these in the recent years is an confirmation of their effectiveness (Fig 5).

**10. *Airpower includes not only military assets, but an aerospace industry and commercial aviation.***

Any aerial asset whether Military or Civil (or the space) is interdependent on the others for its development and application for sustaining its effect. Together they form the aerial arm which wields the power to influence either in peace or in conflict. In Peace Operations this interdependence and synergy is more pronounced due to limited resources and a predominant political objective for the peace mission. This inhibits kinetic usage of Military Airpower unless absolutely necessary. Thus, non-kinetic application of Airpower would be a dominant characteristic supported by a “Robust”

Rules of Engagement to ensure the coercive deterrence character of the Military Airpower is retained.

#### **4.6 AIRPOWER AND ROBUST RULES OF ENGAGEMENT**

After Rwandan genocide there was a debate on UN peacekeeping principles and guidelines on civilian protection with the focus on **“impartiality does not and must not mean neutrality in the face of evil”**. It was accepted that there is a need for timely intervention by the international community when death and suffering are being inflicted on large numbers of people and when the state in charge is unable or unwilling to stop it. This led to recommendations of abandonment of outdated neutral peacekeeping and adoption of a more muscular peace operation to avoid another Rwanda. The 2000 Brahimi Report also recommended more assertive and deterrent mission force to be able to confront the challenges of human rights violations. It argued that **in dangerous situations with “obvious aggressors and victims”, peacekeepers, “may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so” and should therefore be equipped with “robust rules of engagement”**.

In certain volatile situations, the Security Council has given UN peacekeeping operations “robust” mandates authorizing them to “use all necessary means” to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order. Although on the ground they may sometimes appear similar, robust peacekeeping should not be confused with peace enforcement.

The definition of Rules of Engagement is at variance when referred in context of Military application in a conflict (war) and that defined by UN for Peacekeeping. The NATO defines Rules of engagement as:



*Directives to military forces, including individuals, that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force, or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be applied.*<sup>22</sup>

Whereas the UN states that Rules of engagement are:

*Directives issued by DPKO that specify the way how units in peacekeeping operations have to act with hostile parties and the population.*

While ROE limit the use of force and those for peace operations are more restrictive than those for regular combat there are **no specific ROEs developed for Air Operations in Peace Operations**. The mission mandated ROEs are issued across all military components and Force Commanders are to ensure that all subordinate commanders and troops are given extensive training on mission-specific ROE. The timely availability of the ROE to the TCC for incorporation into pre-deployment training, along with mandatory routine ROE refresher training whilst in Mission, including scenario based realistic practical exercises, remain the key to ensuring that peacekeepers have the knowledge, skills and support to implement their mandate.

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<sup>22</sup> NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, AAP-06, 2019 Edition

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **INDIAN AIR FORCE IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

#### **ONUC**

#### **(Opération des Nations Unies au Congo)**

(July 1960 to June 1964)

#### **5.1 BACKGROUND**

The Republic of the Congo, a former Belgian colony, became independent on 30 June 1960. In the days that followed, disorder broke out, and Belgium sent its troops to the Congo, without the agreement of the Congolese Government, for the declared purpose of restoring law and order and protecting Belgian nationals. On 12 July 1960, the Congolese Government asked for United Nations military assistance to protect the national territory of the Congo against external aggression. Two days later, the Security Council called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo and authorized military assistance as might be necessary until, through the efforts of the Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces might be able, in the Government's opinion, to meet their tasks fully. In less than 48 hours, contingents of a United Nations Force, provided by a number of countries including Asian and African States began to arrive in the Congo. At the same time, United Nations civilian experts were rushed to the Congo to help ensure the continued operations of essential public services.

The United Nations Operation in the Congo (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo, or ONUC), which took place in the Republic of the Congo from July 1960 until June 1964, marked a milestone in the history of United Nations peacekeeping in terms of the responsibilities it had to assume, the size of its area of operation and the manpower involved. It included, in addition to a peacekeeping force which comprised at its peak strength nearly 20,000 officers and men, an important Civilian Operations component. ONUC was established to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. The function of ONUC was subsequently modified to include maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo,

preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries.

## 5.2 ONUC MANDATE

ONUC was established by Security Council resolution [143 (1960) of 14 July 1960], by which it decided "to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with **such military assistance as might be necessary until, through that Government's efforts with United Nations technical assistance, the national security forces might be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks**".

The initial mandate of ONUC was to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Republic of the Congo, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. The function of ONUC was **subsequently modified to include maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal from the Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries**.

In implementing its mandate, **ONUC was authorized to use force, if necessary**. By resolution 161 (1961) of 21 February 1961, the Council urged that the United Nations "take **immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for ceasefire, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort**".

By resolution 169 (1961) of 24 November 1961, the Council authorized the Secretary-General "to take **vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations Command, and mercenaries**", as laid down in Council's resolution 161 (1961).

## **Strength**

Maximum (July 1961)

19,828 all ranks, supported by international civilian and locally recruited staff

At withdrawal (30 December 1963)

5,871 all ranks, supported by international civilian and locally recruited staff

## **Operations**

Over the next four years, the task of the United Nations Operations in the Congo was to help the Congolese Government restore and maintain the political independence and territorial integrity of the Congo; to help it maintain law and order throughout the country; and to put into effect a wide and long-range programme of training and technical assistance.

To meet the vast and complex task before it, the United Nations had to assemble a very large team. At its peak strength, the United Nations Force totalled nearly 20,000 officers and men. The instructions of the Security Council to this Force were strengthened early in 1961 after the assassination in Katanga province of former Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. The Force was to protect the Congo from outside interference, particularly by evacuating foreign mercenaries, and advisers from Katanga and preventing clashes and civil strife, by force if necessary, as a last resort.

Following the reconvening of Parliament in August 1961 under United Nations auspices, the main problem was the attempted secession, led and financed by foreign elements, of the province of Katanga. In September and December 1961, and again in December 1962, the secessionist gendarmes under the command of foreign mercenaries clashed with the United Nations Force.

During the latter half of 1960 and early 1961, Moïse Tshombe, the leader of the secessionist province of Katanga, was successful in reinforcing his military capabilities in Katanga. He equipped Katanga Air Force (FAK-Force Aérienne Katangaise) with aircrafts and recruited Mercenary Pilots to train and raise "Avikat" – AT-6-unit. The main base of Avikat was Luano airfield. On 4 April 1961, the Katangese regained the airport at Elisabethville from the Swedish component and on 7 April 1961 at Manono there was a battle with Ethiopian

ONUC-contingent, leaving several soldiers killed. At this stage UN had no combat aircraft in Congo. **On 14 April 1961, ONUC was firmly authorised to use force in pursuit of its goal of retaining the unity of Congo.**

**Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld lost his life on 17 September 1961 in the crash of his airplane on the way to Ndola (in what is now Zambia) where talks were to be held for the cessation of hostilities.**

In February 1963, after Katanga had been reintegrated into the national territory of the Congo, a phasing out of the Force was begun, aimed at its termination by the end of that year. At the request of the Congolese Government, however, the General Assembly authorized the stay of a reduced number of troops for a further six months. The Force was completely withdrawn by 30 June 1964.

### **INDIAN AIR FORCE IN CONGO (ONUC)** **(Aug 1960-Dec 1962)**

Three sets of IAF Transport Aircraft crew were among the initial lot to reach as early as Aug 1960, within few days of the authorisation of the mission. They were led Wing Commander KL Suri, who was supported by fifteen officers and NCOs, and around 35 ground staff. They in fact reached there even before their Army counter parts. These crew were drawn from 12 Squadron which operated C-119 'Packet' aircraft. In addition, there were UN Dakota aircrafts, which were also flown by IAF pilots. Their presence as a coordinated team as Squadron was encouraging in light of uncoordinated lot of pilots from 11 different Nations. They were mostly involved in logistic support and Troop build-up. They operated from Léopoldville (Present Kinshasa) to as far as Goma and Kamina. The first contribution of IAF in Peacekeeping went under appreciated and unsung.

The IAF combat elements in form of six Canberra aircraft were deployed as a part of the enforcement action envisaged by UN, though there was some scepticism on the issue of using combat aircraft. These aircrafts were drawn from 5 Squadron of IAF and the first four of these reached Léopoldville on 12 Oct 1961 with remaining two following the next week. The Canberra aircraft though "Bombers" by design, were classified as "fighter" in this UN mission

and never dropped bombs during the ONUC mission. The Canberra's mainly operated from Léopoldville as well as Elisabethville and Kamina. After arriving at Congo, the Canberra team started their mission by adopting an intensive flying programme. The Squadron was given its area of responsibility over southern Katanga province aligned with the Indian forces. The Canberra's practiced low level (500 feet) and night flying over the area of operations. This also enabled the UN to show their robust presence with a show of UN flag.

The Primary task was neutralisation of FAK (Air Superiority/ Dominance) and the secondary was to support ground troops under the directions of Air Control Teams (ACT), in today's parlance Close Air Support (CAS). They also carried out armed reconnaissance sorties, engaging rebel lines of communications and hideouts. The weapon was limited to 20 mm Canon. Further because of their range and navigational aids, Canberra's also carried out Visual and Photographic Reconnaissance.

The Canberra aircraft did suffer battle damage from small arms fire and one of the Flight Navigators was injured in one of the attacks. The Canberra's started winding from Congo and left by 05 Oct 1962. While the Indian Canberra's did not get into Aerial combat with any of the FAK fighters but the Swedish J29Bs did briefly engage in aerial combat with the FAK T-6Gs.


IAF fighters in the end achieved the following:

- Neutralized FAK through Offensive Air Support
- Significant impact on Katangese morale
- Demoralised Katanga's Mercenary Pilots
- Provided top cover for rescue mission (21 Sep 1962)

The Limitations faced by them during this period were:

- Lack of Radio Navigational aids
- Lack of Maps or inaccurate Maps
- Equatorial Weather
  - Lack of radar cover (but for a one Radar each at Elisabethville and Kamina)

**Fig 5.1: Map Displaying Troop Positions of the ONUC, the Republic of the Congo, and those supporting other leaders.**



(Taken from the US President's Intelligence Checklist of September 13th, 1961.,retrieved from [www.reddit.com](http://www.reddit.com))

## UNOSOM

### (UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA)

(UNOSOM I: Apr 1992-Mar 93)(UNOSOM II: Mar 1993-Mar 95)

#### **BACKGROUND**

The downfall of President Said Barra in Jan 91 and the resulting power struggle and clan clashes led to situation deteriorating by Nov 91. The resulting death and destruction forced hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee their homes and causing need for emergency humanitarian assistance. Almost one million Somalis sought refuge in neighbouring countries and elsewhere. The political chaos, deteriorating security situation, widespread banditry and looting, and extent of physical destruction compounded the problem and severely constrained the delivery of humanitarian supplies.

The deteriorating and appalling situation in Somalia led the United Nations Secretary General, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), to become actively involved with the political aspects of the crisis and to press for a peaceful solution to the conflict.

UNOSOM I was established in Apr 1992 to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia and to provide protection and security for UN personnel, equipment and supplies at seaports and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centres in the city and its immediate environs. In Aug 92 its mandate and strength were expanded to enable protection to Humanitarian convoys and distribution centres throughout Somalia. However, with continued deterioration of situation, member states were authorised to establish UNITAF (United Task Force) for providing safe environment for delivery of humanitarian assistance.

The United States led UNITAF (US Code Name- Operation Restore Hope) was a “Unified Command and Control” Military arrangement authorised by UN Security council for a large intervention force. The primary objective being security rather than institution building. As UNITAF was intended as a transitional body, once it was assumed that secure environment



was created, UNSOM II was created (Mar 93) and there was a transfer of power from UNITAF to UNSOM II. However, **as there was no disarming of rival factions within Somalia, the mandate to create “Secure Environment” was not durable.**

## UNOSOM II

UNOSOM II was established in accordance with Security Council resolution 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993, to take over from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). [UNITAF was a multinational force, organized and led by the United States, which, in December 1992, had been authorized by the Security Council to use "all necessary means" to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.]

### UNOSOM II MANDATE

The mandate of UNOSOM II was to take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. To that end, UNOSOM II was to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. Its main responsibilities included:

- monitoring that all factions continued to respect the cessation of hostilities and other agreements to which they had consented;
- preventing any resumption of violence and, if necessary, taking appropriate action;
- maintaining control of the heavy weapons of the organized factions which would have been brought under international control;
- seizing the small arms of all unauthorized armed elements;
- securing all ports, airports and lines of communications required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
- protecting the personnel, installations and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies, ICRC as well as NGOs;
- continuing mine-clearing, and;
- assisting in repatriation of refugees and displaced persons in Somalia.

On 4 February 1994, the Security Council, by its resolution 897 (1994) revised UNOSOM II's mandate to exclude the use of coercive methods. The revised mandate included:

- assisting the Somali parties in implementing the “Addis Ababa Agreements”, particularly in their cooperative disarmament and ceasefire efforts; protecting major ports, airports and essential infrastructure;
- providing humanitarian relief to all in need throughout the country;
- assisting in the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system;
- helping repatriate and resettle refugees and displaced people;
- assisting the political process in Somalia; and
- protecting the personnel, installations and equipment of the United Nations and its agencies as well as of NGOs providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.

UNOSOM II was withdrawn from Somalia in early March 1995.

### **Strength**

Authorized,

28,000 military and civilian police personnel; there was also provision for approximately 2,800 international and local civilian staff

Strength at the start of withdrawal (30 November 1994)

14,968 all ranks, supported by international and local civilian staff

### **IAF CONTINGENT IN SOMALIA (UNOSOM II) (Oct 1993 – Dec 1994)**

The IAF took part in a UN peacekeeping mission after a gap of 30 years. The IAF contingent took part from 01 Oct 93 to 21 Dec 94 as part of the Indian contingent (Brigade) in support of UN operations. Incidentally they were also accompanied by Army Aviation elements from Air Observation Post (AOP then, now Army Aviation Corps, AAC). The first batch of troops landed in the capital city of Mogadishu on 28 Aug 93. The two helicopters along with the first batch of fifteen personnel were ferried out in an AN-12 from Delhi to Mogadishu on 01 Oct 93. The remaining personnel went subsequently on 06 Oct 93 and 10 Oct 93. The induction was completed by 22 Oct 93.

The two Chetak (Alouette III) helicopters were Anti-Tank version, armed with Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (AS-11). The Indian aviation was operational immediately. On 12 Oct 93 the first operational sortie was undertaken with the Brigade Commander and his Deputy on board to reconnoitre the area of responsibility in and around Baidoa which was to be the Brigade's permanent location. The helicopters were equipped with a GPS (Global Positioning System) without which it would have been difficult to navigate in the featureless Somalia country. IAF helicopters were utilised for the following tasks:

- Road opening and convoy escorting.
- Aerial Reconnaissance.
- Casualty evacuation.
- Communication.

In February the unit gave air cover to the Mahar battalion who were escorting 500 refugees from Mogadishu to their villages. In March, some bandits attacked a convoy and the soldiers of Mahar regiment fired back and killed some. In a twist of circumstances, the Indian helicopters had to save lives of the bandits by providing them casualty evacuation services. On 08 Dec 94 at 1730 hrs a rocket propelled grenade, fired by Somalia militia during inter-clan fighting, exploded on the roof of the barrack which housed IAF officers. In the explosion, two officers and an airman were injured. The first batch of 10 IAF personnel were de-inducted on 14 Dec 94. The last batch left on 20 Dec 94. Critical stores were de-inducted on 19 Dec 94 by AN-124 contracted by UN. Bulky stores were brought by ship Mogadishu.

Fig 5.2 : Map of Somalia



Map No. 3690 Rev. 10 UNITED NATIONS  
December 2011

Department of Field Support  
Cartographic Section

(Source: [www.unmis.org/map](http://www.unmis.org/map))

## UNAMSIL

### **(United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone)**

(Oct 1999 – Dec 2005)

#### **BACKGROUND**

The conflict in Sierra Leone dates from March 1991 when fighters of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched a war from the east of the country near the border with Liberia to overthrow the government. With the support of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Sierra Leone's army tried at first to defend the government but, the following year, the army itself overthrew the government.

Despite the change of power, the RUF continued its attacks. Parliamentary and presidential elections were held in February 1996, and the army relinquished power to the winner. The RUF, however, did not participate in the elections. They would not recognise the results and the conflict continued.

Later the Abidjan agreement between the Government and RUF was derailed by another military coup d'état in May 1997. This time the army joined forces with the RUF and formed a ruling junta. The President and his government went into exile in neighbouring Guinea. The Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo on 8 October 1997 and authorized ECOWAS to ensure its implementation using ECOMOG troops.

In February 1998, ECOMOG, responding to an attack by rebel/army junta forces, launched a military attack that led to the collapse of the junta and its expulsion from Freetown. On 10 March, President was returned to office. The Security Council terminated the oil and arms embargo and strengthened the office of the Special Envoy to include UN military liaison officers and security advisory personnel.

On June 1998, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) for an initial period of six months. The mission monitored and

advised efforts to disarm combatants and restructure the nation's security forces. Unarmed UNOMSIL teams, under the protection of ECOMOG, documented reports of on-going atrocities and human rights abuses committed against civilians. Fighting continued with the rebel alliance gaining control of more than half the country. In December 1998 the alliance began an offensive to retake Freetown and in January overran most of the city. All UNOMSIL personnel were evacuated. The Special Representative and the Chief Military Observer continued performing their duties, maintaining close contact with all parties to the conflict and monitoring the situation. Later the same month, ECOMOG troops retook the capital and again installed the civilian government, although thousands of rebels were still reportedly hiding out in the surrounding countryside. Negotiations between the Government and the rebels began in May 1999 and on 7 July all parties to the conflict signed an agreement in Lome to end hostilities and form a government of national unity. The parties to the conflict also requested an expanded role for UNOMSIL.

On 22 October 1999, the Security Council authorized the establishment of UNAMSIL, a new and much larger mission with a maximum of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers, to assist the Government and the parties in carrying out provisions of the Lome peace agreement. At the same time, the Council decided to terminate UNOMSIL. The mandate was reviewed continuously in view of the deteriorating situation to include a number of additional tasks and also expanded the military component.

## **MANDATE**

According to Security Council resolution 1270 (1999) of 22 October 1999, UNAMSIL had the following mandate:

- To cooperate with the Government of Sierra Leone and the other parties to the Peace Agreement in the implementation of the Agreement
- To assist the Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan
- To that end, to establish a presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone, including at disarmament/reception centres and demobilization centres
- To ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel
- To monitor adherence to the ceasefire in accordance with the ceasefire agreement of 18 May 1999 (S/1999/585, annex) through the structures provided for therein

- To encourage the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms and support their functioning
- To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance
- To support the operations of United Nations civilian officials, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his staff, human rights officers and civil affairs officers
- To provide support, as requested, to the elections, which are to be held in accordance with the present constitution of Sierra Leone

According to Security Council resolution 1289 (2000) of 7 February 2000, the mandate was revised to include the following tasks (acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations):

- To provide security at key locations and Government buildings, in particular in Freetown, important intersections and major airports, including Lungi airport
- To facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along specified thoroughfares
- To provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme
- To coordinate with and assist, the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities
- To guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and to assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction
- The Council authorized UNAMSIL to take the necessary action to fulfil those additional tasks, and affirmed that, in the discharge of its mandate, UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone.

## **SHORTCOMINGS OF UNAMSIL**

The problem of peace in Sierra Leone highlighted certain basic flaws in the UN peacekeeping missions and raised certain questions about the capacity of the UN to undertake effective operations, including issues concerning:

- The clarity of purpose and robustness of the mandate. The mandate today lies somewhere between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. This has definitely led to questions about the nature of the operation and its ability to use force.
- Fragmented command and control procedures. Questions about command and control have accompanied United Nations peacekeeping almost since its inception. When command in the field is divided, the risks increase, including the risk of casualties.
- There is lack of common operational cultures of UN forces.
- Another weakness is the shortfalls in intelligence gathering and processing capacity. The absence of effective intelligence architecture and bureaucratic difficulties preclude creation of an accurate intelligence picture.

### **IAF CONTINGENT IN SIERRA LEONE (UNAMSIL)**

The IAF contingent in UNAMSIL initially consisted of eight Helicopters (four Chetak (Alouette III)s/Alouette III and four Mi 8). They were deployed in Mar/Feb 2000 in support of the Indian Brigade. As the situation deteriorated in Apr- May 2000, three Mi 35 Attack Helicopters joined them in Jun 2000 as a part of the expanded mandate of UNAMSIL. The initial contingent was referred as IAF 2000; hence the Mi 35 unit was referred as IAF 2001. The manpower, including the aircrew was 215 personnel and they operated from Hastings airfield close to Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone.

The role of IAF 2000 was determined by the mandate given to UNAMSIL and consisted of casualty/medical evacuation, armed rescue, communication and logistic support. The rules of engagement stated that the helicopters could fire only in self-defence or to provide protection for UN troops or personnel in the carrying out of the mandate of UNAMSIL. Whereas when Mi 35s of IAF 2001 got inducted, certain provisions under chapter VII were added so as to permit enforcement through the rules of engagement. The Mi 8s as well as the Chetak (Alouette III)s were also modified for armament role.



IAF 2000 personnel were involved in daring rescue Operation at Makeni in May 2000. Subsequently the in Jul 2000 “Operation Khukri” displayed the resolve and professional ability of Indian Armed forces facilitate extraction of 222 peacekeepers being held hostage by the rebel forces for over two months. This was accomplished successfully by use of eight helicopters, including three Mi-35 gunships, three Mi-8s and two Chetak (Alouette III)s helicopters.

The Mi 35s were armed with their 12.7mm Gatling gun along with the 57mm rockets. As a run up to “Op Khukri” they were effectively used to provide air cover as well as suppressive fire for Heliborne operations. They also carried out armed strikes and were on continuous over watch over the column after they broke out to provide fire support on call. The Mi 35s also carried out pre-emptive strikes at designated targets so as to keep the RUF engaged. They used Infra-Red flares also as there were some intelligence reports of shoulder fired missiles. The Mi 35s latter carried out interdiction of RUF reinforcements and then provided convoy protection while carrying out armed reconnaissance.

In contrast the light Chetak (Alouette III) helicopters took on the to act as Airborne Communication posts (due to large distances and lack of powerful ground-based radio stations). In addition, they were also carrying out reconnaissance and were standing by for any Casualty evacuation.

### **Constraints**

- Terrain
- Topography and Vegetation
- Weather
- Inadequate training with ground forces
- Inadequate intelligence
- Communication

**Fig 5.3 : Map of Sierra Leone**



Map No. 3902 Rev. 5 UNITED NATIONS  
January 2004

Department for Peacekeeping Operations  
Cartographic Section

(Source: [www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/sierrale.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/sierrale.pdf))

## MONUC

### (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)

(Nov 1999-Jun 2010)

#### BACKGROUND

The 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the establishment of a new government there, led to fleeing of 1.2 million Rwandese Hutus, including elements who had taken part in the genocide, to the neighbouring Kivu regions of eastern part of Congo (then known as Zaire), an area inhabited earlier by ethnic Tutsis and others. This led to a rebellion there in 1996, pitting the forces led by Laurent Désiré Kabila against the army of President Mobutu Sese Seko. Kabila's forces, aided by Rwanda and Uganda, took the capital city of Kinshasa in 1997 and renamed the country the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This is often referred as the "First Congo War".

However, a rebellion against the Kabila government started in the Kivu regions in 1998 and within weeks, the rebels seized large areas of the country. President Kabila was militarily supported by Angola, Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe and the rebels by Rwanda and Uganda. This led to the bigger and one of the deadliest conflicts since World War II. It is often referred as the "Second Congo War" with involvement of nine African countries and around twenty-five armed groups. By 2008, the war and its aftermath had caused 5.4 million deaths, principally through disease and starvation with another 2 million displaced from their homes or seeking asylum in neighbouring countries.

The signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999 between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and five regional States (Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe) in July 1999 called for ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign forces at the behest of Security Council. **The Security Council established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) by its resolution 1279 on 30 November 1999.** It was initially planned for the observation of the ceasefire and disengagement of forces and maintain liaison with all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement. Later in a series of resolutions, the Council expanded the mandate of MONUC to the supervision of the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and assigned multiple related additional tasks. However, the violence continued and in Jan 2001 the President Laurent

Kabila was assassinated by his bodyguard. The situation continued to deteriorate through 2001 to 2002 in spite of Joseph Kabila, son of Laurent Kabila, stepping in as President after a unanimous vote in the Congolese parliament. The Pygmy Massacre “Effacer le Tableau” (through 2002-03) and the UN reported exploitation of mineral wealth in eastern Congo specifically, were the stark reality of the purported genocide and its aftermath. In a series of agreements with Uganda, Rwanda and other warring factions within Congo a transitional government came into being in Jul 2003. This transitional continued to remain weak and ineffective especially in eastern Congo.

In the ensuing “Ituri Conflict” (1999-2003) in eastern Congo, led to deployment of a European Union Force, led by France. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for establishing and deploying a temporary multi-national force to the area until the weakened MONUC mission could be reinforced. On 30 May 2003, the Security Council adopted the Resolution 1484 authorising the deployment of an Interim Multinational Emergency Force (IMEF) to Bunia with a task to secure the airport, protect internally displaced persons in camps and the civilians in the town. This was termed as “Operation Artemis” by the EUFOR. Following the rapid deployment of about 1800 troops to the region in June 2003, Bunia was secured but massacres continued in the countryside. On 1 Sept 2003, responsibility for the security of the region was handed over to the MONUC mission.

## **MANDATE**

While MONUC was authorised in 1999, but in Jun 2003 just prior to IAF deployment, the Security council passed resolution 1493 under chapter VII. In this they authorised MONUC to take the necessary measures in the areas of deployment of its armed units, and as it deemed it within its capabilities:

- to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment;
- to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, including in particular those engaged in missions of observation, verification or DDRRR;
- to protect civilians and humanitarian workers under imminent threat of physical violence;
- and to contribute to the improvement of the security conditions in which humanitarian assistance is provided;

Further, they authorized MONUC to use all necessary means to fulfil its mandate in the Ituri district and, as it deemed it within its capabilities, in North and South Kivu. It also requested the Secretary-General to deploy in the Ituri district, as soon as possible, the tactical brigade-size force whose concept of operation was set out in the second special report by Secretary General, including the reinforced MONUC presence in Bunia by mid-August 2003.

### **INDIAN AVIATION CONTINGENT - I (IAC-I)** **(Jul 2003- Jul 2010)**

In the above elaborated backdrop Indian Air Force once again participated as peacekeepers in Congo for the second time in Jul 2003. The IAF contingent, called the Indian Aviation Contingent (IAC-I), consisting of 243 personnel, was equipped with four Mi 25 Attack Helicopters along with five Mi 17 Helicopters. The IAF contingent was also supported by a “Guard” Infantry company to secure the airfield as well as the helicopters on ground. IAC-I was established at Goma in the eastern province in support of Sector 5 (Kivu). However, they were also mandated to contribute two Mi 25s to at Bunia in support of Sector 6 (Ituri). These invaluable assets increased the MONUC's sphere of influence in the Eastern DRC and UN forces were been able to reach areas that had hitherto been outside its sphere of influence.

The roles for Mi-25 Squadron included:

- Armed reconnaissance & surveillance
- Fire support for Heliborne operations in critical phases of flight
- Armed escort to UN Aircraft and ground forces
- Psychological Operations (through area domination aerial patrol as well as morale booster for UN troops)

Whereas, for Mi 17 Squadron it was:

- Troop insertion/extraction
- Casualty evacuation
- Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) support
- Logistic Supply
- Search and Rescue
- Observation and Reconnaissance

## **INDIAN AIRFIELD SERVICES UNIT (IASU): KINDU**

**(Sep 2004-Oct 2008)**

In 2004 UN requested for additional support to run the Airfield services at Kindu, which was then developing as one of the major logistical nodes for MONUC. IAF deployed an Indian Airfield Services Unit (IASU). The IAF unit comprised of 120 personnel for manning these services at Kindu in support of all UN air movements and it included 30 “Garud” IAF Commando’s to help them in managing their as well as their equipment security. The operations include airport management, ramp operations, crash and firefighting services, cargo and passenger handling, medical support, meteorological services and communication. Their major equipment consisted of two Crash fire tenders, one ambulance, a 30-ton crane and variety of fork lifters. They were also equipped with x ray machine and vehicles to facilitate cargo & passenger handling.

## **INDIAN AVIATION CONTINGENT - II (IAC-II)**

**(Feb 2005-Sep2011)**

Effectiveness of the IAC-I prompted UN to approach India for another aviation contingent. Thus, Indian Aviation Contingent-II (IAC-II) with its fleet of six-night capable Mi-17 helicopters were deployed at Kavumu Airport in Bukavu and four night upgraded Mi-35 helicopters were deployed at Goma in Feb 2005. While IAC-II was the largest contingent by IAF with ten helicopters and 303 personnel. It was also given an additional task of manning a detachment at Kalemie. While the roles for these helicopters remained similar to those of IAC-I, the new aircraft added enhanced night capability to UN Air Operations hitherto lacking.

## **OPERATIONS**

In Jul 2003, while the Towns of Goma and Bunia were outwardly calm, there was a palpable tension with intelligence report of rebel groups controlling the outskirts of these two towns. In Bunia the IEMF was primarily deployed around the town and the integral aviation elements (two Pumas, two Gazelles at Bunia) had limited their scope in ensuring the stability within town and adjoining areas limited to few kilometres. However, these helicopters were

constantly assured of Air support in form of Fighter aircraft from Entebbe in Uganda and N'Djamena in Chad. The IEMF was also supported by tactical lift transport aircraft (C-160 and C-130). While Bunia airport was secured by IEMF, Goma airfield security was weak as the security fence/wall was damaged a year earlier by lava flowing out of the nearby Mount Nyiragongo. The lava had also damaged the runway and the aircraft parking area. IAF helicopters were inducted through Kisangani (500 Kms from Goma), whereas the personnel came in through Kigali, Rwanda.

The Mi 25 Squadron (IAF 2003) was the enforcement element of IAC-I. Its roles included Armed recce and surveillance, Fire support to heliborne forces during critical phases of flight and Armed escort to UN aircraft and ground forces. On the other hand, the Mi-17 Squadron (IAF 2004) formed the utility support helicopter component of IAC-I and its tasking included troop insertion/extraction, casualty evacuation, disarmament, demobilization and resettlement (DDR) support, logistics supply, search and rescue, observation and reconnaissance.

IAC-I, like its predecessors in 1960s, remained at the forefront of all the humanitarian tasks of MONUC during its deployment with a mature and reasonable enforcement ability demonstrated often during its entire stay in eastern Congo. Within few days of their induction into MONUC they extended the reach of the Mission many folds. In the North Eastern Ituri province their area influence was till Fataki and Mahagi (60-100 Kms from Bunia) and in South Eastern Congo it was till Bukavu initially (100 Kms from Goma). Subsequently this was further extended to Kindu (350 Kms West of Goma) and Kalemie (480 Kms South of Goma). Their proactive approach in implementing the mandate led to UN reaching out to Indian government for additional troops specifically to support Air Operations in MONUC as well as UNMIS. Interestingly one of the first missions undertaken by the Mi 25s in Bunia was to provide Aerial reconnaissance and fire support to Pakistani Mechanised column in opening the road connection between Bunia and Beni.

The Military Operations in MONUC were regulated in accordance with the mandate, under the directions of SRSG, principle objectives being:

- Stopping the Killing and ending the tragedy of war and conflict.
- Facilitating the political transition leading to free and transparent elections.

- Working towards the establishment of a rule of law and respect for human rights which are essential foundations for economic development.
- Addressing the legacy of war by improving human conditions for sustainable peace.

The mandate when translated to rules of engagement for Air operations were:


- Correct identification of the target.
- No friendly troops/civilians in the vicinity.
- No collateral damages.
- Ascertaining hostile intent

The induction of Night capable helicopters in 2005 (Mi 17s and Mi35s) was another testament to the evolving confidence in employing Airpower in UN Peacekeeping as well as the UNs faith in Indian Air Force to uphold the mandate. Their contribution in famous Sake standoff during the 2008 Goma crises remains till date one of the finest examples of deterrence posturing through use of aerial assets. The presence of the Night capable Attack Helicopter constantly keeping an over watch, nearly round the clock, ensured that the rebel forces halted their advancement fearing a swift retribution.

MONUC aviation assets were one of the largest ever deployed in UN Peacekeeping which were directly under the control of Special Representative of Secretary General (SRSG).



**Fig 5.4 : Map of Troops in MONUC (2010)**



Map No. 4121 Rev. 45 UNITED NATIONS  
February 2010 (Colour)

Department of Field Support  
Cartographic Section

(Source: [www.peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/monuc/resources](http://www.peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/monuc/resources))

**UNMIS**  
**(United Nations Mission in the Sudan)**  
**(Mar 2005-Jul 2011)**

**BACKGROUND**

The First Sudanese Civil War was a conflict from 1955 to 1972 between the northern part of Sudan and the southern Sudan region that demanded representation and more regional autonomy. However, the agreement that ended the First Sudanese Civil War's fighting in 1972 failed to completely dispel the tensions that had originally caused it, leading to a reigniting of the north-south conflict during the Second Sudanese Civil War, which lasted from 1983 to 2005.

Over the years, there were many attempts to bring peace. One such effort was a regional peace initiative under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The United Nations closely followed and supported the IGAD initiative over the years. During 2002, the Sudan peace process under the auspices of IGAD made significant progress. On 20 July 2002, the parties to the conflict signed the Machakos Protocol, in which they reached specific agreement on a broad framework, setting forth the principles of governance, the transitional process and the structures of government, as well as on the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan, and on state and religion.

To intensify the peace efforts and build on the momentum of the progress made, the UN Security Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, established in June 2004, a special political mission—the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS). UNAMIS was mandated to facilitate contacts with the parties concerned and to prepare for the introduction of an envisaged UN peace support operation. As a response to the escalating crisis in Darfur, the Security Council, in July 2004, assigned some additional tasks to UNAMIS relating to Darfur. Darfur had long experienced localized violence exacerbated by ethnic, economic and political tensions and competition over scarce resources and the Government's decision to respond by deploying its national armed forces and mobilizing local militia, took the violence to unprecedented levels. The cycle of terror inside Darfur also threatened regional peace and security. At the same time, the United Nations and a collection of non-governmental organizations launched a massive humanitarian operation in Darfur,

constantly expanding activities to respond to the needs of an increasing number of people displaced by violence.

In Jan 2005, after a Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Sudanese Government and the rebel groups, the Secretary-General recommended the deployment of a multidimensional peace support operation, the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). It would include components focusing on four broad areas of engagement: good offices and political support for the peace process; security; governance; and humanitarian and development assistance.

## **MANDATE**

UNMIS was established by a Security council resolution in Mar 2005 and its mandated the mission:

- (d) To support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by performing the following tasks:
  - (d) To monitor and verify the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and to investigate violations;
  - (ii) To liaise with bilateral donors on the formation of Joint Integrated Units;
  - (iii) To observe and monitor movement of armed groups and redeployment of forces in the areas of UNMIS deployment in accordance with the Ceasefire Agreement;
  - (iv) To assist in the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme as called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with particular attention to the special needs of women and child combatants, and its implementation through voluntary disarmament and weapons collection and destruction;
  - (v) To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in promoting understanding of the peace process and the role of UNMIS by means of an effective public information campaign, targeted at all sectors of society, in coordination with the African Union;
  - (vi) To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in addressing the need for a national inclusive approach, including the role of women, towards reconciliation and peacebuilding;

- (vii) To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in coordination with bilateral and multilateral assistance programmes, in restructuring the police service in Sudan, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a police training and evaluation programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police;
  - (viii) To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in promoting the rule of law, including an independent judiciary, and the protection of human rights of all people of Sudan through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy with the aim of combating impunity and contributing to long-term peace and stability and to assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to develop and consolidate the national legal framework;
  - (ix) To ensure an adequate human rights presence, capacity, and expertise within UNMIS to carry out human rights promotion, civilian protection, and monitoring activities;
  - (x) To provide guidance and technical assistance to the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in cooperation with other international actors, to support the preparations for and conduct of elections and referenda provided for by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement;
- (b) To facilitate and coordinate, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and humanitarian assistance, inter alia, by helping to establish the necessary security conditions;
- © To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in cooperation with other international partners in the mine action sector, by providing humanitarian demining assistance, technical advice, and coordination;
- (d) To contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Sudan, as well as to coordinate international efforts towards the protection of civilians with particular attention to vulnerable groups including internally displaced persons, returning refugees, and women and children, within UNMIS's capabilities and in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations, and non-governmental organizations;

However more importantly, Security Council acting in accordance with chapter VII stated it:

- Decides that UNMIS is authorized to take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers, joint assessment mechanism and assessment and evaluation commission personnel, and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;

**INDIAN AVIATION CONTINGENT: SUDAN (UNMIS)**  
**(Oct 2005- Oct 2010)**

In Oct 2005 Indian Air Force once again deployed another Aviation contingent. This time, for the first time IAF peacekeepers got deployed to Sudan with six Mi-17 helicopters and 196 personnel. They were deployed at Kadugli as a part of Sector 4 of UNMIS. The contingent had dispersed location, with the camp located few kilometres away from the airport, from where the Mi-17s operated. The terrain and Weather were hostile due dry desert conditions. As the contingent was geared up for conduct of air operations only, it lacked any inherent protection/self-defence capability on ground. Hence, they were co-located with an Infantry Battalion which provided them cover for the base. However, the Helicopters at Kadugli Airport were secured by an Indian Infantry battalion. The Mi 17s were primarily tasked for logistic support, Medical/Casualty evacuation, and surveillance/reconnaissance. These helicopters were unarmed and lacked any self defence capability.

The IAF participation in UNMIS has the distinction of being the only peacekeeping mission wherein the operations did not envisage use of force through air for protection of its mandate, hence there were no armed helicopter (or Attack Helicopter) in this mission. However the situation in Sudan has changed since then and presently the successor mission, UNMISS is regulated by a mandate which invokes clauses of chapter VII.

Fig 5.5 : Map of Troops in UNAMSIL (2005)



Map No. 4249 Rev. 3 UNITED NATIONS  
December 2005 (Colour)

Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
Cartographic Section

(Source: [www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/resources](http://www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/resources))

## CHAPTER 6

### ANALYSIS : INDIAN AIR FORCE IN UN PEACEKEEPING

#### 6.1 INDIAN AIR FORCE CONTRIBUTION

India's contributions to UN peacekeeping operations have been marked by the experience and professionalism of India's Armed forces. Being one of the "original" founding members of the United Nations, India had never hesitated in responding to the calls of the UN to contribute troops for maintaining international peace and security. India is the largest contributor of troops to UNPKOs with more than 200,000 Indian troops having served in 49 of the 71 UNPKOs deployed.

**Table 6.1 : Indian Air Force Deployment in UN Peacekeeping Missions**

| Mission   | Place        | Unit/Squadron | From   | To         | Number of Personnel | Type of Aircraft      | Number                |
|-----------|--------------|---------------|--------|------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| ONUC      | Congo        | 12 Squadron   | Aug-60 | NK         | 50                  | Nil                   | Nil                   |
|           |              | 5 squadron    | Oct-61 | Dec-62     | 130                 | Canberra              | 5                     |
| UNOSOM II | Somalia      | 111 HU        | Oct-93 | Dec-94     | 60                  | Chetak (Alouette III) | 2                     |
| UNAMSIL   | Sierra Leone | IAF 2000      | Mar-00 | Jun-01     | 215                 | Mi 8                  | 4                     |
|           |              | IAF 2001      | Jun-00 | Dec-00     |                     | Mi 35                 | 3                     |
|           |              |               |        |            |                     |                       | Chetak (Alouette III) |
| MONUC     | DR Congo     | IAC I         | Jul-03 | Jul-10     | 243                 | Mi 17                 | 5                     |
|           |              |               |        |            |                     | Mi 25                 | 4                     |
|           |              | IAC II        | Jan-05 | Sep-11     | 303                 | Mi 17                 | 6                     |
|           |              |               |        |            |                     | Mi 35                 | 4                     |
|           |              | IASU          | Sep-04 | Oct-08     | 120                 | Nil                   | 0                     |
|           |              | SO            | NK     | NK         | 2                   | NA                    | NA                    |
| UNMIS     | Sudan        | IAC           | Oct-05 | Oct-10     | 196                 | Mi 17                 | 6                     |
|           |              | SO            | NK     | Continuing | 3                   | NA                    | NA                    |
|           |              | MILOB         | NK     | NK         | 2                   | NA                    | NA                    |

(Source: Data collated from Air Headquarters and Nair K S (2012). Ganesha's Flyboys: The Indian Air Force in the Congo)

Indian Air Force participated in five of these missions with equipment and personnel. This contribution spanned over 50 years of which the majority of the participation was over a decade, 2000 (UNAMSIL) to 2011 (UNMIS). In between these two missions **IAF participated once again in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for the second time (2003-2011) with its largest contribution to Peacekeeping, eight Attack Helicopters (AH) and eleven Medium Lift Helicopters (MLH)**. At its peak in 2008, IAF had 1049 personnel deployed in Peacekeeping with 25 helicopters (08 AH + 17 MLH) (refer table 2). However, by 2011 IAF withdrew all the helicopters from Peacekeeping and presently only three officers are participating in UNMISS as staff officers. The IAF has the unique distinction of having contributed effectively to the entire range of tasks listed by UN for military aircraft (Table 6.2).

**Table 6.2 : UN Aviation Tasks vs IAF in Peacekeeping Mission**

| UN TASKS/MISSIONS                               | ONUC | UNOSOM II | UNAMSIL | MONUC | UNMIS |
|---|------|-----------|---------|-------|-------|
| Deterrence                                      | Yes  | No        | Yes     | Yes   | No    |
| Air cover and close air support                 | Yes  | No        | Yes     | Yes   | No    |
| Troop insertion and extraction                  | Yes  | No        | Yes     | Yes   | Yes   |
| Armed patrols, reconnaissance                   | Yes  | Yes       | Yes     | Yes   | No    |
| Armed escorts and response                      | Yes  | No        | Yes     | Yes   | No    |
| Resupply and air drops under hostile conditions | Yes  | Yes       | Yes     | Yes   | No    |
| Logistics                                       | Yes  | Yes       | Yes     | Yes   | Yes   |
| Casualty evacuation (Casevac)                   | Yes  | Yes       | Yes     | Yes   | Yes   |

(Source : Data Collated from Isser Rajesh (2012). *Peacekeeping and Protection of Civilians: The Indian Air Force in the Congo* Nair K S (2012). *Ganesh's Flyboys: The Indian Air Force in the Congo*)

The IAF deployment in ONUC would be the “cornerstone” of its participation in Peacekeeping operations. In 1960s IAF in ONUC was initially involved in supporting the UN mission by the way of providing Pilots to fly the UN provisioned Transport aircraft for troop movements and logistic support. However, due to deteriorating circumstances, in face of an armed opposition (including from air) to UN, the air assets were mandated to use force to protect UN troops as well as the equipment while Security council did not specifically invoke



Chapter VII. In this backdrop the IAF Canberra's were very effectively used over extended ranges (1000 Kms) using only their guns (20 mm cannon). These aircraft operated from dispersed bases to ensure that their reach and effectiveness was fully utilised and the pilots innovated to ensure that the missions were effectively carried out in difficult terrain and weather. Thus, **IAF was effectively used in ONUC to deter the rebels to an large extent for the given time and space.**

However, when we analyse the UNOSOM II aviation participation, the Chetak (Alouette III) helicopter was limited in range. Furtherand the armament capability was restricted to Anti-tank Missiles, which could never be used in the given conditions in the mission. The **most of the tasking of the helicopter was in support role to the ground forces in terms if reconnaissance, casualty evacuation and mobility.** Further the numbers being employed limited to two from IAF (and probably similar of Army), they **could not have any impact on deterrence through air.** In addition, as these helicopters were not armed for self-protection, any aggressive reconnaissance would also have been fraught with high degree of risk, which would be another limiting factor in their utilisation.

The IAF participation in UNAMSIL initially with Mi 8s and Chetak (Alouette III) helicopters was once again was with the main purpose to support the mobility of ground forces, with limited capability to carry out aggressive deterrence. However, the risk taking ability as perceived during the Casevac during Makeni (Annexure 6) standoff by the Helicopter crew clearly demonstrated a resolve which contributed to upliftment of the moral of the UN troops. Later, during Op Khukri (Annexure 5), IAF utilised Mi 35 Attack Helicopters in armed escort role to Mi-8s for Heliborne operations as well as in conjunction with ground forces which were breaking out after being held under siege by rebel forces. It was a classic demonstration of deterrence through show of intent to ensure protection of the mandate through guaranteeing the safety of the peacekeepers. "Op Kukhri" was an unique operation which was conceptualised and coordinated at the highest level within Department of Peace Operations and the Mission Headquarters' in Sierra Leone. Utilisation of Chetak helicopter as a radio relay during the operation was very effective in managing the Mi 35s in a difficult terrain with inadequate ground support, at the extreme edges of radio ranges.

The IAF deployment in MONUC is a benchmark of its participation in Peacekeeping operations not only because of the largest number of helicopters deployed by any one country at given time in a single mission (19 Helicopters) as also it was the biggest in terms of personnel deployed but it was longest time IAF was involved in a Peacekeeping mission (2003-2011). This was the second time IAF was participating in a Peacekeeping mission in Congo. However the equipment was limited to helicopters, which had become the choice of Airpower tool for UN Peacekeeping. In addition IAF was also the first to induct Military aviation units into this mission (closely followed by Bangladesh Air Force). The IAF helicopters could make their presence known all along the eastern sector of DRC, and within few days of their arrival in 2003. The Attack Helicopters of IAC I had started dominating areas much outside the earlier reach of MONUC ground forces, this helped opening up many road axis and thereby open up Military ground posts to assure the populace of their security (PoC : Protection of Civilian). The Indian Mi 17s were also at the forefront of these missions to expand the reach of MONUC troops by providing them mobility and logistic support.

Later in 2005 IAC II added Night capability to UN Peace Operations with the Mi 35s which were equipped with Night Vision Goggles (NVG) and Forward Looking Infra-Red Sensor pod. The pod also had an Day time camera along with a laser ranging beam. This brought in a technology hitherto not available in a Peacekeeping mission. The reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities on MONUC achieved a big boost. Further it was also reassuring to know that there was a capability to carryout casualty evacuation at night in case of an emergency. The 2008 “Sake Crises” which nearly led to fall of Goma to M23 rebels was deterred with the support of the Night capable Mi 35s, whose presence even during night was unnerving to the rebels.

The deployment of Indian Aviation Support Unit was first of its kind for IAF/India. As the contingent was located at Kindu, which was more that 300 kms away from Goma ( Location of IAC I), and there was no additional Military Infantry unit available to provide them protection, this unit had gone with an integrated self-protection troops from IAF commando force the “Garuds”. It was the first time when IAF had sent such troops.

The IAF deployment in UNMIS was primarily to provide logistic support and mobility to an expanding mission. While the UN mandate did authorise use of force under chapter VII, the political consent for the same was there only for ground troops and its extension into air

was seen suspiciously. In view of this the IAF helicopters operated in UNMIS without any self-protection and were dictated by conditions of chapter VI.

The IAFs equipment profile (aircraft/helicopter/support equipment) was always contemporary and battle proven. While technologically they may not have been as advanced as some of the western nations, the personnel operating them were professionally very capable and were often complimented for their contribution to the Peace Operations. The withdrawal of Indian Helicopters due to domestic compulsions was reported as a loss of the most powerful military asset.

## **6.2 UN AVIATION ASSESMENT**

The Military aircraft and Civil aircrafts are a key enablers in the achievement of Security Council mandated objectives in Peacekeeping missions and their provisioning remains a challenge. These components also provide Air support for continuity of logistics support even for the transition from peacekeeping to political missions. They are often the sole transportation and logistics lifeline for isolated special political missions.

A report was submitted by Secretary General on Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations in regard to United Nations Air operations in Feb 2011 (A/65/738). The **Aviation assets are provisioned either through commercial contract for Civil aircraft or through Letter of Assist to Member states for Military aircraft**. Following acquisition and deployment of aircraft, mission leadership has responsibility for the full utilization of the air assets and the safety, quality and performance of the air carriers and aviation contingents throughout the term of the related commercial contracts and letters of assist.

The Civil aviation tasks included Transportation which included Troop rotations, Logistics and VIP transport. Further they were also tasked for Observation & monitoring, Aero-medical evacuation, Command and control and Search and rescue. On the other hand the Military aircraft task are as listed above in Table 6.2. An UN Office of Internal Oversight Services report of 2009 brings out following observations with regard to the UN aerial assets<sup>23</sup>:

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
<sup>23</sup> Dorn Walter, Maj. Linden Filip Van Der & Cross Ryan, 2011, UN Aviation: Some Basics

- Highly dispersed theatres of operation in difficult environments, often with limited or no local support
- Significant number of deployed aircraft that can change quickly based on mandate evolution & availability from contributing countries
- Wide range of aircraft origins, variable regulatory regimes in host countries & contracted aircraft operators
- **Lack of a formal integrated peacekeeping aviation strategy**
- **Management framework required to effectively manage air operations missing**
- **Need to increase aircraft utilization, including extending strategic relationship with the Humanitarian Air Service**
- **Air charter acquisition strategy needs development along with procurement procedures**

### **Capacity Gap**

While capacity gap across most of the Peace Operations remains a reality, which was 26 helicopters (16 utility helicopters and 10 attack helicopters) as reported in 2017 peacekeeping, the main reason for this shortfall is the gap financial outlay for these missions and the rising commitment to the Aviation (refer fig 4.3). In April 2014 Secretary- General Guterres decided to launch “an initiative to increase the efficiency in the use of UN air assets,” asking “every mission with any number of dedicated aircraft to systematically analyse and adjust the composition and utilization of its fleet,” with the aim of reducing costs by up to 15%.

**Fig 6.1 : Number of UN Helicopters in Peacekeeping Missions (2017)<sup>24</sup>**  
**Capability Gap**



Capability formulation of military aviation units towards air operations requirements is responsibility of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. They work in coordination with the Department of Operational Support to ensure that force requirements are fulfilled with respect to the provision and capability of military aviation units of troop-contributing countries. Department of Operational Support also ensures that the operational integration of military and civil aviation at the mission level meets the military air support requirements of force commanders. It optimizes utilization of military utility aircraft under letters of assist with troop-contributing countries through mission tasking of the utility helicopters. **Typical military-specific roles include close air support to deployed military formations on the ground, show of force, patrol, observation, troop insertion and extraction, casualty evacuation and medical evacuation and search and rescue (refer table 6.2).** Military utility helicopters in addition have a role in providing mobility for land

<sup>24</sup> Novosseloff Alexandra, 2017, Keeping Peace from Above: Air Assets in UN Peace Operations, International Peace Institute.

forces. When not engaged in military operations, these assets can supplement the aviation support effort of commercially contracted air carriers in the mission to achieve maximum utilization under the terms of the letter of assist. The **letter of assist serves as the formal contractual arrangement** negotiated and concluded between a Member State as a troop-contributing country and the United Nations. It **reflects the force requirement as derived from the military concept of operations to support the mission mandate.** It is articulated by the **Department of Peacekeeping Operations** and outlines the troop-contributing country's responsibilities to the United Nations with respect to the operation and maintenance of the aircraft, necessary qualifications of the aircrew, and the set of tasks the aircraft is permitted to carry out on behalf of the United Nations.

The overall tasking process for all mission aviation assets, including military utility helicopters, is conducted through an integrated mission procedure, using the Air Tasking Order procedure. This integrated, centrally coordinated and managed process is aimed at ensuring responsive, safe and cost-effective aviation support that meets operational requirements and provides for optimal flexibility and responsiveness to the Head of Mission, Force Commander and other component heads in executing their mandated responsibilities.

In this context it has been often said that there has been often obsolete capabilities or limited at best. One of the contributing factor stated has been the commitment gap from the more capable Western Nations. These capability gaps were further compounded with these aviation assets having insufficient interoperability and Command and Control (C2) problems<sup>25</sup>. UN on its part has often blamed these shortcoming to the Troop contributing countries (TCC) "High Risk Aversion" and their view of "Little or no collateral damage permitted".

### **Administrative Gap**

The above two shortfalls were further compounded with certain "Reimbursement issues and complaints", "Slow deployment/employment", "Lack of military air operations doctrine, SOPs" and "Limited military staff capacity in UN HQ New York". UN was also criticised for

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<sup>25</sup> Dorn Walter, Maj. Linden Filip Van Der & Cross Ryan, 2011, UN Aviation: Some Basics

its “Limited outreach to other strategic partners” (e.g., NATO)<sup>26</sup>. The Secretary General’s report on “Administrative and safety arrangements relating to the management of military utility helicopters in peacekeeping operations” in May 2010 ( A/64/768) while admitting that **“Problems with the execution of relevant policies and procedures concerning the use of military utility helicopters remain”** they are the an “exception rather than the rule”, and the United Nations is committed to ensuring that all relevant frameworks are effectively in the field. Towards this he goes on to report that DPO and DOS have **“identified regular and comprehensive training of both civilian and military leadership in missions on aviation safety and management procedures as a priority”**.

### Assessment

There is a dominance of Non Kinetic use of Airpower (Table 6.2) in UN Peace Operations. These are generally backed by a “Robust” Rules of engagement for a Kinetic application of the Airpower as coercive deterrence which should be **perceivable when required**.

**AIRPOWER IN PEACE OPERATIONS IS HIGHLY VISIBILE COMPONENT,**  
due to this inherent characteristic, it’s application would be **DRIVEN MORE BY POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS RATHER THAN MILITARY.** Thus, it is a **STRATEGIC TOOL IN UN OPERATIONS.**

**Q1: Can Airpower Doctrine be reinterpreted in the context of Peacekeeping Operations?**

**Ans: In the context of Peacekeeping Operations , the understanding of the Airpower would have to be reinterpreted specifically for the benefit of Political representatives at UN.**

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<sup>26</sup> Dorn Walter, Maj. Linden Filip Van Der & Cross Ryan, 2011, UN Aviation: Some Basics

### 6.3 QUESTIONNAIRE AND ANALYSIS

The Questionnaire (Annexure 4) was designed to seek information from respondents who had primarily been exposed to Peacekeeping Operations and in specific if they had any experience with utilisation of Air power or awareness to the concept of Airpower. A total of 103 people responded to the questionnaire. A collated sheet is attached along with the questionnaire at Annexure 4.

#### **Observations**

- (1) All 103 respondents were Indian National (one is now a Australian National but when he participated in Peacekeeping Mission he was a Indian National)
- (2) 85.5% had served in Peacekeeping missions.
- (3) 99% were familiar with the concept of Airpower.
- (4) 85.4% had taken part in Peacekeeping Mission.

#### **Amongst the Peacekeepers**

- (5) 95.5% of the respondents were with Military background.
- (6) And 86.2% were part of a contingent and 11.5% were UN Military staff.
- (7) 98.9% agreed that Aerial assets can influence Peacekeeping on ground.
- (8) 92% endorsed the Airpower is essential (77% very essential) in Peacekeeping.
- (9) There was a general disagreement about **“Peacekeeping”** and **“Peace enforcement”** as **distinct** (62.5%) or **Complementary** (35%) .
- (10) 71.6% have taken part in a single Peacekeeping Mission, whereas 27% have taken part in two Peacekeeping missions. (there was one respondent who took part in three).
- (11) 96% respondents had served in Peacekeeping for a year or more.
- (12) 92% have been part of Indian Air Force.
- (13) 63.2% undergo training prior to UN Peacekeeping deployment, whereas 35.6% did not.
- (14) 64.8% underwent training during the Peacekeeping mission, while 33% did not.
- (15) While 91.6% were sensitised about Human Rights during training, there was 8.4% which is either not sure or were not sensitised on Human Rights.



- (16) 100% respondents were familiar with the term Rules of engagement.
- (17) 89.8% responded stating Rules of engagement were Clearly stated, however 10.2% were not sure.
- (18) 81.6% were satisfied with the stated Rules of engagement.
- (19) 100% respondents were familiar with concept of self Defence.
- (20) 92% were familiar with concept of Proportionality, while 8.9% were not.
- (21) While 54.7% admitted that Rules of engagement were specific to the weapon/equipment they used, 33.7% said they were not and 11.6% did not offer a comment.
- (22) 45.5% accepted that Rules of engagement can be interpreted differently by individuals, while 30.7% stated it as a maybe, a 23.9% said that they cannot be interpreted differently.
- (23) 89.8% agreed that the Rules of engagement must be discussed by practitioners, while 9.1% did not agree.
- (24) 90.8% were familiar with the concept of “Force Planning”.
- (25) While 94.3.8% agreed that technology can influence Peacekeeping efforts, 5.7% strongly disagreed.
- (26) 70.1% said area of influence of an air asset can be defined, 29.9% either did not agree or were not sure.
- (27) 59.1% of the respondents had used (fired) a weapon in a Peacekeeping Mission, while rest 40.9% had not.
- (28) 51.5% of these were used to either in defence of UN personnel or equipment, 15.2% was a part of planned mission objective, 18.2% was for other reasons. There was only one response for self-defence.
- (29) While 57.3% said that warning shots were fired, 32.7% either were not sure or they did not.
- (30) 59.3% undertook Night tasks in Peacekeeping, while 39.5% did not.
- (31) 42.9% used a Night Vision device, while 57.1% did not.
- (32) Current Intelligence, Latest Situation report and latest threat perception were the most common briefing points.
- (33) 86.4% responded that there was no aerial threat in the mission.
- (34) 100% of the respondents confirmed that they understood the difference between Armed and Attack helicopter.

- (35) 84.1% felt the need for Armed/ Attack Helicopter, 14.7% were either not sure or did not feel the need.
- (36) 89.8% stated that there were reconnaissance flight in the mission.
- (37) 59.1% undertook reconnaissance flights, while 39.8% did not.
- (38) 86.9% undertook visual search.
- (39) While 42.5% rated the reconnaissance as average, 45.1% said it was satisfactory.
- (40) 76.1% felt lack of effective intelligence, 21.6% did not agree.
- (41) 45% felt that the available intelligence was average for Aerial missions, 34.1% were satisfied.
- (42) While 47.1% did not feel lack of self-defence, 43.7% felt a lack of self-defence, 9.2% were not sure.
- (43) 93.1% respondents confirmed that there was no ground based radar, while 5.7% said that they had .
- (44) Aircraft Guns and Aerial Rockets were the most common Aerial weapon used in by the respondents
- (45) Most of the respondents confirmed that their missions had, Civil helicopters & Military helicopters (also consisting of Attack and Armed Helicopter). They also had Civil and Military Transport aircraft. Only two respondents confirmed that they had fighter aircraft deployed in the mission.
- (46) 77.9% of the respondents said that there were no Air Defence weapons in the mission.
- (47) However, 83.7% responded saying that Air defence weapons were with either Govt force or UN Forces, only 27.9% said that these were with Rebel forces.
- (48) 50% confirmed that they were never fired upon in Peacekeeping mission, 45.3% were fired upon, 4.7% were not sure.
- (49) 45.9% said that there was no threat of escalation when aerial assets were used, 29.4% felt it was there, 24.7% said maybe.
- (50) Aerial communication was average (39.6%) to satisfactory (40.7%), only 19.8% confirmed it as below average.
- (51) 94.1% responded endorsing the time criticality of Aerial requirements in Peacekeeping.
- (52) While 64% said that Aerial assets were used for Psychological impact, 23.3% did not agree and 12.8% said maybe it was used.

- (53) While 80.2% agreed that Aerial assets led to economy of effort, 15.1% were not sure and 4.7% said it did not.
- (54) 67.4% respondents confirmed that they had access to Satellite communication for effective conduct of Aerial missions, while 23.3% persons said they did not and 9.3% were not sure.
- (55) 79.1% confirmed that Aerial assets were fairly effective in preventing conflict during peacekeeping .
- (56) 73.7% confirmed that Aerial assets are effective in intervening in a conflict.
- (57) 75.6% were Aircrew
- (58) Majority of them were associated with Medium Utility Helicopter (54.8%) and Attack Helicopter (48.8%)

### **Assessment**

The questionnaire was mostly responded by persons with good peacekeeping exposure (85.5%) which consisted of either one (71.6%) or two (27%) missions. These Peacekeepers were mostly from with military background (95%) with majority being part of Indian Air Force (92%), in that they were mostly part of the contingent (86.2%), while some were on the Military Staff in the mission (11.5%). Further, most of these respondents were Aircrew (75.6%) amongst which it was primarily Helicopter Aircrew (Medium Utility Helicopter – 54.8% & Attack Helicopter- 48.8%).

It could thus be concluded that the **responses were an adequate representation of the perceptions of Peacekeeping Operations in itself as well as use of Airpower in it.**

### **Assessment on Peacekeeping Operations**

- (a) While Peacekeeping and Peace enforcement are complex concepts, there is a tendency to understand them strictly by their stated definitions or sometime referring to the UN Charter (Chapter VI &Chapter VII). The trend of Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Missions with complex and large number of mandates (including Peace building) makes it difficult for Troops in the field to understand their specific role in the Mission Mandate. Hence it is very **important to ensure that the Letter of Assist (LOA) for the**

**Troop Contributing Countries are properly drafted and the MoUs properly understood.**

- (b) While the pre-deployment training and training during deployment was average (63-64%), the sensitisation on “Human Right”, concept of “Self Defence”, “Proportional response” was high (this could be attributed to many personnel getting deployed for a second time). **The Training during Pre deployment and Post deployment phases could have been better.**
- (c) While all the respondents were familiar with Rules of Engagement and were satisfied with them, however in contrast they (45.5%) stated that these could be interpreted differently by individuals and needed a discussion. Further, a large percentage (33.7%) of respondents confirmed that the Rules of Engagement were not specific to their equipment/force. Hence there is a **need to formulate and ensure that the Rules of engagement are clear and take into account the equipment/force capabilities.**
- (d) Most of the respondents were familiar with the concept of force planning and accepted that Technology could influence Peacekeeping efforts. Hence **Technology must be used as an Force enabler in Peacekeeping Missions and must be factored in when doing force planning.**

#### **Assessment of Airpower in Peacekeeping Operations**

- (a) Most of the respondents confirmed that Aerial assets can intervene and prevent conflicts during peacekeeping and their area influence can be defined. They also agreed that that their usage led to economy of effort and the missions were time critical. It is therefore important that the **force generation for a mission must not only take into account the capacity and capability required from the Aerial assets but also their deployment/re-deployment strategies so as to use them effectively. LOAs and MoUs must reflect/capture these strategies adequately.**

- (b) While some agreed that there is no threat of escalation (45.9%) when aerial assets were used, there were some who felt it could lead to escalation (29.4%) and others (24.7%) who were maybe. Further, 64% respondents confirmed use of Aerial assets for Psychological impact (Non Kinetic). Thus **use of Aerial assets must be weighed in judiciously at the highest level in the mission, in view of the local sensitivities and consent of the Parties to the Peace.**
- (c) While some (59%) of the respondents fired a weapon during the mission, it was mostly for defending the UN personnel or assets. Only 15% time they were used as a pre-planned mission objective. Nearly 50% of the respondents confirmed that they were never fired upon, however some of them (45.3%) were fired upon. But the aerial weapons were not fired back in self-defence (only one response for Self Defence) . The most prevalent aerial weapons were Guns and Rockets. Some respondent did indicate presence of bombs and missiles, however there is no confirmation of their usage. Thus, **use of Aerial weapons would be more reactionary and less of a pre-planned objective. In addition chances of using an aerial weapon for self-defence is unlikely in Peacekeeping missions. Further, because the use is going to be more reactionary, the stated Rules of Engagement must be “Robust” and clear.**
- (d) Not all aerial weapons usage were preceded by firing of warning shots.(only 57.3% times warning shots fired). Once again it re-emphasises the **importance of relevant Rules of Engagement in Peacekeeping Operations.**
- (e) Most of the UN Peacekeeping missions undertaken in the recent years did not have any Aerial threat (ONUC is an exception). In addition there were no Air defence weapons (77.9%), however 83.7% respondents indicated presence of some Air Defence weapon with UN Forces or Govt Troops and 27.9% indicated that these were available with rebel forces. The availability of any ground radar was not there. Most of the respondents also confirmed that these UN Peace operations primarily consisted of helicopters and

transport aircraft with only two respondents confirming presence of Fighter aircraft. Presence of Air Defence weapons pose a major threat to slow and low moving platforms, like the helicopters and to some extent the transport. While lack of self defence capability was split (47.1% did not feel lack vs 43.7% felt the lack), it is a major cause for concern. While most proliferated and mobile air defence weapon is a shoulder fired heat seeking missile (Stinger/ Mistral/Igla), their presence in conflicts where UN peacekeeping is deployed can be discerned through international arms control and intelligence. However another low cost weapon, the Rocket Propelled Grenade and a medium machine gun effectively could also be equally disastrous for these Aerial assets. Military aerial assets are supposed to be used in higher threat levels as compared to their civil counter parts, hence **self defence capability of military aerial assets is a minimum requirement.** However, **display of self defence capability can be based upon the prevalent threat scenario.**

- (f) The mission brief for aerial missions mostly included current intelligence, situation report and the latest threat perception. Most respondents (76.1%) felt lack of effective intelligence and rated the available intelligence as average (45%), though some of them were satisfied also (34.1%). Reconnaissance and intelligence complement each other, and some of the respondents undertook reconnaissance flights (59%) which was primarily restricted to visual search. Further the quality of the reconnaissance was average (42.5%) to satisfactory (45.1%). **Intelligence is a pre requisite for efficient operations and reconnaissance is one of the important tools to gather it. The need for effective reconnaissance needs strengthening. The reconnaissance should not be limited to visual band but also others like Infrared & electronic.**
- (g) Night Operations capability in Peace Operations are a necessity of the hour, it cannot be procured/acquired on a short notice. Many respondents (59.3%) undertook Night operations in Peacekeeping with most of them having used a Night Vision Device (42.9%). Persistence of Peace efforts is a Psychological effect which cannot be ignored, towards this Night capability

is a tremendous enabler. Hence, **Aerial operations at night must be encouraged in Peacekeeping and capability to use Night Vision systems like Night vision Googles must be acquired.**

- (h) Most of the Military helicopters can be armed, either for self-defence or for supporting troops on ground. While Attack helicopters are dedicated by design for use of Weapons only (with the exception of Mi 25s), use of Armed Helicopters has not been exploited in UN Peacekeeping operations. Most of the respondents understand this difference and felt the need for an Attack or Armed helicopter. However as UN Peacekeeping procurement policy made a clear distinction between Attack helicopter and Utility helicopter without recognise the Armed Helicopter as an option, all the LOAs of the period under survey did not have this mentioned. Since then there has been a change. However, **UN Peacekeeping Operations must recognise the capability of an Armed Helicopter and ensure that this acquired with all Military helicopters (even if it's meant as an self defence capability).**
- (i) Aerial Communications are a major challenge in all the Peacekeeping Missions. Availability of reliable and Range unrestricted systems like satellite communication though prevalent (67.4% respondents) needs more proliferation in all Peacekeeping operations. The communications are not only important coordinating the missions but are also critical for safety. In the recent missions UN aviation wing has been strengthened on this aspect. Hence, **Unrestricted range capable reliable Communications for Aerial assets must continue be a priority in UN Peacekeeping missions.**

**Q2: Is Airpower in Peacekeeping Operations Sub optimally utilised?**

**Ans: While there were certain capacity, capability and administrative gaps for Aviation assets for the period during which Indian Air Force was actively involved in Peacekeeping Missions, however at field missions there has been no shortfalls in its applications.**

**Q3: Were the Indian Air Force assets effectively utilised?**

**Ans: The IAF assets were very effectively used in these missions in spite of certain administrative gaps in these missions.**



## CHAPTER 7

### RECOMMENDATIONS

As we approach the end of first quarter of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there has been noticeable rise in Regionalism at the cost of waning interest in Globalism. While the reasons for this is beyond the scope of the present study, its impact on UN Peacekeeping is visible with increased presence of Regional Military forces as a part of the UN Peace Operations, ( UNAMID: African Union – United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur 2007).

While “**Brahimi Report**” in 2000 did flag issues like **role of regional responses to conflicts; a strong focus on robust operations; and critical non-military roles played by civilian and police components in providing long-term recovery and peacebuilding**, the **High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)** prioritised **Pursuit of political settlements, Protection of civilians, Tailored and appropriate responses, Accountability, Global-regional partnerships and Renewed focus on prevention and mediation**. However one of the major impediment of these Peacekeeping Missions has been their inability to address the **complex needs of the mandates and the reality on the ground**.

Many of these operational and political challenges reflect the threats which continue to effect the Peacekeeping missions which are **changing nature of conflict, complex mandates and peacebuilding challenges, along with planning, partnerships, human rights and the protection of civilians**.

The “**Brahimi report**” as well as the HIPPO did bring in certain reforms specifically to strengthen strategic analysis and planning; improvement in training; performance monitoring, and accountability; enhance situational awareness and protection of personnel; deepen partnerships with regional and sub regional organizations and reorganise UN headquarters for field support and political oversight of peace operations. These **reforms have shown signs of improvement** like intelligence and reconnaissance has been enhanced with deployment of Unmanned Aerial systems (UAS). However, these **reforms are**

**technical, incremental and slow and do not reflect in strategic goals of the missions which are politically driven.**

In this context the A4P agenda sets the way forward for UN Peace Operations. The Indian Govt statement in Sept 2018 endorsed the Declaration of Shared Commitments on Peacekeeping. It also welcomed the development of the 'Integrated Performance Policy Framework', covering all the stakeholders while emphasising the need to address the insistence by some on caveats in deployment. India continues to contribute troops to UN Peacekeeping operations whether Military or Police. In addition it has been at training and helping capacity building efforts of peacekeepers worldwide, especially for African partners and women peacekeepers through the efforts of Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK) in New Delhi.

As for Indian Air Force, it had stopped contributing to UN Peacekeeping efforts in form of Equipment ( primarily Helicopters) from 2011 and at present is maintain only three officers as Military staff at UN Peacekeeping mission HQ of UNMISS at Juba in South Sudan. Since its last participation in UN Peace Operations, many reforms have been implemented and the Military Aviation section has issued Guidelines in form of Guidelines.

The decision to contribute IAF equipment in UN Peacekeeping missions is driven by the need of UN and acceptance by Government of India. In this context availability of these resources for UN task is the responsibility of IAF through Ministry of Defence. The study is not poised to answer “whether Indian Air Force should participate in UN Peacekeeping Missions”, however it intends to suggest the following recommendations for any future possible Indian Air Force contribution to UN Peacekeeping missions in terms of equipment and personnel:

### **Training**

- 1. In future all the personnel of IAF must undertake training under the guidance of CUNPK before getting deployed.**

2. In addition **IAF must develop its own training programme**, to especially address the issues with regard to **application of Airpower in Peacekeeping Operations**.
3. It **must encourage research/studies on the subject of “Airpower in Peacekeeping Operations” at Defence Academic institutions** for Higher Studies like Defence Services Staff college, College of Air Warfare and National Defence college.
4. **Centre for UN Peacekeeping at New Delhi must regularly interact with IAF personnel with UN Peacekeeping experience** to ensure that their own training programmes are aligned especially in context of application of Airpower. It must also conduct training exercises (table top) which bring out the advantageous and short comings of usage of Airpower.
5. **Training on Rules of Engagement for Aerial assets specifically in UN Peacekeeping operations need to developed** by Dept of UN Peace Operations.

#### **Doctrinal/Policy**


6. The UN **“Peacekeeping Capability Readiness system” (PCRS) needs to understood by IAF staff and the Higher Defence organisation** within India to ascertain whether IAF assets could be offered under this scheme to UN Peace Operations.
7. **Deployment of Composite Air Units** consisting of Medium Utility Helicopter (Armed), Unmanned Aerial System and if required Attack Helicopter with a Brigade staff (when required) could be considered under PCRS.
8. **UN Department of Peace Operations could consider developing their own strategy/doctrine on use of Airpower in UN Peace Operations.** (Different from Military Aviation Unit Guidelines).

9. The Letter of Assist (LOA) and MOUs must be comprehensive while retaining flexibility of employment/deployment of Aerial assets.

**Operational**

10. The Military staff in a Peacekeeping mission must regularly review the effect of using Airpower and realign their employment/deployment.
11. The Military staff and the Military aviation units in a mission must discuss the Rules of Engagement regularly/constantly so as to understand the compulsions of each other in employment.
12. Technology for capability development for Aviation assets must be exploited as this act as force enablers. Towards this, Night Vision Devices, Satellite communication and imagery, Reconnaissance pods, Unmanned Aerial systems etc must be explored for their availability for deployment in these Peace operations.

**Table 7.1: NUMBER OF UN TROOPS vs INDIAN CONTRIBUTION**



(Source: Data collated from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data>)

## **CONCLUSION**

The concept of UN led Peacekeeping is at critical juncture in history where its credibility is under question. The contemporary conflicts are no more bounded by geography. They have a regional spread, with not only an increase in violence, but asymmetric and cyber threats becoming an integral part of the Hybrid Conflict. The reducing number of troops (Table 7.1) in peacekeeping operations is an indicator of decreasing commitment by the member states to this noble cause. While many reforms have been undertaken to operationalise their mandates there is a need to empower the Field Missions. These Mandates must be supported by means which are rationalised and regularly reviewed to ensure that “Mission Creep” does not set in and the mandate is sustained.

Aviation assets are one such means which could help UN Peace Operations retain their credibility through a well thought out capability generation. However use of the Aviation assets as a conflict management tool in the context of Peace Operations needs a clear understanding of their constraints and deterrent effects. The use of term “Airpower” is often misrepresented when associated with only “Kinetic” means of use of Aviation assets, hence there is a need to recognise the “Non Kinetic” application of Airpower and the associated deterrent effects.

Indian Air Force contribution to Peacekeeping Operations has been lauded by many for its professionalism and commitment to the mission mandate. The IAF personnel had acquired considerable experience and expertise in these missions, however this is fast eroding having not participated in any Peace Operations for nearly a decade now.

India has been the founding member of United Nation and it has made use of UN peacekeeping across the world to ensure a political transition to peace. It has also augmented peacebuilding activities by encouraging and mentoring the strengthening of national governance institutions. Indian troops also have been leading the ground level response to new challenges. while its contribution to Peacekeeping has been one of the largest, its troop contributions over the last decade is reducing (Table 7.1). The reason maybe the denial by the permanent members of the Security Council to participate in "decisions of the Security Council” concerning the deployment of her troops, as provided for in Article 44 of the UN Charter.

In such a scenario, if India's continued commitment to World Peace has to make its mark, then it must commit some of its Aviation assets at some point in the near future. Towards this it could consider the extending the its current commitment under UN **"Peacekeeping Capability Readiness system" (PCRS) to a Aviation Unit.**

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## Annexure - 1

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### **CHAPTER VI: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES**

#### **Article 33**

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

#### **Article 34**

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

#### **Article 35**

Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

#### **Article 36**

The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

**Article 37**

Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

**Article 38**

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

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## **CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION**

### **Article 39**

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

### **Article 40**

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

### **Article 41**

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

### **Article 42**

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

**Article 43**

All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

**Article 44**

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

**Article 45**

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

**Article 46**

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

**Article 47**

There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of

international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

#### **Article 48**

The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

#### **Article 49**

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

#### **Article 50**


If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

#### **Article 51**

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to

the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

# Annexure - 2




**Annexure - 3**

## DEPARTMENTS OF POLITICAL AND PEACEBUILDING AFFAIRS AND PEACE OPERATIONS

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND PEACEBUILDING AFFAIRS**

**DEPARTMENT OF PEACE OPERATIONS**



DPPA - DPO Information Management Unit – Last updated: January 2019



# QUESTIONNAIRE

&

# RESPONSE

(Collated)

## **Airpower in UN Peacekeeping Operations: A Review of Indian Air Force employment and its efficacy**

The concept of Peacekeeping is regarded as a measure to be taken in aftermath of war (conflict) in order to assist the implementation of peace agreement. It also addresses issues of conflict resolution and a peaceful settlement of conflict. In addition, it has also been used to for conflict prevention. Over the years, the concept of Peacekeeping has been modified and expanded significantly. The Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and VII (Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of Peace, and Acts of Aggression) are at the core of UN Charter to maintain Peace.

The spectrum of conflict, when derived on the basis of level of Violence vs level of Combat, places the Peace support operations on the lower end, which is typically referred as Spectrum of Peace as against the spectrum of combat. Peacekeeping is a part of Peace support Operations, which also includes Peace enforcement, Humanitarian, Peacebuilding, Peace-making and Conflict Prevention operations. These are generally undertaken during unstable peace conditions with an aim to convert it into a stable peace condition. Thus these operations would typically require a robust defence capability with a latent offensive ability.

Air power was born in the crucible of World War I, but came of age in the conflagration of World War II. One of the Modern doctrines defines Air Power as "the ability to project power from the air and space to influence the behaviour of people or the

course of events." The fluidity and flexibility with which air power can be employed and the long ranges over which it can operate, along with the fact that it does not occupy terrain as surface forces do, make the dynamics of air power employment tactically and strategically distinctive.

Typically, Air power has often been viewed as an Offensive option, yet at the strategic level Airpower has often favoured the defence, a pattern that began in World War I, where the massive defensive power of artillery was multiplied by aerial observation, and reconnaissance aircraft revealed enemy forces massing for attacks in time for defenders to shift forces to meet them.

While Peace has to be achieved on ground, however contextualising Peacekeeping as a prerogative of land forces operations entirely would be parochial. The role of Aerial Assets (Air Power) in Peacekeeping has been predominantly in support of the efforts underway on "Terra Firma". This very approach could lead to an employment philosophy which is either restrictive in nature or ineffective in applicability. Hence, there is a need to examine the Air Power doctrine in context of Peacekeeping operations.

In view of this, the Hypothesis is: Are Aerial assets in UN Peacekeeping operations Sub Optimally Utilised?

In this context, it is proposed that a study of employment of Indian Air Force assets specifically in various Peacekeeping missions may postulate certain guidelines for future employment of Air Power in UN Peacekeeping missions.

While the study intends to analyse Indian Air Force employment in Peacekeeping, it would also attempt to study and compare them with the current practices of UN Peacekeeping Aerial assets.

Further this questionnaire can be responded by anybody whether associated with Aerial assets or otherwise, Military or civilian, Peacekeeper or not.....

**\*Required**

1. Email address \* \_\_\_\_\_
2. Request Nationality \* \_\_\_\_\_

3. Are you familiar with the concept of "Air Power" *\*(Mark only one oval)*.
- Yes
  - No
  - Not Sure
4. Have you been a part of an UN Peacekeeping Mission *\*(Mark only one oval)*.
- Yes *(Skip to question 5)*
  - No *(Skip to question 62)*

## Peacekeeper

This section is primarily designed for respondents with Peacekeeping experience. Only few Questions are mandatory.

5. You Participated in UN peacekeeping as a *\*(Mark only one oval)*.
- Military
  - Civilian
  - Police
  - Other \_\_\_\_\_
6. If Military, Check one of the below *(Mark only one oval)*.
- Observer
  - Staff
  - Contingent Member
  - Not Applicable
7. If Civilian, Check one of the below *(Mark only one oval)*.
- With Military background
  - No Military Background
  - Not Applicable
8. If Police, Check one of the below *(Mark only one oval)*.
- Observer
  - Staff
  - Contingent Member
  - Not Applicable

9. Can Aerial assets influence Peacekeeping on ground \* *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Yes
  - No
  - Maybe
10. How essential are Aerial assets in UN Peacekeeping efforts \* *(Mark only one oval.)*
- |               |     |     |     |  |                |
|---------------|-----|-----|-----|--|----------------|
| Not Essential |     |     |     |  | Very essential |
| O 1           | O 2 | O 3 | O 4 |  | O 5            |
11. Definition of "Peacekeeping" and "Peace enforcement" is *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Synonymous
  - Complementary
  - Distinct
  - Not sure
12. How many UN Peacekeeping Missions have you participated in (Different Missions) *(Mark only one oval.)*
- 1
  - 2
  - 3
  - > 3
  - None
13. How much is your total UN Peacekeeping experience (in months)\_\_\_\_\_
14. Have you served in Indian Air Force *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Yes
  - No
  - No Comments
15. Have you served along with Indian Air Force *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Yes
  - No
  - No Comments
16. Did you undergo any training on Peacekeeping before participating in a UN Peacekeeping mission *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Yes
  - No

- O Not sure
17. Did you undergo any training during a Peacekeeping mission (*Mark only one oval.*)
- O Yes
- O No
- O Maybe
18. During the Training on UN Peacekeeping were you Sensitised about "Human Rights" (*Mark only one oval.*)
- O Yes
- O No
- O Maybe
19. Are you familiar with the term "Rules of Engagement" (RoE) \* (*Mark only one oval.*)
- O Yes
- O No
- O Maybe
20. Were RoE during the UN Peacekeeping Mission clearly stated (*Mark only one oval.*)
- O Yes
- O No
- O Maybe
21. Rate the stated Rules of Engagement given to you (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Bad Very Good
- O 1 O 2 O 3 O 4 O 5
22. Are you familiar with the concept "Self Defence" \* (*Mark only one oval.*)
- O Yes
- O No
- O Maybe
23. Are you familiar with the concept of "Proportionality" in context of RoE (*Mark only one oval.*)
- O Yes
- O No
- O Not Sure
24. Were RoE specific to the weapon/equipment/ used by you (*Mark only one oval.*)

- Yes
  - No
  - No Comments
25. Could the stated RoE be interpreted differently by individuals \* *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Yes
  - No
  - Maybe
26. Should stated RoE be debated/discussed by practitioners \* *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Yes
  - No
  - No Comment
27. Are you familiar with the concept of "Force Planning" *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Yes
  - No
  - Maybe
28. "Technology can influence Peacekeeping efforts" \* *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Strongly disagree
  - Disagree
  - Neutral
  - Agree
  - Strongly agree
29. Can Area of Influence of any Air asset be defined *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Yes
  - No
  - Not Sure
30. Have you or personnel associated with you ever fired an Aerial weapon during the UN peacekeeping Mission *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Yes
  - No
  - No Comments
31. Weapon was fired under following circumstances *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Self Defence
  - In support of UN Military personnel

- Protect UN assets
  - Protect Civilians
  - As a planned Mission objective
  - Other Reasons
32. Were any warning shots fired (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Yes
  - No
  - Not sure
33. Did you undertake Peacekeeping tasks at Night (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Yes
  - No
  - No Comments
34. Did you use any Night Vision Devices (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Yes
  - No
35. Prior to undertaking a Peacekeeping Military Task, the mission brief included (*Tick all that apply.*)
- Current Intelligence report
  - Latest Sitrep
  - Latest visuals
  - Latest Threat perception
  - Other \_\_\_\_\_
36. Was there any Aerial threat in your mission (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Yes
  - No
  - Not sure
37. Do you understand the difference between Armed and Attack Helicopter (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Yes
  - No
  - Not Sure
38. Did you ever feel the need for an Armed or Attack Helicopter (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Yes
  - No

- May Be  
 Not Applicable
39. Were there any reconnaissance flights undertaken in your mission (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Yes  
 No  
 Not Aware
40. Did you undertake any reconnaissance flights (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Yes  
 No  
 No Comment
41. The reconnaissance was based on (*Tick all that apply.*)
- Visual search  
 Sensor based search  
 Not Applicable  
 Other \_\_\_\_\_
42. Rate the reconnaissance by its quality (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Very poor Very good  
 1  2  3  4  5
43. Did you feel lack of effective Intelligence (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Yes  
 No  
 No Comment
44. How relevant was the available intelligence for Aerial missions (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Totally irrelevant Very Relevant  
 1  2  3  4  5
45. Did you ever feel lack of self defence capability during the UN Peacekeeping mission (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Yes



- No  
 Maybe
46. Was there any ground based Radar deployed/available in your Mission (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Yes  
 No  
 Maybe
47. Aerial Weapons in your Peacekeeping Mission consisted of (*Tick all that apply.*)
- Aircraft Guns  
 Rockets  
 Bombs  
 Missiles  
 Other \_\_\_\_\_
48. The Aviations Assets in your UN Peacekeeping mission included (*Tick all that apply.*)
- Civil Helicopters  
 Military Helicopters  
 Military Armed Helicopters  
 Attack Helicopters  
 Civil Transport Aircraft  
 Military Transport Aircraft  
 Fighter Aircraft
49. Were there any Air Defence weapons in your mission (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Yes  
 No  
 Maybe
50. The Air Defence Weapons were in possession of (*Tick all that apply.*)
- UN Forces  
 Government Forces  
 Rebel Forces
51. Have you ever been fired upon during a UN Peacekeeping mission (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Yes

- No  
 No Comment
52. Was there ever a fear of escalation if Aerial assets were used offensively (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Yes  
 No  
 Maybe
53. How was the Aerial Communication Network in your mission (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Very Poor Very Good  
 1  2  3  4  5
54. How time critical are Aerial requirements in Peacekeeping operations (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Not Critical Very Critical  
 1  2  3  4  5
55. Were the Aerial assets ever used for Psychological impact only (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Yes  
 No  
 Maybe
56. Did use of Aerial Assets lead to Economy of Effort (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Yes  
 No  
 Maybe
57. Did you have access to any Satellite Communication equipment for effective conduct of Aerial Missions (*Mark only one oval.*)
- Yes  
 No  
 Not sure
58. How effective are Aerial assets in preventing a conflict during peacekeeping (*Mark only one oval.*)

Not at all Effective Very Effective  
 1  2  3  4  5

59. How effective are Aerial assets in intervention during a conflict during peacekeeping (*Mark only one oval.*)

Not at all Effective Very Effective  
 1  2  3  4  5

60. Were you a part of Aircrew in UN Peacekeeping (*Mark only one oval.*)

- Yes
- No
- No Comment

61. Type of Aircraft or Helicopter associated with (*Tick all that apply.*)

- Light Utility Helicopter
- Medium Utility Helicopter
- Heavy Cargo Helicopter
- Attack Helicopter
- None
- Light Aircraft
- Tactical Transport
- Not Applicable
- Other: \_\_\_\_\_

*Skip to question 78*

## Non Peacekeeper

Respondents with no Peacekeeping exposure/experience may kindly endorse their responses here

62. Can Aerial assets influence Peacekeeping on ground \* (*Mark only one oval.*)

- Yes

- No  
 Maybe
63. Would you consider Aviation assets essential component in UN Peacekeeping mission \* *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Yes  
 No  
 Not sure
64. How essential are Aerial assets in UN Peacekeeping efforts *(Mark only one oval.)*
- |               |     |     |     |  |                |
|---------------|-----|-----|-----|--|----------------|
| Not Essential |     |     |     |  | Very essential |
| O 1           | O 2 | O 3 | O 4 |  | O 5            |
65. Definition of "Peacekeeping" and "Peace enforcement" is *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Synonymous  
 Complementary  
 Distinct  
 Not sure
66. Are you familiar with the term "Rules of Engagement" (RoE) \* *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Yes  
 No  
 Maybe
67. Are you familiar with the concept "Self Defence" \* *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Yes  
 No  
 Maybe
68. Are you familiar with the concept of "Proportionality" in context of RoE *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Yes  
 No  
 Not Sure
69. Could the stated RoE be interpreted differently by individuals \* *(Mark only one oval.)*

- Yes  
 No  
 Maybe
70. Should stated RoE be debated/discussed by practitioners \* *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Yes  
 No  
 No Comment
71. Are you familiar with the concept of "Force Planning" *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Yes  
 No  
 Maybe
72. Can Technology influence Peacekeeping efforts \* *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Strongly disagree  
 Disagree  
 Neutral  
 Agree  
 Strongly agree
73. Can Area of Influence of any Air asset be defined *(Mark only one oval.)*
- True  
 False  
 Not Sure
74. Do you understand the difference between Armed and Attack Helicopter )*Mark only one oval.)*
- Yes  
 No  
 Not Sure
75. Does use of Aerial Assets lead to Economy of Effort *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Yes  
 No  
 Maybe
76. How effective are Aerial assets in preventing a conflict during peacekeeping *(Mark only one oval.)*
- Not at all Effective Very Effective

O 1

O 2

O 3

O 4

O 5

77. How effective are Aerial assets in intervention during a conflict during peacekeeping (*Mark only one oval.*)

Not at all Effective

Very Effective

O 1

O 2

O 3

O 4

O 5

*Skip to question 78*

## Air Power in Peacekeeping Operations

Kindly annotate your thoughts on the subject(If you wish)

78. Comments

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| <u>No.</u> | <u>Question</u>  | <u>No of Responses</u> | <u>Response</u>     |             |         |          |
|------------|--|------------------------|---------------------|-------------|---------|----------|
| 1          | <b>Email Address</b>   |                        |                     |             |         |          |
| 2          | <b>Nationality</b>   | 103                    | Indian              | Australian* |         |          |
|            |  |                        | 102                 | 1           | *Ex IAF |          |
| 3          | <b>Familiarity with "Air Power"</b>                          | 103                    | Yes                 | Not Sure    |         |          |
|            |  |                        | 102                 | 1           |         |          |
| 4          | <b>Part of UN Peacekeeping</b>                               | 103                    | Yes                 | No          |         |          |
|            |  |                        | 88                  | 15          |         |          |
| 5          | <b>Participated in UN peacekeeping as</b>                    | 103                    | Military            | Civilian    |         |          |
|            |  |                        | 88                  | 15          |         |          |
| 6          | <b>Military</b>  | 88                     | Contingent          | Observer    | Staff   | Civilian |
|            |  |                        | 75                  | 2           | 10      | 1        |
| 7          | <b>Civilian</b>  | 1                      | Military Background |             |         |          |
|            |  |                        | 1                   |             |         |          |
| 8          | <b>If Police, Check one of the below</b>                     | 0                      |                     |             |         |          |
| 9          | <b>Can Aerial assets influence on Peacekeeping on ground</b> | 88                     | Yes                 | No          | Maybe   |          |
|            |  |                        | 87                  | 1           | 0       |          |

|    |   |    |            |               |          |          |      |     |    |    |    |    |    |  |
|----|---|----|------------|---------------|----------|----------|------|-----|----|----|----|----|----|--|
| 10 | How essential are Aerial assets in UN Peacekeeping efforts                      | 88 | 1          | 2             | 3        | 4        | 5    |     |    |    |    |    |    |  |
|    |   |    |            | 1             | 6        | 13       | 68   |     |    |    |    |    |    |  |
| 11 | Definition of "Peacekeeping" and "Peace enforcement" is                         | 88 | Synonymous | Complementary | Distinct | Not sure |      |     |    |    |    |    |    |  |
|    |   |    | 2          | 31            | 55       | 0        |      |     |    |    |    |    |    |  |
| 12 | How many UN Peacekeeping Missions have you participated in (Different Missions) | 88 | 1          | 2             | 3        | >3       | None |     |    |    |    |    |    |  |
|    |   |    | 63         | 24            | 1        | 0        | 0    |     |    |    |    |    |    |  |
| 13 | How much is your total UN Peacekeeping experience (in months)                   | 87 | 7          | 9             | 11       | 12       | 13   | 14  | 18 | 19 | 20 | 23 | 24 |  |
|    |   |    | 1          | 1             | 2        | 31       | 16   | 8   | 3  | 3  | 2  | 1  | 5  |  |
|    |   |    | 25         | 26            | 27       | 30       | 58   | 168 |    |    |    |    |    |  |
|    |   |    | 5          | 2             | 3        | 2        | 1    | 1   |    |    |    |    |    |  |
| 14 | Have you served in Indian Air Force   | 88 | Yes        | No            | No       | Comments |      |     |    |    |    |    |    |  |
|    |   |    | 81         | 7             | 0        |          |      |     |    |    |    |    |    |  |
| 15 | Have you served along with Indian Air Force                                     | 7  | Yes        | No            | No       | Comments |      |     |    |    |    |    |    |  |
|    |   |    | 5          | 1             | 1        |          |      |     |    |    |    |    |    |  |



|    |  |    |     |    |          |    |   |
|----|--|----|-----|----|----------|----|---|
| 16 | Did you undergo any training on Peacekeeping before participating in a UN Peacekeeping mission | 87 | Yes | No | Not Sure | NA |   |
|    |  |    | 55  | 31 | 1        | 1  |   |
| 17 | Did you undergo any training during a Peacekeeping mission                                     | 88 | Yes | No | Maybe    | NA |   |
|    |  |    | 57  | 29 | 2        | 0  |   |
| 18 | During the Training on UN Peacekeeping were you Sensitised about "Human Rights"                | 88 | Yes | No | Maybe    | NA |   |
|    |  |    | 76  | 4  | 3        | 5  |   |
| 19 | Are you familiar with the term "Rules of Engagement" (RoE)                                     | 88 | Yes | No | Maybe    | NA |   |
|    |  |    | 88  | 0  | 0        | 0  |   |
| 20 | Were RoE during the UN Peacekeeping Mission clearly stated                                     | 88 | Yes | No | Maybe    | NA |   |
|    |  |    | 79  | 4  | 5        |    |   |
| 21 | Rate the stated Rules of   | 87 | 1   | 2  | 3        | 4  | 5 |

|    |  | Engagement given to you |                   |          |                |       |                |
|----|--|-------------------------|-------------------|----------|----------------|-------|----------------|
|    |  |                         | 1                 | 3        | 13             | 47    | 24             |
| 22 | Are you familiar with the concept "Self Defence"                         | 88                      | Yes               | No       | Maybe          | NA    |                |
|    |  |                         | 88                | 0        | 0              | 0     |                |
| 23 | Are you familiar with the concept of "Proportionality" in context of RoE | 88                      | Yes               | No       | Not Sure       | NA    |                |
|    |  |                         | 82                | 3        | 3              | 0     |                |
| 24 | Were RoE specific to the weapon/equipment/ used by you                   | 86                      | Yes               | No       | No<br>Comments | NA    |                |
|    |  |                         | 47                | 29       | 10             | 2     |                |
| 25 | Could the stated RoE be interpreted differently by individuals           | 88                      | Yes               | No       | Maybe          | NA    |                |
|    |  |                         | 21                | 27       | 40             | 0     |                |
| 26 | Should stated RoE be debated/discussed by practitioners                  | 88                      | Yes               | No       | No<br>Comments | NA    |                |
|    |  |                         | 79                | 8        | 1              | 0     |                |
| 27 | Are you familiar with the concept of "Force Planning"                    | 88                      | Yes               | No       | Maybe          | NA    |                |
|    |  |                         | 79                | 5        | 3              | 1     |                |
| 28 | "Technology can influence  | 88                      | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neutral        | Agree | Strongly Agree |

**Peacekeeping efforts"**

|    |  |    |              |                           |                   |                   |             |       |     |
|----|--|----|--------------|---------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|-------|-----|
|    |  |    | 5            | 0                         | 0                 | 33                | 50          |       |     |
| 29 | <b>Can Area of Influence of any Air asset be defined</b>   | 87 | Yes          | No                        | Not Sure          | NA                |             |       |     |
|    |  |    | 61           | 18                        | 8                 | 1                 |             |       |     |
| 30 | <b>Have you or personnel associated with you ever fired a Aerial weapon during the UN peacekeeping Mission</b> | 88 | Yes          | No                        | No Comments       | NA                |             |       |     |
|    |  |    | 62           | 36                        | 0                 | 0                 |             |       |     |
| 31 | <b>Weapon was fired under following circumstances</b>  | 66 | Self Defence | In Support of UN Mil Pers | Protect UN Assets | Protect Civilians | Mission Obj | Other |     |
|    |  |    | 1            | 31                        | 3                 | 9                 | 10          | 12    |     |
| 32 | <b>Were any warning shots fired</b>  | 75 | Yes          | No                        | Not Sure          | NA                |             |       |     |
|    |  |    | 43           | 14                        | 18                | 13                |             |       |     |
| 33 | <b>Did you undertake Peacekeeping tasks at Night</b>   | 86 | Yes          | No                        | No Comments       | NA                |             |       |     |
|    |  |    | 51           | 34                        | 1                 | 2                 |             |       |     |
| 34 | <b>Did you use any Night Vision Devices</b>  | 84 | Yes          | No                        |                   | NA                |             |       |     |
|    |  |    | 48           | 36                        |                   | 2                 |             |       |     |
| 35 | <b>Prior to undertaking a</b>  | 86 | Current Int  | Latest Sitrep             | Latest Visual     | Latest Threat     | Other       | All   | N/A |

**Peacekeeping  
Military Task, the  
mission brief  
included**

|    |   |    | 70            | 56                  | 9              | 52    | 2 | 1 | 2 |
|----|---|----|---------------|---------------------|----------------|-------|---|---|---|
| 36 | <b>Was there any Aerial threat in your mission</b>                          | 88 | Yes           | No                  | Not Sure       | NA    |   |   |   |
|    |   |    | 9             | 76                  | 3              |       |   |   |   |
| 37 | <b>Do you understand the difference between Armed and Attack Helicopter</b> | 88 | Yes           | No                  | Not Sure       | NA    |   |   |   |
|    |   |    | 88            | 0                   | 0              | 0     |   |   |   |
| 38 | <b>Did you ever feel the need for an Armed or Attack Helicopter</b>         | 88 | Yes           | No                  | Maybe          | NA    |   |   |   |
|    |   |    | 74            | 9                   | 4              | 1     |   |   |   |
| 39 | <b>Were there any reconnaissance flights undertaken in your mission</b>     | 88 | Yes           | No                  | Not Aware      | NA    |   |   |   |
|    |   |    | 79            | 7                   | 2              | 0     |   |   |   |
| 40 | <b>Did you undertake any reconnaissance flights</b>                         | 88 | Yes           | No                  | No Comment     | NA    |   |   |   |
|    |   |    | 52            | 35                  | 1              | other |   |   |   |
| 41 | <b>The reconnaissance was based on</b>                                      | 84 | Visual Search | Sensor based Search | Not Applicable | Other |   |   |   |

|    |  |    |               |         |         |          |       |
|----|--|----|---------------|---------|---------|----------|-------|
|    |  |    | 73            | 17      | 6       | 1        |       |
| 42 | Rate the reconnaissance by its quality   | 80 | 1             | 2       | 3       | 4        | 5     |
|    |  |    | 2             | 8       | 34      | 29       | 7     |
| 43 | Did you feel lack of effective Intelligence  | 88 | Yes           | No      | No      | NA       |       |
|    |  |    |               |         | Comment |          |       |
|    |  |    | 67            | 19      | 2       | 0        |       |
| 44 | How relevant was the available intelligence for Aerial missions                      | 85 | 1             | 2       | 3       | 4        | 5     |
|    |  |    | 1             | 10      | 45      | 20       | 9     |
| 45 | Did you ever feel lack of self defence capability during the UN Peacekeeping mission | 87 | Yes           | No      | Maybe   | NA       |       |
|    |  |    | 38            | 41      | 8       | 1        |       |
| 46 | Was there any ground based Radar deployed/available in your Mission                  | 87 | Yes           | No      | Maybe   | NA       |       |
|    |  |    | 81            | 5       | 1       | 1        |       |
| 47 | Aerial Weapons in your Peacekeeping Mission consisted of                             | 76 | Aircraft Guns | Rockets | Bombs   | Missiles | Other |
|    |  |    | 64            | 61      | 4       | 10       |       |

|    |   |    |                   |             |                 |    |                    |                  |                  |
|----|---|----|-------------------|-------------|-----------------|----|--------------------|------------------|------------------|
| 48 | <b>The Aviations Assets in your UN Peacekeeping mission included</b>              | 86 | Civil Helicopters | Mil Heptr   | Mil Armed Heptr | AH | Civil Tpt Aircraft | Mil Tpt Aircraft | Fighter Aircraft |
|    |   |    | 59                | 84          | 46              | 61 | 67                 | 50               | 2                |
| 49 | <b>Were there any Air Defence weapons in your mission</b>                         | 86 | Yes               | No          | Maybe           | NA |                    |                  |                  |
|    |   |    | 67                | 12          | 7               | 2  |                    |                  |                  |
| 50 | <b>The Air Defence Weapons were in possession of</b>                              | 43 | UN Forces         | Govt Forces | Rebel Forces    |    |                    |                  |                  |
|    |   |    | 15                | 21          | 12              |    |                    |                  |                  |
| 51 | <b>Have you ever been fired upon during a UN Peacekeeping mission</b>             | 86 | Yes               | No          | No Comment      | NA |                    |                  |                  |
|    |   |    | 39                | 43          | 4               | 2  |                    |                  |                  |
| 52 | <b>Was there ever a fear of escalation if Aerial assets were used offensively</b> | 85 | Yes               | No          | Maybe           | NA |                    |                  |                  |
|    |   |    | 25                | 39          | 21              | 3  |                    |                  |                  |
| 53 | <b>How was the Aerial Communication Network in your mission</b>                   | 86 | 1                 | 2           | 3               | 4  | 5                  |                  |                  |
|    |   |    | 4                 | 13          | 34              | 28 | 7                  |                  |                  |
| 54 | <b>How time critical are Aerial requirements in Peacekeeping operations</b>       | 85 | 1                 | 2           | 3               | 4  | 5                  |                  |                  |

|    |   |    |     |    |            |    |    |
|----|---|----|-----|----|------------|----|----|
|    |   |    | 0   | 0  | 5          | 31 | 49 |
| 55 | Were the Aerial assets ever used for Psychological impact only  | 86 | Yes | No | Maybe      | NA |    |
| 56 | Did use of Aerial Assets lead to Economy of Effort  | 86 | Yes | No | Maybe      | NA |    |
|    |   |    | 69  | 4  | 13         | 2  |    |
| 57 | Did you have access to any Satellite Communication equipment for effective conduct of Aerial Missions | 86 | Yes | No | Not Sure   | NA |    |
|    |   |    | 58  | 20 | 8          | 2  |    |
| 58 | How effective are Aerial assets in preventing a conflict during peacekeeping                          | 86 | 1   | 2  | 3          | 4  | 5  |
|    |   |    | 1   | 2  | 15         | 36 | 32 |
| 59 | How effective are Aerial assets in intervention during a conflict during peacekeeping                 | 85 | 1   | 2  | 3          | 4  | 5  |
|    |   |    | 0   | 1  | 12         | 33 | 39 |
| 60 | Were you a part of Aircrew in UN Peacekeeping   | 86 | Yes | No | No Comment | NA |    |

|    |   |    |                     |                     |                   |          |      |                |              |     |       |
|----|---|----|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------|------|----------------|--------------|-----|-------|
|    |   |    | 65                  | 20                  | 1                 | 2        |      |                |              |     |       |
| 61 | Type of Aircraft or Helicopter associated with                                    | 84 | Light Utility Heptr | Medium Utlity Heptr | Heavy Cargo Heptr | AH       | None | Light Aircraft | Tactical Tpt | N/A | Other |
|    |   |    | 9                   | 46                  | 7                 | 41       | 1    | 4              | 7            | 5   |       |
| 62 | Can Aerial assets influence Peacekeeping on ground                                | 15 | Yes                 | No                  | Maybe             | NA       |      |                |              |     |       |
|    |   |    | 15                  | 0                   | 0                 | 0        |      |                |              |     |       |
| 63 | Would you consider Aviation assets essential component in UN Peacekeeping mission | 15 | Yes                 | No                  | Not Sure          | NA       |      |                |              |     |       |
|    |   |    | 15                  | 0                   | 0                 | 0        |      |                |              |     |       |
| 64 | How essential are Aerial assets in UN Peacekeeping efforts                        | 15 | 1                   | 2                   | 3                 | 4        | 5    |                |              |     |       |
|    |   |    | 0                   | 0                   | 1                 | 4        | 10   |                |              |     |       |
| 65 | Definition of "Peacekeeping" and "Peace enforcement" is                           | 15 | Synonymous          | Complementary       | Distinct          | Not sure |      |                |              |     |       |
|    |   |    | 0                   | 9                   | 6                 | 0        |      |                |              |     |       |
| 67 | Are you familiar with the term "Rules of Engagement" (RoE)                        | 15 | Yes                 | No                  | Maybe             | NA       |      |                |              |     |       |



|    |  |    |                   |          |          |       |                |
|----|--|----|-------------------|----------|----------|-------|----------------|
| 67 | Are you familiar with the concept "Self Defence"                         | 15 | 15                | 0        | 0        | 0     |                |
|    |  |    | Yes               | No       | Maybe    | NA    |                |
| 68 | Are you familiar with the concept of "Proportionality" in context of RoE | 15 | 15                | 0        | 0        | 0     |                |
|    |  |    | Yes               | No       | Maybe    | NA    |                |
| 69 | Could the stated RoE be interpreted differently by individuals           | 15 | 13                | 1        | 1        | 0     |                |
|    |  |    | Yes               | No       | Maybe    | NA    |                |
| 70 | Should stated RoE be debated/discussed by practitioners                  | 15 | 10                | 3        | 2        | 0     |                |
|    |  |    | Yes               | No       | Maybe    | NA    |                |
| 71 | Are you familiar with the concept of "Force Planning"                    | 15 | 14                | 1        | 0        | 0     |                |
|    |  |    | Yes               | No       | Maybe    | NA    |                |
| 72 | Can Technology influence Peacekeeping efforts                            | 15 | 13                | 1        | 1        | 0     |                |
|    |  |    | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Neutral  | Agree | Strongly Agree |
| 73 | Can Area of Influence of any Air asset be defined                        | 15 | 1                 | 0        | 0        | 4     | 10             |
|    |  |    | Yes               | No       | Not Sure | NA    |                |
|    |  |    | 13                | 2        | 0        | 0     |                |

|    |   |    |     |    |          |    |    |
|----|---|----|-----|----|----------|----|----|
| 74 | Do you understand the difference between Armed and Attack Helicopter                  | 15 | Yes | No | Not Sure | NA |    |
|    |   |    | 15  | 0  | 0        | 0  |    |
| 75 | Does use of Aerial Assets lead to Economy of Effort                                   | 15 | Yes | No | Maybe    | NA |    |
|    |   |    | 11  | 1  | 3        | 0  |    |
| 76 | How effective are Aerial assets in preventing a conflict during peacekeeping          | 15 | 1   | 2  | 3        | 4  | 5  |
|    |   |    | 0   | 0  | 2        | 5  | 8  |
| 77 | How effective are Aerial assets in intervention during a conflict during peacekeeping | 15 | 1   | 2  | 3        | 4  | 5  |
|    |   |    | 0   | 0  | 2        | 3  | 10 |

## ANNEXURE - 5


### Operation Khukri : Standoff At Sierra Leone

*Gp Capt Vivek Saxena (Retd)*

#### Prelude

1. **Operation Khukri** was launched in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), involving majority of forces from India and few elements from Ghana, Britain and Nigeria. The aim was to break the two month long siege laid by rebel armed cadres of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) around two companies of 5/8th Gorkha Rifles Infantry Battalion Group at Kailahun (a small town in North East Sierra Leone) by effecting a fighting breakout and redeploying them with the main battalion located at Daru about 75 Kms away. 222 troops and 11 military Observers were held captive by RUF for more than 75 days. The entire stretch of the road from Kailahun to Daru was under the control of rebels.

2. **Force Levels.** The Indian Forces mainly comprised of 5/8 GR Bn Gp, 18 Grenadiers, 2 PARA SF, QRC and IAF heptrs ( Mi-35s, Mi-8s and Chetaks). Elements of RAF( Hercules and Chinooks), two companies of Ghana bn and two platoons of Nigeria Bn were also utilized. The known dispositions of RUF in the area of Ops were Bde Hqs at Pendembu, Bn Hqs at Kuiva and Mobai and two additional strike battalions. The estimated strength was 1500-1800 cadres.



● RUF  
● Indian Forces


3. **Planning.** The planning of the entire operation was done by Force Hqs at Freetown and monitored by Army and Air Hqs. The final plan was cleared by Dept of Peacekeeping Ops (DPKO) at New York. Certain elements of Chapter 7 of Peacekeeping were added to existing Chapter 6 in UNAMSIL for use of Attack Helicopters. The Operation was planned to be carried

out in phases. The D day was 15 July 2000 with H hour at 0527 h. It was planned to be carried out in three days.

4. **Intelligence.** There was limited Int available in terms of sketches of known target areas. The request for satellite images to US and UK were turned down citing security reasons. Most of the missions by Mi-35s were flown using tourist maps.

### Execution

5. **D Day.** The day break on 15 Jul 2000 saw incessant rains, low clouds and poor visibility over the area of ops. Negotiating the adverse wx, C-130 of RAF got airborne and established an airborne command post. It guided two Chinooks with 80 SF troops on board to negotiate wx and terrain and insert them 4 km south of Kailahun and thereafter land at Garrison and extricate 11 Milobs and few sick and wounded personnel of 5/8 GR. Thereafter, as planned two Mi-35s and three Mi-8s got airborne at 0620h but had to return due to inclement weather. A break finally came at 0820h after a long and anxious wait, the helicopters got airborne. The first Mi-35 engaged and neutralized the rebel targets at Manova ferry at 0845h and Geihun at 0815h. After making contact with the ground column, which had by then broken out of the garrison and was experiencing heavy resistance from the RUF. As a result of this they could cover just 4km in 2.5 hours. The Mi-35 attacked the rebel target at Kailahun and neutralized their resistance. The second Mi-35 attacked Kuiva, Mobai and Pendembu. This was done to soften the en defenses along the axis of advance and in the vicinity of Mi-8 dropping zones. The Mi-8s then inserted a coy of 18 Grenadiers and QRC at Geihun and Pendembu respectively.



6. After the initial strikes, the first gunship maintained station over the convoy and from this point continuous over watch was maintained. The speed of the convoy improved significantly. With the progress of day, fresh inputs of rebel movements were passed to Mi-35 on station, by airborne communication post maintained by Chetak. These targets were efficiently neutralized at Segbwema, Bueudu and Baima. This prevented the rebels from interfering with the troops and thereafter the opposition from them was lesser than envisaged. The ground column made good progress southwards and reached Pendembu by 1800h and spent the night there, since movement towards Daru was considered dangerous due to non-availability of air cover by night.

7. **D+1, 16 Jul 2000.** The weather God was kind and at 0800h first Mi-35 took off and engaged targets near Bunumbu junction as rebel reinforcements were coming from Liberia. The second Mi-35 neutralized the strike battalion at Tongo. It was at this place that around 250 rebels were killed and their morale was shattered. An airhead was established in the meantime at Pendembu and Mi-8s extricated 313 troops in 13 sorties. Throughout this period, air cover was provided by Mi-35. Later in the day, a strike was launched in Southeastern sector to neutralize rebel reinforcements coming in from Sandharu, Mendekelma and Naima .

8. The movement of convoy was unhindered until Kuiva, where at 1400h, it was ambushed just 15Km short of their final destination, Daru. The gunship at station engaged the targets, which in turn helped ground forces to neutralize the ambush. It was at this place that rebels fired an RPG at convoy, resulting in a casualty. The convoy was also warned by Mi-35 of another ambush site 4Km ahead, where the road had been dug up. While the ground party was bridging the ditch, speculative firing was carried out to prevent any further rebel interference. After this episode, the movement of convoy was unimpeded and the leading elements reached final destination Daru at 1700h. This marked the successful culmination of this operation, a day ahead of its original schedule.





*Convoy passing through areas sanitized by Attk Heptrs*

### **Aftermath**

9. Op Khukri proved to be a well executed joint Army & Air Force operation that was swift, short and successful. All the besieged forces were evacuated successfully, with one casualty that too while operating deep inside the rebel territory. This op displayed optimal and apt utilization of helicopters, well integrated with Special Forces, Arty & Mech Inf in a copy book “**All Arms Team Concept**”. Operation Khukri was not a success simply in tactical terms. It was the worst defeat that the RUF has suffered in recent times, and was a tremendous boost to UNAMSIL forces. The Civil war was officially declared over on 18 Jan 02. RUF disintegrated by end of 2003. Till date UNAMSIL is considered as one of the most successful UN mission and was called off in Dec 2005.

## **Operation Khukri : Joint Excellence**


By Major Anil Raman

### **INTRODUCTION**

Operation (Op) KHUKRI was an unique multinational operation launched in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), involving India, Ghana, Britain and Nigeria. The aim of the operation was to break the two month long siege laid by armed cadres of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) around two companies of 5/8 Gorkha Rifles (GR) Infantry Battalion Group at Kailahun by affecting a fighting break out and redeploying them with the main battalion at Daru. Its successful execution displayed the effectiveness of the United Nations and brought it kudos from every corner of the globe. The professionalism and the dedication of the Indian Armed Forces was yet again reiterated for the world to see.

### **Background to the Conflict**

Sierra Leone (see Map I) is located on the west coast of Africa, bounded by the Atlantic Ocean, the Republic of Guinea and the Republic of Liberia. It was a home for slaves and ruled by the British till 1961. Thereafter, it was wracked by tribal strife, which culminated in full-scale civil war in 1991. The participants in this bloody and savage conflict were the RUF and ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group. ECOWAS is an abbreviation for Economic Community of West African States). The RUF gained a notorious reputation for brutality and using drugged child soldiers who were particularly savage. This was brought to world attention when on 5 January 1999, the rebels attacked Freetown and held it till 12 January 1999. During their offensive in Freetown, the rebels indulged in indiscriminate slaughter of families, mass rape, burning buildings with people inside, and worst of all, amputated the hands of hundreds of children including infants.



**Map I**

### **The Lome Peace Accord**

After attack on Freetown, the ECOMOG gained control but were unable to defeat the RUF decisively. After negotiations, the Lome Accord was signed whereby all conflicting parties agreed to disarm, supervised by a United Nations (UN) Force. When requested by the UN, India as a responsible member of the UN, agreed to contribute troops, including an infantry battalion group, engineer company and a medical unit to UNAMSIL.

### **Organisation of Battalion Group**

5/8 GR was selected, redesignated as INDBATT-1, and was reorganised to include two Mechanised Companies of 14 Mechanised Infantry including two platoons of 23 Mechanised Infantry alongwith 116 Engineer Regiment, Signals and Electrical and Mechanical Engineers elements. The battalion also shed two rifle companies which formed the core of the Quick Reaction Company (QRC) and the Guard and Administrative Company. The QRC also had complements of wheeled company and tracked mechanised infantry and 9 Special Force (SF).

### **Induction and Initial Activities**

The unit was inducted into UNAMSIL in December 1999 and by mid April 2000 was deployed deep inside the RUF held territory at Daru (battalion minus two companies) and Kailahun (two companies), 400 kilometres from the capital, Freetown. The battalion had been tasked to assist the Government of Sierra Leone in carrying out disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of various rebel groups in its area of responsibility. Accordingly, reconnaissance of interior and far-flung regions was carried out with the assistance of the RUF. Extensive civic action, to include medical care, road and bridge construction, water supply and assistance to schools, also commenced, with the intention of winning over the population. In Kailahun, which had been under rebel control for a decade, the state of the people especially the children was extremely pathetic



due to malnutrition and diseases and the Indians were worshipped as saviours. This policy paid rich dividends when one battalion of the RUF disarmed on 10 April 2000 at Segbwema in the largest numbers ever seen. Another disarmament was planned in early May 2000 in Kailahun.



An Indian soldier watches an RAF Chinook land at Freetown, 09 May 2000. (© AFP/Corbis)

### Genesis of Crisis

While some tension always existed between the RUF, and the Kenyans and Nigerians, events suddenly turned for the worse when on 01 May 2000 the RUF at Makeni, in the Kenyan Battalion (Kenbatt) Area of Responsibility (AOR), attacked and overran UN forces. Due to a communication gap, this information could not be passed to indbatt in real time, as a result of which, on the morning of 02 May 2000 when the Kailahun company commanders went to meet the local RUF commander about the planned disarmament rally, they were taken hostages. Certain Military Observers (MILOBS) present in Kailahun were also captured. While the capture of their commanders and MILOBS from 13 other countries made it difficult for the companies to take offensive actions against rebels, they manned their defences and steadfastly refused the RUF's demand for their surrender. Based on orders, the Battalion Second in Command (2IC) was despatched with a patrol from the Battalion Headquarters (HQs) at Daru, alongwith the RUF Cease Fire Monitoring Committee (CMC) member, to negotiate the release of the hostages at Kailahun. At Kuiva this patrol was stopped and surrounded by about 200 drugged rebels. As the battalion had experienced similar situations many times earlier during reconnaissance and initial deployment, the 2IC tried to calm the rebels down and began negotiations with their commander. The RUF commander requested the patrol not to go ahead since the situation was extremely volatile. He said that the RUF leadership at Makeni had informed all its cadres that the UN had attacked them. The patrol was detained and, while not being ill treated, and even being permitted delivery of food and movement of persons to Daru, was not allowed to leave as a whole. The hostage crisis at Kailahun was resolved 10 days later through intense pressure put on the RUF commanders by friendly civilians and the officers of INDBATT-1.



### Situation in the Rest of the Country

By 06 May 2000 general hostilities had broken out all over the western and northern parts of the country and bulk of a Zambian battalion and some troops of a Kenyan battalion (approximately 500 peacekeeping troops in all) were disarmed and taken hostage. As the RUF began moving towards Freetown, the British troops landed to stem the panic and UNAMSIL HQs evacuated most of its civilian staff. The Battalion's QRC was launched to move to Magburaka where more Kenyans had been surrounded.

Led by BMPs (tracked armoured personnel carriers/infantry combat vehicle), the company made a lightning 180 kilometres advance through rebel territory. They linked up with the Kenyans and then extricated them after defeating RUF ambushes and attacks. This action which received wide international acclaim and special praises from the Kenyan media, generally went unnoticed in India. This shattering reverse caused the RUF to recoil and the growing British presence in the

country caused them to return to their original positions. The capture of their leader Foday Sankoh and mounting international pressure on Liberia were used to secure the release of the remaining UNAMSIL hostages less the Indians. India also inducted additional forces including an infantry battalion and an attack helicopter flight by the end of May 2000.

### **Factors Affecting the of Use of Force**

The extrication of the patrol at Kuiva was well within the capability of the troops at Daru and the plans had been prepared and the forces rehearsed. However, the same could not be executed in the absence of resources required for the extrication of troops at Kailahun. As the strength of UNAMSIL increased, with the arrival of fresh troops, specially the INDBATT-2, Artillery Battery, Special Force (SF) Company and Attack Helicopters, the feasibility of executing successful military operations increased.

The 2IC's patrol was detained at Kuiva for nearly two months amidst intense negotiations at all levels. The patrol was released on 29 June 2000 through Liberia due to international pressure and efforts by the Indian government. Plans for break out of the Kailahun companies took a concrete shape immediately on release of the 2IC's patrol. While the personnel could have been safely extricated in helicopters, the need to bring warlike stores back and question of regimental pride, dictated a fighting breakout.

## **OVERALL PLAN : OP KHUKRI**

### **Design of Battle**

The design of battle envisaged the following :-

- [a] Mobilise maximum air effort to concentrate own forces at Kenema and Daru secretly.
- [b] Ground offensive from Daru and Kenema and breakout from Kailahun.
- [c] Simultaneous engagement of key RUF locations by attack helicopters and artillery.
- [d] Selected troops to be helilanded with attack helicopter cover at key locations along the road axis to secure picquets for safe passage of ground column.
- [e] Ensure early link up of both the columns at Pendembu and evacuation by air.
- [f] Return of all vehicle columns from Pendembu for redeployment at Daru on completion of air evacuation.
- [g] Security of Daru to be ensured at all times.

### **Deployment of the RUF**

The military organisation of the RUF consisted of six brigades under a Defence HQ. Each brigade had four battalions and a "strike" battalion. The cadre consisted of battle hardened and motivated veterans. Each battalion had approximately 960 men and women, divided into four companies of 240 persons each. Each company had four platoons of 60 divided into four squads of 12 to 15 persons. They were equipped with AK-47, RPG-7s, Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) and Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs). The 1st Brigade of the RUF, with its HQ in Pendembu, was deployed in own AOR as under :-

- (a) 1st Battalion - Mobai
- (b) 2nd Battalion - Kuiva
- (c) 3rd Battalion - Neama
- (d) 4th Battalion - Koindu
- (e) Strike Battalion - Segbwema

### **Own Troops Available**

The troops available for this operation were :-

- (a) INDBATT-1 : 5/8GR and two Companies 14 Mechanised Infantry
- (b) QRC : troops of 5/8GR, 14 Mechanised Infantry, 23 Mechanised (Recce and Support), 9 PARA (SF)
- (c) INDMECH QRC :
- (d) INDENG Coy-2 : Company from 7 Engineer Regiment
- (e) INDSF Coy : Company 2 PARA(SF)
- (f) Indian Aviation Unit : Mi-8s, Chetaks and Mi-35s
- (g) Indian Sector HQ :
- (h) Indian Surgical HQ :
- (i) Forward Surgical Team :
- (j) INDBATT-2 : 18 Grenadiers
- (k) Independent Composite Battery : Mortars 120 mm from 310 Light Regiment  
Light Field Guns (105 mm) from 255 Field Regiment
- (l) 2 Companies GHANBATT : Ghana Army
- (m) 2 Companies NIBATT : Nigerian Army
- (n) 2 x Chinhook helicopters : UK Royal Air Force (RAF)
- (o) Elements of D Sqn of the British Special Air Service (SAS)

### General Outline

The operation was to be conducted in 5 Phases (See Map II):

#### Phase I

Mobilisation and move of combat elements from Freetown/Hastings to Kenema / Daru on 13 and 14 July 2000 by air/road.

#### Phase II

- [01] Pre-emptive attack helicopters strikes and pre-planned artillery engagements from 0600 hours (h) on 15 July.
- [02] 18 Grenadiers to secure firm base for 5/8GR (Daru column) earliest and secure and hold Giehun by heliborne assault.
- [03] 5/8 GR less 2 Companies (Daru column):
  - (aa) Advance along axis Daru-Kailahun and link up with QRC column at area 3 Bridges earliest but not later than 1400h on 15 July 2000.
  - (ab) Assist in securing firm base.
- [04] Kailahun Companies of 5/8 GR. Establish an air head at Kailahun for air extrication of non essential personnel, MILOBs and stores by British forces and prepare to break out by road for link up with SF team.
- [05] SF team to secure general area North of Kenewa by heliborne assault.
- [06] QRC column to secure area 3 Bridges by heliborne assault.
- [07] IND MECH QRC to secure Pendembu.
- [08] Two companies of GHANBATT to advance from Kenema at 0630h on 15 July 2000 and secure Bendu Junction earliest.
- [09] NIBATT companies to relieve company of 5/8 GR and hold defended locality in Daru and act as force reserve.

[10] One platoon INDENG Company-2 to occupy a platoon defended locality in Daru with effect from 1900h on 14 July 2000.

[11] Two CH-47s of the RAF and the SAS to drop Indian SF Company at Kenema and evacuate MILOBS and essentials from Kailahun.

### Phase III

[01] 5/8 GR (Daru column) to secure and hold Pendembu and establish air head.

[02] Kailahun column and SF team to link up with Company at Giehun earliest.

### Phase IV


[01] Link up of 5/8 GR Daru and Kailahun columns at Pendembu.

[02] Air extrication of foot columns from air head established by 5/8 GR.

### Phase V

[01] 5/8 GR columns to withdraw tactically to Daru.

[02] Other elements to fall back to Daru after passage of 5/8 GR columns.



Map II

## CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

### Mobilisation

The build up at Daru and Kenewa was conducted from 13 to 15 July 2000. 3 x MI-26s, 7 x MI-8s, 2 x Chinook helicopters and 1 x RAF C-130 aircraft were pressed into service for the task. Daru

being cut off from the rest of government controlled areas, had to be built up by helicopters. By the last light of D minus one (14 July 2000) the build up of forces was completed.

### **Preparations at Kailahun**

The entire operation depended on the successful breakout of Kailahun companies and extrication of MILOBs. The Kailahun company commanders were given a broad outline of the plan and the force commander and commanding officer (CO) also spoke to them regularly on satellite phone (satphone). As most of the troops were to be helilanded and close support was dependent on attack helicopters, the weather conditions for flying were of paramount importance. The two companies were deployed 500 metres from Kailahun on dominating ground . Two helipads within the defended area, were secured by occupying perimeter defence and deploying protective elements.



*The first batch of helicopters sent to UNAMSIL, a set of four Mi-8s and Chetaks each are lined up for inspection at Palam New Delhi before being despatched to Sierra Leone. The Mi-35s were sent later when it was felt that more dedicated firepower was needed.*

### **Air Extrication**

On 15 July 2000, the helipad was secured and entire area sanitised by 0600h. Despite bad weather, two RAF Chinook helicopters landed exactly as per plan at 0620h and extricated 44 personnel including 11 MILOBs and war like stores. Enroute the same helicopters had dropped Company 2 PARA(SF), two kilometres South of Kailahun. The RUF had approximately 300 to 400 of its cadre in Kailahun. Due to the arrival of Chinook helicopters the RUF were activated but were effectively engaged by own fire. As per plan the Chinooks were to be followed by three MI-8 escorted by attack helicopters (AH) of Indian Aviation Unit to extricate more stores, however, these helicopters could not take off due to bad weather.

### **Breakout**

Prior to move, a fire assault was delivered for 10 minutes employing fire power of rocket launchers, armoured personnel carries, automatic grenade launchers, 51 mm mortars and medium machine guns. As per the plan Mechanised Company-1 of 5/8 GR (Mech 1 Company) was tasked to capture Town Square in Kailahun and Motorised Rifle Company-1 of 5/8 GR (Mot 1 Company) to capture RUF checkpost astride road Kailahun - Daru. The advance was led by the Ghatak (Commando) Platoon supported by three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDMs). The advance drew fire from QG area and RUF checkpost. QG area was neutralised by Ghatak with support of BRDMs. Thereafter on contacting the town square, a fire base was established by Mech 1 Company and Mot 1 Company assaulted the check post with the Town Square as their forming up place (FUP). The advance of Mot 1 Company towards the barrier came under heavy fire from the RUF but the fierce assault closed in and soon secured the check post. Immediately, the B vehicle column moved out and link up was established with Company 2 Para by Mot 1 Company at the barrier. The fire base at Town Square in Kailahun continued to be in position till all elements had crossed and then disengaged by fire and move. The column quickly advanced towards Giehun with Company 2 Para and BRDMs covering the tail. At around 0930h the attack helicopters arrived and

thereafter it was easy to break contact from the RUF who by now had reorganised and were continuously sniping at the rearguard. Around 1030h the road column arrived at Geihun to link up with the INDBATT-2 Company which had been helilanded earlier. The Force Commander landed at Geihun to meet the troops and ordered the helilift of 60 troops to Daru.

### **Move to Pendembu**

After reorganising, the column moved on and encountered two major road blocks in the form of 8 feet wide and 4 feet deep ditches dug on the road covered by small arms and rocket launcher fire. Continuous sniping by rebels and slushy conditions on the road impeded progress. The area was physically secured and bridging stores carried by the column and those dropped by an MI-8 helicopter facilitated speedy bridging. The column met the linkup force under the CO 5/8 GR Battalion Group about 5 kilometres from Pendembu at 1700h, D Day. Thereafter the entire column moved to Pendembu and was directed to deploy in respective areas of the battalion harbour for the night.

### **Actions of Daru Link Up Force**

The insertion of SF Company and extrication of MILOBs from Kailahun at 0620h signalled the commencement of operations of forces located at Daru. 18 Grenadiers advanced and secured a firm base in conjunction with the Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICVs) of 5/8GR Battalion Group and artillery bombardment.

### **5/8 GR Advance to Pendembu and Link Up with QRC**

5/8 GR columns ex Daru commenced advance immediately on securing of the firm base with the ICVs of Mech-2 Company leading. At approximately 0830h the lead elements came under heavy fire from North of the road 500 metres short of Tikonko. ICVs effectively neutralised the fire and the advance continued. The column again drew fire from houses in Bewobu (RUF Company location) but burst through with all guns blazing. At Kuiva, heavy small arms fire was encountered from jungle on either side of the road and the village. It was initially planned to physically secure and search Kuiva, but the progress of Kailahun columns indicated a possibility of link up and air evacuation on the same day. Therefore, CO decided to continue to advance with speed for Pendembu. Supported by battalion mortars, the column crossed the town by fire and move. The rebels had taken up positions inside the village but after offering initial resistance, fled into the jungle in face of accurate fire leaving ammunition scattered behind. The column moved at good speed suppressing small arms fire using its ICVs. In the meantime, the battalion's QRC was lifted from Daru in two waves of 3 x MI-8s each and captured Area 3 Bridges by heliborne assault. Maintaining momentum, the 5/8 GR column advanced at high speed to link up with the QRC. Enroute a rebel vehicle full of arms and ammunition was chased by the ICVs and recovered by Mot-2 company. At 1230h the link up was established with the QRC and thereafter the battalion column started to deploy on the southern edge of Pendembu.

### **Securing of Pendembu**

Pendembu was the HQ of RUF's No 1 Brigade and its stronghold in the east and a pitched fight was expected. The town was about one kilometre in length and had solid single storeyed cement houses. Tall grass along the road and inside made it ideal for ambushes.

An attack helicopter directed to strafe Pendembu made five passes at 1300h and carried out pin point engagement of the known RUF locations in town. In the meantime, the Battalion mortars deployed north of Bridge 3. The CO reviewed the plans and chose Mot 2 Company, to secure the complete built up area of nearly 300 houses and an air head in the south west (SW) portion of Pendembu. First to secure the northern flank, Mech-2 company moved through with all guns blazing and occupied the north edge of the town. Thereafter, the Mot-2 company began its operations by first silencing heavy fire from the SW of the town using ICVs and then using its rifle platoons to clear the houses systematically. A massive RUF cache of arms and ammunition was found. Some rebels were killed in the SW portions by 4 Platoon of Mot 2 Company and more were killed while clearing the armoury by 6 Platoon. Later a suitable airhead was selected along the Pendembu - Daru road. The QRC Company linked up to the SW of Pendembu. Soon thereafter,

companies were reorganised, areas allotted and preparation of temporary defences for the night commenced.

### **Link up with Kailahun Column**

At about 1630h the CO led a column to the link up site. The advance through dense jungle was done by boldly employing ICVs and link up was established with the Kailahun party at about 1730h. This column was escorted to Pendembu by about 1900h.

### **Pendembu Night 15/16 July 2000**

Officer Commanding (OC) QRC coordinated the defences at Pendembu and on arrival, the Kailahun columns were guided to their respective areas of responsibility. Throughout the night, the RUF who tried to probe the defences were, much to their discomfiture, accurately engaged by own fire. The 105mm Light Field Gun (LFG) and the battalion mortars were used to engage likely routes of RUF reinforcements throughout the night.

### **Helilift Operations**

By 0700h Mot 2 Company prepared a helipad and troops earmarked for helilift started to upstick as per their deinduction schedule and the defences were readjusted. The MI-8s started arriving at the helipad at 0815h in a continuous stream. A total of 12 sorties were flown. Mech 1 Company, Mot 1 Company, SF Company, D Company 18 Grenadiers and QRC Company (two Platoons) were deinducted. The last helicopter took off at 1030h.

At about 0930h own troops, deployed to the north of the town reported 50 to 60 armed RUF cadres moving towards the platoon post along the road. They were effectively engaged by an armed helicopter directed by the Adjutant acting as an Air Control Team (ACT). Later, selected RUF bunkers in basement of buildings and their ammunition storage centre were demolished with help of the battalion engineers.

### **Move Back to Daru**

After the last helicopter took off for Daru, the road column comprising of Daru companies, QRC company less two platoons and vehicles of Kailahun Companies started to reel in as per their order of march with Mot 2 Company leading. The Mech 2 Company was told to hold on to the north edge of the town till the last and bring up the rear of the column after conducting a tactical disengagement. Continuous overwatch and intimate fire support was given by one MI-35 helicopter at all times till the column reached Daru. While crossing area 3 Bridge, the CO's party came under fire. The command BRDM was effectively used to silence the fire. The column reached Kuiva without incident. Speculative fire was brought down at all suspected locations by the leading ICVs. The troops deployed for the firm base also started reeling in as 5/8 GR moved back.

### **Kuiva Ambush**

The column had been cautioned to expect a road block cum ambush near Kuiva based on information from radio intercepts and intelligence. At about 1400h scout helicopters also reported that the road had been dug up between Bewabu and Kuiva. At Kuiva, which had been secured by a company of 18 Grenadiers, the CO ordered a halt as the column had extended over a long distance. Suddenly, the column was engaged by rocket launcher (RPG) fire from very short range and a rifle platoon supported by ICVs had to be used to drive the rebels away.

### **Bewabu Ambush**

The column then moved ahead with caution towards Bewabu and at about 1430h, the leading ICVs, short of Bewabu came across a ditch covered by heavy small arms fire from high ground on both sides of the road. The Mot 2 Company Commander, moving just behind the second ICV of the column realised at once that the column was in the killing ground of the ambush. Immediately Number 4 rifle platoon following just behind was ordered to counter ambush on the high ground supported by ICV fire. The firefight continued for next 15 minutes. Attack helicopters were also

tasked to strafe both sides of the road to deter the rebels from further interference. Number 6 platoon and the battalion's engineer platoon immediately set about bridging the gap.

### **Mobai Ambush**

While the head of the 5/8 GR column was engaged in tackling the Bewabu road block, the 18 Grenadiers column was following up about six kilometres behind with 2x BMPs of Mech-2 and 2x BRDMs of Mech-1, at the end of the convoy. This convoy, came under heavy fire short of Kuiva. After 10 minutes of exchange of fire, the troops again mounted the vehicles and advanced. After about 500 metres of move, a vehicle carrying artillery ammunition had a direct RPG hit. A Chetak helicopter flew in to pick up the casualty from Kuiva.

The entire convoy thereafter moved at high speed without encountering any resistance and carrying out speculative fire where necessary. With the MI-35 helicopters also providing intimate fire support the convoy made good speed and reached Daru at 1730h.

### **REASONS FOR SUCCESS**

Synergisation of all Available Assets. Op KHUKRI was a classical example of synergy of effort. The optimum utilisation of all resources, joint planning (Indian Army, IAF, UNAMSIL forces and the British Forces) and execution resulted in a synergy that multiplied the effectiveness of the assets deployed.

Simultaneity of Operations. Commencing operations simultaneously from Kenema, Daru and Kailahun, and helilanding troops at three places enroute caused utter confusion in the RUF.

Real Time use of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT). During the planning of rescue mission from Kuiva, Pendembu and Kailahun, non availability of air/satellite imagery was a big handicap. The Intelligence Non Commissioned Officer (NCO) of 5/8 GR made nine trips with the ration convoys to covertly note RUF strength, deployments and obtain Global Positioning System (GPS) fixes of RUF targets. This intelligence was later used by the artillery and attack helicopters to engage targets. The Battalion radio monitoring cell did an outstanding job in monitoring RUF communications throughout the three months to build up a clear picture of the RUF activities. Real time monitoring of RUF communications during operations gave a picture of RUF actions regarding move of reinforcements and preparation of ambush/road block sites. These were passed on to the columns and to attack helicopters for verification and engagement.

Good Intelligence of RUF Activities and Intentions. The painstaking study of RUF tactics, organisation, personalities of leaders and updating of activities helped to anticipate reactions correctly.

Deception and Security During Build Up. RUF was successfully kept in the dark about the build up. The RUF was made to believe that the battalion was being replaced hence additional troops were coming as relief. No operational messages were passed on radio and only satphones were used. The unit had made own codes and nick names for places and personalities. All conversation was in Hindi and Gurkhali and for further secrecy, plans were passed over satphone to Kailahun in colloquial Malayalam.

Flexibility in Conduct. The plan had an inherent capacity to be changed as per the progress and situation. The presence of the Force Commander at Daru helped further, as decisions were taken on the spot.

Maintenance of Momentum. Relentless advance by Daru columns and brushing aside ambushes without dismounting added to the speed of advance. Not changing the leading companies at Kuiva and Mobai as planned ensured momentum.

Resolute and Competent Junior Leadership. Op KHUKRI was a series of subunit actions fought independently. The exemplary leadership displayed by junior leaders was infectious and added to the potency of the force.



Use of ICVs to Lead Advance and Break Ambushes. Notwithstanding the dense jungle, ICVs were used to lead the advance. Their mobility and high volume of fire enabled the columns to proceed without dismounting at most of the ambush sites.

Attack Helicopter Support. The attack helicopter was one of the most potent assets and proved very effective in breaking ambushes as well as denying free movement of rebels on the road by day. Combat Air Patrol (CAP) provided to the returning road column on 16 July 2000 was instrumental in its safe return.

## **Conclusion**

The success of Op KHUKRI was felt not merely in its tactical terms. It gave the RUF its worst defeat in recent history and at the same time gave a tremendous boost to the UNAMSIL forces in particular and to the UN as a whole. The detractors of the UN were silenced and the potential of this noble institution was once again displayed. The greatest reward for the Indian Peacekeepers was the rapturous reception given to them by the people of Daru as they came triumphantly back from battle. It was the welcome of a long suffering and desperate people who understood that there were people in this world who would shed their blood for them. Perhaps, that is why they helped build the KHUKRI Memorial in Daru barracks overlooking the Moa River.

*Major Anil Raman is from 5/8. Gorkha Rifles. He was adjutant of the Battalion Group in UNAMSIL.*