

FAULTLINES IN PAKISTAN AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

A Dissertation submitted to the Panjab University, Chandigarh for the award of
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that Brigadier Harjit Pal Singh Hansi has pursued his research work and prepared the present dissertation titled 'Fault lines in Pakistan and Implications for India' under my supervision and guidance. The dissertation is a record of bona fide work carried out by him and to the best of my knowledge no part of it has earlier comprised of any monograph, dissertation or book. This is being submitted to the Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA), New Delhi, for the award of Master of Philosophy in Social Sciences, in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Advanced Professional Programme in Public Administration (APPPA).

I recommend that the dissertation of Brigadier Harjit Pal Singh Hansi is worthy of consideration for the award of Master of Philosophy in Social sciences, Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA), New Delhi.

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CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION

The idea of Pakistan was conceived by All India Muslim League in 1906 to protect "Muslim identity, interest and under-representation in a Hindu majority India". In the late 1930s, Mr Muhammad Ali Jinnah propagated the concept of Two Nation Theory, demanding an independent State for the Muslims, where they could fashion their lives according to the dictates of the Holy Quran and Sunnah. Eventually, the British India was partitioned into two independent states - a Muslim majority Pakistan and India on 14 / 15 August 1947 respectively.

Pakistan since partition has remained turbulent and chaotic afflicted by number of fault lines. It came into existence as a disjointed, amalgamation of unorganised provinces with 1600 kilometres of separation between its Eastern and Western wings.



The Eastern wing comprised of the single province of East Pakistan (divided Bengal), while the politically dominant Western wing consisted of North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Punjab (divided Punjab), Sind, Baluchistan and Karachi as the Federal Capital Territory. The fierce regional affiliations, lack of identity, demand for greater autonomy, sectarian and ethnic violence posed major threat to Pakistan's sovereignty and internal security situation since independence and remains till date.

The state of Pakistan's economy continues to be fragile with GDP growth of less than 3.3 percent in 2019, well below the stated target of 6.2 per cent. It survives on huge foreign aid & expat remittances.

Even after 70 years of Independence nearly half the country is illiterate. According to the Pakistan Economic Survey, 2018-2019, the literacy rate stood at 62.3 percent in 2017-18, with male literacy being 72.5 per cent and female literacy rate being 51.8 per cent. Currently, 64 per cent of Pakistan's population is under the age of 30 years and with its existing defunct and useless education system, it does not allow much scope for employment, leading to frustration and exploitation by perverse elements.

Sectarianism and terrorism has never struck Pakistan with such intensity as it has in the last three decades. Suicide attacks, targeted killing, bombing or explosions in markets, mosques and imambargahs are continuously on the rise. Instead of punishing the culprits, the consecutive governments have been busy making alliances with these banned organizations and their leaders are being invited to become part of both federal and provincial governments.

While the armed forces stand as a bulwark against the emerging centrifugal forces however, growing religious and ethnic fissures within the forces do not bode well for the country. An islamized Pakistan Army would have no qualms in engaging India in asymmetric / conventional war which it proclaims as anti-Islamic, however, the preferred option would be to continue with the sub conventional conflict employing terror tactics as huge disparity exists in the conventional war fighting capability between India and Pakistan. In Pakistan, the deeply embedded popular narrative of 'India as enemy' adds life to their political and ideological

relevancy and helps Pak Army maintain its primacy. Abrogation of Article 370 and J&K becoming a Union Territory may have disturbed Pakistan Army's long term adversarial plans, nonetheless it will continue to indulge in proxy war in the region and create unrest. Hence, for the Pakistani military to reconcile and take initiative to restore genuine peace with India is not a desired alternative as it would undermine its interests. On the contrary, the military has repeatedly sabotaged efforts of the civilian governments aimed at offering peace to India, like the Kargil operations. In 1999, while prime ministers of India and Pakistan were meeting in Lahore, Pakistan's military was executing the Kargil operation in Kashmir. The operation not only derailed the ongoing reconciliation process but also came as a shock for both civilian governments. Another major effort came when on 25 December 2015, Mr Modi landed in Lahore to felicitate Mr Sharif on his birthday and his daughter's wedding and within a week on 02 Jan 16, the Pathankot Airforce station was attacked by proxies of Pak Army.

In recent past, since very few government institutions and media houses have been allowed to function freely to voice the concerns of citizens in matters of human right violations, rampant corruption, nullification of basic civil rights etc, the Civil Societies in Pakistan have become vocal and taken over the streets and media circuits. However, the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have not really yet succeeded in developing a comprehensive strategy to disable the coercive measures of state, and create a society with equal opportunities and legal rights. Being the victims of both state-repression and other violent organizations, the CSOs are unfortunately depicted as battered socio-political weaklings in Pakistan, who can protest but cannot substantially change the system. On 03 October 2018, Pakistan's Interior Ministry ordered 18 NGOs to wind up their operations within 60 days. In

spite of restrictions by the Government, both civil society and religious organisations continue to protest. Additionally, international organisations like FATF are also pressuring Pakistan to mend ways. In its Paris plenary on 21 Feb 2020, FATF noted that Pakistan addressed only a few of the 27 tasks given to it in controlling funding to terror groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). The FATF directed Pakistan to swiftly complete its full action plan by June, and if Pakistan fails to comply with the FATF directive, there is every possibility that the global body may put the country in the 'Black List' along with North Korea and Iran. The country will remain on the FATF Grey List till June 2020s.

Statement of the Problem

Pakistan came into existence on 14 August 1947, to form the Muslim majority state. Scarred from birth, Pakistan's quest for survival has been as compelling as it has been uncertain. All of Pakistan's struggle hinge on the dilemma it faces in trying to achieve parity with India, in spite of being on the brink of bankruptcy. Today, the instability within Pakistan is fast acquiring proportions which could lead to critical internal crisis and likely implosion. In order to divert attention of the domestic population and boost nationalism, the military and the Government may embark on adventurism against India. Hence to deter any misadventure by Pakistan, India must be prepared for an apt response to secure its interest and make the cost of war prohibitive for Pakistan.

Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study is:

- To carry out detailed analysis of the prevalent social, economic, political and security fault lines in Pakistan.
- To gauge the implications of any fall out due to prevailing situation in Pakistan and likely response options for India .

Research Design

- The study is proposed to be descriptive and exploratory based on secondary data.

Rationale of the Study

Pakistan continues to face multiple existential threats internally with adverse ramifications for the neighbours and global community at large. The inability of State to resolve these issues; due to vested interests of many has encouraged anarchy, political instability, radical violence and rampant corruption as a legitimate alternative. The country is facing mounting debt crisis and its trade imbalance / deficit is burgeoning incessantly. Furthermore, Pakistan's growing radicalisation, support to terrorism and religious fundamentalism continue to pose threat to regional and international peace and security. With India as its immediate neighbour, an imploding Pakistan will have the greatest impact on it. This study will concentrate on the prevailing situation in Pakistan covering the aspects of socio economic fault lines, fragile political condition, overarching role of Armed Forces, followed by analysis of the implications of the same for India. It will also provide a perspective to the policy makers regarding likely response options at the political, diplomatic and military level in case of any misadventure by Pakistan Army / Government to divert attention from its worsening internal situation.

Research Question

- Will the prevailing fault lines in Pakistan, which may lead to an adversarial internal situation, manifest into an hostile action by it against India to divert domestic attention?
- What are the security implications and response options - political, diplomatic and military available to India in case of any such misadventure by instable Pakistan?

Limitations

- The study is limited due to availability of time for research and incapability of collecting primary data.

Literature Review

Since Pakistan was founded in 1947, it has been in a state of turmoil and unrest. The situation over period has become adverse with rise in terrorism, radicalisation, poor economy and weak political structures, while Army continues to dominate the state and all its policies both internal and external. The military establishment has locked the country in an enduring rivalry with India, and has initiated three wars over Kashmir, failing to win any. Today also the army continues to prosecute this dangerous policy by employing non-state actors against India and have brought international opprobrium upon itself. In recent years, their erstwhile proxies have turned their guns on the Pakistani state itself. (Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War 1st Edition, by C. Christine Fair,2014). After 9/11, the

selective cooperation of President General Pervez Musharraf in sharing intelligence with the United States and apprehending Al-Qaeda members led to the assumption that Pakistan might be ready to give up its long-standing ties with radical Islam. However, Pakistan while seeking US support by making itself useful for concerns of the moment—will continue to support radical Islam as its status as an Islamic ideological state is closely linked with the Pakistani elite's world view and the praetorian ambitions of its military. (Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military by Husain Haqqani, 2016). Pakistan is a state run by its army and intelligence service. The political institutions in Pakistan have been made almost defunct due to corrupt and weak politicians and an over bearing Army. The democratic processes are hostage to Army commanders whims and fancies with political leaders having no loci standing (Pakistan Adrift: Navigating Troubled Waters by Asad Durrani, 2018). The military is entrenched in the corporate sector with main assets being in the hands of a tiny minority of senior army officials. The burgeoning defence budget has adversely affected all socio welfare schemes like education, power generation, infrastructure development etc adversely affecting the literacy rate, manufacturing processes and overall development of the state. (Inside Pakistan's Military Economy by Ayesha Siddiqa (2016)).

Method of Data Collection

- Books by Subject Experts.
- Research papers and monographs published by various think tanks and distinguished authors.
- Daily Periodicals and professional literature.

- Internet.
- Interaction with defence experts.

Organisation of the Dissertation

The paper is covered in the following Chapters:-

- **Chapter II : Prevailing Socio Economic State of Pakistan.** Every province of Pakistan since partition has been in a constant state of unrest and disorder. There are grievances of political and economic mismanagement, regional aspirations for greater autonomy / independence, sectarian violence and increasing fundamentalism. The economy is in a state of disarray and Pakistan ranks among the fifteen most backward countries as per literacy rate.
- **Chapter III : Islamisation And Sectarianism in Pakistan.** Pakistan came into being as a State for the Muslims with Islam as unifying ideology. The rise of radical militant Islam in Pakistan can be traced to the rule of General Zia ul Haq (1979-89)ⁱ. Zia, himself a devout Deobandi Muslim, espoused and promoted a regime ideologically based on an orthodox version of Sunni Islam. Pakistan with a large population of underprivileged youth and the current socioeconomic conditions coupled with the madrasa education, make it much easier for fundamentalist religious groups to harness the rich recruitment pool and propagate idea of radical Islam. The radicalisation further led to sectarian violence between orthodox Shia, Sunni

, Ahmadi's and other religious sects with bombing of religious places and targeted killing of religious leaders.

- **Chapter IV : The Pakistani Security Forces.** The Pakistan Armed Forces is the seventh largest military in the world. Islam is the predominant faith of the Pakistan Armed Forces, with 99 per cent of Pakistani military personnel adhering to the religion. The Pakistan military has traditionally been a secular, disciplined and a professional organization however, over period, there has been infiltration of the force by overwhelming strength of radical Islamists sympathizers. The Army to maintain its primacy in the affairs of its state has ensured weak political structures and subservient bureaucracy.
- **Chapter V : Fragile Political Scenario.** Pakistan since its inception has seen more than twenty four governments : fourteen elected or appointed prime ministers, five interim governments and thirty-three years of military rule under four different leaders. Excluding the military and interim governments, the average life span of a politically elected government has been less than two years. Democratically elected governments have been alternately dismissed by presidents or removed from power by the army chiefs. The democratic parties could never find roots and tales of corruption and high handed behaviour of leaders maligned the democratic process and set stage for takeover by military dictators.

- **Chapter VI : Implications for India and Response Options.** Pakistan since its creation has been bedevilled by one crisis after another. Today, ethnic, religious and social fault lines have deepened so much that Pakistan is on the verge of tearing itself apart with likely fall out on India. The possession of nuclear weapons has facilitated risk taking by Pakistan in pursuing the policy of jihad under the nuclear umbrella. It keeps Indian security forces pre occupied and Pakistani public satisfied by false propaganda of its Army's successes. To cater for any likely fallout from existing turmoil in Pakistan, the Indian decision makers have an array of response options available. These range from punitive military action on one end of the spectrum to confidence building measures and cultural exchanges on other. Adopting a single option as a common reaction to all contingencies may not be prudent to yield the desired result.
- **Chapter VII : Summary and Conclusion.** Scarred from birth, Pakistan's quest for survival has been as compelling as it has been uncertain. Despite the shared religion of its majority Muslim population, Pakistan has been engaged in an unending struggle to define its national identity and evolve a stable and robust political system for its diverse population. Internally, the anti-India rhetoric that sustained Pakistan Army is no longer as effective, as the population has realised Pakistan Army's incapability to fight India to yield favourable results. Today, the instability within Pakistan is fast acquiring proportions which could lead to major law and order breakdown. Hence, Pakistan to divert attention from domestic issues may undertake military operations against its perennial enemy India. To deter Pakistani's adventurism, India has to make the cost of war prohibitive for Pakistan with

option ranging from CBM, diplomacy to full scale aggression under nuclear overhang.

CHAPTER II : PREVAILING SOCIO ECONOMIC STATE OF PAKISTAN

Introduction

Since partition every province of Pakistan has been in a constant state of unrest and disorder. There are grievances of political and economic mismanagement, regional aspirations for greater autonomy / independence, sectarian violence and increasing fundamentalism. In the early 1970's the hegemonic behaviour of West Pakistan led to civil war in East Pakistan and Bangladesh was created. Presently, the Sindhi's and Baloch continue to demand greater autonomy, Punjab has become a support base of Islamic fundamentalism, NWFP and FATA continue to be restive and in turmoil. Gilgit Baltistan has no political loci standi and its population is denied the basic right to vote. There is a forced demographic conversion being carried out in Northern Areas with Sunni Panjabi's and pathans from Kyber Pakhtunwa being incentivised to settle there. Additionally, the majority Shia population of POK is being brutally massacred by various Sunni terrorist organisations duly supported by Army and Federal dispensation.

As regards Pakistan's economy, it grew at an impressive rate of 6 per cent for the first four decades after partition. However, in early 1970's Bhutto's populist nationalizing policies derailed Pakistan's journey of economic development. Widespread corruption, economic mismanagement, volatile internal situation and fiscally imprudent policies adversely affected the economic growth of Pakistan. Presently, Pakistan's economy is in a downward spiral with massive debts, inflation and widening fiscal deficit. In the budget presented by the government in June 2019, Pakistan's overall budget of Rs 6 lakh croreⁱⁱ had a fiscal deficit of Rs 3.5-lakh crore. Its GDP has plummeted to a nine-year low of 3.3 per cent. Today more

than 60 per cent of the population earns less than \$2 a day and face an uncertain future. Pakistan economy continues to survive on foreign aid and remittances from expats rather than by domestic revenue. The recent FATF warning to Pakistan to exert itself to reduce terror funding or face consequences does not behove good for its already flailing economy.

Additionally, to further exacerbate the situation Pakistan ranks among the fifteen most backward countries as per literacy rate. In more than seventy years since independence, the literacy rateⁱⁱⁱ in Pakistan has risen from 14 per cent to around 62.3 percent in 2017-18, with male literacy being 72.5 per cent and female literacy rate being 51.8 per cent. With almost half the country's adult population being illiterate, it is resulting into economic stagnation, despondency and unemployment. The elite manage to provide quality education to their children through private school, colleges and Universities and majority of whom leave Pakistan forever. As for the middle and lower middle classes, the Urdu medium schools and Madrasas equip them with sub-standard education, restricting their employment to low / mid-level jobs. The religious fundamental leaders through their affiliated madrasas aim to propagate their own agenda and create a theocratic pool to forward their perverse ideology.

The bane of the matter is that in spite of numerous issues which rake Pakistan, minimal endeavour is made by the ruling dispensations or powerful military to assuage the concerns and alleviate the problems of local population. The various important aspects of socio political fault lines that ail Pakistan are covered in the succeeding paragraphs:

Ethno-Nationalism

“We are starting in the days where there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State”

Extract

Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s speech of
Aug 11, 1947

Since partition every province of Pakistan has been in a constant state of turmoil. There are grievances of political bias, economic mishandling, regional aspirations for greater autonomy / independence and the situation continues to fester. The progression of various provinces since partition is covered in the succeeding paragraphs:



- **East Bengal.** After it became apparent that the partition of India was almost a certainty, the Bengal Provincial Muslim League leaders^{iv} proposed that Bengal to remain unpartitioned and be made independent and it won't join either Pakistan or India. However, the proposal was rejected and massive population transfer began. Millions of Hindus migrated to India from East Bengal and vice versa. However, unlike Punjab, due to large scale violence,

population transfer happened almost immediately within a year; in Bengal since the violence was limited only to Kolkata and Noakhali the migration occurred gradually over the next three decades. Among Hindus those who were economically better off left for India soon after partition, however poorer Hindus belonging to lower castes found it difficult to migrate and stayed back. The situation in East Bengal became worst preceding the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971, when the Pakistani army systematically targeted ethnic Bengalis regardless of religious background.

The traumatic events of the 1971 civil war and subsequent secession of East Pakistan (creation of independent Bangladesh) had psychologically unsettling effects on Pakistan. The brutal civil war demonstrated that ethnic nationalism could override religious solidarity and this seriously undermined the Two Nation theory which was the foundation on which the state of Pakistan was created. The attempt to construct Pakistani nationhood based on religious identity had failed miserably.

- **Baluchistan.** It is the largest province of Pakistan^v (42 per cent of landmass) with least population density (5 per cent of total population). Although it has vast natural resources, Baluchistan is one of poorest and most backward regions of Pakistan. Shortly after independence, Baluchistan became restive as separatist insurgents rejected the King of Kalat's^{vi} decision to accede to Pakistan. The Nationalist movement led to violence, unrest and political disorder in the region which continued till the 1970s. In 1973, the security forces launched a massive military operation to control the deteriorating situation in Baluchistan. More than 80,000 troops duly supported by armoured

vehicles, attack helicopters, artillery guns and mortars attacked the Baluch guerrillas and their bases. Heavy losses were incurred by the insurgents with more than 3,300 casualties and 7,000 families were displaced. This led to temporary ebbing of the insurgency, however in 2000s, the insurgency resurged and large number of attacks on Pakistani troops, police, and civilians were carried out by the separatists. On 12 August 2009, Khan of Kalat declared himself ruler of Baluchistan and formally announced a Council for Independent Baluchistan. The council claimed allegiance of "all separatist leaders".

Baluchistan continues to be a battleground^{vii} with freedom-seeking Baloch on one side and brute state forces and unjust polity on the other. The discovery of more than 800 graves of abducted Baloch in Tutak and 18,000 missing persons bear testimony of the high handed approach of the security forces and state atrocities meted to the Baloch's. The blowback of the political and military injustices inflicted on the Baloch's has resulted in the insurgency previously limited to Marri and Mengal areas, today reaching every nook and corner of Baluchistan.

With the problem continuing to simmer, the ongoing construction of Gwadar port and CPEC has further aggravated the precarious situation. Baluch nationalists and underground organisations opposed CPEC from beginning, as they felt it would turn the Baluch people into a minority in their own province and showed little sign of direct economic benefits for impoverished locals. Baluch insurgents killed Chinese engineers and workers in recent months, putting the province on the edge. The first attack occurred on

18 April 2019, when 15 to 20 Baluch insurgents dressed in military uniform forced 14 passengers off a public bus and shot them, one by one. Most of the victims were from the Pakistan Navy and Coast Guards, whom Baluch insurgents view as occupying force. Again, on 11 May 2019, the Pearl Continental Hotel, a favourite of foreign dignitaries in the heart of Gwadar came under heavy fire. Three armed attackers from the Baluchistan Liberation Army breached the defences and opened fire on people inside. According to officials, five individuals - four hotel employees, including three security guards and a navy officer-lost their lives. With increasing frequency of attacks the incumbent government of Pakistan has substantially slowed progress on CPEC projects in the country.

- **Punjab**. Punjab^{viii} is Pakistan's second largest and most densely populated province. The partition resulted in the larger Western portion of Punjab becoming part of Pakistan. The partition of Punjab was a bloody and violent affair often described as one of the ten great tragedies of the 20th century. The violence and ethnic cleansing that took place in Punjab dwarf the violence that took place in other parts of India. Between 15 August to 31 December 1947 anything between 500,000 to 800,000 people lost their lives. 73 per cent of the people who came to Punjab as migrants were Punjabi's and majority settled in Punjab. The State was in total turmoil with no functional governance and administrative bodies, leading to mass carnage, robbery and plundering. The mass inter migration of population destroyed the very fabric of Punjab culture and traditions. Because of the scars of partition, it became the leading proponent of Islamic fundamentalism, providing recruits and refuge to various terrorist organisations to create unrest in India and it continues till date.

- **Sindh**. In comparison to Punjab, there were practically no riots or violence in the Sindh Province even though almost its entire Hindu population of about 800,000 were forced to move out to India except the poor Scheduled Caste Hindu's who stayed back^{ix}. The exodus of the Hindu middle class crippled the Sindhi society and its overall economy hit rock bottom. However, gradually the vacuum created by exodus of Hindu middle class was filled by influx of large Muslim refugees (Mohajirs) migrating from various parts of India. Within less than five years of partition, the Sindhi speaking population declined from 87 per cent to 67 per cent. The migrant population of Mohajirs became majority and the Sindhi's became a minority in Karachi. Amid the tumultuous events of the Partition, Sindh though achieved religious unanimity but lost the cultural harmony and composition. It comprised of a sandwiched society with Sindhi's in the lower and upper class and Urdu-speaking middle class (Mohajirs), who were not only alien to Sindhi culture and language but insisted on a distinct identity and independent political status. Today, the capital city Karachi is engulfed in major ethnic battle between Mohajirs, Pakhtoons, Baluchs and Sindhis besides religious Shia – Sunni conflict.

In 1948 Sindhi's started a nationalist movement^x seeking a separate Sindhi country. By the mid 1970's the Sindhi separatist movement was weakened by a mixture of inducements and military action. However, the nationalist feelings still simmers and grievances of the Sindhi population continue to run deep.

- **Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) {(Formerly Known as North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)}**. In July 1947, the British Government vide the Indian Independence Act 1947 declared, that the future of the North West Frontier Province would be decided by referendum. On 02 July 1947^{xi}, the referendum was held and according to the official results, out of 572,798 registered voters, only 292,118 votes were cast, 289,244 (99.02 per cent) in favour of Pakistan while only 2874 (0.98 per cent) were cast in favour of India. Thus NWFP became the fourth province of Pakistan with Pashtuns forming the largest ethnic group.

The Province remained heavily affected by events in Afghanistan over the years. In 1949, the Durand Line, the Interstate boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan was denounced by Afghanistan as it laid claims on large swaths of Pakistani lands abutting its boundary. Afghanistan also supported the secessionist movement of Pushtunistan in NWFP and the border dispute between the two States still continue.

During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, NWFP became the frontline state serving as a recruiting, training and supplying base of Mujahideens , to fight the Soviets. The unrest in Afghanistan lead to exodus of over five million Afghan refugees into the region creating massive management problems. The 1992 – 96 civil war in Afghanistan led to the rise of Taliban, which had large administrative support base in the region. In 2001, following the US intervention in Afghanistan post 9 / 11, North-West Frontier Province and bordering region became front-line state again, as part

of the global "War on Terror" and instability and unrest continues to haunt the province till date.

- **Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Merged With KP in 2018).**

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) was a semi-autonomous tribal region bordering Afghanistan almost exclusively inhabited by the largely Muslims Pashtuns. During the British period, the British could never succeed in completely calming the unrest in the region and the turmoil continues till date. The character of the region underwent a tumultuous shift beginning 1980s with the invasion of Afghanistan by USSR and entry of Afghan Mujahideen into FATA to seek safe haven. The spill overs from Afghanistan's wars brought FATA under international scrutiny, with U.S. President Barack Obama dubbing it "the most dangerous place in the world". In beginning of 2000's the local terrorist groups, Tehrik-e-Taliban and later the Afghan Taliban and other militants started entering FATA to take shelter and established bases for carrying out terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In March 2004, on pursuance of US, the Pakistani troops entered the Tribal Areas, but were met with fierce resistance and were forced to negotiate a truce with Pakistani Taliban, an indicator of the extent of Taliban's control over the region. Pakistani troops have launched number of operations in the region of South Waziristan and North Waziristan from 2004 till date, but repeatedly faced stiff resistance, incurred heavy casualties, with no consequential success. The operations in North Waziristan, Zarb-e-Azb like all preceding endeavours achieved subpar success, with no reported extermination of senior terrorist leaders or any major change in security situation in Pakistan.

In May 2018, the Pakistani government passed a historic constitutional amendment^{xii} that ended the semi-autonomous rule in the region, abolished the colonial-era laws that governed it and merged it with the country's territory. The merger was widely heralded as a way of ushering development into the impoverished tribal region and bringing peace and stability to its militant and conflict-laden history, instead the locals now have to deal with slow and unsteady development, delayed justice and further alienation^{xiii}. If the Province continues to operate at the current stagnant pace, it could push the growing Pashtun Spring down the road of anti-state movement, and possibly an outcry for separation. With the rising Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM)^{xiv} demanding an end to alleged extrajudicial acts by the Pakistani military, these post-merger issues come at an uncertain time. Recent clashes between Pashtun activists and the army, leading to the arrest of Pashtun legislators, have already angered the residents of the tribal districts.

- **Gilgit Baltistan.** The region is part of Kashmir that's been administered by Pakistan since the first war with India in 1947. The occupation took place without the consent of the people and, for over 70 years now, its legal identity and constitutional status have been under dispute. It has a semi-provincial status. The residents do not have a right to vote in the national elections, and limits on freedom of speech and expression have been imposed. Lacking proper legal rights and a democratic set-up, the territory has faced a number of human rights violations over the years. Currently, over a hundred activists have been charged with sedition for demanding greater

self-rule in the disputed territory. Students, social workers and political activists have also been languishing in jails.

Residents have been asking Islamabad to grant rights similar to those enjoyed by Pakistani citizens, however, Pakistan has been putting off the demands for decades. According to the 2018 Human Rights Watch^{xv} report on Pakistan, a climate of fear continues to impede media coverage of abuses by both government security forces and militant groups. Journalists in the territory continue to face threats and harassment in the course of carrying out their professional duties. The political crackdown and arrests are being made against people protesting against the CPEC, which they said would only benefit China and Pakistan's Punjabi traders. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), Pakistan's "response to local dissent and alienation has been an overbearing security presence, marked by army checkpoints, intimidation and harassment of local residents, and crackdowns on anti-CPEC protest."

Economic Crisis

Since partition Pakistan's economy, has experienced an uneven journey. It grew at a fairly impressive rate of 6 per cent for the first four decades, an achievement very few nations could boast of. Its per capita income of the population doubled, inflation remained low and poverty declined significantly^{xvi}. By 1969, Pakistan's exports were higher than the exports of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia combined. Pakistan was seen as a model of economic development worldwide, and there was praise for its economic prowess. Many countries sought to emulate Pakistan's economic planning strategy and one of them, South Korea, copied Karachi's second

"Five-Year Plan". Though speculative, it is possible that, had the existing economic policies and programs continued over the next two decades, Pakistan would have emerged as another miracle economy. The presidency of Ayub Khan is often dubbed as "Great Decade"^{xvii} during which various economic development plans and reforms, ensuring expeditious economic growth were promulgated. During his time, the private-sector gained more power to control the national economy and the educational reforms, human development and scientific achievements gained a lot of ground.

Bhutto's populist policies of nationalizing industries, banks, insurance companies, educational institutions and other organizations, thoroughly derailed Pakistan's journey toward modernization and economic development. This setback hit Pakistan so badly that the countries that were lagging behind Pakistan in growth and economic indicators in the late 1960s not only overtook it but also became huge success stories. The growth rate of Pakistan in the 1970s fell to 3.7 per cent per annum from 6 per cent recorded in the 1960s. Income inequalities rose and inflation accelerated, hurting the poor most.

Post Bhutto's adverse economic nationalization policies, to resurrect the failing economy, Zia ordered the end of centralised control and promulgated policies to improve both foreign and domestic environment in the country. By late 1980's, the financial environment in Pakistan improved and became conducive for investment. Under Zia's Presidency, the economy rose from under 4 per cent to 6.5 per cent. The dramatic spurt in Pak's economy was driven by massive aid from US, China and Saudi Arabia, besides remittances by 3 million Pakistani migrant workers^{xviii}. Remittances sent by Pakistani Nationals living abroad have always

served as an effective poverty coping mechanism in Pakistan. There has been an increasing trend in the remittances by expats over the past years, from \$ 3.87 billion in the fiscal year 2003-2004 to approx \$ 22.19 billion in 2018-19.

The 1990's saw withdrawal of Soviets from Afghanistan causing the foreign aid from US almost drying up. Additionally, the shaky democracy under Benazir and its populist policies lead to burgeoning fiscal deficit, amplified by ineffective domestic revenue collection. With the recession hitting the globe, the inflow of remittances from the immigrant Pakistan's also reduced.

From 1988 to 1999, a little over a decade nine different governments ruled Pakistan. Frequent changes in the government and reversal of the decisions taken by the preceding government created an environment of uncertainty. Pakistan's lost its credibility among the international financial community and local investors due to failure of the Governments to promulgate and implement long term economic policies and reforms. Additionally widespread corruption, economic mismanagement, personal interests and fiscally imprudent financial policies of the ruling dispensation dominated the decision making process, ignoring the recommendations of the intelligentsia and professional business institutions. Further the political parties also lacked the resolve to take tough and at times unpopular decisions which would help boost economy but may affect their future political prospects.

In the 1990s, Pakistan's economic growth plunged drastically from 6-7 per cent to between 3-4 per cent, the poverty level rose to 33 per cent, inflation was in double digits and the foreign debt amounted to nearly the entire GDP of Pakistan.. Pakistan's total public debt as percentage of GDP was the highest in South

Asia – 99.3 per cent of its GDP^{xix}. In 1998 the economic growth reached its lowest ebb at 2.6 per cent.


During the mid-2000s, under President General Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistani economy resurged. The national GDP between 2003–07 more than doubled from prevailing 3 - 4 per cent to averaging 7 per cent yearly, the country's debt burden halved restoring investors' confidence. Pakistan succeeded in reducing poverty by one-half and saw a dramatic expansion of urban middle class as more than 13 million jobs were created. In 2005, Pakistan was included by the Goldman Sachs Global Economics Group as one of the "Next Eleven (N-11)" – a group of countries with economies that “might have the kind of potential for global impact, essentially an ability to match the G7 in size”. The improved economic state facilitated Pakistan’s re-entry in the international capital markets as the large capital inflows financed the current account deficit and contributed to an increase in gross economic development.

By October 2007, Pakistan through its exceptional fiscal policies raised its Foreign Reserves to a handsome \$16.4 billion, its trade deficit was controlled, exports boomed and lot of foreign investment flew in. The country's real GDP and international trade volume increased almost three times and the per capita income more than doubled.

However, the economic honeymoon was short lived and from the beginning of 2008, Pakistan's economy started to decline. Prevailing security situation and Pakistan’s role in the War on Terror as a frontline state created anxiety amongst both domestic and foreign investors, forcing massive exodus of financial capital from Pakistan to other neighbouring countries and Middle East. The adverse domestic

environment inflicted a debilitating blow to Pakistan's economy, leading to escalating trade deficits, high inflation and Balance of Payment crisis.

Despite marginal



recovery, the real GDP of Pakistan grew from 3.83 per cent in 2012 to 4.13 per cent in 2014^{xx}. The rate of unemployment declined marginally from 7.6 per cent in 2005-06 to 6 per cent in 2013-14^{xxi}, but the numbers of unemployed remain high because of its huge youth population.

The Pakistan's economy continues to be on a downward spiral with massive debts, rampant corruption, increasing unemployment, inflation and widening fiscal deficit. The present dispensation, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) chief Imran Khan presented its first-ever Budget on 11 June 2019. Pakistan's overall budget of Rs 6-lakh crore for this financial year had a fiscal deficit of Rs 3.5-lakh crore. Its GDP has hit a nine-year low. Despite touching a maximum of 5.8 per cent growth in FY18, its economy's growth for FY 19 plummeted to 3.3 per cent, well below the target of 6.2 per cent set last year, with major sectors all performing poorly. The budget also projected the economy to grow at a rate of 2.4 per cent in FY20, while inflation is estimated to remain high.

Pakistan is one of the poorest in terms of income and lowest in social indices. The cost of living in Pakistan continues to soar and the economic asymmetry

between the poor and rich continues to widen, which currently is among the largest in the world. More than 60 per cent of the population earns less than \$2 a day and face an uncertain economic future. The presence of large pool of unemployed youths, makes a very lucrative option for radical and terrorist's organisation to exploit for recruitment.

Corruption, poor governance and terrorism are the greatest obstacles in economic development of the country. Owing to populist policies and vested interests, much of the economy remains outside the Government's reach, adversely effecting revenue generation. The large unofficial economy, estimated to be 50 to 100 percent of the size of the regular economy, makes it hard for Government to collect the due taxes.

Another bane which since partition has denied development of the Pakistani economy is feudalism and Army's self-serving financial interests. The Feudalism in Pakistan (zamīndāri nizam) has a stranglehold on the economy and politics of the nation. The feudal landlords have created states within a state where they rule their fiefs with impunity while not contributing a paisa as tax to the state. The landlord's influence spans over the police, bureaucracy and judiciary. The majority of the politicians in Pakistan are themselves feudal landlords with more than two-thirds of the National Assembly (lower house of the legislature) is composed of this class. Besides, most of the key executive posts in the provinces are held by them. Many children of feudal families are also argued to take up bureaucratic roles to support family agendas, while interests of majority population is totally disregarded and they live at subsistence level.

To further accentuate the fragile economic situation is the Army's corporate interests and its grip on country's budget. In spite of meagre funds available to the State to meet the colossal requirement of essential and high priority developmental and social sector infrastructure projects for employment generation, the military continues to get the lions share of the national cake after debt servicing. In the budget for 2019-20, defence spending accounted for 33 per cent of the total revenue available to the federal government^{xxii}. Just debt servicing and defence, account for the entire federal government's revenue. Every other expenditure made by the government is met from borrowing. Army in order to present a politically correct picture while the country is in economic distress and top economists are demanding significant cuts in defence expenditure, Army has conceded to reduce its budget as a favour to the State. However, if the past record is anything to go by and given the Pakistani penchant for cooking books and hiding defence expenditures under other heads, chances are the 'sacrifice' that the Pakistan military is making with so much fanfare is more cosmetic than it is substantive. And if need be so felt for additional budget, an anti-India rhetoric about its hegemonic design and desire to annihilate Pakistan is enough justification to loot the country of its scarce resources.

The military also runs business enterprises like "Fauji Foundation", one of the largest business conglomerates in Pakistan^{xxiii} which manages about 50 commercial entities. It has grown exponentially from Rs 152 million in 1970 to Rs 9.8 billion in 2000 and is still flourishing. The growth is more because of large subsidies and concessions received from the government at the expense of others^{xxiv}. According to Bloomberg^{xxv}, the Foundation's assets grew 78 percent between 2011 and 2015, and it has annual income of over \$1.5 billion. The military-backed organization has stakes in real estate, food, and the communications industry as well.

Dr Ayesha Siddiqa, a former researcher with the country's naval forces, estimated that the military's net worth would be more than \$20 billion, "split between \$10 billion in land and \$10 billion in private military assets." According to Dr Siddiqa,^{xxvi} \$10 billion was roughly four times the total foreign direct investment generated by Islamabad. She also found that the "army owns 12 per cent of the country's land, its holdings being mostly fertile soil in eastern Punjab. Two-thirds of that land is in the hands of senior current and former officials, mostly brigadiers, major-generals and generals. The most senior 100 military officials are estimated to be worth, at the very least, £3.5 billion" (2007 estimates). Siddiqa argues that the military like the feudal class, leverages its power to redistribute land within its fraternity and shows no regard for the country's poor populations. The military exploits the state's resources in partnership with its civilian clients and politicians.

The military's throttling of public interest and its arrogant, dismissive attitude and flagrant profiteering has engendered resentment against the Army. To counter the adverse attitude of the impoverished and subjugated populace the army has created a perception of it being the sole responder and saviour of Islamic Pakistan from the hegemonic design of Hindu India which has a singular agenda to destroy it.

Sub-Par Education System

"... the importance of education and the type of education cannot be over-emphasized ... there is no doubt that the future of our State will and must greatly depend upon the type of education we give to our children, and the way in which we bring them up as future citizens of Pakistan ... we should not forget that we have to compete with the world which is moving very fast in this direction."


Jinnah, in his message to the Conferences in
1947

Education is the most essential ingredient for development of any nation. It is a global fact that nations who have achieved the heights of development and prosperity have done it by using education and information as a tool to do it. Education is simply an investment to achieve both human and economic development but unfortunately it is one of the biggest problems in Pakistan.

Pakistan achieved independence in August 1947. The regions comprising Pakistan were among the least developed in the world with the overall literacy rate of being just 14 per cent and the more backward regions of the country, e.g., Baluchistan, the literacy rate was even lower, with the rate for rural women being virtually zero^{xxvii}. Even post partition, the education sector was not given due priority and the primary focus was on Industrial and Infrastructure development. This continued for almost half a century and the standard of primary and secondary education remained below par^{xxviii}.

The rural population of Pakistan is very conservative and don't encourage education of girls leading to a highly skewed ratio of boys and girls in primary schools which being – 10 (Boys) : 4 (Girls). In Human Development Report

Pakistan^{xxix} is placed at 136th position for having just 49.9 per cent educated population. In addition to that, Pakistan is ranked 113th out of 120



registered UN members according to the research conducted by UNESCO.

The real dent in the education system came during the Zia decade, where focus from modern contemporary education shifted to Islamic religious teachings and Madrasas mushroomed duly aided by state exchequer. However, subsequent dispensations also continued to neglect the education sector, as other services competed for the Pakistan's meagre budget, with Army getting disproportionately high share.

Pakistan's educational incongruity lies not in the access to education facilities but in the access to type of educational facility. Education in Pakistan is polarised along the socio-economic lines, wherein children from varying background subscribe to corresponding class of Schools, with very little intermingling between them. The education system in Pakistan is divided into three distinct segments – the traditional

‘madaris’ , the religious schools affiliated to religious seminaries of different sect propagating their religious teachings and beliefs, the Urdu Medium Government schools which caters for majority children and lastly the Private schools which basically educate the children of the rich and the empowered.

- **Madrassa System.** Education in Pakistan post partition got heavily influenced by religion. At the time of independence there were 137 madrassas^{xxx} in Pakistan. Within a decade the number almost doubled and by 2000 there were 7,000 madrassas. In 2004-2005, the government estimated there were 13,000 seminaries in Pakistan and today according to unofficial estimates they range between 15,000 and 25,000, and in some cases as high as 40,000.

The explosion of Madrassa’s promoting radicalisation and Islamic ideology originated under Gen Zia and proliferated during the decade with funding from the State. With the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan quickly became a frontline US ally in its fight against the Soviets and communism in Afghanistan. Saudi and US money poured into Pakistan to fund madrassas responsible for recruiting, mobilizing public opinion and training jihadis and other vehicles of Islamist militancy to help fight the Afghan Jihad. Madrassa proliferation did not end with Zia or with the end of the Afghan Jihad, Pakistani military patronage of these institutions continued even under civilian rule during the 90s which coincided with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the rise of Taliban. Sunni-Deobandi groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and its later offshoot, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ)^{xxxii}, grew out of these jihadi madrassas. The countrywide network of

mosques and madrassas remain major centers of jihadi recruitment to date, providing recruits for internal sectarian conflicts, “regional jihad” in Afghanistan, terrorism in India and the “global terrorism” against the West. In fact, both the SSP and LJ have been responsible for providing recruits, finances and weapons to Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) contributing to its rise. These groups are also accused of serving as al-Qaeda principal allies in the region.

The madrassa system, largely caters for the children of the poorest, underprivileged, and lowest strata of the society. The orientation of the curriculum is primarily along religious lines, producing graduates with narrow-minded orthodox ideological alignment. Approximately 1.3 per cent of Pakistani children going to school are enrolled in madrassas. Though the percentage may appear inconsequential, but translates into large youth population.

Social and economic factors and the government's failure to enact widespread educational reform have contributed to the continued popularity of the madrasa system. The country's annual population growth rate of nearly 2 percent, with 35 percent of the population earning less than the \$1.00 per day, has caused madrasas to flourish and become a leading source of education for a large part of the impoverished urban and rural population. Today as per unconfirmed sources about 1.5 million students are enrolment in various madrassa.

- **Urdu-Medium Government Schools.** The Government run Urdu-medium schools caters for over 90 per cent of school going children^{xxxii}.

Majority of students in these schools belong to the lower-middle or middle class strata of the society. Pakistan has more than 80,000 Government primary schools, but nearly a quarter of these have teachers who are untrained and incompetent. The quality of education is dismal with virtually no control or accountability to achieve any laid down standards or outcomes. The situation is depressing and neglect by Government continues to further exacerbate the situation.

- **Private Schools.** The elite and empowered class of population enrol their children in private sector schools, which provide high quality education and facilities. They have all but abandoned the public education system. Very limited / no interaction between the children from elitist schools is seen with other class of schools. In spite of competence and education prowess, access to private schools is limited to the powerful and rich with strong socio-economic credentials.

The inherent stratification in the education system has resulted in significant differences in the outlook of students. Students passing from the Madrassa's have a more fundamentalist and pro-jihadi outlook, while students of Urdu-medium schools are relatively less radicalised and more tolerant to the idea of Islam. The children from English medium school have a more secular outlook with greater acceptance to the modern concept and ideology. Further the children of the elite treat their counterparts from Madrassa's and Urdu speaking institutions with disdain and consider it below their dignity to interact with them, creating acrimony and hostility between the classes which may have perilous implications. Majority of youths graduating from Government Schools and Madarsas are barely literate and unfit to tenant any job of significance, leading to discontentment and frustration. The idea of

haves versus have not's is present in the jihadi propaganda of virtually all Islamist outfits.

The state of higher educational in public universities and colleges is equally pitiable with substandard quality of education. Rather, some universities have become recruitment pool for radical thinkers and activists leading to violence and battles between students aligned to various religious sects in the campuses. In response to pathetic standards of higher public educational institutes, number of private universities have mushroomed, but high fee structure and limited vacancies deny admission to majority.

Pakistan ranks among the fifteen^{xxxiii} most backward countries as per literacy rate. The elite manage to provide quality education to their children through private school, colleges and Universities and bulk of them leave Pakistan forever. As for the middle and lower middle classes, the Urdu medium schools and Madrasas equip them with sub-standard education, restricting their employment to middle level jobs. The religious fundamental leaders through their affiliated madrasas aim to propagate their own agenda of creating a theocratic pool to forward their ideology.

In the fiscal year 2018-19 Pakistan' public expenditure on education as a percentage of the GDP is estimated at 2.4 percent^{xxxiv}, the lowest in the region, revealed the Economic Survey (2018-2019). According to UNDP's Human Development Report 2018, Pakistan is ranked 150th out of 189 countries with a Human Development Indicator (HDI) value of 0.562 (with 1 being the maximum value). According to the educational indicators, only Afghanistan lags behind Pakistan in the context of regional comparison. All other regional countries have shown improvement in HDI in comparison to Pakistan.

In recent times with almost 30 per cent of population being less than 30 years of age, the Government both Federal and Provincial have increased budget allocation on education. In 2017-18 the literacy rate stood at 62.3 percent as compared to 60.7 percent in 2014-15, with male literacy increasing from 71.6 per cent to 72.5 per cent and female literacy rate going from 49.6 per cent to 51.8 per cent. Area wise analysis suggests that literacy rate increased marginally in both rural (51.9 per cent to 53.3 per cent) and urban areas (76.0 per cent to 76.6 per cent).

It is also observed that male-female disparity is decreasing with time. The literacy rate increased in most provinces with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa going from 54.1 per cent to 55.3 per cent, Punjab 61.9 per cent to 64.7 per cent and Balochistan 54.3 per cent to 55.5 per cent. Sindh was the only province which registered a marginal decline (63.0 per cent to 62.2 per cent).

Public Expenditure on education was estimated at 2.4 percent^{xxxv} of GDP in 2017-18, as compared to 2.2 percent in 2016-17. Education expenditure has been rising gradually since the FY2013-2014. The education-related expenditure increased by 18.6 percent (to Rs 829.2 billion) in 2017-18 which however is grossly inadequate..

The provincial governments are also spending a sizeable amount of their Annual Development Plans (ADPs)^{xxxvi} on education. Punjab increased its expenditure in 2017-18 to Rs. 340.8 billion as compared to Rs. 260.6 billion in 2016-17, showing a significant increase of 30.8 percent. Sindh also increased its expenditure from Rs. 146.7 billion in 2016-17 to Rs. 166.0 billion in 2017-18 showing an increase of 13.16 percent. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan also increased their expenditure on education from Rs. 136.1 billion to Rs. 142.6 billion

and from Rs. 47.7 billion in 2016-17 to Rs. 52.8 billion in 2017-18, respectively. The status of Gilgit Baltistan also remains similarly dismal.

In spite of the tall claims made by the federal and provincial governments about improving the education sector, official statistics released on 05 July 2018 presented a bleak picture showing 22.84 million^{xxxvii} children still out of school. There was even a slight increase in the number of out of school children compared to the figures released last year according to which in 2015-16, there were 22.63m children out of school. The annual report launched by caretaker minister for education Mohammad Yusuf Shaikh stated that out of the total 51.53 million children between the age of five and 16, as many as 22.84 million i.e. 44 per cent were out of school. The figures were highlighted in a report - Pakistan Education Statistics 2016-17 - which was launched by the Academy of Educational Planning and Management (AEPAM), a subsidiary of the federal education ministry.

Though effort is being made by the current dispensation to improve the infrastructure and standard of education, but it's still grossly adequate. A large uneducated youth with no job opportunities is a sure recipe for disaster to occur.

CHAPTER III : ISLAMISATION AND SECTARIANISM IN PAKISTAN

“I would like to remind the house that the Father of the Nation, Quaid-i-Azam, gave expression of his feelings on this matter on many occasions, and his views were endorsed by the nation in unmistakable terms, Pakistan was founded because the Muslims of this sub-continent wanted to build up their lives in accordance with the teachings and traditions of Islam, because they wanted to demonstrate to the world that Islam provides a panacea to the many diseases which have crept into the life of humanity today”

Liaquat Ali Khan, First Prime Minister of
Pakistan

While moving the Objective Resolution on 12 March
1949

Pakistan came into being as a State for the Muslims with Islam as unifying ideology. It today has world’s second largest Muslim population and has largest share of Shias after Iran. Based on the demands of the Islamists for an Islamic constitution, Objectives Resolutions which would become preamble to the constitution was formulated. It affirmed the commitment of making Pakistan an Islamic State rather than a secular state and after nine years of efforts, Pakistan was successful in framing a constitution. The Constituent Assembly adopted it on 29 February 1956, and it was enforced on 23 March 1956, proclaiming Pakistan to be an Islamic republic The decision to make Pakistan an Islamic State was motivated by the fact that Pakistan had multiple identities and the adoption of Islam as the

unifying ideology offered the best prospect of countering the divisive potential of Pakistan's diversity.

The idea of an Islamic Pakistan was seized upon by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He applied Islamic rhetoric to Pakistan's foreign and strategic policy, hosting a major Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) meeting in Lahore in 1974. He also supported several extremist groups in the opposition to Afghan government. Gradually Islamist parties gained prominence to such a level that Pakistani governments sought compromise with Islamists.

The rise of radical militant Islam in Pakistan can be traced to the rule of General Zia ul Haq (1979-89)^{xxxviii}. Zia, himself a devout Deobandi Muslim, espoused and promoted a regime ideologically based on an orthodox version of Sunni Islam. Soon after assuming power, Zia embarked on a



process of state-led Islamization. He believed that Islamic principles should be guiding Pakistan and that Islam made a man a better citizen. During his years in power Zia extended and reinforced the Islamisation of Pakistan out of belief that the more devout a country, the better country it would be. Extending the Islamic reforms introduced by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Zia allowed the 'Tableghi Jamaat' or 'Society for Spreading Faith' to operate freely within the state. The abrupt growth in the number of mosques in Pakistan during the Zia and Bhutto regimes was an indicator of the

growing Islamisation of the country. At the time of partition there were about 250 religious schools in Pakistan which later rose to almost 45,000, of which about 10 to 15 percent preach hatred and provide military training. During Zia's government an Islamic religious cut from bank accounts was deducted to fund the local religious institutions. Additionally money from the Gulf States especially Saudi Arabia began to also flow into these madrassas, which taught a combination of Wahhabism and Deobandi to make a mixture of conservative theologies.

During the election in 1970 religious parties secured only 10 per cent of the national vote. However, during the Presidency of Zia with state patronage the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), a religious party expanded its influence in state institutions and military and its members were given cabinet portfolios. Zia's Islamization campaign included cruel restrictions, especially on women, under the Hudood Ordinances^{xxxix}, which attempted to impose a set of putative Islamic laws on Pakistan and the Qanun-e-Shahadat or the Law of Evidence (1984), which reduced the testimony of a woman to half that of a man in a Pakistani court of law. Zia also implemented ordinances on Ushr and Zakat (Islamic tax), established Shariat courts to hear cases under Islamic law, and Islamized Pakistan's education system. In 1982, and again in 1986, he made changes in the Pakistan Penal code to include the death penalty for those convicted of blasphemy.

Under Zia, the military and its intelligence wing, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) forged close contacts with Islamist parties to mobilise support for jihad against the Soviets. While religious parties were certainly not a monolith, Zia was successfully able to unite them under the banner of Islam in support of the military government's external and domestic policies. The JI, as well as Zia's other

Islamist ally, the Jamaat-i-Ulema Islam (JUI), organised training camps, conducted recruitment efforts and other jihadi activities in support of the Afghan war. As American and Saudi money also poured into Pakistan to fund the Afghan jihad, the money was also accompanied by Wahhabi propaganda literature and preachers who, with the help of Pakistani Deobandi groups, oversaw the creation of new madrassas and mosques in Pakistan. Their purpose was to increase the influence of Sunni Wahhabi Islam in Pakistan and prepare recruits for the jihad in Afghanistan. Groups such as LeT received Saudi funding allowing them to expand their operations. LeT's compound in Murdike, near Lahore (Punjab) was established in 1988 with Saudi money with the explicit purpose of spreading the teachings of Wahhabi Islam.

After the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, the ISI deployed these militant groups for a supposed new jihad to wrest control of Kashmir from India. The Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), spearheaded the Kashmir insurgency that had erupted in 1989. JUI madrassas provided recruits for Deobandi militant groups operating in Kashmir, particularly the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), and its offshoot, the Jaish-e-Mohd.

Pakistan with a large population of underprivileged youth and the current socioeconomic conditions coupled with the madrasa education, make it much easier for fundamentalist religious groups to harness the rich recruitment pool and propagate idea of radical Islam. Darul Uloom Haqqania, a seminary in the North-West Frontier Province and one of the largest madrasas in Pakistan, displays tanks and Kalashnikovs much like a military training school. About 3,000 young students, mostly from the underprivileged, deprived classes, pass out every year from here and, as a matter of course, are expected to spend their lives in service of Islam, and

dedicate their lives to jihad. Additionally a new brand of jihadi females are emerging in Pakistan; these 'burqa-clad' students, who belong to madrasas, brandish sticks while they demand imposition of sharia laws and the banishment of all 'dens of vice'.

The well-planned suicide attack on Benazir Bhutto on 27 December 2007 that killed her demonstrated the reach of the radical groups. On her return to Pakistan, one of her e-mail said,^{x1} "those who support the Taliban and oppose me continue to have high positions in government. Musharraf doesn't remove them nor has he kept any of the promises he made guaranteed by third parties. Yesterday (before Musharraf's state of emergency), television channels broadcasted a meeting in Bajaur where a mullah claimed that he and his group will kill me in Rawalpindi. The fact that militants hold open meetings without fear of retaliation proves that the Musharraf regime is totally inept, unwilling or colluding in their expansion." Mahmoud Al Hasan, a leader of the extremist Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen, declared Benazir Bhutto and Musharraf as "slaves" of the US. Bhutto, in addition, was labelled as an infidel and deserved to die as she was the enemy of Islam and jihadis".

Majority of Pakistan's militant organisations germinated during the anti-Soviet jihad but subsequently evolved into lethal sectarian entities. The Harkat ul Mujahideen (HUM), LeT and JeM developed close affinity with the Afghan Taliban and later became heavily involved in spreading terrorism in Kashmir. Most of these militant organisations in Pakistan had a smooth going for themselves till the beginning of Global War on Terror which started after the events of 9/11. They enjoyed the support of Pakistani establishment for the strategic objectives both in

Afghanistan and Kashmir and had their roots and bases in central Pakistan, in the most populous province of Punjab.

Post 9/11, after the U-turn by General Musharraf, when the Pakistani Army started targeting the Afghan Taliban as a front line state in GWOT, the so-called Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) (TTP) appeared on the scene and mounted violent revolt against the government. The Pakistani security forces since then have been facing repeated attacks by radical Islamic elements operating under the umbrella organization of TTP. Their jihad is aimed not just at “infidels occupying Afghanistan”, but also the “infidels” who are ruling and running Pakistan including Army and maintaining the secular values of Pakistani society. “They aim to cleanse Pakistan and turn it into a pure Islamic state”.

During, the Karachi defence expo in 2015, Gen Raheel Sharif reiterated that the main threat to Pakistan was from the supra national forces of disorder - implicitly referring to non- state actors. Overtime the jihadi movement has rapidly spread to new areas of Pakistan; radicalising large cross section of illiterate and unemployed youth. The efforts of the Pakistan government to curb the militant activities of madrasas that provide recruits for the jihadi movement have been half-hearted; resulting in increasing violence and lawlessness. Security forces have generally proved ineffective in dealing with the Taliban elements calling for Islamic laws. The Pakistani army operating in Waziristan has suffered more than 1,000 fatal casualties. The sincerity of Pakistani establishment to deal with Jihadi organisation is questionable as they utilise them to further their own vested interest.

As regards India, Islamabad has been openly supporting terror groups in Punjab in directing attacks against India. JeM, has been enjoying state and Army

patronage in Punjab and as per Praveen Swami, in a column on First Post on July 27, 2018, disclosed that JeM had been secretly building a complex on a 15-acre area on the outskirts of the city of Bahawalpur—five times the size of its existing headquarters. In the complex, the Jaish hopes to train thousands of young children from Punjab to ‘sacrifice’ themselves to the cause of Jihad. Further, the Hafiz Muhammad Saeed led Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), the front organisation of LeT, is also openly engaged in anti-India activities and operates out of its Headquarters in Murdike in Punjab. The radical Islamic movement in Pakistan is also connected with the global jihadi movement and is not a local phenomenon. Enough evidence of close links between al Qaeda-Taliban combine and domestic terrorist groups such as LeT and JeM, which are also operating in Kashmir exists. Hafiz Muhammad Saeed co-founder of LeT and the chief of JuD, is listed on the NIA most wanted list and are UN designated terrorist. In April 2012, the United States announced a bounty of \$10 million on Saeed for his alleged role in the 2008 Mumbai attacks that killed 164 civilians. In spite of that Saeed operates freely across Pakistan under patronage of Pakistan Army, holding rallies dominated by anti-India rhetoric, inciting cadres to wage jihad against India.

On 11 Feb 2020, an anti-terrorism court in Pakistan sentenced Hafiz Mohammad Saeed to 11 years in jail for financing terrorist operations. The accused will serve two five-and-a-half years prison terms concurrently. Significantly, Saeed's conviction comes a week before the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which discusses Pakistan's progress in curbing terror financing. The timing of the arrest may lie in Pakistan's threat of being blacklisted by the FATF, growing international isolation since the mid-2000s, and ever worsening economic woes. The US State Department called the conviction of Saeed a "step forward".

But many see these actions as just meant for optics, with no serious action visible against major militant groups such as JuD and JeM. Hafiz Saeed was arrested in last July also, three months before FATF's scheduled review of whether Pakistan was complying with its action plan. In the review held in October, Pakistan was found lacking on several counts, and the decision on whether to downgrade it was put off until the next review. The International Co-operation Review Group (ICRG)^{xli} of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) held its review on 18 February 2020 and recommended that Pakistan be retained on the “Grey List”, given its failure to completely implement the 27-point action plan to check terror financing. Most of the group members were in favour of continuing the pressure on Pakistan to execute all the measures suggested against funding of banned terror outfits and United Nations designated global terrorists operating from its soil. Pakistan's Minister for Economic Affairs Hamad Azhar assured the group that all the objectives would be achieved as early as June 2020. He claimed that since the last FATF Plenary, the country had taken all possible measures against terror financing. Mr. Azhar said Pakistan had acted against trans-national terror funding operations on priority and that it had convicted unprecedented number of persons, which includes LeT chief Hafiz Saeed. All the shortcomings identified in the mutual evaluation report would also be addressed soon, he added.

India countered Pakistan's claims, saying the recent action taken by Islamabad against Saeed and others was an attempt to evade further FATF sanctions. India asserted that the terror funding operations were still on and outfits such as the LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed, whose chief Masood Azhar's location as per Pakistan is “unknown”, were having a free run in Pakistan.

Based on historical precedence, Pakistan will create a façade of taking action against terrorists and terror financing to get out of FATF grey list but will continue with terror business as usual. Given Saeed's close links with the Pakistani security establishment, it is unlikely that he will be abandoned by the Pakistani establishment, made to serve a full sentence and condemned to the life of a convicted criminal.

Military rulers and right wing politicians in Pakistan have continued to and in future also will persist to patronise militant activities of extremist Islamic organisations and exploit them for political purposes - utilising their vote bank or for deploying them as proxies. Many people rather have eulogised their social, charitable and welfare activities, thus making them very popular with the masses and deterring the dispensation to take any harsh action against the organisation or its leadership, if at all they intend to under pressure.

Even liberal political parties looked the other way as foreign powers and Pakistan's security establishment used these militants as proxies in regional and global conflicts. In due course, nationalist and sub nationalist militant organisations also emerged in the country owing, partly if not entirely, to the deteriorating security situation. Hence, as long as radicalized forces find fertile ground in Punjab under state patronage, the problem of terrorism will continue to constitute a threat for the entire region and globally. The overall situation in Pakistan seems rather bleak with radicalisation continuing to spread rapidly across the country with global spill over.

In recent times, Pakistan has proscribed some militant organisations and their members under pressure from global powers and international regulatory authorities. Proscription, though, has had little impact on the activities of these organisations.

This is mainly because the laws enacted – including the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) 1997 – and the initiatives taken – such as the National Action Plan formulated in December 2014 – for curbing their activities have never been implemented in letter and spirit.

Over the last few years, though, there has been a growing realisation among the ruling class that the policy of nurturing, patronising and appeasing religious militant organisations was flawed and would not work any longer. But reversing these decades-long covert and, at times, overt policies overnight is not feasible nor desirable by Pakistan's because of its nefarious interest.

There are always apprehensions that militant organisations could react with violence if and when a strict action is taken against them. These misgivings are certainly not misplaced and it's an uncontrollable monster which will not die with a whimper and would continue to inflict harm for times to come.


Sectarian In Pakistan

“You are free, you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or cast or creed — that has nothing to do with the business of the State..”

Extract Mohammad Ali Jinnah's speech of Aug 11, 1947

Pakistan has the world's largest share of Muslims after Indonesia and the world's largest share of Shias after Iran. Although precise figures are unavailable, with Muslims majority (96.28 per cent)^{xlii} it is estimated that Sunnis comprise 75 to 80 percent of Pakistan's population, while Shias make up around 15 to 20 percent, 3.19 per cent. are Christians and Hindu and 2.7 – 3.2 per cent others. 0.22 per cent are Ahmadis who are officially considered non-Muslims by virtue of a 1974 constitutional amendment. Sunni-Shia relations in Pakistan had remained largely peaceful until the late 1970s. Not only were Sunni-Shia relations nonviolent, they were also not particularly important when it came to politics. This began to change in the early 1980s, as then military dictator Zia-ul-Haq implemented a nationwide Islamization policy, which privileged particular schools of extremist Sunni thought and began to polarize Sunni-Shia relations. The Iranian Revolution of 1978–79 further stroked the issue. Zia's regime reformed the constitution extensively, entrenching orthodox interpretations of Sunni Islam, which alienated both Shias and Barelvis. Such reforms

included an ordinance to enforce zakat (religious tax), which allowed for the automatic deduction of this tithe from personal bank accounts, contradicting Shia jurisprudence. Islamic



parties, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, which had assisted army in bringing down Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, were allowed to extend their influence into the

bureaucracy and institutions of public education in exchange for supporting the military.

Sectarianism in Pakistan became an arena for a broader geopolitical competition between the governments of Saudi Arabia and Iran for influence in Pakistan. Additionally, the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad, supported and financed by both the United States and Saudi Arabia, further fuelled this proxy war. This funding stream strengthened and armed Sunni groups on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and established a network of madaris (religious schools) following the Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith sub sects of Sunni Islam throughout the country. In turn, Iran provided funding to Pakistani Shia clerics who had returned from studying in Najaf and Qom to establish their own religious seminaries in Punjab.

Sunni militancy also contributed to a backlash from the traditionally moderate Barelvis leading to emergence of radical Barelvi groups such as the Dawat-i-Islami formed in the early 1980s to counterbalance the growth of the Deobandi Tableeghi Jamaat. In 1992, splits within the Jamiat Ulema Pakistan (JUP), Pakistan's oldest Barelvi party led to the formation of the militant Sunni Thereek (ST).

In mid-eighties, a group of Sunni clerics led by Haq Nawaz Jhangvi under State patronage, formed the anti-Shia : Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi^{xliii} with aid from Saudi Arabia. The SSP operated as a political party, achieving some success in Punjab elections, but was primarily involved in sectarian terrorism. In response, the Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan (SMP), a Shia extremist group, was formed to defend the Shia community and allegedly carried out a number of retaliatory killings. General Pervez Musharraf banned both the SSP and SMP in 2001-02. However, the SSP was re-established under a new name, first as the Millat-

i-Islamia Pakistan in 2003 and subsequently as the Ahle-Sunnat-Wal-Jamaat (ASWJ). The ASWJ contested elections in 2013, despite the organization's formally banned status. A militant offshoot of SSP, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi that was formed in 1996 is viewed as responsible for much of the sectarian violence occurring in Pakistan today. Such extremist groups consider Ahmedia's, Shias, as well as subsects of Sunni Islam as Barelvis, as apostates / infidels deserving death.

All these sectarian groups have a specific institutional base, the madrassas or Islamic seminaries and their growth and effectiveness is directly linked to the rise of these institutions. At the time of partition there were only about 250 religious schools in Pakistan which currently have risen to almost 45,000 of which some 10 to 15 percent preach hatred and provide military training. Deobandi madrassas frequently issue anti-Shia fatwas calling for a constitutional amendment to declare Shias non-Muslim. The political parties have turned a blind eye to the activities of these organizations and militant groups and rather are seeking their help for securing votes during elections. According to data from media reports based on the SATP, since 1988 while the number of sectarian incidents has ebbed averaging around hundred incidents per year however, the incidents have become increasingly dangerous, with an average of more than one thousand people getting killed or injured in sectarian attacks every year since 2009, which is three times the annual rate during the 1990s.

The whole country is afflicted with the problem of sectarian clashes and violence. Cities such as Karachi which underwent large demographic upheaval because of influx of Pashtuns and Baluchs have suffered relatively more than others in recent years. Some of the most deadly attacks have been those targeting the

Hazara Shia community that lives primarily in Baluchistan and Northern Areas. An ethnic minority overwhelmingly Shia, the Hazara are especially vulnerable targets for groups such as the LeJ. Human Rights Watch estimates that “of Shias killed across Pakistan in 2012, around a quarter of the victims were Quetta Hazaras. The violence against Shia’s continue by Sunni Muslim militant groups in both Pakistan and neighbouring Afghanistan. On 12 April 19 the Shi’ite Hazaras blocked traffic in a sit-in protest in the southwestern Pakistani city of Quetta after a suicide bomber killed 19 people in an outdoor market, many of them ethnic Hazaras. The bloodshed came two days after authorities freed Ramzan Mengal, a top leader of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Amnesty International condemned the attack and said ‘ the 12 April 19 blast was a painful reminder of the many attacks suffered by the Hazara community over the years”, however local dispensation showed no such concern.

On 27 Jan 20, Police arrested Manzoor Pashteen, a popular Pashtun leader of KP, a military critic and the leading figure of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), in the north-western city of Peshawar. PTM, which was founded in 2018, have accused the military of conducting extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and unlawful detentions. Pashteen who has led number of peaceful demonstrations in the past has been accused by Pak Army of running an anti-national agenda and making false accusations against the military. Hence, on 27 Jan 20 he was arrested for "disturbing public order" ahead of a planned rally highlighting the atrocities of the Pakistan Army and the dispensation against the Pashtun minorities at Peshawar. Any voice raised by the minorities demanding their rights is crushed by the military with utter disregard for human rights or collateral damage.

In recent years, sectarian tensions in Pakistan is being played out in a national context where the writ of the state is facing a broader and more concerted challenge from militants who justify their actions on the basis of a claim to Islamic legitimacy. Groups that recruit and organize around sectarian hatred link to and support groups that target the Pakistani state. Sectarian organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) have strong ties with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the umbrella organization responsible for much of the violence in Pakistan today, and several former LeJ leaders have assumed important positions within the TTP's ranks. Although estimates of the number killed or injured in sectarian attacks vary depending on the source, however all statistics indicate that sectarian violence in Pakistan remains a major problem today. Violence motivated by sectarianism has taken many forms in Pakistan. Prominent representatives from each sect have been victims in tit-for-tat targeted killings. One group launches armed attacks and bombing against another group's mosques, schools, funerals and religious processions and the other group retaliates even more violently and the vicious cycle continues. While the perpetrators are typically affiliated with militant organizations as sectarian affiliations are ubiquitous and deeply felt. In the words of one expert, "this kind of violence has the potential to involve large swathes of the population and spur radicalization." A 2013 Pew Research Centre report found that almost two in three Pakistanis surveyed considered Sunni-Shia tensions in their country to be a "very big" or "moderately big problem" facing the nation. For fragile states, uncovering the roots of violent ethnic or sectarian conflict is a major concern because counteracting such tendencies helps maintain political stability and security.

Pakistan's religious groups also play an important role in politics and have often benefited from periods of strong state support. While they pursue distinct agendas in

terms of both religious and civil goals, most share the same fundamental objective – to propagate the ideology of Islam in all aspects and more importantly wield authority in the hierarchy of governance of the state.

Conclusion

Pakistan remains the epicentre of the global jihadi movement and the principal breeding ground of Islamic radicalism. A large number of madrasas in Pakistan have not even responded to government schemes of registration; on the other hand, generous funding by foreign contributors such as Saudi Arabia for promotion of Wahhabism has helped the growth of radical institutions. Further the political turmoil in Pakistan has created a dangerous and chaotic environment in which the influence and following of the radical groups has increased greatly. The presence of American and NATO forces in Afghanistan and collateral damage by their military action has created new radical groups among the well to do classes in Pakistan. Some Pakistanis and Afghans in Pakistan are reported to have trained potential suicide bombers; the alleged plotters of bombings in London seem to have made several visits, received monetary help and technical assistance in Pakistan.

The Pakistan army has yet to demonstrate that it has the will and the capability to ward off the jihadi challenge, rather a large number of Pakistani troops have chosen to join the Taliban and not fight their ‘brothers’. The militants and terrorist operating in Kashmir will continue to get a free hand to carry on their depredations with the help of the Pakistani Taliban and some foreign groups. The militants want to establish a truly Islamic state in Pakistan that can influence or coerce Muslim dominated areas like Kashmir and some other parts of India to join them in the global jihadi movement. They also want to get hold of Pakistan’s nuclear

arsenal to threaten and blackmail countries which may challenge their ambitious Islamic projects.

Radicalisation represents a threat at several levels with the worst case scenario being the possibility of Pakistan becoming a Talibanised state, with a formal structure of a rigid Islamic state dominated by a strong religious hierarchy. The possibility of a violent takeover by any religious group replicating the Taliban take-over in Afghanistan seems remote but there are disturbing developments visible in the country with large segments of the society veering towards radicalisation. However, if Pakistan were to become a Talibanised state, the society at large, and the ruling elite, would have to accept the religious ideology being propagated by certain ultra-conservative clerics; presently there is no militant cleric group strong enough to dictate terms to the powerful urban elite. To examine the present trend towards radicalisation, one has to look at the developing mindset of different socio-economic ethnic groups and the army. A close study of Pakistani society shows that more than 70 million Pakistanis are below 15 years of age; it is this vulnerable segment which would determine the future of Pakistan.

Conservative and rigid religious beliefs exist in many segments of the society, besides the tribal areas that are under the influence of al Qaeda and the Taliban. The rich urban groups would prefer democracy and modernization even though they would like Pakistan to become a truly Islamic state. Conservatism cannot and should not always be equated with extremism and terms such as radicalisation, fundamentalism and religious intolerance should be examined in relation to the religious upsurge now being witnessed in Pakistan because of the American-NATO military intervention.

Antagonism towards non-believers, Ahmedia's, moderate Muslims, Sufism and Shiites are signs of growth of radical culture. Moderate Muslims, who would like the secular culture to survive and the current unrest to be controlled, have become helpless spectators in the face of increasing political chaos and coercive religious violence.

CHAPTER IV : THE PAKISTANI SECURITY FORCES

The Pakistan Armed Forces is the seventh largest military in the world in terms of active troops. Islam is the predominant faith of the Pakistan Armed Forces, with 99 per cent of Pakistani military personnel adhering to the religion. 70 per cent of Pakistan Army officers are Sunni, and the remaining 30 per cent are Shia. Historically, about 71-75 per cent of the army is drawn from Punjab, balance are Pukhtoons (15-21 per cent), Mohajir & Sindhis (3-5 per cent) and Baluch (about 0.3 per cent).

The Pakistan military has traditionally been a secular, disciplined and a professional organization. However, over the period, there has been infiltration of the force by overwhelming strength of radical Islamists sympathizers. The arrest of Pakistani brigadier^{xliv} for his ties with, Hizbul-Tahrir, a radical Islamist group; gunning down of two senior Pakistani officials, one by his own security guard; attack on Karachi naval base, purportedly by inside assistance and refuge to Osama bin Laden, highlights increasing radicalization of the security forces.

The rise of Islamism in the Pakistani Army gained impetus under the presidency of Gen Zia. The period witnessed consolidation of the role of the armed forces as the protector of Pakistan's Islamic identity and Islam became synonymous with the Army. The observance of the religious practices and beliefs were encouraged under the Zia's 'Islamization' programme and were made mandatory for the security forces to follow. For the first time the Army began to recruit officers and soldiers from various religious seminaries, majority being from sunni madrassa's. The sincerity with which an individual followed religious practices and beliefs became an important input for Annual Confidential Report determining future career

progression prospects. The Islamic literature and philosophy was also introduced in the curriculum of various training courses conducted in Regimental centres, Schools of instruction and Staff College, Quetta. The book 'Quranic Concepts of War' whose foreword was written by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq was accepted as the Pakistan's military doctrine. According to the book, Islam divided the world into two camps – the Dar-ul-Islam (the world of Islam - the believers) and the Dar-ul- Harb (people defiant to Allah - the non-believers). It is the onus on the believers to make non-believers subservient to Allah, which may involve repeated conflicts between two, till the latter becomes a believer.

The Army, which was the only surviving secular institution in the country, took a sharp turn towards religious fundamentalism, a trend unlikely to reverse in the near future. Post Zia, subsequent Chiefs tried to dilute the influence of religious fundamentalist, but the close association of Pakistani Army with radical jihadi elements continued to impact soldiers religious and Jihadist orientation. There is ample evidence to prove discreet links between Army personnel's and the Islamic hardliners and the role of subverted soldiers in propagating radical ideology and assisting in attacks on own military establishments. The attack on GHQ in 2009, failed assassination attempt on Pervez Musharraf's, Mehran base raid in 2011 were planned and coordinated by soldiers from within the service. The hostile reaction of the Army on killing of Osama bin-Laden by US are all indicators of increasing radicalization of the Pakistani Army. There have also been complaints by Pakistan air force commander about the pilots refusing to shave off their full beards, a mark of Islamic observance and air crews sabotaging F-16s to prevent them from flying missions close to the border with Afghanistan.

The Pakistan Army today does not appear to be as professional, secularist and capable to thwart the threat of latent radicalization it faces. 40 terrorist attacks over the past three years against military installations duly assisted by insiders is a sign of revolt and growing religious fanaticism within the organisation. As per retired Rear Admiral Tanvir Ahmed “We don’t need to look for enemies outside our borders, we have plenty within”. The ongoing counter terrorist operations in Waziristan, FATA and rest of Punjab did not produce the desired results, as a fairly large section of soldiers and officers harbour strong radical views and cannot be trusted to sincerely confront the jihadi challenge^{xlv}. Over period about 250 Pakistani soldiers, including officers, are reported to have surrendered to militants without firing a shot. Some disillusioned officers and men have even chosen to join the militants. The reverses faced by the Pakistan army indicate growing reluctance of its ranks to fight its own people; as it is considered like killing own Muslim brethren’s at the behest of Western powers. Thus in the prevailing situation with an increasingly radicalized army, it cannot be expected of them to play a meaningful role in combating jihadi-terrorism, resulting in unrest and violence, assisting the cause of fundamentalist organisations.

Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)

The ISI Directorate has over the decades emerged as one of the most powerful institution in Pakistan. The agency is a central organ of Pakistan's military machine and has played a pivotal - often dominant - role in the country's volatile politics. ISI is run as "a state within a state". The ISI not only undertakes surveillance of political parties and politicians, it often infiltrated, co-opted, cajoled

or coerced them into supporting the army's centralising agenda. It has also been involved in subverting elected governments and drug smuggling.

Till the 1970s, the organisation had a limited external agenda which was largely India-centric. However with every successive military dispensation, the ISI has gained in strength and its involvement in affairs of the state has grown. The Afghan jihad turned the ISI into the most powerful department of the country. From 1985 onwards, the ISI has been actively involved in political manipulations and exporting self-serving terrorists activities in the garb of jihad.

The rationale for ISI becoming an 'invisible government' has much to do with Pakistan being a 'weak state politically' which depends on a strong military apparatus. ISI has been actively involved in double game play, while supporting GWOT, it maintains clandestine links with Taliban and other terrorist organisations. It's hard to believe that ISI had no idea that Osama Bin Laden was living under the nose of the Pakistani military until his death. In the documents released in April 2011 on the Wikileaks website, US authorities described the ISI as a "terrorist" organisation at par with al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif successfully used ISI to collect evidence of corruption against political rivals like Benazir Bhutto and other bureaucrats. The agency played a frontline role in initiating power struggle and internecine war between PPP and PML (N) contributing to political instability and crisis in governance. The DG-ISI General (Retd) Asad Durani admitted that funds were distributed by the organisation to manipulate the 1990 elections against the Pakistan People's Party (PPP).

The army's influence on Pakistan's election^{xlvi} on 25 July 19 was greater than it has ever been. To support Imran Khan, the military also tried to suppress unsympathetic media during the election campaign. It tried to intimidate journalists, using the threat of tax investigation, and even kidnapping. EU and Commonwealth election observers found evidence of "severe restrictions and curtailment on freedom of expression, which had resulted in extraordinary levels of self-censorship."

The other aspect of ISI involvement in domestic politics is its strong linkages with Islamic fundamentalist groups like Harkat-ul-Ansar and Lashkar-e-Toiba, which besides being extremely active in waging terrorist operations against the Indian state, have a large mass following and can influence outcome of elections.

The import of ISI wielding power in the country also has a strong bearing on Islamabad's national security and foreign policy. It is a major decision influencing element in the policy formulation process and tends to maintain an anti-India stance, furthering the agenda of its mentor, the Pakistani Army irrespective of the desires of the political parties. A case in point, improvement in ties between India-Pakistan through promotion of trade and commerce is a viable option. However, Pakistani intelligence agency through its vile mechanisation have persistently impeded any positive development in trade ties and businessmen keen on trade with India are discouraged and harassed. Additionally, despite denials from Islamabad, there is plenty of evidence of direct involvement of ISI in propagating terrorism in India and its role in the 2008 Mumbai attacks in which 165 people were killed. This relationship between the ISI and fundamentalists, fostered on anti-India interests, clearly characterizes a close-minded approach to any improvement in relations with India even if the ruling dispensation may so desire.

Further the 10-year-long Afghan war has not only bestowed on the ISI huge experience of covert warfare, it also created for it a vast reserve of motivated manpower that could be used as its proxy in the geo-strategic horseplay of regional powers. However, post 2001 the Islamist proxies created and supported by the Army and ISI turned against the state, following the decision of Pakistan to support the US war on terror. Thousands of the Pakistani's have been killed and maimed by these home grown extremist elements creating internal strife and unrest.

Intervention in State Governance

The main bane of political instability and ineffective democratic institutions in Pakistan is the primacy of its Army, which neither permits the elected government to function independently nor does it own responsibility to singularly govern the state. This diarchy which is also being called as hybrid civil - military relations model is difficult to sustain and has failed to provide effective governance. Unlike other Armies where the charter and role of the security forces are drawn by the political leadership, with primary responsibility of mitigating the external security challenges, Pakistan Army is completely involved in managing both the internal and external affairs of the state, with the ruling political parties relegated to manage peripheral issues. Number of successive Army Chiefs have used this ideology to ensure dominance of the Army in conducting the affairs of the state while ensuring the political structures remain weak and unstable, incapable of challenging the writ of the Army.

Likely Way Ahead : Post Abrogation of Article 370

On 05 August 2019, the President of India, Ram Nath Kovind, issued a presidential order, which revoked Articles 370 and 35A of the Indian constitution.

The articles had institutionalized a unique constitutional relationship between Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and the Central Government since 1954. Article 35A authorized the J&K legislature to determine residency requirements and restrict property rights. Originally written as a temporary measure, Article 370 restricted the Union government's ability to legislate in J&K without the consent of the State's Constituent Assembly and prevented the Indian Parliament from altering the borders of the State. In response to the abrogation, Pakistan's Prime Minister, Imran Khan, downgraded diplomatic relations with India, recalled Pakistan's top diplomat from New Delhi, expelled India's High Commissioner from Pakistan, and suspended bilateral trade. Following a meeting of Pakistan's National Security Committee on 07 August 19, the Prime Minister's office stated they would raise the issue to the United Nations (UN) and the UN Security Council (UNSC). Pakistan's Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying, "as party to this international dispute, Pakistan will exercise all possible options to counter the illegal steps." Prime Minister Imran Khan stated, "if India attacks us, we will respond...we will fight until the last drop of blood." He called on the Malaysian and Turkish Prime Ministers, as well as the Crown Princes of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to recognize the act as violations of UNSC resolutions, and warned that it would pose "serious implications for regional peace and security." Pakistan's foreign minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, addressed an emergency meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), however didn't get the desired support as major countries of OIC felt that it was an internal matter of India and it was within its right to do what it did. Qureshi also spoke with UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet and "highlighted that the recent Indian measures are in breach of international human rights and humanitarian law." On pursuance by Pakistan, China on 16 Aug 19, a permanent

member of the UNSC, called a private meeting to discuss Kashmir, the first time the international body has done so in nearly half a century. Following the meeting, Pakistani Ambassador to the UN, Maleeha Lodhi, argued that, “since this meeting took place, is testimony to the fact that this is an international dispute which was refuted by Indian ambassador to the UN, Syed Akbaruddin. The UNSC did not issue any statement on the matter.

For the last 72 years all Pakistani political parties repeatedly told its people that Kashmir flows in its blood and propagated the narrative of resolution of the Kashmir dispute in Pakistan’s favour. However, despite Pakistan’s eagerness to agitate the matter internationally, there seems to be little interest politically in encouraging domestic protests. The demonstrations currently being held in Pakistan are very deliberate and lack the ferocity that was expected. The current Imran Khan government is more aligned to see the matter being agitated abroad rather than creating unrest in Pakistan.

While military is being prodded to take action by the people of Pakistan, its capacity to finish the unfinished business of partition has diminished dramatically, a fact unspoken by the Army. Pakistan’s military has realised, especially after the Kargil and Uri operations and Balakote airstrike, that direct military response is not an option without having to face severe retribution. Hollow rhetoric notwithstanding, Pakistan has effectively surrendered what it long touted as its “jugular vein,” acquiescing to its slice of the territorial pie^{xlvii}. The military establishment overtime has been blatantly misusing the Kashmiri struggle to nourish its jihadist assets, which served its misplaced domestic and regional ambitions, and maintained its hegemony over the national exchequer. The harsh reality of the military

establishment is that with the Arab world no longer enjoying the oil clout of the 1970s, nor being as invested in South Asian jihad, coupled with the economic crises engulfing Pakistan, it simply does not have the resources to engage India in a prolonged conventional warfare over Kashmir or otherwise. However, this position was never explained to the ordinary man, who is now struck with shock, dejection and a sense of betrayal at this realisation. Further, even worse, Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi admitted Pakistan's lack of capacity to pull the world together including OIC to push India to revise the decision.

Notwithstanding the above, Pakistan will not easily give up its Kashmir agenda in which it has invested for more than 30 years. It will continue with its sub conventional operations and create unrest where possible, though a waning effort.

Judicial Activism

Further, while the Army has been ruling the roost since partition, however in recent times its primacy has been challenged by the judiciary. The latest account of judicial activism was the legal crisis over extension in term of its Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa. It was a last-minute showdown, just before General Bajwa's term was set to expire on 28 November 19 between the federal government, which had ordered the extension, and the Supreme Court, which on 26 November 19 took notice of a petition challenging it and suspended the extension. This case was unprecedented as till date no such hearing over an extension for an army chief has ever been held in Pakistan, despite a history of army chiefs' tenures being extended. The case also has wider, significant implications about the state of civil-military-judiciary relations in Pakistan.

Further the historic sentencing in December of former dictator and president Pervez Musharraf^{xlviii} was a blow to the military's image and directly questions its unequivocal authority over shaping Pakistan's political life, even if it is only symbolic. In a rare streak of defiance, the country's courts are pushing back against a traditionally powerful and popular establishment hoping to inch the country from a seemingly illiberal to a more liberal democracy.

CHAPTER V : FRAGILE POLITICAL SCENARIO

Mohammad Ali Jinnah had always envisioned a democratic Pakistan. Many of his successors waged decades-long struggle to establish a sustainable democratic system in which elected civilian leaders had clear primacy over the country's governance. However, this effort faced serious reversal due to immature and corrupt political leaders and direct military intervention in the country's governance.

Pakistan has seen more than twenty four governments since independence: fourteen elected or appointed prime ministers, five interim governments and thirty-three years of military rule under four different leaders. Excluding the military and interim governments, the average life span of a politically elected government has been less than two years. Democratically elected governments have struggled to complete their terms, being alternately dismissed by presidents or removed from power by army chiefs.

When Pakistan's founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah died within just over a year after partition on 11 Sept 1948 and his chief confidante, Pakistan's first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated on 16 Oct 1951, the fledgling political system was deprived of experienced leaders triggering political instability and chaos. The democratic parties could never find roots and tales of corruption and high

handed behaviour of leaders maligned the democratic process and set stage for takeover by military dictators.

While the provinces continued to foster and develop their basic political structures, those responsible for establishment of central government were either politicians with no mass base or bureaucrats with very limited administrative experience. This inherent weaknesses of the central administrative apparatus from the early stage proved to be a crippling disadvantage for Pakistan's political development and stability and continues to ail it till date.

In the initial decades, Pakistan cycled through a number of politicians as majority of them were corrupt, power hungry and contributed very minimally towards governance and administration of Pakistani citizens. The change of ministers in quick succession and disbanding of various ministries created political turmoil and instability. Gen Ayub Khan, seized power and Pakistan got its first military dictator in 1958, a little over a decade after partition.

Between 1958 and 1971 President Ayub Khan was able to centralize the government and brought together an alliance of senior army officers, civil bureaucracy, industrial and landed elite to replace the parliamentary government by a system of Basic Democracies. He disqualified all old politicians under the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order, 1959. A small number of 1,20,000 basic democrats divided equally between the two wings elected the members of both the provincial and national assemblies. The Basic Democracies system did not empower the individual citizens to participate in the democratic process, but opened up the opportunity to bribe and buy votes from the limited voters who were privileged enough to vote.

Ayub Khan's policies exacerbated disparities between West and East Pakistan. The mounting regional discontent in East Pakistan and urban unrest in West Pakistan helped undermine Ayub Khan's authority, forcing him to relinquish power in March 1969.

After Ayub Khan, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan headed the second military regime from 1969-1971. By that time the country had been under military rule for thirteen of its twenty-five years of existence. A civil-war like situation developed in East Pakistan in 1971. National elections in the previous year had delivered a resounding victory to Awami League, a political party led by Mujibur Rahman and whose entire electoral base was in the East. Politicians in the Western wing colluded with the military in preventing transfer of power to the elected government. This led to disenchantment and armed rebellion in East Pakistan clearing the way for creation of Bangladesh. The dismemberment of Pakistan discredited both the civil bureaucracy and the Army. General Yahya Khan was left with no choice but to hand over power over to the Pakistan's People's Party (PPP) led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The gap between his promised manifesto and the marginal successes of his somewhat haphazard reforms prevented Bhutto from consolidating a mass support base. He relied on the coercive arm of the state to snuff out political opposition and neglected build-up of PPP as a truly popular national party. The corrupt, ineffective and high handed governance policies of Bhutto lead to violent urban unrest which gave the army under General Zia-ul-Haq the pretext to make a powerful comeback and on 05 July 1977, Pakistan was placed under military rule yet again and the 1973 Constitution was abrogated.

On assuming power General Zia banned all political parties and expressed his determination to transform Pakistan into an Islamic state. In December 1985, after confirming his own position in a controversial "Islamic" referendum, he introduced a series of amendments to the 1973 constitution. The eighth amendment turned out to be the most draconian as it gave the President explicit power to remove any Government, if he felt was necessary to secure national interests. During his Presidency, Gen Zia used this amendment repeatedly to expel number of prime ministers, mainly on whim or insecurity over shift in power.

This democratic era ushered post sudden demise of Zia was equally turbulent. The elections in November 1988 were based on political party for the first time in fifteen years. None of the parties won majority, but Pakistan People's Party since got maximum seats was invited to form the Government with alliances. But soon bitterness crept between the ruling dispensation, its alliances and opposition. Large sums were doled by PPP as bribes to sway the affiliations of the politicians, draining the State economy. Corrupt politicians and poor administration scarred the image of Bhutto's government. In 1990 the President dismissed Bhutto and once again fresh elections were held within two years and Mr Sharif came into power. He was dismissed within three years in 1993 by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan who was accused of conspiring with Benazir Bhutto to dismiss Sharif. The Supreme Court declared the dismissal unconstitutional and reinstated Sharif. However, President Ghulam through bribes and scheming influenced a rebellion in Punjab, forcing the Army Chief to intervene and both the president and prime minister were asked to resign and fresh elections were ordered.

In the elections PPP claimed majority seats and Bhutto was placed as prime minister. However, Bhutto was unable to run a just government and she fell back into corruption, misuse of state resources and was soon dismissed. Fresh elections were planned in February 1997, the fifth in twelve years. From 1988 to 1999, a little over decade nine different governments (four interim appointed, four elected and one following the military coup of October 1999) ruled Pakistan. All too frequent elections during the period affected the legitimacy of the electoral process and the people lost faith in the democratic system.

The two leading parties continued to alternatively form Government, but were repeatedly ousted by military dictators due to inapt governance, corruption and increasing incidents of terrorism and ethnic violence. The civilian^{xlix} governments in Pakistan resigned to being manipulated by the military for reason some real while others alleged in order to maintain its primacy. In June 2013 the first successful political transition from one civil government to another took place, raising hopes of international community of a stable political landscape in Pakistan. However, overtime as the internal situation deteriorated; gradually the power started shifting from the civil dispensation to the Army. Army was also unhappy with Sharif permitting legal action against Pervez Musharraf and his growing overtures towards India. The Sharif government since coming to power in May 2013 had shown interest in resolving outstanding disputes and deepening bilateral ties with India, affecting Army's interests.

In 2013, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) appointed General Raheel Sharif as the Chief Of Army Staff. The General then, as all his predecessors, assumed substantial influence over Pakistan's

national security and foreign policies. Nawaz Sharif subsequently angered the General and army with his speeches criticising military officers and offering peace to neighbouring countries. By extending an opportunity to strengthen diplomatic, trade, and security ties with India, Sharif was signalling the legitimacy of accepting India as a partner and not an existential threat to Pakistan. In late August 2014, the Army announced that it was taking a “facilitative” role in resolving the political impasse between Mr Sharif, Imran Khan and Tahir-ul-Qadri, a step seen as a precursor to a “soft coup”, with Mr Sharif reduced to a “ceremonial prime minister”.

The army considered Sharif to be an unsuitable candidate of choice in future elections and pressurised the Supreme Court to disqualify him from holding office in August 2017. The Court ruled against him under Article 62 of the constitution on corruption charges, stating he was neither *sadiq* (truthful) nor *ameen* (honest) — and was banned from politics for life and is currently jailed along with his daughter.

The only candidate left to be cultivated by the army was Imran Khan of PTI. Khan had a chequered political career since he founded PTI in 1996. He used to refuse to play the game of forging alliances, which is an essential tactic since it is rare for any political party to get majority across different provinces of Pakistan. Khan was also critical of the military, accusing them of rigging the 2013 elections in favour of Sharif, and selling Pakistani blood for American dollars. However, in 2013, Khan saw his inability to win support nation-wide without the backing of the army and changed his stance to praise the military unconditionally, including its management of internal security. The military reciprocated in his favour. There is evidence to suggest that military ran a campaign of intimidation and threats to secure

Imran Khan's position by suppressing his political opponents, the judiciary, media, and activists.

Firstly, the media was subjected to unprecedented pressure, raising concerns that the army was carrying out a silent coup. There were widespread abductions of journalists, censorship, and financial ruin of establishments that refused to toe the official line — do not cover or praise the PML-N, focus on the winning image of PTI and Imran Khan. Geo TV, the country's largest broadcaster, was forced off air for weeks. Dawn, the oldest newspaper, was threatened for interviewing Sharif where he suggested Pakistani militants were responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The brazen suppression of two of the largest media houses was a warning to the rest to fall in line. The suspension of media and press rights highlighted the excess of military influence on the electoral process.

Secondly, the vote-banks of opponents were systemically broken down and candidates from PPP and PML-N were forced to join the PTI — 248 politicians switched parties in four months. Party workers of the opposition were detained, harassed and disqualified from contesting elections. The army facilitated the rise of political parties with ties to jihadists, terror groups and right-wing Islamists. They were encouraged to field hundreds of candidates and the Election Commission of Pakistan, which is supposed to disallow any individual with terror-links from contesting or organising elections, made no efforts to stop them. These groups contesting included the Lashkar-e-Taiba (conducted terror attacks in 2008 in Mumbai), the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jammāt (has ties with the Islamic State) and the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Labbaik (popular for enforcing Pakistan's blasphemy law that has led to murders of religious minorities on frivolous allegations of offending the

Prophet). These extremists, backed by the military, were part of the electoral coalition led by Imran Khan. However, the military has denied any such influence and maintained that they did not intervene in elections.

Imran Khan was sworn-in as the 22nd Prime Minister of Pakistan on August 17th, 2018 after his party the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) won 151 out of the 342 seats. Khan's ascendance to the post of Prime Minister has stirred controversy about the legitimacy of these elections and the influence of the army; enough for him to proclaim at the swearing that he is standing on his own feet.

The popular belief remains that true power to alter policies lies with the military headquarters in Rawalpindi and not with politicians in Islamabad. Therefore, his election, like virtually all previous elections, will have little meaningful consequences for Pakistan's behaviour at home or abroad. Khan's promise is to build a New Pakistan in the long-term, however, he will have to recognise that an elected official in this country relies on the military's willingness to sanction these policies. One of the most pressing issues in the country has been that of extremism, however some political parties are exploiting it to further their agenda. There has been a recent crackdown on internal militant groups but the root causes of extremism are not being tackled. Imran has earned the title of 'Taliban Khan' over his readiness to hold talks with terrorists and calling them "our brothers". The presence of fringe elements in his coalition has made extremists feel emboldened under his leadership. There was an alarming level of electoral violence in 2018, including suicide bombings, that led to over two-hundred people being killed.

It is unsure whether politics and politicians in Pakistan can ever be immune to the influence of the military and implement an agenda that is reflective of the

mandate of the people. There remains uncertainty over the economic and security prospects of Pakistan. With little manoeuvrability, it is unlikely that Khan will be able to act on any progressive policies, either internally or abroad.

Civil Society Organisations(CSO)

Since the polity has always been subservient to the Army, with little concern for the welfare of the masses, number of Civil Society Organisation came into being from all facets of society. In Pakistan, Civil Society is considered as an umbrella organisation for a range of non-state and non- market citizen organisations and initiatives, network and unions operating in an expansive gamut of social, economic and cultural fields. Contrasting the West, where Civil Society conjures up the reflection of liberals and others challenging the state, in Pakistan Civil Society is comprised of an assorted set of actors. Since independence in 1947, the progress of Civil Society in Pakistan has been marred by the structural dynamics of state configuration, legitimization, and consolidation. In current years, nevertheless, CSOs have proven to be stronger and more dedicated than ever before. The last few years have witnessed a change in Civil Society movement in Pakistan.

From a focus on poverty alleviation and rural development, the Civil Society is occupied with issues of good governance, accountability, and political and human rights. This shift has come about partially because of the social and political crises and partly as an outcome of the rapid development of the electronic media. A series of rallies lead by the Lawyer's Movement in support of a disposed Chief Justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry¹ and against the martial rule of the then President Pervez Musharraf gathered millions of people during in the summer of 2007. The tens of thousands of lawyers that formed the movement were joined by thousands

more from other CSO sectors, including students, women's groups, journalists, human rights activists, academics, trade unions, and professional groups. The struggle focused on the democratic ideals of an independent judiciary, parliamentary supremacy, a free media, and free and fair elections.

As a carved 'Nation', Pakistan is still at a nascent juncture, and needs a certain level of political maturity to provide a working space for CSOs. As it has been seen, the staff and workers associated with several organizations, are hardly provided with a conducive working environment in the fields. In addition, it has been observed that the Civil Society has largely operated in the reactive mode in the country. It is energized periodically to react to the state's excesses and dispose-off corrupt and ineffective governments. For short durations, its divergent groups and components come together to confront a regime that becomes too self-serving and/or unresponsive.

The workings of CSOs in Pakistan also vary in size and structure of the organization. Smaller CSOs often require adequate management structures, while large CSOs with international funding have stronger management structures. Resultantly, the Civil Society fails to act as a unified and strong force protesting against the state excesses and other violent non-state actors. The CSOs also have little incentive and expertise to invest in training of ground staff. The lack of training and professional outlook of CSO workers towards the subject leave them without expertise in the uncharted territories.

Although, in recent past, the Civil Society movement has been very vocal and in many cases, they have taken over the streets and media circuits, but, CSOs in Pakistan have not yet succeeded in developing a comprehensive strategy to disable

the coercive measures of state & Army, and create a society with equal opportunities and legal rights. Being the victims of both state-repression and other violent organizations, the CSOs are unfortunately depicted as battered socio-political weaklings in Pakistan, who can protest but cannot substantially change the system. In December 2017, Pakistan ordered almost 30 international non-governmental organisations^{li} to leave the country, the latest sign of a wider crackdown on human rights and civil society across South Asia. The interior ministry wrote to 29 organisations, including Action Aid, Plan International and Marie Stopes, to warn them that their applications to continue working in the country have been rejected and that they should leave within 60 days. None was given a reason. The development is an example of continuity of Islamabad's hostility towards international NGOs, which began in 2011 after the killing of Osama bin Laden. Pakistani intelligence services accused Save the Children of being complicit in helping the US Central Intelligence Agency find the al-Qaeda leader, something the charity denies. The move is also part of what many view as deteriorating human rights across the region, which has seen foreign funding for NGOs cut off, activists disappear and journalists killed.

At the same time, there is no denying the fact that CSOs have close contact with people, as they work at community level and are better equipped to tap local resources. They are endeavouring to transfer themselves to become agents for change and initiating substantial improvement in the system. The recent reduction in the defence budget for other welfare and infrastructure development schemes is a change where Army finds itself answerable to local population and not do what it desires without any concern for the domestic requirements. Irrespective of the same, Army will

continue to be the sole power in Pakistan with political dispensation a puppet which it can make dance the way it suits them.

CHAPTER VI : IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA AND RESPONSE OPTIONS

Pakistan since its creation has been bedevilled by one crisis after another. Today, ethnic, religious and social fault lines have deepened so much that Pakistan is on the verge of tearing itself apart with likely fall out on India. Pakistan all along since independence has accused India for all its afflictions. According to Dr Fair^{lii} Pakistan is an insecure state which views India as ‘its eternal foe that not only seeks to dominate Pakistan but to destroy it’. The Pakistani domestic opinion is also being influenced by brainwashing the local population through doctored history, creating fear psychosis of Indian hegemony and continuous anti-India propaganda. Pakistani army, the main power centre has taken upon itself as the sole custodian responsible for ensuring Pakistan’s integrity, ideology and its Islamic identity. Defeat for the Pakistan army would be the day it accepts the Indian supremacy as it would

tantamount to losing its primacy and influence in managing the affairs of state governance, which would be absolutely unacceptable to the Army. It is this fear, which propels Pakistan to take calculated risks for changing the status quo periodically and show parity with India. Apart from initiating three regular wars with India and the Kargil misadventure, Pakistan has constantly supported insurgencies in India and presently is waging proxy war in Kashmir as a state policy to seek strategic parity with India and to resist its rise. The possession of nuclear weapons has facilitated risk taking by Pakistan in pursuing the policy of Jihad under the nuclear umbrella and partially deterring India from escalating the conflict. Few thinkers' belief that a grand bargain with India to resolve the Kashmir dispute (to Pakistan's satisfaction), may facilitate dissipating the Kashmir impasse. However Dr Fair while rubbishing the grand bargain theory describes Pakistan as a state that is 'fundamentally unsatisfied with the status quo' and would continue to propagate its anti-Indian stance whatsoever.

For the Pakistani army, a policy of 'mix of terror and talks' is the strategy for India. It keeps Indian security forces pre occupied and Pakistani public satisfied by false propaganda of its Army's successes. International empathy towards Indian cause specially by the primary aid-givers China and the United States is restricted to lip service, meekly cautioning Pakistan of sponsoring terror attacks and ceasefire violations in India as it suits their interest in keeping a rising power like India in check. The implications of the growing fault lines in Pakistan are as given under:-

- Pakistan would continue to use asymmetric option in Kashmir & others parts of India to create unrest and violence to showcase parity with India. With abrogation of Article 370 and J&K becoming a Union Territory, the political

and over ground support enjoyed by Pakistan would reduce substantially. Notwithstanding, Pakistan would endeavour to propagate terrorism in J&K as before and if required shift its focus from the borders areas to hinterland where its devious manifestations may find resonance.

- Foster and maintain links with underground fundamentalist elements, IM sleeper cells and elements of AQIS/IS inside India to create turmoil and disorder at the opportune time.
- Pakistani Army to maintain its primacy in affairs of the state and display its military prowess against India to domestic population would continue to carry out low intensity conflict and violate the cease fire and generate tension along the borders.
- Organisations like Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed under the umbrage of Pakistan would continue to flourish and launch dramatic terrorist attacks against India with impudence, without fear of judicial reprisal or reprimand. Case in point is the Uri / Pulwama attack. The farcical arrest of top terrorist leaders to fool the world and seek grants from its benefactors and international organisations like FATF would continue as a routine.
- Indian economic growth hinges on domestic stability. Upsurge in terrorism would undermine investors' confidence and adversely affect economic development of India.
- The costs of sustained tension with Pakistan is a huge external check on India's rise, necessitating money and policy maker's attention that could be far better utilised on other social, economic and developmental priorities.

- There is always the possibility that the beleaguered Pakistani regime may try to mobilise support at home by raising tensions with India. Presently due to extended deployment along the Western borders and financial crunch, it is unlikely that Pakistani military is in a position to credibly play a game of brinkmanship with an increasingly powerful India, but the possibility exists. Post Balakote air strike, Pakistan has become weary of India's' intentions and will not like to unnecessarily raise the ante.
- Finally, the worst case scenario of a imploding / collapsing Pakistan would pose enormous challenges for India. The most direct result would be a massive wave of refugees, like the deluge that streamed out of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971. Likelihood of undesirable elements entering India along with refugees to foment unrest is very high. This social, security and logistical burden would be compounded by the uncertainty over the control of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and its safekeeping.

Response Options

The Indian decision makers have an array of response options available to cater for any likely fallout from existing turmoil in Pakistan. These options range from punitive military action on one end of the spectrum to confidence building measures and cultural exchanges on other. Adopting a single option as a common reaction to all contingencies may not be prudent to yield the desired results. Each situation would demand an assortment response addressing the issue concurrently at number of levels.

- **Military Options.** The various military response options available can be segregated based on the quantum of force application. The severity of the

response would be determined jointly by the military and the Government depending on the situation. The various options available are:

- **Fire Assaults.** Employment of artillery guns and medium / small arms fire as hitherto fore is the least escalatory option. However, it is unlikely to yield any worthwhile result or change Pakistan's policies towards India or coerce it to dismantle its terrorist infrastructure. Limited deterrence against unprovoked firing by Pakistan and infiltration by terrorist can be achieved.
- **Hot Pursuit / Cross Border Raid.** Hot pursuit / raid beyond own geographical boundaries to kill terrorist and destroy their infrastructure is an effective option, denying them even safe haven across the border. Special Forces / Specialist sub units of infantry who are trained and equipped to undertake these operations. The shots that resounded in cross border raid by 21 PARA SF in Myanmar on 08/09 June 15 and Uri retaliatory "surgical strikes on 28 September 16, on the launch-pads of militants in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir echoed world over and conveyed stern message of Indian resolve to respond punitively to any misadventures by the enemy state.
- **Employment of Long Range Vectors / UAV's / Drones.** Employment of precision long range vectors, Armed UAV's , drones and ground launched ballistic missiles to strike terrorist targets in depth is a viable option. However, it would establish a new precedent and lower the threshold for use of these weapons, mandating India to develop counter measures and be prepared to thwart a similar threat from Pakistan.

- **Precision Air Strikes.** Employment of air force to deter Pakistan is seemingly a less escalatory option but sufficiently punitive. However, employment of air power does not obviate the need of ensuring readiness of the ground forces to prevent escalation. The Air Force will be operating in a contested air space and should be prepared for counter offensive, e.g. the Balakote strike on 26 Feb 2019 by Indian Air Force.
- **Punitive Action by Limited Ground Offensive.** A punitive response to Pakistan's adventurism would involve a swift limited ground offensive aimed to destroy Pakistan's war machinery, pre designated terrorist facilities and capture territory. The intent being to increase the cost of asymmetric war for Pakistan and impose caution. The Indian Navy be employed to deny Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) and precision air strikes be conducted to destroy terrorist camps and bases. Possibility of limited offensive escalating into a full scale war, affording Pakistan to raise the bogey of use of nuclear weapon, is an eventuality India must be prepared for.
- **Conventional War Under Nuclear Overhang.** A full scale offensive triggered by Pakistani misadventure is the ultimate military option available to India. Being weaker in conventional warfare capability, Pakistan will threaten India by nuclear sabre rattling, to deter it from undertaking military operations.

For any set of options to be effective, it has to make the cost of adventurism by Pakistan prohibitive, especially for its Army. Any military action by India is likely to provoke Pakistan and even a limited offensive may speedily spiral into a larger conflict. Hence, irrespective of the options being exercised, the ground forces, elements of Air Force and Navy have to be in a constant state of readiness, poised to

react to any contingency and deter Pakistan. In Maj Gen Bakshi's^{liii} words, even limited air strikes "must be accompanied by a partial or complete mobilisation of the armed forces to cater for any Pakistani response." Use of precision munitions, air strikes and cross border operations are attractive options but counter strike capabilities of enemy needs to be appreciated and factored in while securing own assets. Concomitantly with punitive military action, diplomatic efforts to favourably shape international perception to compel Pakistan to discontinue its anti-India policies are critical.

Over the period India has become less tolerant to Pakistan's transgressions, responding aggressively and in disproportionate measures. The intend being to convey a sharp message "Mend your ways or face the wrath".

Diplomatic Initiatives. The business of diplomacy to resolve contentious issues has to be an on-going process, irrespective of any option being exercised. Both Pakistan and India need to indulge in constructive bilateral engagements with the aim to resolve all outstanding issues and ensure peace in the region. Mutual trust between the two countries can only evolve through genuine and sustained dialogue and a perceptible step-by-step peace process. Improved relations would concomitantly aid in lowering of tensions, bettering of economic and trade relations and averting any terrorist act escalating into a larger conflict. Any interaction should not be hostage to predetermined agenda's and stated positions but be flexible, aimed at amicable resolution of issues based on pragmatism and not emotions.

The political leaders and diplomats also need to apprise the international comity of Pakistan's role in breeding and disseminating terrorism world over. No Nation should feel secure that it cannot be inflicted by the scourge of terrorism.

Pressure through peace organisations, monetary aid organisations and other benefactors of Pakistan need to be invoked, to compel Pakistan to change its policies towards supporting terrorism and create unrest in the world.

Pakistan Army is a major stake holder in all critical aspects of State Governance. It is prudent that India recognises the true power centre and engages with it to resolve contentious issues henceforth. Since Independence, India has restricted its interaction primarily with political leaders and inhibition to deal with Pakistani military has yielded negative results. Hence for any meaningful outcome, India should engage directly with the Pakistani military hierarchy as is being done by the rest of the world while concurrently also interact with its polity. Interaction with the Pakistani military to be done both at political and military level. There is a need to enhance frequency of interaction between the Director General Military Operations and border guarding forces and to put in place robust mechanism to prevent escalation of tensions along the borders. Regular bilateral visits between senior military officers to be organised and resolve issues diplomatically.

Economic and Trade Relations. This key area carries maximum promise as all relations in the future are going to be driven by economic linkages and interests. Even during the worst of times with increased violence and terrorist activities, trade between India and Pakistan continued to flourish though at a low level. According to a data released in May 2014 by the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Ministry of Commerce and Industry India, the volume of bilateral trade recorded a net increase of \$410 million from April 2013 to March 2014. Pakistan's exports to India grew by 28 per cent while Indian exports to Pakistan increased by 19 per cent. Bilateral trade increased to \$2.4 billion, which could had

soared to \$6 billion in the next two years if Pakistan granted “most favoured nation” (MFN) status to India and good relations prevailed. However, relations deteriorated and post abrogation of Article 370^{liv}, Islamabad decided to suspend trade with New Delhi. India had earlier revoked Pakistan’s most-favoured nation (MFN) status following the Pulwama terrorist attack in February 2019 and imposed up to 200 per cent duty on import of Pakistani goods. In FY19, total exports to Pakistan were \$2.06 billion, while imports were \$495 million. But post suspension of trade, in the first quarter of FY 2020, India’s exports to Pakistan were \$452.5 million and imports were reduced to \$7.13 million. The suspension of trade relations will hit Pakistan more as our exports to them have a very limited profile.

However, in the present environment which has financial interests superseding all other interests in international relations, bilateral trade between India & Pakistan has the potential to galvanize the relationship by creating powerful stakeholders with large financial interests in either country. Businessmen and entrepreneurs can exert pressure on respective governments to ensure peace and stability in the region and unlock the existing barriers to exploit mutually advantageous economic opportunities.

Cultural Exchanges. Cultural exchanges between the two countries can help bridge the trust deficit and improve ties between the people. With Pakistan and India having common history and languages, cultural exchanges can help erase prevailing misconceptions and differences. Adoption of confidence building measures (CBMs) and consultations with different segments of the informed public, media, politicians, military dignitaries, intelligentsia and strategic opinion makers would help clear the webs of suspicion created by people with vested interests. The pressure by the civil

societies and intelligentsia would compel the respective Governments to ensure peace and harmony in the region and focus on development rather than create discord.

Perception Management. Media has a critical role in creating and managing perceptions. It can steer government policies, generate sympathy, legitimise acts of violence and articulate a particular narrative. It is important that to project the correct picture and ensure true representation of the facts and sentiments the media must maintain highest principles of integrity and not use jingoistic and hyper-nationalistic assertions and push fabricated narratives, to cater for the interests of the vested few. Regular media conclaves, conferences and seminars to be organised to exchange ideas, share opinions, views and concerns.

Exploitation of Fault lines. In case Pakistan continues to maintain its belligerent attitude, than India is left with no choice but to respond in a quid pro quo manner. Pakistan is infested with plethora of fault lines - ethnic, sectarian, religious, socio-economic etc making it vulnerable for exploitation. All the factors that allow Pakistan to use non-state actors and create unrest in India, in principle also allow India to reciprocate in a similar measure. Rather, India enjoys much better ties with all of Pakistan's neighbours less China, has a larger conventional warfighting capabilities, bigger economy and more reputable standing, hence it is arguably better poised to respond in a more aggressive and punitive manner and create substantial turmoil in Pakistan. However, India has been remarkably constrained in spite of decades of Pakistani provocation. In case Pakistan continues to create unrest and volatility in India by employing terrorism as a state policy and disrespecting the

cease fire obligations, than India by all means is justified to exploit the fault lines and create anarchy in Pakistan.

Conclusion

The appeasement of Pakistan should not be a policy option and India must eschew verbal bellicosity & muscle flexing in its dealings with Pakistan, when required. Failure to respond vigorously will surely encourage more audacious adventurism by Pakistan. India must continue to engage Pakistan diplomatically, monitoring carefully the dynamics of power equations between the Army and civilian dispensation. The diplomacy must involve interaction between both the political and military leaders of the two countries.

It clearly stands out that India does not lack the ways and means to punish Pakistan either militarily or otherwise in case it misbehaves. However, prudence demands that conventional military confrontation between the two countries should never be allowed to escalate beyond a point. Hence there is a need for India to develop a suite of policies that should impose significant and escalating costs upon Pakistan, diplomatically, politically and militarily^{lvvi} without crossing the critical threshold. India must continue to seek support internationally to compel Pakistan to curb anti - India activities and support military action against it in case of Pakistan's adventurism. Additionally India should concentrate on strengthening its economy and military, enhance homeland security, use of positive/ negative levers to influence strategic calculus, expedite police reforms, better intelligence co-ordination and hone capabilities to undertake covert operations behind enemy lines. Concurrently effort to improve economic and trade relations with Pakistan and regular cultural exchanges must be initiated to help build trust between the two countries. Both

nations should initially endeavour to harvest low hanging fruits, e.g. Sir Creek dispute, ceasefire violations, fisherman issues etc to enhance positivity before resolving sensitive issues.

CHAPTER VII : SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Pakistan came into existence on 14 August 1947^{lvii}, to form the Muslim majority state. The creation of Pakistan involved the largest demographic movement

in recorded history and nearly seventeen million people-Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs moved in both directions between India and the two wings of Pakistan. Sixty million of the ninety-five million Muslims of the British India became citizens of Pakistan while balance thirty-five million Muslims remained in India making it the largest Muslim minority in a non-Muslim state.

Scarred from birth, Pakistan's quest for survival has been as compelling as it has been uncertain. Despite the shared religion of its majority Muslim population, Pakistan has been engaged in an unending struggle to define its national identity and evolve a stable and robust political system for its diverse population. Pakistan is known to have over twenty languages and over 300 distinct dialects. This diversity has led to persistent regional tensions and failure in forming coherent unbiased policies, catering to the interests of all.

All of Pakistan's struggle hinge on the dilemma it faces in trying to achieve parity with India, in spite of being on the brink of becoming a failed state. The breakaway of East Pakistan in 1971 questioned the very ideology of Pakistan's origin, a State for the Muslims. Political developments in Pakistan continue to be marred by provincial agenda seeking greater autonomy / independence. Resentment of the smaller provinces of Sind, Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Gilgit Baltistan and POK against the hegemony of the Punjabi majority, the primary beneficiary of power and profit run deep. Due to absence of any strong and effective central political party, Pakistan has to rely on its Army and civil service for Governance.

Predicated on the situation in Pakistan, it can be averred that more than half the country has slipped into anarchy and the remaining may also follow if Islamabad does not carry out drastic reassessment of its national policies and ideologies. The

Pakistan Army continues to get targeted by the monster it has created and is greatly over-stretched owing to its commitments in internal security duties and deployment on borders with India and Afghanistan. Internally, the anti-India rhetoric that sustained Pakistan Army is no longer as effective, as the population has realised Army's incapability to fight India and yield favourable result. Today, the internal instability within Pakistan is fast acquiring proportions which could lead to major law and order breakdown - all due to sheer myopic policies pursued by its military junta. The government's subdued response to rising radicalisation and sectarian violence suggests that it does not want to rock the boat one way or another. Today, Pakistan is standing on the crossroads where it can either continue to follow the current trajectory or transform and undertake processes and decisions to restructure and reform its existing political, judicial, economic and societal fault lines and move towards stability and development. If Pakistan continues on its present course, then as stated by Stephen Cohen "Pakistan would become its own worst enemy".

To deter Pakistani's adventurism, India has to make the cost of war prohibitive for Pakistan. Indian response has to be bold, audacious and disproportionate employing all viable means available. Likelihood of military action by India may provoke a counter offensive by Pakistan, hence the need for own forces to be in a constant state of preparedness, poised to react to any contingency. Employment of punitive means to strike Pakistan by precision munitions, air strikes, armed / combat UAV's and UAC's and cross border operations are attractive options but counter strike capabilities of enemy needs to be factored into own defence preparedness. Diplomatic efforts to shape the international environment to favourably support India effort in dealing with Pakistan is critical.

India today really does not need to wage war against Pakistan, it can simply exploit the precarious situation prevailing in Pakistan and its neighbourhood by using its intelligence agencies and other covert and financial means . The dividends achieved would be much higher compared to employing conventional means with minimal risk of escalation. Fortunately, India as a mature and responsible nation has no hegemonic designs or military interests towards Pakistan and does not intend to exploit Pakistani fragilities. Hence, Islamabad instead of exporting hatred and destruction should endeavour to seek peace with India and work towards improving relationship and restoring harmony between the two countries.

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