

Chapter- 3

Organizational Structure of UK, US and Indian Police

In order to understand the national organization of police, it is necessary to distinguish the number of autonomous forces, the coordination of jurisdictions among them, and the territorial and functional distribution of commands within them. Among the US, UK and India, the number as well as the coordination of forces varies sharply. As a result, differences in scale are so great as to call into question the value of using either forces or police stations as units of managerial analysis. Surprisingly, the scale of jurisdictions does not affect the number of command levels within forces. The concept of centralization/decentralization (of Police forces) must be grounded in considerations of scale. Differences in national structures of policing depend on political settlements achieved at the time countries were formed. Differences in functional organization are smaller among countries than structural ones, and they depend on professional outlooks shared internationally. Finally, very little is known about the effects of police organization on goals and objectives. The entire subject is shrouded in unexamined assumptions often unintelligently applied (Bayley, 1992).

The organization of the police is a curious (and boring!) subject. Knowledge about police organization, changes in organization by abolishing or amalgamating police forces is tantamount to changing the constitution. Efforts at the reform of policing inevitably, and too often exclusively, focus on questions of location, scope, and chain of command. Proposals to assign detectives, for example, to patrol commands or to base traffic units in police stations are contested and controversial issues.

Here, an attempt is made to explore these issues by describing the variations in police organization among the countries viz. US, UK and India. India, despite being an outlier for cultural reasons, presumably has something to learn from US and UK and vice-versa. The study explores theoretical propositions that explain national differences in police organization: the spatial organization of command, including both the number of autonomous forces in a country and the dispersion of command responsibility within forces, and the functional organization of police forces, meaning the way in which work of different types is coordinated (Bayley, 1992).

The study also describes differences in rank structures. Together these three viz. spatial organization, functional organization and rank structure, aspects of police organization constitute the steel frame of policing. The study also tries to explore if organization makes a difference. Are the police right in thinking that organizational matters are worth fighting about or are the rest of us right in thinking they are distracting and inconsequential? (Bayley, 1992).

3.1 Police Forces in the Countries:

There is enormous variation in the number of autonomous general-purpose police forces. The United States has by far the largest number of autonomous forces.

India has twenty-nine state (provincial) forces and seven Union Territories forces. In addition to these, there are more than ten central forces that report to the government in center. These include Intelligence agencies (IB), investigative agencies (CBI, NIA, NCB, ED etc.), para-military forces (BSF, CRPF, ITBP, SSB, NSG etc.) and special purpose force to provide security to VIPs (SPG etc.).

UK has forty-three forces, consisting of forty-one provincial forces and one each in the City of London and the surrounding London metropolis. UK should be understood to refer here to England and Wales, as Statistical information about police and crime in the United Kingdom usually covers only England and Wales.

To count forces in the United States is impossible. Forty thousand (!) was the figure that was cited for many years (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 1967). In the late 1960s, the U.S. Department of Justice undertook a survey to find out how many forces there were. It concluded that there were approximately 14,901 "enforcement agencies," 14,000 of them maintained by local governments (Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 1970). However, because this survey excluded governments, covering less than 1,000 persons, which according to estimates ranged from as few as 10,000 to as many as 25,000, many people thought there could be at least 25,000 separate police agencies in the United States. This chaotic situation has now been stabilized by the U.S. Department of Justice, which annually provides a figure on the number of American police forces, carefully noting that it is "based on weighted sample results, not on enumeration" (Jamieson and Flanagan 1989, p.78). The estimated figure for 1987 was 15,118, consisting of 11,989 local forces, 3,080 county sheriffs' departments, and forty-nine state forces. As per these estimates, more than one-third of governments in the United States have raised their own police. (Bayley, 1992).

Police forces are difficult units of analysis because they vary so enormously in scale. The largest jurisdictions of the forces are that of India, followed by Britain, and last the United States. Police (provincial) forces in India has vast police jurisdictions. Its twenty-

nine state forces cover an area that is 40 percent of the size of the mainland United States. The average state police jurisdiction is about 58,000 square miles. Police jurisdictions in UK and the United States are on an altogether different scale. Police jurisdictions in England and Wales, which together are slightly smaller than Oregon, average about 1,357 square miles. This makes them smaller than India's police jurisdictions by a factor of forty-three! British police forces cover territories the size of American counties. Most police forces in the United States cover even less territory. Computing an average would be meaningless because American forces often overlap in their jurisdictions and are attached to levels of government formed on very different scales. State police jurisdictions are larger on the average than others but are confined to unincorporated areas or highways. County police usually share authority with state and municipal forces. If counties did all of the policing in the United States, police jurisdictions would average 983 square miles- appreciably smaller than Britain's. Most of the American population, however, is covered by police forces that operate within even smaller boundaries. The United States has a few police jurisdictions of substantial size, but the vast majority are minuscule compared to the other countries.

Huge disparities also exist among the police forces of these countries in terms of the number of officers employed and the size of the populations covered. Proving again that the number of police officers is determined largely by population, the rank order of the countries by officers per force and populations per force are identical. India has gigantic forces that are responsible for enormous populations. The average size of an Indian force is almost half again as large as New York City's, approximately 44,130.8 (BPR&D, 2015 Report). The largest force, with 179,676 officers, is in the state of Maharashtra followed

by 165,040 officers in the state of Uttar Pradesh. The smallest is in the UT of Dadra Nagar Haveli, with 253. Indian forces are responsible for populations averaging 36,362,000 almost five times larger than the population of New York City. However, the average figures may be misleading as the population of the states vary enormously. An indicator used in India is Police per Hundred Thousand (lakh) of Population Ratio. This itself vary between 984.18 in Manipur to as low as 62.94 in Dadra Nagar Haveli! In Great Britain, London has an enormous force-approximately 28,000 officers-while the forty provincial police forces are much smaller, averaging 2,247 officers. The London police are responsible for 7,202,000 people (Reiner 1988); the remaining forty-two forces for about 1,189,000 each. The United States has the smallest forces of these five countries, covering small populations. If its police officers were distributed evenly among the 15,118 state, county, and local forces, there would be 36.7 in each and they would cover populations of 16,139 each. This calculation is misleading, however, because one-fifth of all police officers are employed in twenty-five large departments (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics 1987). The United States has mostly small departments responsible for few people. In all of these countries the national government plays a very limited role in general-purpose policing. The dominance of local policing might have been expected in India, and the United States, which have federal systems, but it is true of Britain as well. Further, while the constituent federal units all maintain police forces, monopolization at the state level occurs only in India. In Canada and the United States, the constituent federal units allow subordinate governments to create police forces if they choose. General-purpose policing by the central government is done straightforwardly in India in its seven Union Territories and not in US and UK.

At the same time, all three central governments have personnel with powers of investigation and arrest who can be used in connection with national responsibilities. In the United States, where each state has its own criminal code, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have preeminent authority to enforce federal statutes. The same is true for the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and National Investigation Agency (NIA) in India, despite unified criminal code. Britain's position is equivocal. The London Metropolitan Police-Scotland Yard-is responsible to Parliament, not to local government, and can be directed by the Home Secretary to undertake national investigations and law enforcement. It can, therefore, be regarded as both a local and a central government force. MI5, Britain's domestic security service, has authority to investigate subversion throughout the island as well as to make arrests, although arresting is usually left to local forces as a matter of courtesy.

General-purpose police are the heart of policing in any country, making up the bulk of police personnel. Special-purpose police are usually authorized by national governments. Examples include America's Secret Service for the protection of the president and other VIPs; Special Protection Group for the protection of Prime Minister; and Britain's MIS5. Ancillary police forces-the third category--include the New York City Transit Police, which is the seventh largest police force in the United States,¹² the U.S. Army's Military Police, the British Transit Police, the Indian Railway Protection Force, the British Atomic Energy Constabulary. While these ancillary police forces are increasingly being amalgamated into surrounding general-purpose police forces in US, and probably in Britain too, the experience in India is different. In India, in recent decades, specialized

forces have been created to meet specific challenges, Ex. creation of SPG for PM security, NSG for operation 'blue-star', NIA for investigation of terror related crime etc.

Yet another point of comparison of policing in these countries is in the existence of "system." In India and Britain, with exception of the United States, citizens are subject to the authority of only one general-purpose police force at a time. The jurisdictions are coordinated. In India, the state (provincial) forces have exclusivity, both of command as well as the jurisdiction. What it means is that the provincial government exercise the control over the provincial police. Only in rare situations, when emergency is imposed in any of the province the command of the police is exercised by the central government through its representative viz. Governor. Similarly, a citizen is subjected to the authority of the 'general-purpose' police of the province he generally resides in. Similarly, in Great Britain, a citizen is either subject to the authority of the provincial force (where he resides) or of the London Metropolitan Police (if he resides in London). The United States allows overlapping police jurisdictions, where citizens may be subject simultaneously to enforcement by city, county, and state police. As Bruce Smith said over fifty years ago, "there is ... no such thing in the United States as a police system, not even a set of police systems within any reasonably accurate sense of the term" (1940, p. 22). America is not, however, unique in this respect in the world more largely. Lack of jurisdictional coordination also occurs in Italy, the former Soviet Union, Spain, Belgium, and Switzerland. America's curious "non-system" cannot be attributed to federalism since Australia, Canada, and India are federal, too. Neither can it be attributed to the absence of a national criminal code since Australia does not have one either. Canada, Britain, and India, however, do. The United States is stranger than it knows.

3.2 Commands in Police Forces:

The discussion on autonomous police forces only tells where legal/political responsibility for creating and maintaining police forces lies. It does not show where command is actually exercised. Despite the enormous variation in the scale of police forces among these countries, the formal structure of command is surprisingly invariant. There are usually only four levels of command, encompassing force headquarters at the top and ending at police stations, no matter whether the force is municipal, state, or provincial. For example, provincial forces in Britain have four levels of command-headquarters, divisions, subdivisions, and stations. So too does London-headquarters, areas, districts, and stations. The New York State Police has one less-headquarters, troops/districts, and stations/detachments. New York City has three command levels, although a fourth has been inserted in the borough of Manhattan." As city size declines in North America, the number of command levels declines. Medium-size cities such as Edmonton, Alberta, and Denver, Colorado, have only - headquarters and stations. In America's mostly small police forces, all operations are directed from a single police facility. There is a hierarchy of ranks but no spatial decentralization of command. The most elaborate command hierarchy occurs in India, where there are commonly six levels-headquarters, range, district, subdivision, circle, and station (in some states yet another level 'Zone' is there between 'Headquarter' and 'Range'). Since command structures are fairly invariant despite differences in the scale of forces, it follows that police stations vary enormously in area and population. Like police forces, they should not be treated as a homogeneous class of units. The general pattern is that rural police station areas are extensive with small populations while those of urban stations are small with large

populations. Police Stations range in size from an average police station size of 114 square miles covering 10,766 people in Uttar Pradesh, to 3.2 square miles covering 76,453 people in New York City. The point is that, although police stations are the basic unit of operation, they are very dissimilar. They are not even commanded by the same rank of officer. In the United States, most stations are commanded by chiefs. Indian stations are commanded by Inspectors or sub-inspectors, but are units of enormous scale by American or British standards. Subordinate officers, often relatively young in terms of service, are given command responsibilities in India that would be unthinkable in the United States and Britain.

It also follows that either the United States is paying chiefs wages for sergeant's work or sergeants are dreadfully underpaid elsewhere. While command in most forces appears decentralized in terms of territorial organization. The need for devolution of command responsibilities is perceived in all these countries. Senior commanders complain that subordinate supervisors do not want to manage, while station-house commanders complain that they are not given an opportunity. Both are probably right.

TABLE 3.1: The Structure of National Police Systems

Number of Forces	Dispersal of Command	
	Centralized	Decentralized
Single	Sri Lanka Singapore Poland Ireland Israel	Japan
Multiple, Coordinated	France Finland Great Britain	Canada Australia India West Germany
Multiple, Uncoordinated	Italy USSR Belgium Switzerland	United States Mexico

SOURCE: -Adapted from Bayley (1985)

3.3 Personnel in the Police Forces:

Although all these countries, except India, recruit the police at the bottom rank only- constable or police/patrol officer- their rank structures vary considerably. Ranks are most compressed in the United States, where six are standard. There is a marked similarity in rank titles among commonwealth countries, reflecting the historical influence of Britain. The rank structures in the giant cities of London and New York are also very long. Curiously, although India uniquely allows stratified recruitment- to constable, sub-inspector, and deputy/assistant superintendent of police and the officers of Indian Police Service (IPS)- it has a more egalitarian rank structure than the Aussies. See table 3.2, below. Lateral or outside recruitment to very senior positions in most forces is possible but rare (in India it's almost impossible). India has significantly more personnel at the lowest rank than the other countries. The prospects for promotion from the lowest rank to

the rank of sergeant are worst in India and best in the United States, UK falls somewhere, in-between the two. Recognizing that judging the equivalence of ranks is inexact, it appears that a larger proportion of personnel are in senior ranks-above the rank of first-line supervisor- in the United States than in Britain, or India. The Indian rank structure especially is a more wide-based pyramid than the others. In all countries, the command of police stations, the lowest level of operation control, is in the hands of second-line supervisors- lieutenants and captains in the United States, inspectors in Britain, and Inspector/ Sub-inspectors in India. There is a general appreciation among police in all countries that communication is being frustrated by elaborate rank differentiations. The problem is particularly intense in India where there are four rank strata-rank-and-file, noncommissioned officers, commissioned officers-with little promotion between them. In all countries, ranks do not seem to coincide with well-defined command tasks. They establish hierarchy but not functional responsibilities. There is a good deal of discussion in professional circles about compressing ranks in order to encourage participant management and the devolution of operational decision making from central headquarters.

Table: 3.2 Ranks and Commands

United States		Great Britain		India
<u>General</u>	<u>New York City</u>	<u>Provinces</u>	<u>London</u>	
Chief	Commissioner	Chief	Commissioner	Director-General
Assistant/Deputy	Deputy	Constable	Deputy	Additional
Chief	Commissioner	Deputy Chief	Commissioner	Director-General
Captain	Chief of	Constable	Assistant	Inspector-
Lieutenant	Department	Assistant Chief	Commissioner	General
Sergeant	Chief	Constable	Deputy	Deputy
(detective)	Assistant	Chief	Assistant	Inspector-
Police Officer	Chief	Superintendent	Commissioner	General
	Deputy Chief	Superintendent	Commander	Superintendent
	Inspector	Inspector	Chief	Deputy/Assistant
	Deputy	(station)	Superintendent	Superintendent
	Inspector	Sergeant	Superintendent	Inspector
	Captain	Constable	Inspector	(Station)
	(station)		(station)	Sub-inspector
	Lieutenant		Sergeant	(station)
	Sergeant		Constable	Assistant Sub-
	Police Officer			inspector
				Head Constable
				Constable

3.4 Factors Accounting Variations in Organizations:

To discuss the factors that might account for variations in organizations, one needs to address the issues of (i) multiplicity of autonomous forces within countries, (ii) command decentralization within forces, and (iii) development of functional specializations. Above discussions show that variation across countries is greatest with respect to the multiplicity of autonomous forces and least with respect to matters of internal organization. The autonomy of police agencies is closely connected to politics. Whereas, the internal organization responds to the promptings of the police profession, which are shared and highly international (Bayley 1977).

National structures of policing reflect decisions about the geographical distribution of political power. They emerged early in national histories (particularly in US and UK), and they change very little subsequently. The rank order of UK and the United States in terms of the number of autonomous forces would be the same in 1860 and 1990, that is, from about the time organized police forces emerged in respective national histories to the present. In India, the national structures (central government forces) are relatively new and have increased in numbers and strength over the years.

In ascending order of multiplicity, there would be, then and now, India, UK, and the United States. British policing has been based on local authorities at least since the Statute of Winchester, 1285. Because Justices of the Peace could appoint and direct constables, as set forth in the Justice of the Peace Act of 1361, their law-enforcement power gradually supplanted that of the king's sheriffs (Pringle and Parker 1937; Reith 1948; Royal Commission on the Police 1962; Critchley 1967). After the establishment of the London Metropolitan Police in 1829, local governments successively copied Peel's model, but the national government did not require organized police forces throughout the country until the County and Borough Police Act, 1856. Jurisdictions were not rationalized, leading to the elimination of many small ones, until the Local Government Act, 1888 (Critchley 1967, chap. 4). After 1856, the number of autonomous forces declined steadily—from 239 to forty-three (Martin and Wilson 1969). By 1960, on the eve of the creation of the Royal Commission on the Police, the number had fallen to 123. A further substantial decrease occurred in the early 1970s with the consolidation of local governments generally, producing the present number of forty-three. Although Britain seems firmly attached to the principle of local accountability of police, the structure of

policing has always been determined by central initiative through Parliamentary statutes. Britain does not have a federal system, with powers reserved to constituent units. The central government developed the London Metropolitan Police in 1829, required its emulation by local communities after 1856, and determined the number and scale of local police jurisdictions thereafter. Although public opinion remains dead set against the creation of a national police force, Britain may be moving in that direction in fact. Since 1886, the central government has paid an increasing share of the cost of local policing—currently 51 percent. The Home Office plays a substantial role in the selection and training of chief constables, and its policy directives are increasingly accepted by chief constables as authoritative (Reiner 1988). Moreover, during public order crises, often growing out of labor disputes, mechanisms have developed for coordinating police action throughout the country. The appearance of decentralized local control continues to be important in British politics, but in reality, the central government has created the structure of policing and powerfully influenced its operating policies' (Bayley, 1992).

Indian policing was a provincial responsibility under the British and continued as a state responsibility after independence. The number of state forces has increased since as more states were carved out. As mentioned earlier, the provincial (states and UTs) forces stand at thirty-six (excluding 'National structures').

'American traditions of policing have always been local, and there is no sign of change. The only flutter of structural departure from tradition occurred around the time of the Civil War when several states experimented briefly with taking over policing in major cities—for example, in Baltimore, Detroit, New Orleans, Cleveland, San Francisco, New York, and Boston (Richardson 1974). During the early twentieth century, state forces

arose, but instead of supplanting existing forces, they filled in the unpoliced space between them. Faced with the country's uncountable proliferation of forces, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967) urged consolidation. Although there was some interest initially, the movement, which was never strong, now seems stalled (Mastrofski 1985). In fact, the effectiveness of local forces may be improving as they learn to share resources cooperatively with one another (Henderson 1985). This occurs most commonly with respect to communications facilities, hardly ever for patrolling. At the same time, the balance of police authority, as opposed to its territorial structure, is being affected slowly by the nationalization of certain crimes, empowering federal agencies, usually the FBI, to expand the ambit of operations. Such a trend may be occurring in other countries.' (Bailey 1992)

We can infer that 'in the modern world, democratic political regimes, are highly associated with decentralized police systems and authoritarian regimes with centralized ones' (Bailey 1985, chap. 3); 'that structural centralization occurs when the formation of new political communities-in this case nation states-is met with violent resistance' (Bailey 1985, pp. 69-70). UK, the US and India have decentralized police systems because they were formed largely without violence from pre-existing political entities. And they will remain decentralized if threats to national authority are nonviolent or short-lived. In India, such crises have arisen in various provinces (states) e.g. Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir, North-Eastern states etc. where emergency was imposed and the states were governed by the governors. That, in effect, federalize law enforcement. The federal government of the United States, too, used its army to police the South immediately following the Civil War. In sum, the decentralized police structures of these five

countries can be explained by the relative absence of violence accompanying state building. The differences among them with respect to the number of autonomous police forces is explained by differences in patterns of political settlement (Bayley 1985, pp. 70-71).

‘Many historians have argued that serious and persistent rioting, especially in large cities, and the fear of its continuation, precipitated the political decision to create forces organized and paid by government (Reith 1948; Lane 1967, 1980; Silver 1967; Bopp and Schültz 1972; Tobias 1972; Brown and Brown 1973; Richardson 1974; Storch 1975; Grabosky 1977; Gurr, Grabosky, and Hula 1977; Miller 1977; Walker 1980; Harring 1983). Others have argued that the influence of rioting has been exaggerated, that the bankruptcy of previous ordering mechanisms was widely recognized at the time, and that police were reformed because of less dramatic macrosocial changes (Radzinowicz 1957; Critchley 1967; Levett 1975; Field 1981; Monkkonen 1981; Emsley 1983; Reiner 1985). The point that should be noted is that however important rioting was in creating organized policing by government in the nineteenth century, it did not produce centralized police forces in any of these countries, apart from India under a colonial administration. Localism triumphed, based on whatever dispersed political centers were valued in each country. It is a mistake to talk about police reform in the nineteenth century as being a case of "centralization." (Bailey 1992)

Turning to the dispersal of command responsibilities within police forces, any connection between it and external circumstances is hard to discern. It is because of the vagueness in operationalizing "centralization" viz. in what sense was command centralized- discipline,

hiring, promotion, patrol, criminal investigation, community contact, or finance and audit?

Much reforms were taking place in police of these countries other than "centralization/decentralization. The so-called professional model gained ground in these countries (UK and US). Even India was seized by the necessity of reforming the police: the only major systematic examination of policing in India between the Police Act of 1861 and independence came under the auspices of the national Police Commission in 1902-3. "Community-oriented" and "problem-oriented" policing are the hottest ideas. The Indian police, too, though preoccupied with communal and separatist violence, are talking about the need to engender community trust, enhance command responsibilities at the grass roots, and enlist the public in crime prevention. From the above, it can be concluded that: (i) "centralization/decentralization" are code words for reform used by practitioners and scholars regardless of what is actually going on; (ii) changes in the location of command both functionally and geographically are often undertaken as part of reform even though they have no vital, or even clearly perceived, connection with new organizational objectives and (iii) reform is always justified in terms of external conditions.

Further, with the exception of India's large armed reserves, both UK and US have specialized in patrol, criminal investigation, and traffic; and the specializations appear to have developed more or less at the same time historically. Criminal investigation, the most important specialization to emerge in the last two centuries, first appeared in London in 1842. It did not become a sizeable command, however, until 1878 (Critchley 1967, pp. 160-62). Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras developed criminal investigation

divisions (CIDs) in the 1880s, undoubtedly influenced by Britain's example. Criminal investigation departments were added in the provincial forces after the 1902-3 Police Commission' (Bayley 1969, chap. 2). Criminal investigation became a major specialization in the United States around the turn of the century (Richardson 1974; Monkkonen 1981; Marx 1988). The very first unit may have been a three-man group created by the Boston police in 1846 (Lane 1967). Applying a very broad historical brush, it is found that criminal investigation emerged well after the onslaught of industrialization in Britain, during its heyday in the United States and Canada, and well before it in Australia and India. In the absence of more detailed comparative analysis, the best explanation for functional developments within police seems to be the evolution of professional perspectives that are shared among police and informed members of the public about the appropriate role for the police and the most useful strategies for carrying it out. These perspectives are transnational, certainly among English-speaking countries, and once institutionalized have a life of their own (Bayley 1975).

3.5 Significance of Organizations to the Conduct of Policing:

'Does the organizational framework of policing make a difference to the quality of police operations? Almost everyone thinks so. Politicians, supposedly mirroring public opinion, are reluctant to tamper with traditions of multiple autonomous forces. Structural decentralization is considered essential to the protection of the "ancient liberties of Englishmen," while centralization is associated with authoritarian repression. Police officials respond to any crisis-- corruption, crime, race relations--with organizational reforms, usually by the creation of a new unit, task force, or command. Scholars, too,

have associated organizational changes, especially within forces, with key developments in policing during the last century. In the United States, for example, decentralization of command was integral to the "political model" of nineteenth-century policing; centralization to the science based crime fighting of the "professional model"; and decentralization to the "community-oriented" model of the 1980s' (Kelling and Moore 1987).

But are the changes in police organization really instrumental? Officers charged with re-examining the command structure of the Victorian police in Australia in the late 1980s wryly named their task force "Project Arbiter," after Petronius Arbiter of Rome, circa A.D. 50, who said: "We were trained very hard-but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganized. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing: and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization." It often seems that the impulse to improve is expended in battles over form. Police officers know the cynical truth of the expression "plus ça change plus c'est la même chose" (the more it changes, the more it's the same thing). (Bayley, 1992)

Changing organizational boxes is to policing what curriculum reform is to universities- a fractious exercise periodically repeated whenever the institution is challenged. What is needed, then, is a serious examination of the assumptions about the importance of organizational variables. In order to do this, one must stipulate areas of likely impact and then study the differences that changes in organization make. Neither the number of autonomous forces nor the extent of command centralization/ decentralization within forces has any effect on human rights and political freedom. These countries viz. UK, US

and India are all vibrant democracies, but they vary considerably in the multiplicity of forces as well as the command organization within them and there is no threshold effect on either of them. The British Royal Commission on the Police (1962) said: "We therefore summarize our opinion on this matter by observing that to place the police under the control of a well-disposed government would be neither constitutionally objectionable nor politically dangerous; and if an ill-disposed government were to come into office it would without doubt seize control of the police however they might be organized. If reasons are to be found for continuing a system of local police forces, therefore, they must be found elsewhere" (p. 46). (Bayley, 1992)

With respect to community responsiveness of the police, the experience of Australia and Japan shows that a large number of autonomous forces belonging to local governments is not essential. Japan has achieved remarkable community responsiveness through its 'koban' system, despite having a substantially unified police system. The Australian states of New South Wales and South Australia are developing consultative committees for their police stations, even though the jurisdiction of each force is enormous. Conversely, New York City has a local police force, but it is questionable whether communities within the city feel the police are accountable to them. Similarly, the hypotheses that the multiplication of forces ensures community responsiveness is also suspected. If communities want to make police responsive, they must learn to insist on command decentralization. Although considerable attention has been given to the effect of police strength on crime rates and victimization, there are hardly any studies of the effect of variations in police organization (Morris and Heal 1981; Bennett 1983). Contrary to what the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of

Justice had thought, large police forces were not more effective than small ones (Ostrom et al. 1973, 1977). In fact, residents in communities with small police forces reported fewer criminal victimizations and faster response times, and had more favorable opinions about police service. Reanalyzing that rich data set, Robert Worden has recently found that citizens' satisfaction is only weakly related to the size of police departments when one controls for the socioeconomic character of neighborhoods, background of respondents, experiences with the police, styles of local government, and other perceptions of police performance. Moreover, the smaller departments had the better evaluations (Worden 1989).

With respect to the costs of policing, Steve Mastrofski, surveying American studies, found that consolidating small departments rarely produced economies of scale; cooperative sharing of resources through contracting showed mixed results; duplication of services among small departments was rare and sharing common; and patrol coverage on the street was more intense in small departments (Mastrofski 1985).

Finally, centralization of command was once thought essential to the elimination of improper police behavior, particularly corruption and the misuse of force. It was the hallmark of reform during the Progressive Era, carrying with it tighter disciplinary controls and closer supervision. Today this conventional wisdom is being challenged. Centralized control cannot be effective, some contend, in the instrumental sense. It is too cumbersome, perhaps even counterproductive (Maas 1973; Daley 1978; Sherman 1978; Walker 1988). Centralization gives the impression of control but not the reality. Instead, police departments are being encouraged to develop a sense of mission in all officers, stressing the general values that should infuse all activities (Brown 1989). Discipline

would come through socialization and peer reinforcement rather than through the stipulation of rules, covert investigation, and condign punishment (Bayley 1983b). If command decentralization leads to more collegial management, it might assist in "imprinting" the morality of the organization throughout its ranks more successfully. If what I know about the effects of organization on police performance is at all reflective of what is in fact known, then this science is still in its infancy. It has barely proceeded as far as producing good case descriptions, still less comparative ones (Bayley, 1992).

"The organization of the police is a boring topic because it has not been examined to discover if it truly makes a difference. It is viewed so equivocally because it has not been taken seriously intellectually. This is ironic considering the resources, effort, and emotion vested in it by the police themselves. The neglect of organization as a subject for analysis is our fault-police managers, policy analysts, and academic scholars who care about the police. The solution is to use organizational charts for more than getting around in a police organization; they must be treated as independent variables in empirical research. The slender results already obtained indicate that we will probably be surprised." (Bayley, 1992)