

APPENDIX I

*Official Communication made to the Russian Ambassador at London, on the 19th January, 1805, explanatory of the views which His Majesty and the Emperor of Russia formed for the deliverance and security of Europe.*¹

This document was the result of the mission of Novossiltzoff to London in 1804 with proposals for an alliance. In discussions with him and Count Vorontzoff the Russian Ambassador Pitt went over the whole ground of European politics which had been opened up by Russia. The suggestion of the special Guarantee came originally from Russia, as Professor Alison Phillips has pointed out. The final result was the treaty between Russia and Great Britain of April 11th, 1805, where the principle of Guarantee was recognized, though only in the most vague and general terms.²

The result of the communications which have been made by Prince Czar-toriski to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and of the confidential explanations which have been received from your Excellency, has been laid before the King; and His Majesty has seen with inexpressible satisfaction, the wise, dignified, and generous policy, which the Emperor of Russia is disposed to adopt, under the present calamitous situation of Europe. His Majesty is also happy to perceive, that the views and sentiments of the Emperor respecting the deliverance of Europe, and providing for its future tranquillity and safety, correspond so entirely with his own. He is therefore desirous of entering into the most explicit and unreserved explanations on every point connected with this great object, and of forming the closest union of councils, and concert of measures, with his Imperial Majesty, in order, by their joint influence and exertions, to insure the co-operation and assistance of other Powers of the Continent, on a scale adequate to the magnitude and importance of an undertaking, on the success of which the future safety of Europe must depend.

For this purpose, the first step must be, to fix as precisely as possible, the distinct objects to which such a concert is to be directed.

These, according to the explanation given of the sentiments of the Emperor, in which His Majesty entirely concurs, appear to be three :—

¹ This dispatch has generally been quoted by historians from Alison's translation (*History of Europe*, vol. V., chap. XXXIX.) of a French translation of the document in Hansard, vol. XXXI., 176. But this document which was laid before Parliament of May 5th, 1815, was only an extract from the original. The passages there quoted are here given in italics with the exception of folios 49-73 which deal only with the plan of the campaign and the measures necessary to induce Prussia to join the alliance. The Document is endorsed "Draft to Count Woronzow, January 19, 1805. In Lord Milgrave's No. 1 to Lord Gower," and is found in a separate volume, F.O. Russia 60.

² See Alison Phillips, *The Confederation of Europe*, Part I., Chap. 3; Holland Rose, *Napoleonic Studies. Pitt's plans for the Settlement of Europe: Holland Rose Select Despatches . . . relating to the Third Coalition against France.*

1. To rescue from the dominion of France those countries which it has subjugated since the beginning of the Revolution, and to reduce France within its former limits, as they stood before that time.

2. To make such an arrangement with respect to the territories recovered from France, as may provide for their security and happiness, and may at the same time constitute a more effectual barrier in future against encroachments on the part of France.

3. To form, at the restoration of peace, a general agreement and Guarantee for the mutual protection and security of different Powers, and for re-establishing a general system of public law in Europe.

The first and second objects are stated generally, and in their broadest extent; but neither of them can be properly considered in detail without reference to the nature and extent of the means by which they may be accomplished. The first is certainly that to which, without any modification or exception, his Majesty's wishes, as well as those of the Emperor, would be preferably directed, and nothing short of it can *completely*¹ satisfy the views which both Sovereigns form for the deliverance and security of Europe. Should it be possible to unite in concert with Great Britain and Russia, the two other great military Powers of the Continent, there seems little doubt that such a union of force would enable them to accomplish all that is proposed. But if (as there is too much reason to imagine may be the case) it should be found impossible to engage Prussia in the Confederacy, it may be doubted whether such operations could be carried on in all the quarters of Europe, as would be necessary for the success of the whole of this project.

The chief points, however, to which His Majesty considers this doubt as applicable, relate to the question of the entire recovery of the Netherlands and the countries occupied by France on the left bank of the Rhine. His Majesty considers it essential even on this supposition to include nothing less than the evacuation of the North of Germany and Italy, the re-establishment of the independence of the United Provinces and of Switzerland, the Restoration of the dominions of the King of Sardinia and security of Naples; but on the side of the Netherlands it might perhaps be more prudent in this case to confine the views of the Allies to obtaining some moderate acquisitions for the United Provinces calculated (according to the principle specified under the second head) to form an additional barrier for that country. His Majesty, however, by no means intends to imply if very brilliant and decisive success should be obtained, and the power of France broken and overcome by operations in other quarters, the Allies might not in such a case, extend their views to the recovery of the whole or the greater part of these territories, but, as in the first instance it does not appear possible that they can be reconquered by the operations of the war without the aid of Prussia, His Majesty is inclined to think that this object ought in any Treaty of Concert to be described in such terms as would admit of the modifications here stated.

The second point of itself involves in it many important considerations. The views and sentiments by which His Majesty and the Emperor of Russia are equally animated in endeavouring to establish this concert, are pure and disinterested.

The insular situation and extensive resources of Great Britain, aided by its military exertions and naval superiority; and the immense power, the established Continental ascendancy and remote distance of Russia already give to the territories of the two Sovereigns a security against the attacks of France—even after all her acquisitions of influence, power and dominion—which cannot be the lot of any other country. They have therefore no separate objects of their own in the arrangements which are in question, no personal interest to consult in this Concert but that which grows out of the general interest and security of Europe, and is inseparably connected with it. Their first view, therefore, with respect to any of the countries which may be recovered from France, must be to restore, as far as possible, their ancient rights, and provide for the internal happiness of their inhabitants;

¹ In Italics in Hansard.

but in looking at this object, they must not lose sight of the general security of Europe, on which even that separate object must principally depend.

Pursuant to this principle, there can be no question that, whenever any of these countries are capable of being restored to their former independence, and of being placed in a situation in which they can protect it, such an arrangement must be most congenial to the policy and the feelings on which this system is founded : but there will be found to be other countries among those now under the dominion of France, to which these considerations cannot apply, where either the ancient relations of the country are so completely destroyed that they cannot be restored, or where independence would be merely nominal and alike inconsistent with the security for the country itself, or for Europe : happily, the larger number is of the first description. Should the arms of the Allies be successful to the full extent of expelling France from all the dominions she has acquired since the Revolution, it would certainly be the first object, as has already been stated, to re-establish the republics of the United Provinces and Switzerland, the territories of the King of Sardinia, Tuscany, Modena, (under the protection of Austria), and Naples. But the territories of Genoa, of the Italian Republic, including the three Legations, Parma, and Placentia : and on the other side of Europe, the Austrian Netherlands, and the States which have been detached from the German Empire on the left bank of the Rhine, evidently belong to the second class. With respect to the territories enumerated in Italy, experience has shown how little disposition existed in some, and how little means in any, to resist the aggression or influence of France. The King of Spain was certainly too much a party to the system of which so large a part of Europe has been a victim, to entitle the former interests of his family in Italy to any consideration ; nor does the past conduct of Genoa, or any of the other States, give them any claim, either of justice or liberality. It is also obvious that these separate petty sovereignties would never again have any solid existence in themselves, and would only serve to weaken and impair the force which ought to be, as much as possible, concentrated in the hands of the chief Powers of Italy.

It is needless to dwell particularly on the state of the Netherlands. Events have put out of the question the restoration of them to the House of Austria ; they are therefore necessarily open to new arrangements, and evidently can never exist separate and independent. Nearly the same considerations apply to the Ecclesiastical Electorates, and the other territories on the left bank of the Rhine, after their being once detached from the Empire, and the former possessors of them indemnified. There appears, therefore, to be no possible objection, on the strictest principles of justice and public morality, to making such a disposition with respect to any of these territories as may be most conducive to the general interests ; and there is evidently no other mode of accomplishing the great and beneficent object of re-establishing (after so much misery and bloodshed) the safety and repose of Europe on a solid and permanent basis. It is fortunate too that such a plan of arrangement as is itself essential to the end proposed, is also likely to contribute, in the greatest degree, to secure the means by which that great end can best be promoted.

It is evidently of the utmost importance, if not absolutely indispensable for this purpose, to secure the vigorous and effectual co-operation both of Austria and Prussia ; but there is little reason to hope that either of these Powers will be brought to embark in the common cause, without the prospect of obtaining some important acquisition to compensate for its exertions. On the grounds which have been already stated, his Majesty conceives that nothing could so much contribute to the general security as giving to Austria fresh means of resisting the views of France on the side of Italy, and placing Prussia in a similar situation with respect to the Low Countries ; and the relative situations of the two Powers would naturally make those the quarters to which their views would respectively be directed.

In Italy, sound policy would require, that the power and influence of the King of Sardinia should be augmented, and that Austria should be replaced in a

situation which may enable her to afford an immediate and effectual support to his dominions, in case of their being attacked. His Majesty sees with satisfaction, from the secret and confidential communications recently received through your Excellency, that the views of the Court of Vienna are perfectly conformable to this general principle, and that the extension at which she aims, might not only safely be admitted, but might even be increased, with advantage to the general interest. In other respects His Majesty entirely concurs in the outline of the arrangement which he understands the Emperor of Russia to be desirous of seeing effected in this quarter. His Majesty considers it as absolutely necessary for the general security, that Italy should be completely rescued both from the occupation and influence of France, and that no Powers should be left within it, who are not likely to enter into a general system of defence for maintaining its independence. For this purpose, it is essential that the countries now composing what is called the Italian Republic, should be transferred to other Powers. In distributing these territories, an increase of wealth and power should undoubtedly be given to the King of Sardinia; and it seems material that his possessions, as well as the Duchy of Tuscany (which it is proposed to restore to the Grand Duke), should be brought into immediate contact, or ready communication with those of Austria. On this principle *the part of the Milanese to the South West of the Adda, and the whole of the territories which now compose the Ligurian Republic, as well as perhaps Parma and Placentia*, might, it is conceived, be annexed to Piedmont.

The Three Legations might in His Majesty's opinion be annexed to the territories of Austria, and the addition which may be made to the acquisitions proposed for that Power, with advantage to the common cause. And the Duchy of Modena, placed as it would be between the new acquisitions of Sardinia and the Duchy of Tuscany (which may be considered under this arrangement as virtually Austrian) might safely be restored to its former possessors.

The observations which have been stated respecting the situation of Sardinia in Italy seem, in a great measure, to apply to that of Holland and Prussia, in relation to the Low Countries; with this difference, however, that the Piedmontese dominions, affording in themselves considerable means of defence, they may be perhaps sufficiently secure in the possession of the King of Sardinia, supported by Austria, whereas the Netherlands being more open and exposed seem scarcely capable of being secured unless by annexing a considerable part of them to Prussia, and placing Holland in a second line of defence. With this view (supposing France to be reduced within its ancient limits) it might be proposed to annex to the United Provinces, as an additional Barrier the part of Flanders lying within a military line to be drawn from Antwerp to the Meuse at Maestricht, and the remainder of the Netherlands, together with the Duchies of Luxembourg and Juliers, and the other territories between the Meuse and the Moselle to Prussia.

His Majesty indeed feels so strongly the importance both of augmenting the inducements to Prussia to take part and of rendering it a powerful and effectual Barrier for the defence not only of Holland but of the North of Germany against France, that he should even consider it as advisable in addition to what has been already proposed, to put into possession of that Power the territories which may be recovered from France on the left bank of the Rhine, eastward of the Moselle, and His Majesty entertains a strong conviction that this arrangement (if it not in other respects be thought liable to insuperable objections) would be infinitely more effective for the protection of the North of Europe than any other that can be devised.

His Majesty is, however, aware that great difficulties may arise in regulating the proportionate acquisitions of Austria and Prussia, in such a way as to prevent their being the source of mutual jealousy, and this consideration it is which, amongst others, has operated as a great additional inducement of acquisition for Austria on the side of Italy.

He thinks it also important to remark that the acquisition to be held out to Prussia ought not to be measured merely by what would be in itself desirable but by the consideration of what may be necessary to outweigh the temptations which

France will not fail to offer to that Power, to secure its co-operation. These will probably be on an extensive scale, and in a quarter much more calculated to produce effects injurious to the interests of Austria and of Russia herself while, on the other hand, if the ambition of Prussia can be gratified in the manner proposed at the expense of France, it will be diverted from the views which it will otherwise form towards the North, the accomplishment of which would tend to increase, to an alarming degree, its influence both in Germany and over the secondary Powers of the Baltic. But, if notwithstanding these powerful considerations, it should still be thought by His Imperial Majesty that the augmentation here proposed to the territories of Prussia is greater than ought to be admitted, His Majesty will, (though not without reluctance) concur in any other arrangement that may be thought preferable by which a larger portion of the Netherlands may be allotted to the United Provinces, and the acquisitions of Prussia confined within narrower limits; but he trusts that at any rate, it will not be necessary to reduce them to anything less than the territories on the left bank of the Rhine between the Meuse and the Moselle, and it will in this case, require much consideration, in what hands the territories on the left bank of the Rhine, east of the Moselle can best be placed or whether they may be safely left in the possession of France.

In the event of Prussia not being prevailed upon to enter into the concert, I have already stated His Majesty's conviction, that the views of the Allies on this side of Europe must be more limited; and in that case probably nothing more can be expected than to obtain the complete evacuation of the North of Germany, and the re-establishment of the independence of Holland, together with the Barrier here stated within the line drawn from Antwerp to Maastricht, leaving the other territories on the left bank of the Rhine in the possession of France.

[A detailed description follows (folios 49-72) of the plan of campaign and the amount of force necessary to obtain the objects stated above. If Prussia joins the Alliance it is estimated that 300,000 men may be put into the field; if, as is more likely, she abstains, 400,000. Details of the Plan of campaign are given. Russia is urged to do her utmost to induce Prussia to co-operate and especially is asked to notify her immediately that she will not agree to the acquisition of Hanover by Prussia.]

Supposing the efforts of the Allies to have been completely successful, and the two objects already discussed to have been fully obtained, His Majesty would nevertheless consider this salutary work as still imperfect, if the restoration of peace were not accompanied by the most effectual measures for giving solidity and permanence to the system which shall thus have been established. Much will undoubtedly be effected for the future repose of Europe by these territorial arrangements, which will furnish a more effectual barrier than has before existed against the ambition of France. But in order to render this security as complete as possible, it seems necessary, at the period of a general pacification, to form a Treaty to which all the principal Powers of Europe should be parties, by which their respective rights and possessions, as they then have been established, shall be fixed and recognized; and they should all bind themselves mutually to protect and support each other, against any attempt to infringe them:—It should re-establish a general and comprehensive system of public law in Europe, and provide, as far as possible, for repressing future attempts to disturb the general tranquillity; and above all, for restraining any projects of aggrandizement and ambition similar to those which have produced all the calamities inflicted on Europe since the disastrous era of the French Revolution.

This Treaty should be put under the special Guarantee of Great Britain and Russia, and the two Powers should by a separate engagement, bind themselves to each other jointly to take an active part in preventing its being infringed. Such a Treaty might also be accompanied by more particular and specific provisions, by which the several Powers of Italy might be united in a closer alliance for their own defence. How far any similar system could be adopted for giving additional security for the Germanic Body is well deserving of consideration. Their present

state is certainly very unsatisfactory with a view either to their own immediate interests, or to the safety of Europe. At the same time it appears to His Majesty very doubtful whether from local circumstances and other causes, it would ever be possible to consolidate them into any effectual system. Should this be found to be the case, the evils to be apprehended from their weak and exposed state might (as far as relates to the danger from France) perhaps be remedied by adopting a system (but on a larger scale) similar to that formerly established by the Barrier Treaty for the protection of the Netherlands. It might not be difficult to settle some general plan for maintaining at the joint expense of the different Powers of the Empire, fortresses of sufficient strength, and properly garrisoned, along the course of the Rhine from Basle to Ehrenbreiten, commanding the principal approaches from France to the most exposed parts of Germany, and the military custody of these fortresses (without infringing in other respects on the territorial rights of the Power in whose dominions they might be placed) might be confided to the two great Powers of Germany, according to their respective means of occupying them.

It seems also desirable, in order to give further security to the United Provinces (under any of the arrangements which have already been discussed) that they should be called upon to enter into an engagement jointly with Great Britain and Russia to maintain at all times their army on such a footing as may be thought necessary to provide for their defence against sudden attacks. In addition to this stipulation His Majesty in his Electoral capacity, might perhaps be induced to keep a considerable force (in consequence of arrangements with the British Government) ready to be employed on the first alarm for the defence of the United Provinces; and His Majesty would also be ready to enter into a Concert with other Powers for defraying the expense of maintaining at all times an adequate and effective garrison to consist of German troops for garrisoning any fortresses now existing, or hereafter to be established, on whatever may be the line ultimately fixed as the Dutch frontier.

Having thus stated what more immediately relates to the specific objects of the Concert and of the means to be employed to give effect, there still remains one great and important question for consideration, and that is how far, either now or hereafter, the views of the Allies ought to be directed towards the re-establishment of monarchy in France, and the restoration of the Bourbon Family on the throne. His Majesty agrees entirely with the Emperor of Russia in thinking that such a settlement is in itself highly desirable for the future both of France and Europe, and that no fair occasion ought to be neglected of promoting it. But he at the same time thinks, that it ought to be considered only a secondary object in the Concert now to be established and one which could in no case justify the prolongation of the war if a Peace could be obtained on the principles which have been stated. It is one with a view to which no active or decided measures can be taken, unless a series of great and signal successes shall previously have been obtained by the Allies, and a strong and prevailing disposition for the return of the Monarch, shall then manifest itself in the interior of France. In the meantime in order to afford every reasonable chance for the attainment of this object, His Majesty entirely agrees with the Emperor of Russia, that it is highly important that in the conduct of the war, and in the public declarations and language of the Allied Courts, the greatest care should be taken to prevent any apprehension in the minds of any part of the French nation of any design either to dictate to them by force any particular form of government, or to attempt to dismember the ancient territories of France.

Such are the sentiments and observations which His Majesty is desirous of offering to the consideration of the Emperor on the great outlines of the important system which they are equally anxious to establish.

His Majesty will receive with the utmost attention and satisfaction, every fresh communication of the opinion of His Imperial Majesty on all the details connected with so extensive a subject. In the meanwhile from an anxiety to lose no time in laying the foundation of this great work, His Majesty has directed a project to be prepared of a Provisional Treaty conformable to the sentiments which appear to be entertained both by the Emperor and himself: and which, if it should meet with His Imperial Majesty's concurrence, he is ready immediately to conclude.

APPENDIX II

(i).—*Extracts from a Speech of Castlereagh in the House of Commons, March 20th, 1815.*¹

. . . If I were to lead the House to suppose that, in the arduous transactions in which I have been engaged, I had at any time suffered the machine of Congress to stand still, in order to screen my conduct and determination under the cover of previous instructions from my government, when the public interests might suffer from delay, or that I had withheld that impulse which the influence of Great Britain, when applied with decision, was calculated to give, I should think that I had grossly betrayed the trust reposed in me If it shall appear, as the honourable member has, on this night and on many others, contended, that the honour of the Crown has been sullied, that the good faith of the country has been disregarded, and her character degraded in the eyes of Europe, I desire to be considered as alone responsible: I am ready alone to meet the attack and to repel the charge.

[Castlereagh then proceeded to explain the state of the negotiations relative to the abolition of the Slave Trade—a point for which he had been particularly instructed to press the representatives of other Powers, even with offers of territorial cessions and pecuniary sacrifices: he argued—]

If foreign Powers have withstood those temptations held out for their conditional acceptance, whilst our exertions should be continued without relaxation to bring them to a more favourable decision, it is but fair and just for Parliament to conclude that there were serious difficulties in the way of those governments immediately lending themselves to our wishes, and that we are bound to make allowance for the motives which induced them not to embark in what they held to be to them a dangerous experiment. With a view to the success of the object itself, we ought not to disgust them by our inconsiderate reproaches.

Though the Slave Trade is not actually abolished, yet I have the satisfaction to announce that a great step has been made towards its suppression. The eight Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Paris have published a solemn declaration that it was fit that this detestable traffic should be swept from the face of the earth. The claim which particular Powers, who still traffic in slaves, make for themselves, is that so much time shall be allowed for its discontinuance as is necessary for the welfare, security, and internal tranquillity of their respective dominions, and more particularly their colonies; and they pledge themselves to the world then to put an end to this nefarious trade. I am happy in being able to congratulate the House on this important result. It will be obvious that no small step has been gained, by inducing every Power in Europe not only to pronounce against the general principle of the traffic in human beings, but to pronounce in favour of its actual, final, and early extinction . . . Spain and Portugal, who have hitherto made the least progress towards the final accomplishment of the object, have declared eight years to be the utmost interval before it is abolished by them, and I do not despair that even this period may yet be reduced. With respect to France, although I have not yet been able to persuade the French Government to depart from their original determination, yet, from all the intercourse I have had with the minister

¹ This version, corrected by Castlereagh himself, is given in the *Castlereagh Correspondence* I., p. 24 ff. It was made in reply to a hot attack by Villèle. The news of Napoleon's return had already been received, but the full extent of his success was not yet known. I have omitted some of the passages concerning Genoa and Holland which went into details of the negotiations. But most of the other gaps are in the version given in the *Correspondence*.

of his Most Christian Majesty, my belief is that they are sincerely desirous to put the earliest termination to this trade that they can reconcile to the general opinion and the prevailing prejudices of their own nation.

I should not have satisfied Parliament, or indeed my own sense of public duty, if I had not made every effort to procure a partial abolition of the Slave Trade, particularly North of the Line. But I do not myself consider this important question as yet terminated at Vienna; for some of the plenipotentiaries, for instance, that of Portugal, had not time to receive sufficient instructions on the subject from their government, and therefore did not deem themselves authorized to determine upon it. Measures have, in consequence, been taken to adjourn the Congress, as far as the Slave Trade is concerned, and to establish a commission, composed of accredited agents, in London or Paris, to continue the negotiations upon the subject.

[Having disposed of the question of the Slave Trade, Lord Castlereagh passed to the consideration of the proceedings of the Congress of Vienna, in regard to European States.]

Every gentleman in the House must be aware that the Congress was assembled for the purpose of carrying into effect the peace of Paris, a peace which received the approbation of even the honourable gentleman: not that I mean to imply that he is bound to applaud any proceedings that have been since founded upon it, if he thinks them not deserving of applause. The fair question then is, whether, taking the Treaty of Paris as the basis upon which the late deliberations at Vienna were established, and upon the general principles of which those deliberations were to be pursued, whatever declarations might at other times have been issued—whether, I say, under all the circumstances of the case, those who were engaged in this great undertaking have fairly and honourably executed the task imposed upon them, and what judgment the House and the world at large, for whom they acted, ought to pronounce upon their conduct.

I am prepared to meet the honourable gentleman upon that issue: I will, at the proper moment, disguise none of the circumstances of the case: I will then disclose every particle of intelligence upon every single point; I will, at the proper time, avow them openly; and if, on the present occasion, I am accused of withholding any portion of these transactions, it is only because it is not possible for me, with a due regard for the interests of the public service, to lay them all open to the view of the world. But, on every part of this complicated question, I will be prepared to meet the honourable gentleman: I will be prepared to vindicate it against the foul calumnies with which, no doubt from misapprehension and misinformation, he has thought fit to impugn the councils of his country, and to bring charges of the most nefarious character against other governments that have been parties to those transactions, without the slightest foundation for his accusations, and, as I will take leave to say, with great prejudice to the general interests and welfare of Europe. In the commencement, the House will allow me to protest against the principle which the honourable gentleman has attempted to lay down for the sovereigns of Europe. If, as he contends, they had issued a Declaration, under the construction of which all the ancient governments of Europe which Time had swept away were to be re-created; that those rude and shapeless fabrics, which had long been thrown down, and had long ceased to exist in any tangible form, were to be reconstructed without any consideration of the real tendency of such a reconstruction; that those scattered fragments were again to be put together, without reflecting upon the probable consequences—upon the corruptions that had grown up under the shade of those antiquated and ruinous institutions—without recollecting how far those very governments had tended to produce the calamities by which Europe had been so long and so severely visited, and which might in time have the very effect of re-creating the dangers which we have just escaped—I say, if the Declarations of the sovereigns were to be so construed and understood, I should have felt ashamed that my country had belonged to a confederacy founded upon such a principle of imbecility.

The true question is—and I think the honourable gentleman is too much of a statesman and too manly in his understanding not to meet me upon that issue—whether the deliberations and decisions of Congress were guided by an ascertained and worthy principle; whether the basis of a solid and lasting pacification was or was not in itself unsound; and whether, for the sake of the attainment of any partial or selfish views, any of the parties, but more especially this country, had betrayed the trust reposed in them by the confidence of Europe. It is upon these grounds, and these only, that I mean to argue the question, and to refute the assertions and positions of the honourable member . . .

I apprehend that, in the whole course of the negotiations lately held for the attainment of a general peace, it was perfectly understood that the purpose of the sovereigns of Europe, after the contests they had endured, was to establish and reorganize the two great monarchies of Europe, that had been almost annihilated as monarchies, to accomplish the designs of the late ruler of France—I mean, Austria and Prussia.

The object, as all gentlemen must be aware, was to gain and permanently secure greater safety on both flanks of the two States which were to form the immediate bulwarks of Europe, to give adequate power by means of the additional strength which they should supply to that State of North Germany which would be charged with the preservation of that portion of the Continent. It was also desirable that a strong barrier should be interposed between the States of Italy and France, to prevent them also from arraying themselves against each other. It was further wished that Switzerland should be re-established in her influence and independence, to keep up the chain of communication, and that Germany might be again confederated in the same system, to render it an impregnable bulwark between the great States in the East and West of Europe. The question is: Have these arrangements been calculated to produce such a state of things as all professed to be desirous of creating; or have particular Powers been unjustly aggrandized, and have the Potentates acted at the Congress in the honest and faithful execution of the trust reposed in them, and of the general purpose which it was their interest to keep in view?

And here I will beg leave to protest against another and, as I conceive, unfair mode in which the honourable member endeavoured to influence the House upon this subject. He read a letter written by the French minister, in reference to a particular question, in which the writer contends that the important point was not to be decided by throwing, as it were, the whole population of Europe into a general fund, and dealing it out in such quantities as might supply the wants of the various sovereigns whose power was to be augmented. I mean not to deny that the letter may have been written; and, if so, it was done in general opposition to the allotment of the whole of Saxony to Prussia as a territorial aggrandizement. If there were not powerfully operating circumstances, I should be the first to admit that the principle of population ought not to prevail, if merely the morality of the question were at issue. I hope it will not be denied that the importance of population, and of the wealth consequent upon it, is great, when we are arguing the question of a Balance of Power in Europe, and what shall be considered a just distribution of force between the sovereigns who are to be charged with maintaining the tranquillity of the Continent.

[Castlereagh then dealt at length with the question of Genoa.] I set a high value, most assuredly, on the good opinion of the honourable gentleman; I am always happy to meet with his approbation, and the more so because I seldom have that good fortune: but, whatever may be that value, and whatever the weight and deference due to his censure, it is not to prevent the kingdoms of Europe from taking measures for their own security and happiness. I confess that I am not quite so fond of popularity as to wish for it at that expense; but, when he asks me whether there were not secret articles in the Treaty of Paris, I answer that, if there were any which the parties to it were not ready at the

¹ Talleyrand to Metternich, Dec. 19, 1815, which had appeared in the Press and from which Whitbread had quoted several passages. *Supra* p. 273.

time to declare and avow, I should be willing to allow Europe and its Sovereigns to incur that execration to which the honourable gentleman is so ready to consign them.

The House will be aware that, whatever those articles might be, their application was not finally and entirely decided; and that was the reason why they were not proclaimed. I admit very willingly that there were circumstances understood between the Powers at Paris that did not form part of the ostensible Treaty; and, so they acted up to those principles, it cannot be contended that any deception was employed, that any fraud was practised, upon the people of Europe. So far am I—and I should think most reasonable men would concur with me—from blaming the parties to the Treaty for entering into this understanding upon various topics, that I should have thought it very unwise and a great indiscretion not to have come to some sort of previous decision.

The Honourable gentleman asks me whether in the Treaty there was anything respecting Holland. I admit that there was; and, if any reproach be due on that account, I desire that I may bear my full share of the blame, and the more so, because I believe I may say that it was principally owing to me that Holland was mentioned; and I should have despaired of the cause of the country if I had not done so, and betrayed, as I think, a criminal confidence in the ministers of France, if I had not brought them to an understanding of the essential interests of this country with regard to Holland before I parted with the essential securities which still I retained in my hands. At the same time, I was not to deprive France of the situation in which I wished to place her. I wished to make her an important and deliberating party to the Treaty; and the House will allow me to state here that no confidence, no faith, that I placed in the conduct of the French Government, either with respect to the Slave Trade, or to any other subject, has been abused. France has conducted herself throughout these proceedings—and I hope this fact will produce, in the mind of the honourable gentleman, a practical sense of the fitness and necessity of preserving that Government, if, by any efforts of this country not inconsistent with moral and national prudence, or with what we owe to another great people, we are able to support it—France, I say, has conducted herself in a manner that must give the utmost satisfaction to all parties, who, I am sure, will feel the propriety of aiding and supporting a Government that has given peace to the world, and, by the situation in which it has been placed among the nations of Europe, is able and willing to maintain it.

France adopted all the engagements and fundamental Treaties which the Allies had made among themselves, and which were not generally disseminated. She came to Congress, in no way fettered in her decisions, or influenced in her judgment, a free agent to deliberate upon the important topics to be there decided. She did not come, as the honourable gentleman supposed, to throw loose the bonds that united together the European Powers in interest and action; but as a free and independent State, to partake in the deliberations and to form her own decision how far she should support the Treaty of the Allies, and how far its engagements were consistent with the general salvation of Europe and the particular re-establishment of France.

If we had not obtained that previous recognition on her part respecting the future plans of Congress, what would have been the consequence? France would have come to the Congress as an inimical, not a friendly Power. If for no other, this was surely an adequate reason for obtaining those stipulations, and for not making them the subject of communication to Parliament. They were not withheld because there was in them any principle of which Europe or her negotiators need be ashamed, but because such a disclosure would have been attended with many evil consequences, and the House must be sensible that they were not in a shape to be properly made the subject of deliberation. [Further consideration of the case of Genoa at length.]

In one part of his speech, the honourable gentleman said, that he knew not why the noble lord went to Vienna, why he did not stay there, or why, having come away, and re-appeared in Parliament, he is not prepared to give a full

communication to the House. Why I went to Vienna, I trust he will not expect me now to explain. I should imagine that it is well known why I went. I went to Vienna, because I was ordered by my Sovereign to go; and I returned to my place in Parliament, because I received a similar direction for that purpose. Why the order for my return was given, perhaps, the honourable gentleman will not think it necessary that I should explain. At the time when I left Vienna, the arrangements were not absolutely concluded and put into a regular shape to be laid before Parliament; yet they had arrived at such a point, and been put into such a shape, as would enable me at least to touch upon those transactions, and give explanations upon such parts as particularly required my presence in the execution With the exception of that single branch which relates to the arrangements of Italy southward of the Po, I may say that all the other points are finished and decided; and to such an extent are they decided, that the arrangements have been reduced into articles in the same form as they would have in the ultimate Treaty to be entered into by all the Powers. These articles have been signed by the different plenipotentiaries of the sovereigns, and are considered as binding and obligatory upon them, only requiring to be finally and formally executed.

The honourable member has asked whether France has been a consenting party to those arrangements. I have no hesitation in stating, if it can be any satisfaction to him, that she has been a consenting party to them, with no more difference of opinion than, I may say, ought to prevail upon questions of such extreme doubt and difficulty. It gives me pleasure to be able to declare that France has acted upon the same broad and liberal principles that have guided the other Powers. She has been an honest party to the Congress, doing her duty to Europe and herself. Her plenipotentiary acted with perfect fairness and openness during the deliberations; and though he may have written some particular note at a time when discussions upon a certain point were not terminated, and may, in the warmth of some of these discussions, have found something upon which to express his reprobation with regard to the arrangement alluded to yet, neither on the part of France, nor on the part of any other State that I am aware of, could any fair complaint be made of improper proceeding in any one respect; and I think that I cannot adduce to the House a stronger proof of the inconvenience resulting from discussions of this sort, than the partial and unjust use made of the document to which I refer. I think that I cannot lay before it a more striking instance of the danger, the desperate danger, of suffering transactions of this nature to be called in question piecemeal, to be discussed and debated upon every single paper that chances to fall into the hands of any honourable member, instead of waiting till the proper time arrives, and the subject can be freely, fairly, and fully canvassed, and a judgment formed becoming the wisdom of the British Parliament. Instead of that, subjects yet under discussion at Vienna were dragged into premature debate in this House, and most serious injury was often done, not only to our cause, but to that of Europe at large. The honourable member produces in the House a document, he knows not how procured; he discusses it, follows it up, pursues the subject to the fullest extent that it will admit of, or that his ingenuity can devise, and then, after doing all the mischief that is possible, as on this occasion, he asks whether it is an official document, and whether there is any foundation for all that he has been saying, and any reason for all the mischief that he has been doing. Against such a mode of proceeding, I feel it necessary to enter my protest.

With respect to two most important features of the late negotiations, I mean the reconstruction of the Austrian and Prussian monarchies—I call them most important features, because every man must be sensible that, until they were restored to their former rank and importance, there would remain a great blank in Europe; that, until they were re-established in adequate strength, there was no bulwark against any future encroachments by France; that, until they were placed upon their original footing, Europe was not herself, and was deprived of the two main pillars of her security—I say, with respect

to the Austrian and Prussian monarchies, I have the satisfaction to state, that they have now, by the decisions of the Allies, regained their former rank and weight in the scale of Europe, in a mode which discharges them from many calumnies that the honourable gentleman has endeavoured to throw upon them. I am aware, and he is now aware, I apprehend, that he made those accusations upon imperfect information ; but, until he had obtained better proof, I should have thought, the more regular, as well as the more judicious course, both for himself and for them, would have been to withhold his assertions that Austria and Prussia were endeavouring to seize and appropriate to themselves, as if by right of conquest, territories to which they have no right, upon any principles of moderation or of fair repartition. But I may say, with perfect confidence, in justification of those States, after all that I have seen, that they have neither done nor consented to any act which should call in question the general moderation of those States.

The principle laid down as the rule of conduct for their reconstruction, was the state of the possessions in the year 1805. The House will, I am sure, admit that, in fixing upon that period, Austria, at least, did not choose a time that was particularly marked by any spirited aggrandizement. By taking 1805, instead of 1792, the period of the Revolution, she placed out of the question her possessions in the Netherlands. It is true that, in 1805, she had possession of the States of Venice, but she was then two millions weaker in population than in 1792. The period which Prussia took was the time immediately preceding the spoliation of that kingdom by France.

On a general view of the present state of these two monarchies, it will be found that, notwithstanding the unreasonable exertions to obtain additional and supereminent power, which they have been charged with making, notwithstanding the ambitious and grasping spirit which they are alleged to have shown, in consequence of the decision of the Congress, neither of them has obtained any accession of the least importance, beyond what they could demand under the strict application of the principle of re-establishment which they had at first laid down.

Though some of the territorial possessions of Prussia may lie wider, and be upon a somewhat more extended scale than formerly, yet it will appear, by the most accurate calculations, that the utmost she has obtained beyond what she had in 1805 is about 50,000 souls ; while Austria, from the slight alterations in her territorial possessions, has not gained more than three or four hundred thousand new subjects. So much for the greedy spirit of aggrandizement which they have shown ; and, upon the whole, I assert most decidedly that nothing can be less true than the imputations cast upon the arrangements made for the two Powers of which I have been speaking.

The honourable gentleman has referred, in a very pointed manner, to two other important transactions which came under the decision of the Congress—I mean, with regard to Saxony and Poland. On these subjects, I have no objection to give him and the House all the information I can, consistently with that reservation which I feel compelled, by a sense of duty, to observe respecting transactions not yet finally closed. All I have to beg is, that the honourable gentleman and the House will suspend their judgment until more complete information than, under the circumstances, I am able to supply, shall be afforded.

The honourable gentleman has arraigned, in the severest terms, the conduct of the Congress, on account of the arrangement adopted in regard to Saxony : he has called it a base and intolerable purpose to annex Saxony to Prussia. I should perhaps agree with him in thinking that it would not be wise or fit to give the whole of Saxony to the Prussian King ; and, having never concealed or disguised my opinion on that subject, I have no hesitation to avow that I was one of the ministers of the Congress, who differed from the Prussian plenipotentiary and others upon this point ; and that I was one of the persons who felt entitled, at Vienna, to contend, in the strongest manner, against the incorporation of the whole of Saxony with the Prussian dominions. I should

have felt, however, that more intolerable injustice might be done in other directions ; but so strong were the sentiments of the British Government upon this subject, and so serious the remonstrances made, that the settlement now existing in Saxony was ultimately obtained by a sacrifice, in some degree, of the interests of Holland and Hanover.

But let me not be misunderstood. I never was one of those who contested the point upon the principle assumed by the honourable gentleman, that it must, in any case, be inconsistent with the duties of the Powers of Europe assembled at Vienna, with the express leave of the nation itself, to annex even the whole of Saxony to Prussia. I never opposed it on the ground of mere abstract right ; and I broadly and avowedly deny any assertions that may have been made regarding my conduct in that respect. I contended that the right of conquest, under the qualifications which I shall presently state, was a right which gave the conqueror a perfect warrant to annex the whole of a subjugated country to another State. I deny that I had argued this matter on any other principle, and cannot suffer the honourable member to give me credit for a line of conduct which he may perhaps applaud, but which I did not think fit to follow in this particular transaction.

I take no pleasure in stating anything that may be injurious to the illustrious monarch, who is now, I apprehend, at the head of the Kingdom of Saxony ; I hope that he will long continue to reign over his subjects in happiness, after the painful scenes through which he has passed ; but I must be allowed to argue, and I do it with perfect confidence, that never was the principle of conquest more legitimately applicable, or more justifiably exercisable than in the case of Saxony. Her conduct furnished, as the House knows, an instance of former unwarrantable aggrandizement, and of the most persevering resistance to the allies. The King drew the consequences upon himself by his own acts. His great exertions against the common cause of the rest of the European Powers are known ; and, although it is known that opportunities were afforded to the King of Saxony to unite his interests with those of the Allies, he thought fit, on his own view of the subject, to employ his efforts in maintaining the power of France. He made this choice after he had been placed in circumstances where he might have withdrawn himself from among the supporters of Buonaparte, if he had not thought that perseverance in the cause of the man who had given him his crown was not the best mode of preserving his dominions.

Saxony was a conquered country, in the strictest sense of the word ; though it is true that the Saxon army, on the third day of the battle of Leipsic, did join the Allies, and perhaps decide the victory, yet the House must know that Saxony, until that moment, which did not depend upon the voice of the sovereign, had been a Power whose army and resources were devoted to the cause of the common enemy against whom we were fighting

I put this case to the House, with regard to Saxony : Admitting and believing that the re-establishment of Prussia in the same state of strength and security that she held in 1805 is necessary to the general repose and safety of Europe, if no other mode of re-establishing and restoring that kingdom had existed, is there any man, who, in point of justice, would have thought fit to put the case of Saxony in competition with that of Prussia ? Suppose it was impossible for the two kingdoms to exist in the new form which Europe was to take, is there any man who would say that Saxony should be continued and Prussia abolished, and her name swept from the face of Europe ? But that was not the question before the Congress ; the question respecting Saxony, from first to last, was this, whether in truth Prussia would derive from the annexation of Saxony that advantage which she expected. As there was ground to presume that Prussia could be reinstated without the sacrifice at least of the whole of Saxony, I was strongly of opinion that to push the general principle to extremity against Saxony would be doing mischief to Prussia, instead of promoting her ultimate and permanent advantage.

I was persuaded that the public feeling not merely of the people of Germany, but of other countries, would have been wounded by so great and complete a

sacrifice of an ancient family ; that the general opinion of mankind would have revolted at such a proceeding, and that Prussia would be prejudiced in the general estimation of Europe by the annexation. Prussia, it was true, had made unexampled efforts in the general cause ; but I did not think that in the eyes of Europe she would be entitled to demand so great a sacrifice. Such being the state of my mind upon this very important point, I conceived it to be my duty to resist, as far as possible, the incorporation at least of the whole of Saxony with Prussia

Respecting Poland, I should wish the House to reserve its judgment until the whole subject can be disclosed. Whatever may be the final decision of the Congress in regard to that country, the House, I am sure, will be gratified to learn that the situation of its brave people will be considerably ameliorated by the new arrangements. There was undoubtedly a strong feeling in the country upon the subject of independence and a separate government : indeed there was, I believe, but one feeling, and, as far as I was able, I exerted myself to attain that object Whatever may be the particular arrangements resolved upon, or the form of government that shall in future be established, I may venture to say, that in the Congress there was but one feeling—that the whole should be governed under a different system, as Poland. That portion which will form the duchy of Warsaw will be under the sceptre of a different prince ; and I have reason to believe that the principle of the government in general will be found far more congenial with the feelings and wishes of the Poles than when they were placed under the authority of different masters from those to whom they will in future be considered to belong. The natives will be relieved from those local difficulties which attached even to their principal duties and avocations, and upon the whole will be ruled upon a system of liberality befitting the spirit of the times. Whatever policy may have formerly prevailed with regard to Poland, a general determination has been taken by such Powers as are interested in the question to promote, by all means, the welfare of the people of this most unfortunate portion of Europe, and to establish in the country a system by which the Poles shall be governed as Poles, with the rights and privileges that ought to belong to them. . . .

I can assure the House that, on my part, there was not wanting any exertion that appeared to me conducive to this important object, and consistent with the general peace of Europe, and indeed with the welfare of the Poles themselves, which, I trust, has been duly consulted. I know that it was the wish of a vast number of persons in this country, and, I believe, in Poland, that it should be erected into a separate State, to maintain its own rank and independence in Europe ; but such was not the wish of all. It was found inconsistent with the views of several of the other great Powers of Europe ; and the House must be aware that such a plan could not be carried into effect without the complete and general concurrence of all the parties interested. . . .

In contemplating the late arrangements, I should have little satisfaction, if I could persuade myself that, in supporting the views and objects with which I was specially entrusted, I had felt that I was maintaining the separate interests of Great Britain I felt throughout that I was not supporting separate interests ; that in all points our Allies were equally concerned, and that, in truth, our own welfare and theirs were intimately connected and closely bound together

Upon the whole view of the foreign relations of this country, as they have been settled at the Congress, I cannot help thinking that Parliament will contemplate with satisfaction those important arrangements. By them, we have obtained many advantages, and not the least, in which we participate with all Europe, is that we are delivered from the danger which might arise from the predominating power of France. The wise measures adopted for this purpose have not degraded France from the high station which she ought to hold among the nations, while they have given to others additional power and security Taking, therefore, into view the general state of our relations abroad, even separating our policy and interests from those of the rest of Europe, I trust that

the House will see that they have been discussed and determined in a temper productive of the best consequences ; and that it will feel that there is nothing left for this country in good sense or reason to wish for but a continuance of the blessings of peace, and a perseverance in that system by which they have been procured.

The honourable member, before he sat down, called the attention of the House to what is passing in an adjacent country. Whatever steps Great Britain may take, upon the issue of the contest which has thus unexpectedly been forced upon us depend all those blessings of peace, and all those advantages of arrangement, of which I have been speaking. Where is the man who can lay his hand upon his heart and say that, if the power of Buonaparte is re-established in France, any of those blessings which Europe was about to enjoy can be realized ? Who will say, if he again rules the destinies of France, that Europe can be tranquil, secure, or independent ? I consider that in the question now at issue in France is involved the more vital question, whether the world can return to that moral system by which happiness and the interests of mankind were to be upheld, or whether we shall remain, as we have been during the last twenty years, under the necessity of maintaining a system of military policy ; whether Europe shall in future present the spectacle of an assemblage of pacific or of armed nations. Shall the nations of the world take up arms to destroy each other, or lay them down to promote each other's happiness ? These are the questions to be decided by the result of the present contest in France—questions of the deepest interest ; for if, indeed, the authority of Buonaparte be restored, who can doubt that with him will be restored also that destructive military power ?—If that military power be re-established in France, where, let me ask, must we look for peace and prosperity, unless we conquer it with our swords ?

If it shall be necessary for Britain to return to that system which we have been so long and so painfully pursuing—if we must, at the moment of expected ease, again submit to the toils of war, and re-establish a military force necessary for our security—it will, doubtless, as on former occasions, be tempered by the wholesome checks of the British constitution. In this country, the military force must always be comparatively subordinate to the civil power, and our military institutions must always be inferior to our civil establishments : but, if Buonaparte prove successful, we must look forward to becoming again a military people ; while that man keeps up in France his military resources, a condition of defence by military power also can alone give security to Europe.

Let this country then, let France herself, reflect that upon the result of this new struggle—upon the management of which, or the part which this nation must take, I say nothing at present—must depend all our happiness or all our calamities. Upon the success of the family of Bourbon—who in my judgment have done for France the greatest acts of favour that a people could conceive, but more especially that act of grace by which peace, so long banished, was restored to her—depends the important question for this country, whether we shall return to that natural and happy state of peace, or whether we shall continue the struggle against the military power of France, under the artificial system which such a contest has heretofore rendered, and would again render, necessary. Upon this great question there can be, I am sure, but one feeling ; and I trust that Providence, conducting us through the remainder of the task which we may have to perform, will ordain only one result.

Upon the whole, I am persuaded that the House will perceive that, in the deliberations of the Congress, a great deal has been accomplished : indeed, for my own part, I know that nothing connected with the important and general interests of Europe has been omitted. With the pledge of mutual support which the Sovereigns will be prepared to give to each other, I know of nothing that can interrupt the general tranquillity of Europe, if Buonaparte be not allowed to infringe upon it. In conclusion, I feel satisfied that the House and the country will think with me, that never before was so much accomplished for Europe, and that we never had in our history a fairer prospect of bright days of continued happiness than at the present moment, if they be not clouded by new and unforeseen calamity.

(ii).—*Extracts from a Speech of Sir James Mackintosh on the Transfer of Genoa, April 27th, 1815.*¹

I shall not presume to define on invariable principles, the limits of the right of conquest. It is founded, like every right of war, on a regard to security, the object of all just war. The modes in which national safety may be provided for, by reparation for insult, by compensation for injury, by cessions, and by indemnifications, vary in such important respects, according to the circumstances of various cases, that it is, perhaps, impossible to limit them by an universal principle. In the case of Norway, I did not pretend to argue the question upon the grounds so high as those which were taken by the writers on public law. These writers, who for two centuries have been quoted as authorities in all the controversies of Europe, with the moderate and pacific Grotius at their head, have all concurred in treating it as a fundamental principle, that a defeated sovereign may indeed cede part of his dominions to the conqueror : but that he thereby only abdicates his own sovereignty over the ceded dominion ; that the consent of the people is necessary to make them normally subject to the authority of the conqueror. Without renouncing this limitation of the right of conquest, founded on principles so generous, and so agreeable to the dignity of human nature, I was content to argue the cession of Norway, as I am content to argue the cession of Genoa, on lower and humbler but perhaps safer grounds. Let me waive the odious term "right,"—let me waive the necessity of any consent of a people, express or implied, to legitimate the cession of their territory. At least this will not be denied, that to unite a people by force to a nation against whom they entertain a strong antipathy, is the most probable means to render the community unhappy, to make the people discontented, and the sovereign tyrannical ; but there can be no right in any governor, whether he derives his power from conquest or from any other source, to make the governed unhappy. All the rights of all governors exist only to make the governed happy. It may be disputed among some, whether the rights of government be from the people ; but no man can doubt that they are for the people. Such a forcible union is an immoral and cruel exercise of the conqueror's power ; and as soon as that concession is made, it is not worth while to discuss whether it be within his right, in other words, whether he be forbidden by any law to make such a union ; but if every cession of a territory against the deliberate and manifest sense of its inhabitants be a harsh and reprehensible abuse of conquest, it is most of all culpable, it becomes altogether atrocious and inhuman, where the antipathy was not the feeling of the moment, or the prejudice of the day, but a profound sentiment of hereditary repugnance and aversion, which has descended from generation to generation, has mingled with every part of thought and action, and had become part of patriotism itself. Such is the repugnance of the Genoese to a union with Piedmont, and such is commonly the peculiar horror which high-minded nations feel for the yoke of their immediate neighbours,—Norway towards Sweden, Portugal towards Spain, in former and less happy times, Scotland towards England, are a few out of innumerable examples. There is nothing either unreasonable or unnatural in this state of national feelings. With neighbours there are most occasions of quarrel ; with them there have been most wars ; from them there has been most suffering ; of them there is most fear. The resentment of wrongs, and the remembrance of victories, strengthen our repugnance towards those who are most usually our enemies. It is not from illiberal prejudice, but from the constitution of human nature, that an Englishman animates his patriotic affections, and supports his national pride, but now looking back on victories over Frenchmen, on Cressy and Agincourt, on Blenheim and Minden, as our posterity will one day look back on Salamanca and Vittoria. The

¹ Hansard. *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. XXX, 918. Papers concerning Genoa had been laid before the House on April 7th, 1815 (Hansard XXX., 387). Mackintosh moved a long motion condemning the policy of the Government.

defensive principle ought to be the strongest where the danger is most likely frequently to arise. What, then, will the House decide concerning the morality of compelling Genoa to submit to the yoke of Piedmont,—a state which the Genoese have constantly dreaded and hated, and against whom their hatred was sharpened by continual apprehensions for their independence? Whatever construction may be attempted of Lord William Bentinck's proclamations, whatever sophistry may be used successfully, to persuade you that Genoa was disposable as a conquered territory, will you affirm that the disposal of it to Piedmont was a just and humane exercise of your power as a conqueror?

It is for this reason, among others, that I detest and execrate the modern doctrine of rounding territory and following natural boundaries, and melting down small states into masses, and substituting lines of defence, and right and left flanks, instead of justice and the law of nations, and ancient possessions and national feeling: the system of Louis XIV. and Napoleon, of the spoilers of Poland, and the spoilers of Norway and Genoa—the system which the noble Lord, when newly arrived from the Congress, and deeply imbued with its doctrines, had delivered, in his ample and elaborate invective against the memory and principles of ancient Europe, when he condensed the whole new system into two phrases so characteristic of his reverence for the rights of nations, and his tenderness for their feelings, that they ought not easily to be forgotten—when he told us, speaking of this very antipathy of Genoa to Piedmont, "that great questions are not to be influenced by popular impressions," and "that a people may be happy without independence." The principle article of the new system is the incorporation of neighbouring, and therefore hostile communities. The system of justice revered the union of men who had long been members of the same commonwealth, because they had been long fellow-citizens, and had all the attachments and antipathies which grow out of that fellowship. The system of rapine tears asunder those whom nature has joined, and compels those to unite whom the contests of ages had rendered irreconcilable. And if all this had been less evident, would no aggravation of this act have arisen from the peculiar nature of the general war of Europe against France? It was a war in which not only the Italians, but every people in Europe were called by their Sovereigns to rise for the recovery of their independence. It was a revolt of the people against Napoleon. It owed its success to the spirit of popular insurrection. The principle of a war for the restoration of independence, was a pledge that each people were to be restored to their ancient territory. The nations of Europe accepted the pledge, and shook off the French yoke. But was it for a change of masters? Was it that three foreign ministers at Paris might dispose of the Genoese territory?—was it for this that the youth of Europe had risen in arms from Moscow to the Rhine.

Ergo pari voto gessisti bella Juventus?

Tu quoque pro Dominis et Pompeiana fuisti.

Non Romana Manus!

The people of Europe were, it seems, roused to war, not to overthrow tyranny, but to shift it into new hands; not to re-establish the independence and restore the ancient institutions of nations, but to strengthen the right flank of one great military Power, and to cover the left flank of another. This, at least, was not the war for the success of which I offered my most ardent prayers. I prayed for the deliverance of Europe, not for its transfer to other lords; for the restoration of Europe, by which all men must have understood, at least, the re-establishment of that ancient system, and of those wise principles under which it had become great and prosperous. I expected the re-establishment of every people in those territories, of which the sovereignty had been lost by recent usurpation; of every people who had been an ancient member of the family of Europe; of every people who had reserved the spirit and feelings which constitute a nation; and, above all, of every people who had lost their territory or their independence under the tyranny which the Allies had taken up arms to overthrow. I expected a reverence for ancient boundaries, a respect

for ancient institutions, certainly without excluding a prudent regard to the new interests and opinions which had taken so deep a root that they could not be torn up without incurring the guilt and the mischief of the most violent innovation. The very same reason, indeed, both of morality and policy (since I must comply so far with vulgar usage as to distinguish what cannot be separated), bound the Allied Sovereigns to respect the ancient institutions, and to regard the new opinions and interests of nations. The art of all government, not tyrannical, whatever may be its form, is to conduct mankind by their feelings. It is immoral to disregard the feelings of the governed, because it renders them miserable. It is, and it ought to be, dangerous to disregard those feelings, because bold and intelligent men will always consider it as a mere question of prudence, whether they ought to obey governments which counteract the only purpose for which government exists. The feelings of men are most generally wounded by violence to those ancient institutions under which these feelings have been formed, the national character has been moulded, and to which all the habits and expectations of life are adapted. It was well said by Mr. Fox, that as ancient institutions have been sanctioned by a far greater concurrence of human judgments than modern laws can be, they are, upon democratical principles, more respectable. But new opinions and new interests, a new arrangement of society which has given rise to other habits and hopes, also excite the strongest feelings, which, in proportion to their force and extent, claim the regard of all moral policy. As it was doubtless the policy of the Allies to consider the claims of ancient possessions as sacred, as far as the irrevocable changes of the political system would allow, the considerate part of mankind did, I believe, hope that they would hail the long-continued and recently-lost sovereignty of a territory as generally an inviolable right; and that as they could not be supposed wanting in zeal for the sovereignty of ancient reigning families, so they would guard that re-establishment, and render it respectable in the eyes of the world, by the impartiality with which they re-established those ancient and legitimate governments of a republican form, which had fallen in the general slavery of nations. We remembered that republics and monarchies were alike called to join in the war against the French Revolution, not for forms of government, but for the social order. We hoped that Austria (to select a striking example) would not pollute her title to her ancient dominion of Lombardy, by blending it with the faithless and lawless seizure of Venice. So little republican territory was to be restored, that the act of justice was to be performed, and the character of impartiality gained at little expense, even if such expense be measured by the meanest calculations of the most vulgar politics. Vacant territory remained at the disposal of the Congress to satisfy the demands of policy. The sovereignty of the ecclesiastical territories might be fairly considered as lapsed. No reigning family could have any interest in it: no people could be attached to such a rule of nomination to supreme power. And, in fact, these principalities had lost all pride of independence and consciousness of national existence. Several other territories in Europe had been reduced to a like condition. Ceded, perhaps, at first questionably, they had been transferred so often from master to master; they had been so long in a state of provincial degradation, that no violence could be offered to their feelings by new transfer or partition. They were, as it were, a sort of splinters thrown off from nations in the shocks of warfare, during two centuries; and they lay like stakes on the board to be played for at the terrible game which had detached them, and to satisfy the exchanges and cessions by which it is usually closed. Perhaps such detached partitions of the social system are necessary in the European system; but they are in themselves great evils. They are amputated and lifeless members, which, as soon as they lose the vital principle of national spirit, no longer contribute aught to the vigour and safety of the whole living system. From them is to be expected no struggle against invasion, no resistance to the designs of ambition, no defence of country. They have no independence: they have no country. They are individual men, but no longer a people. They are in themselves the defenceless part of the European commonwealth. They

are the ready prey of every candidature for universal monarchy, who soon compels their passive inhabitants to fight for his ambition, as they would not fight against it, and to employ in enslaving other nations that courage which they had no noble interest to exert in defence of their own. Why should I seek examples of this truth in former times? What opened Europe to the first inroads of the French armies?—Not, I will venture to say, the mere smallness of the neighbouring states,—(for if every one had displayed as much national spirit in 1794, as the smallest states of Switzerland did in 1798, no French army could ever have left the territory of France),—but the unhappy course of events which had deprived Flanders and the Electorates and Lombardy of all national spirit. Extinguished by the form of government in some of these countries, crushed by a foreign yoke in others, without the pride of liberty, which bestows the highest national spirit on the smallest nations, or the pride of power, which sometimes supplies its place in mighty empires,—or the consciousness of not depending on another nation, without which there is no nationality,—they first became the prey of France, and afterwards they supplied the arms with which she almost conquered the world. To enlarge this dead part of Europe, to enrich it by the accession of countries renowned for their public feelings, to throw Genoa into the same grave with Poland, with Venice, with Finland, and with Norway, is not the policy of the preservers or restorers of the European commonwealth.

It is not the principle of the balance of power, but one precisely opposite. The system of preserving some equilibrium of power; of preventing any state from becoming too great for her neighbours, is a system purely defensive, and directed towards the object of universal preservation. It is a system which provides for the security of all states, by balancing the force and opposing the interests of great states. The independence of nations is the end: the balance of power is only the means. To destroy independent nations in order to strengthen the balance of power, is the most extravagant sacrifice of the end to the means. This inversion of all the principles of the ancient and beautiful system of Europe, is the fundamental maxim of what the noble lord, enriching our language with foreign phrases as well as doctrines, calls "a repartition of power." In the new system small states are annihilated by a combination of great. In the old, small states were secured by the mutual jealousy of the great. The noble lord very consistently treats the re-establishment of small states as an absurdity. This single feature betrays the school where he has studied. Undoubtedly, small communities are an absurdity, or rather their permanent existence is an impossibility on his new system. They could have no existence in the continual conquests of Asia. They were soon destroyed amidst the turbulence of the Grecian confederacy. They must be sacrificed on the system of rapine established at Vienna. Nations powerful enough to defend themselves, may subsist securely in most tolerable conditions of society. But states too small to be safe by their own strength can exist only where they are guarded by the equilibrium of force, and the vigilance which watches over its preservation. When the noble lord represents small states as incapable of existence, he, in truth, avows that he is returned in triumph from the destruction of that system of the balance of power of which indeed great empires were the guardians, but of which the perfect action was indicated by the security of feebler commonwealths. Under this system, no great violation of national independence had occurred, from the first civilization of the European states, till the partition of Poland. The safety of the feeblest states, under the authority of justice, was so great, that there seemed little exaggeration in calling such a society the commonwealth of Europe. Principles, which stood in the stead of laws and magistrates, provided for the security of defenceless communities, as the safety of the humblest individual is maintained in a well-ordered commonwealth. Europe can no longer be called a commonwealth, when her members have no safety but in strength.

In truth, the Balancing System is itself only a secondary guard of national independence. The paramount principle, the moving power, without which

all such machinery would be perfectly inert, is national spirit. The love of country, the attachment to laws and government, and even to soil and scenery; the feelings of national glory in arms and arts, the remembrances of common triumph and common suffering, with the mitigated, but not obliterated recollection of common enmities, and the jealousy of dangerous neighbours, instruments employed (also by nature) to draw more closely the bands of affection to our country and to each other,—this is the only principle by which sovereigns could in the hour of danger rouse the minds of their subjects. Without this principle, the policy of the Balancing System would be impotent. To sacrifice a people actuated by this spirit, to overrule that repugnance to the yoke of a neighbour, which is one of the chief bulwarks of nations, is in the effect, and much more in the example, to erect a pretended balance of power by the destruction of that spirit, and of those sentiments, which alone render that balance effectual for its only useful purpose—the protection of independence.

The Congress of Vienna seems, indeed, to have adopted every part of the French system, except that they have transferred the dictatorship of Europe from an individual to a triumvirate. One of the grand and patent errors of the French Revolution, was the fatal opinion, that it was possible for human skill to make a government. It was an error too generally prevalent not to be excusable. The American Revolution had given it a fallacious semblance of support, though no event in history, more clearly showed its falsehood. The system of laws, and the frame of society in North America, remained after the Revolution, and remain to this day fundamentally the same as they ever were. The change in America, like the change in 1608, was made in defence of legal right, not in pursuit of political improvement, and it was limited by the necessity of the defence which produced it. The whole internal order remained, which had always been essentially republican. The somewhat slender tie which loosely joined these republics to a monarchy, was easily and without violence divided. But the error of the French revolutionists was, in 1789, the error of Europe. From that error, we have been long reclaimed by fatal experience. We know, or rather we have seen and felt, that a government is not like a machine, or a building, the work of man—that it is the work of nature, like the nobler productions of the vegetable and animal world, which man may improve, and corrupt, and even destroy, but which he cannot create. We have long learned to despise the ignorance or the hypocrisy of those who speak of giving a free constitution to a people, and to exclaim with a great living poet—

“ A gift of that which never can be given,
By all the blended powers of Earth and Heaven ! ”

We have, perhaps, as usual, gone too near to the opposite error, and we do not make sufficient allowances for those dreadful cases which we must not call desperate, where, in long-enslaved countries, we must either humbly and cautiously labour to lay some foundations from which liberty may slowly rise, or acquiesce in the doom of perpetual bondage on ourselves and our children.

But though we no longer dream of making governments, the Confederacy of Kings seem to feel no doubt of their own power to make nations. Yet the only reason why it is impossible to make a government is, because it is impossible to make a nation. A government cannot be made, because its whole spirit and principles arise from the character of the nation. There would be no difficulty in framing a government, if the habits of a people could be changed by a law-giver; if he could obliterate their recollections, transfer their attachment and reverence, extinguish their animosities, and correct those sentiments which, being at variance with his opinions of public interest, he calls prejudices. Now this is precisely the power which our statesmen at Vienna have arrogated to themselves. They not only form nations, but they compose them of elements apparently the most irreconcilable. They make one nation of Norway and Sweden: they tried to make another of Prussia and Saxony. They have in the present case forced together Piedmont and Genoa to form a nation, which is to guard the avenues of Italy, and to be one of the main securities of Europe against universal monarchy.

It was not the pretension of the ancient system to form states, to divide territory according to speculations of military convenience, and to unite and dissolve nations better than the course of events had done before. It was owned to be still more difficult to give a new constitution to Europe, than to form a new constitution for a single state. The great statesmen of former times did not speak of their measures as the noble lord did, about the incorporation of Belgium with Holland (against which I say nothing), "as a great improvement in the system of Europe." That is the language only of those who revolutionize that system by a partition like that of Poland, by the establishment of the federation of the Rhine at Paris, or by the creation of new states at Vienna. The ancient principle was to preserve all those states which had been formed by time and nature, which were animated by national spirit, and distinguished by the diversity of character which gave scope to every variety of talent and virtue; whose character was often preserved, and whose nationality was sometimes created by those very irregularities of frontier and inequalities of strength, of which a shallow policy complained, to preserve all these states, down to the smallest, first by their own national spirit, and secondly, by that mutual jealousy which made every great Power the opponent of the dangerous ambition of every other. It was to preserve nations, living bodies, produced by the hand of nature, not to form artificial dead machines, called states by the words and parchment of a diplomatic act. Under this ancient system, which secured the weak by the jealousy of the strong, provision was made alike for the permanency of civil institutions, the stability of government, the progressive reformation of laws and constitutions; for combining the general quiet, with the highest activity and energy of the human mind; for uniting the benefits both of rivalry and of friendship between nations; for cultivating the moral sentiments of men by the noble spectacle of the long triumph of justice in the security of the defenceless; and finally, for maintaining uniform civilization by the struggle as well as union of all the moral and intellectual combinations which compose that vast and various mass. It effected these noble purposes, not merely by securing Europe against one master, but against any union or conspiracy of sovereignty, which, as long as it lasts, is in no respect better than the domination of an individual. The object of the new system is to crush the weak by the combination of the strong;—to subject Europe in the first place to an oligarchy of sovereigns, and ultimately to swallow it up in the gulp of universal monarchy; where civilization has always perished, with freedom of thought, with controlled power, with national character and spirit, with patriotism and emulation, in a word, with all its characteristic attributes, and with all its guardian principles.

I am content, Sir, that these observations should be thought wholly unreasonable by those new masters of civil wisdom, who tell us, that the whole policy of Europe consists in strengthening the right flank of Prussia, and the left flank of Austria; who see in that wise and venerable system long the boast and the safeguard of Europe, only the millions of souls to be given to one power, or the thousands of square miles to be given to another; who consider the frontier of a river as a better protection for a country, than the love of its inhabitants; and who provide for the safety of their states by wounding the pride and mortifying the patriotic affection of a people, in order to fortify a line of military posts. To such statesmen I will apply the words of the great philosophical orator, who so long vainly laboured to inculcate wisdom in this House: "All this I know well enough will sound wild, and chimerical to the profane herd of those vulgar and mechanical politicians who have no place among us; a sort of people who think that nothing exists but what is gross and material; and who, therefore, far from being qualified to be directors of the great movement of empire, are not fit to turn a wheel in the machine. But to men truly initiated and rightly taught, these ruling and master principles, which in the opinion of such men as I have mentioned have no substantial existence, are in truth everything, and all in all."¹

¹ Mr. Burke's Speech on Conciliation with America. New Parl. History, Vol. 18, p. 535.