

PART IV

THE SECOND PEACE OF PARIS



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CXCVIII. [*W. S. D. X.* 630.]

LIVERPOOL TO CASTLEREAGH.<sup>1</sup>

MEMORANDUM.

June 30th, 1815.

In considering the course of policy which it may be expedient for the Allies to adopt under the present circumstances, there are obviously three alternatives which present themselves to our view.

First, Louis XVIII. may be restored, Buonaparte being dead or a prisoner in the hands of the Allies.

Secondly, Louis XVIII. may be restored, Buonaparte being still alive and having escaped to America or elsewhere.

Thirdly, the difficulties in the way of the restoration of Louis XVIII. may have rendered that event, however desirable, impracticable; and it may become, therefore, necessary to treat with some other government as representing the French nation.

Upon the first alternative it will be necessary to consider whether the previous declarations and engagements of the Allies compel them to consider the integrity of France as settled by the Treaty of Paris, as a question concluded by what has already passed; or whether it will admit of any modifications which it may be judged expedient to adopt after the experience of the last twelve months for the general security and permanent tranquillity of Europe. Upon this point it does not appear possible to give any precise or positive instructions until we are more particularly informed of the sentiments of the Allies in consequence of recent events.

In the second alternative it is to be hoped that there would be no difference of opinion. We must all be sensible that, if Buonaparte is still alive and at large, we can have no security that he will not again make his appearance in France in the course of a few months, and we may, therefore, be again involved in a war as critical and burthensome as the present, without many advan-

<sup>1</sup> Castlereagh proceeded to the Continent soon after the news of Waterloo was known and reached Paris on July 7th.

tages which have attended the renewal of the contest at this time. We shall have a clear right, therefore, under such circumstances, to require some additional securities ; and although Louis XVIII. should be restored to the throne of France, we should be entitled to provide for the future security of Europe by insisting upon taking from France some of her frontier fortresses, including Lille ; and the only modification which should be admitted of this principle is that it might perhaps be provided that, instead of being actually ceded in sovereignty by France to the Allies, they should be retained by the Allies during the life of Buonaparte or for a given number of years, and then revert again to France.

With respect to the third alternative, it would leave the discretion of the Allies entirely unfettered ; and if they cannot have the security for peace arising out of the character of the government with which it is concluded, they would be fully justified in attempting to obtain it by a reduction of the power and territory of the enemy. As this alternative, however, is not likely under present circumstances to occur, it does not appear to be necessary to say more upon it. The principle as above laid down cannot possibly be disputed ; the expediency of acting upon it to a certain degree will hardly be denied ; but the extent to which we may carry it must depend upon contingencies of which at this time we cannot have the means of forming any judgment.

It appears to be quite indispensable that in the event of the restoration of Louis XVIII. a severe example should be made of those commanding officers of garrisons or corps who deserted the King and went over to Buonaparte. Such a proceeding is not only become necessary with a view to the continuance of the power of the House of Bourbon, but likewise for the security of the object for which the Allies have been contending, a safe and lasting peace. The true principle, taken in its full rigour, would be to consider all the officers commanding garrisons or corps as subject to the penalties of high treason who had gone over to Buonaparte previous to the King leaving the French territory ; but it might be as well to modify this principle by confining it to those who took that step before the King was known to have quitted Paris, considering the elements for conspiracies and rebellion which must exist in France for some years, there can be no chance of stopping them but by an exemplary punishment on the present occasion of those who were forward to join the standard of Buonaparte.

With respect to the conspirators who were not military, it might be proper, likewise, to make an example of those who are

most dangerous, subjecting the most criminal to the pains of high treason, and those who were less so to that of banishment.

Whilst measures of just severity are adopted with regard to the authors or abettors of the late revolution, it is of the utmost importance that the King should take the most public measures for allaying the fears of the purchasers of national property. The apprehensions of this class of the King's subjects were productive last year of the very worst effects ; and it will be in vain for the King to think that he can consolidate his authority unless by the security of property as it now exists, without reference to the title by which it was acquired.

CXCIX. [C. C. X. 419.]

CASTLEREAGH TO LIVERPOOL.

Paris, July 8th, 1815.

As I have no doubt that every endeavour will be made to poison the minds of the Sovereigns and especially the Emperor of Russia's, on the steps taken by the Duke of Wellington to accelerate the advance of the King and his restoration to this throne previous to their arrival, I have concerted with the Duke to send General Pozzo di Borgo to meet the Emperor at some distance from Paris. He will carry with him copies of the papers that have passed ; and, having been present at all that has occurred, he will have the means of giving his Imperial Majesty a correct view of the whole before he reaches Paris.

The immediate difficulty is now to keep Blücher and the Prussians within any bounds towards this town. They have notified to the Duke to-day that they had laid on the city of Paris a contribution of 110,000,000, and equipments for 110,000 men ; and they are at this moment mining the bridge of Jena, with a view of blowing it up. The Duke has written to urge them at least to suspend all measures of this nature till the arrival of the Sovereigns ; and we propose to-morrow morning to pay the Marshal a visit at St. Cloud, together, to stop, if possible, these measures of arbitrary and unconcerted severity. . . .

CC. [F. O. Cont. 21.]

CASTLEREAGH TO LIVERPOOL. (No. 5.)

July 12th, 1815.

. . . I have the satisfaction of stating that I have never observed the Emperor of Russia to be in a more cordial, contented, and at the same time reasonable disposition—perfectly well

affected to the King, disposed to keep the Jacobins at a distance as you will see from the enclosed letters, and prepared to pursue a precautionary system with all due regard to the King's authority. [Agreed to suspend the march of his army if this was the general wish; hopes to arrange a council soon to revise our military means.] We continue to have considerable difficulty with the Prussians, who last night proceeded to arrest some of the banners in Paris, in order to enforce their demand of contributions. As the Emperor of Russia co-operates with us I hope we shall succeed in bringing them to reason, and that the conduct of the respective armies will be rendered in all measures of this nature, entirely subordinate to the direction of the cabinets now united. There is a republican spirit in that army, which is very little amenable even to its own Government.

[Jaucourt and Fouché wish the British squadron to help to arrest Napoleon.] From what has occurred in conversation on this subject, it appears to me that the King of France's Government will not, and perhaps have not sufficient authority to charge themselves with the judging and executing Buonaparte as a traitor. If so, and he should fall into our hands, there is no other course than to confine him as a prisoner. The Emperor of Russia asked me this morning whether the British Government would undertake the charge. I told him that the task was not a very pleasant one, but that I had no doubt they would be disposed to meet whatever might be the general wish. I think it is quite clear he must not be in France and that he is better beyond sea, than in any more accessible point of Europe, but if we are to take charge of him I think it is desirable it should be as the prisoner of the principal Powers, France included, who should each nominate a Commissary to exercise a joint surveillance over him.

CCI. [*F. O. Cont.* 21.]

CASTLEREAGH TO LIVERPOOL. (No. 7.)

July 14th, 1815.

. . . The intervention of the political cabinets of the respective Powers appeared to the Duke of Wellington and to myself the most effectual instrument to restrain the armies and to preserve them in an uniform and correct system. The Provisional Government being dissolved and the King's restored, it is proposed that the ministers of the respective Powers should confer daily with the chiefs of the armies at Paris, or such of their staff as they may appoint to attend, and that the former should

serve as a channel of communication between the Allied armies and the Government of the King on all military measures which may be considered as directly involving political consequences, as well as to convey to their respective armies the orders of their particular Governments, connected with the events passing in France. [General Knesebeck (acting for Hardenberg) took the *Projet ad referendum*. I have no doubt it will be agreed to, although they may struggle for some part of what has been already laid on to replenish their military chest which they complain is very low.]

It was easy to see that the requiring France to defray their war extraordinaries would be a very favourite *measure of precaution* with the Allied Powers, and I perceive they will not leave France without obtaining a considerable indemnity. I have not felt myself called upon to oppose this pretension on their part in principle. I have only desired that at a proper time when we know what the state and position of France is, this question may be weighed in combination with other precautionary guarantees which Europe may have to require from France, and that whatever is to be imposed on France beyond the immediate subsistence and supply of the troops with necessaries may be demanded and regulated as a measure of state by a common accord of the four great Powers, instead of each army making arbitrary impositions for itself in such towns or districts as it may happen to occupy without any knowledge or regard to their relative abilities to pay ; and that when the amount of the contribution to be required of France is once fixed, the assessment of it should be left to be effectuated by the King's officers and local authorities. With this reserve in its application a reasonable imposition at a proper time may have a very salutary moral effect upon the minds of the people. It is the Duke's opinion<sup>1</sup> that the Allies will in a short

<sup>1</sup> Wellington to Castlereagh, July 14th, 1815.

" . . . It is my duty, however, to apprise your Lordship, in order that you may make such suggestions as you may think proper to the Ministers of the Allied Courts, that it is my decided opinion that we shall immediately set the whole country against us, and shall excite a national war, if the useless, and if it was not likely to be attended with such serious consequences, I should call it ridiculous, oppression practised upon the French people, is not put a stop to ; if the troops of the several armies are not prevented from plundering the country, and the useless destruction of houses and property ; and if the requisitions and all the contributions levied from the country are not regulated by some authority besides the will of each individual General commanding an army.

" I assure your Lordship that all the information I receive tends to prove that we are getting into a very critical state ; and you may depend upon it that, if one shot is fired in Paris, the whole country will rise in arms against us. I hope that some measures will be adopted without delay which shall put an end to this state of affairs." Gurwood. XII. 558.

time find themselves circumstanced in France as the French were in Spain, if the system pursued by the Prussians and now imitated by the Bavarians, shall not be effectively checked.

CCII. [*F. O. Cont.* 21.]

CASTLEREAGH TO LIVERPOOL. (No. 8.)

July 14th, 1815.

[The position of the King is now considered safe, but he has no army on which he can rely. War will be vigorously carried on by the Allies against those parts of the army which do not surrender.]

With respect to the arrest and punishment of the principal traitors, civil and military, I think there is a great repugnance to shed blood, the result in a great measure of fear and party compromise, and that they look rather to an extensive deportation and outlawry. Prince Talleyrand told me yesterday, upon my urging the importance of adequately indicating the King's authority and the authority of the laws, that they meant to be severe when they had the means of acting, but that until they could estimate what was the temper of their new assembly, they could not judge to what extent or in what manner they could best proceed to deliver France from the individuals they consider it indispensibly necessary should be got rid of. In the obvious state of weakness in which the Government yet stands, it was impossible for me to do more than represent, how much the King's authority must be brought into contempt, so long as the most notorious criminals were not only at large, but seen abroad defying the laws. . . . Upon the whole, up to the present moment, considering their means, I don't know what the King's Government could have done more, and in judging them, your Lordship and the Prince Regent's ministers must make allowances for the infancy of their authority.

CCIII. [*C. C. X.* 430.]

LIVERPOOL TO CASTLEREAGH.

Fife House, July 15th, 1815.

We have received this morning your despatches of the 12th instant.<sup>1</sup> Before I enter on other matters, I am desirous of apprizing you of our sentiments respecting Buonaparte. If you should succeed in getting possession of his person, and the King

<sup>1</sup>CC.



of France does not feel sufficiently strong to bring him to justice as a rebel, we are ready to take upon ourselves the custody of his person, on the part of the Allied Powers; and, indeed, we should think it better that he should be assigned to us than to any other member of the Confederacy. In this case, however, we should prefer that there were no Commissioners appointed on the part of the other Powers, but that the discretion should be vested entirely in ourselves, and that we should be at liberty to fix the place of his confinement, either in Great Britain, or at Gibraltar, Malta, St. Helena, the Cape of Good Hope, or any other colony we might think most secure. We incline at present strongly to the opinion that the best place of custody would be at a distance from Europe, and that the Cape of Good Hope or St. Helena would be the most proper stations for the purpose. If, however, we are to have the severe responsibility of such a charge, it is but just that we should have the choice of the place of confinement, and a complete discretion as to the means necessary to render that confinement effectual.

CCIV. [C. C. X. 431.]

LIVERPOOL TO CASTLEREAGH.

Fife House, July 15th, 1815.

We have had a long sitting this day on the several dispatches which have been received from you since your arrival at Paris. It is satisfactory to find that the Emperor of Russia is in so reasonable a state of mind, and so likely to co-operate with us cordially in the great objects we must all equally have in view.

The more we consider the various circumstances which have attended the return of the King of France to Paris, the more strongly are we impressed with the opinion of the impossibility of giving that strength to his Government which can afford any real security to the Allies, or to Europe. The forbearance manifested at the present moment can be considered in no other light than weakness, and not mercy; and, though the King may follow the advice which has been given to him by disbanding his army, I am afraid that very little dependence will be able to be placed on any army formed out of the same materials; and, if an army could even be otherwise constituted, what dangers might not be apprehended from forty thousand officers unemployed—men of desperate fortunes, and possessing a large proportion of the talents and energy of the country! A severe example made of the conspirators who brought back Buonaparte could alone

have any effect in counteracting these dangers : but this is not now to be expected, and perhaps would have been very difficult, considering the share in the Government which the King has been obliged to assign to some of the members of the Jacobin party.

In this state of things we must look to other measures for our security, and we shall never be forgiven if we leave France without securing a sufficient frontier for the protection of the adjoining countries. The prevailing idea in this country is, that we are fairly entitled to avail ourselves of the present moment to take back from France the principal conquests of Louis XIV. It is argued with much force that France will never forgive the humiliation which she has already received—that she will take the first convenient opportunity of endeavouring to redeem her military glory—and that it is our duty, therefore, to take advantage of the present moment to prevent the evil consequences which may even flow from the greatness of our own success. It might have been not unwise last year to try the effect of a more magnanimous policy ; but in the result of that we have been completely disappointed ; and we owe it to ourselves now to provide, in the best manner we can, for our own security.

These, I can assure you, are the generally received opinions in this country at present, and I think it is material that you should sound our Allies with respect to them. If, however, you should find them not disposed to proceed to such lengths, we think we are completely entitled to an arrangement upon the principle which I am about to state ; and, indeed, their interests will be found as much involved in it as our own.

Supposing Buonaparte to be dead, or a prisoner in the hands of the Allies, we might be induced to waive any permanent cession of territory on the part of France, upon the following conditions :

First. That a considerable part of the Northern barrier of France, including Lille, should be placed in the hands of the Allied Powers, until such time as a sufficient barrier for the Netherlands was completed, and the expenses thereof defrayed by the French Government. The period of seven or five years (as the Duke of Wellington might judge necessary) might be definitely fixed as the time for completing the barrier, and the sum of five millions as the expense : the French fortresses to be restored, at the time fixed, and as soon after as the money should be paid, to Louis XVIII., or to his descendants in line direct, but to no other sovereign of France.

Secondly. The same principle to be applied in such degree as the Allies may think proper to the Eastern frontier of France.

If Buonaparte should escape, and should, therefore, be alive and at liberty, the French frontier above alluded to should be retained during his life, as well as during the time necessary for erecting the new frontier, and for the liquidation of the expenses of it.

These propositions appear to be founded upon a principle perfectly equitable. The French nation is at the mercy of the Allies, in consequence of a war occasioned by their violation of the most sacred Treaties. The Allies are fully entitled, under these circumstances, to indemnity and security. We might not unreasonably claim a security that was permanent, such as France has so frequently enforced under similar circumstances ; but we are contented to limit the extent of the security to the necessity of the case, and, having delivered the adjoining territories from invasion, and being in possession of a considerable part of the kingdom of France, we feel that we have a right to retain such part of the kingdom of France as is necessary for the security of adjoining countries, until that security shall have been provided for in another manner, and the enemy has defrayed the expenses of it.

This arrangement would have the advantage likewise of affording some security to the Government of the King of France, as the restoration of the fortresses would be limited to him and to his legitimate successors. I sincerely believe that this proposition would be far short of the expectations of the country at this time ; but I state it to you, on the part of the Cabinet, as one which, we are convinced, under all the circumstances, is reasonable in itself, as the lowest point to which we ought to go, and as one to which we have little doubt, after all the expense they have incurred, and the dangers to which they may hereafter be exposed, our Allies may be reconciled.

CCV. [*F. O. Cont.* 21.]

CASTLEREAGH TO LIVERPOOL. (No. 13.)

July 17th, 1815.

At our conference this morning I thought it right to call the attention of the Allied Ministers to the necessity of urging the Government of Louis the XVIII. without further delay, to adopt some measure of vigour against the most criminal of the traitors ; here was but one opinion, that the King's authority would be

brought into utter contempt if some step of this nature was not taken without loss of time, and General Pozzo di Borgo was authorized to wait upon the Prince de Talleyrand with a representation in the name of the Allied ministers to this effect. [Castlereagh afterwards had an interview and gave Talleyrand a memorandum as to the necessity of punishing the " traitors." ] Prince Talleyrand did not attempt to combat any of its positions, and promised me that the measures to be taken against the most criminal of Buonaparte's adherents should be forthwith decided, and that his own view of the policy to be adopted entirely coincided with that which the Allies recommended.

It is perhaps unlucky that Fouché's office should be at this moment that of the police, as, although the most competent of any to discharge its functions in an ordinary sense, it is difficult for him to be otherwise than indulgent to those who have been supporting the same cause as himself. The great service performed by Fouché was in the last fortnight of the Provisional Government. He had the merit of acting with great personal courage and address, opposed successively to the resentment of Buonaparte, of the army, and of the assemblies ; with a majority against him in the executive government, he succeeded in saving himself, dissolving them, and bringing in the King. It is not that he is not now hearty in the King's cause : I believe he really is and must be from interest, but having always played a game of personal popularity, by covering his friends when they got into a scrape, he has now additional motives for endeavouring to screen them, that he may retain some character, or perhaps what he more values, influence with his party. Talleyrand assured me he had spoken to him very strongly this morning upon this subject.

[Rumours concerning Buonaparte.] As the escape of Buonaparte to America may yet be effectuated, it is worth weighing every collateral aid that can be derived towards the accomplishment of this object. The first that occurs, and it is one to which the Russian minister inclines, is to address a strong note on the part of all the Allied Powers to the American Government, calling upon them to arrest and surrender Buonaparte to them. Such an appeal could do no harm ; at the same time I should expect little good to result from it. I do not see how the President could of his own authority take such a step, and the utmost that our influence might perhaps accomplish, would be to effect his removal from the United States. It is however a measure worth considering, and I should be glad to be informed of the sentiment of the Government upon this point.

What appears to me of more importance, however, is to accumulate every possible difficulty in the way of his ever again finding a party ready to receive him in France. To effect this, in addition to renewing the defensive branch of the Treaty of Chaumont against France, it appears essential to render the 3rd and 8th articles of the Treaty signed at Vienna on the 25th of March<sup>1</sup> a part of the permanent Law of Europe, extending the exclusion to the family at large. There can be no doubt that before we retire, the nation will have felt deeply what it is to be invaded by all Europe. If we make an European invasion the inevitable and immediate consequence of Buonaparte's succession or that of any of his race, to power in France, I am confident, after the experience they have had of his impotence against such a confederacy and their own sufferings, that there is not a class in France, not excepting even the army, that will venture to adhere to him at the hazard of being again overrun by the armies of Europe, with the certainty of being dismembered, and loaded with contributions. We committed a great error when last at Paris, in not opposing the barrier of such a stipulation against his return, for there is no doubt he had address enough to make both the nation and the army believe, that he might be restored and the peace nevertheless preserved. I understand from Fouché that to the last he tried to deceive his ministers by affecting to have an understanding with Austria, with Russia, and even with Great Britain.

I do not suggest this expedient in substitution of the system of interior securities referred to in my instructions, and with a view to which I have already taken steps to prepare the sentiments of the Allied Courts. I am desirous of only adopting it still further to enforce the principle of exclusion, because if we can once lead the publick mind of France completely to dismiss Buonaparte and his race, as pregnant with calamity to the nation, we give the stability to the King's title which it wants. Except Buonaparte the King has no real rival. If he can quiet the alarm of the proprietors of national lands, break down the parties who are struggling for office, by using them according to their means of rendering him service, and organize a new army comprehending much of the old material, I do not despair of his establishing himself and the succession.

I should wish to know if the Prince Regent's servants feel any objection to my endeavour to negotiate a defensive Alliance, upon the principles above laid down.

<sup>1</sup> See CLXXXVIII.

CCVI. [*F. O. Cont.* 21.]

CASTLEREAGH TO LIVERPOOL. (No. 14.)

July 17th, 1815, at night.

[News of Buonaparte's surrender received.] You must make up your mind to be his gaolers. The French Government will not try him as a traitor, and there is nowhere a place so suitable for his confinement as in Fort St. George<sup>1</sup> under a joint surveillance.

The Emperor of Russia approves this plan, so does Austria, so does France, and so no doubt will Prussia. He will be less exposed in England to any sudden change in European politicks, and after fighting him for twenty years, as a trophy, he seems to belong to us. . . .

I have had another interview with Talleyrand and Fouché this evening upon the necessity of acting with more vigour against traitors, and I hope my representation of the sentiments of my Government has produced a salutary effect, and that we may expect without delay some measure of this description.

CCVII. [*W. S. D. XI.* 122<sup>2</sup>.]

CASTLEREAGH TO LIVERPOOL. (No. 16.)

Most Secret and Confidential.

Paris, July 24th, 1815.

. . . Too soon to give any decided opinion of policy which Allies may adopt towards France, as yet only tendency to their respective dispositions can be traced. Amongst the Powers which border on France there is an evident desire for strong measures, even to the extent of a partial dismemberment. This is the tone of the King of the Netherlands; of the Prussians, loudly; of the Bavarians, Würtembergers—all probably influenced by the double motive of securing their frontiers and augmenting their respective possessions.

Russia, on the contrary, being remote, rather inclines to protect France: the Emperor's principles naturally lead him to this line; he may also be inclined to keep up a connexion, and not to see France reduced too low. In a long conversation with him the day before yesterday, could perceive he was averse to any permanent reduction of the territory of France, and that as a measure of

<sup>1</sup> In Scotland.<sup>2</sup> Précis of a number of dispatches are given in the *Supplementary Dispatches*. The précis are in most cases almost as full as the originals in the Record Office with which I have compared them. Where the words left out appear to be material I have incorporated them in the text now given. These additions are indicated by being printed inside round brackets.

security he looked with more favour to dismantling than temporarily occupying certain of her fortresses. Austria is nearer our mode of viewing this question ; but the Austrian Minister fears, moreover, to give Russia so much the lead in point of conciliating the French Government as to produce between France and Russia too close a connexion.

In meantime French ministers not idle in taking advantage of these shades of difference amongst the Allies. Talleyrand has hinted that whilst they are prepared for pecuniary sacrifices within certain bounds, neither the King nor his ministers will ever consent to sacrifice the smallest portion of French territory. As this declaration reached me through the Russians, as a counter principle I protested against that of a simple pecuniary sacrifice ; that security, not money, was the object of the war ; and that unless concessions of this description were combined with a satisfactory system for securing and permanently covering Europe by a counter-line of defence against France, the Allies would never be forgiven by their own subjects. Unfortunate that the Prussians cannot be restrained, as their conduct tends to unite the French and divide the Allies. Requests that what has been stated may be received with caution, as they are not yet sufficiently advanced to speak with confidence as to the final judgment of the parties.

CCVIII. [C. C. X. 445.]

LIVERPOOL TO CASTLEREAGH.

Fife House, July 28th, 1815.

We have considered your despatch of the 24th instant.<sup>1</sup> We are not at all surprised at the different shades of opinion which subsist amongst the Allied Powers as to the measures which it may be proper to adopt respecting the frontier of France. It is quite natural that the Powers bordering on France should look to their own security in some permanent reduction of the territory of that country.

It is quite intelligible, likewise, that the Emperor of Russia should be desirous of being considered as a protector of the French nation ; but this disposition on the part of His Imperial Majesty should be kept within reasonable bounds. He should recollect that those who are near to France, and consequently in the post of danger, have the deepest interest in the issue of the contest. And, though it may be very proper that he should so far act the part of a mediator as to keep down extravagant and unreasonable pre-

<sup>1</sup> CCVII.

tensions, he ought not to sacrifice what may be necessary for the security of his Allies to the pretensions of the French nation, particularly as that nation has never acted upon those principles of permanent territorial integrity with respect to other countries, when the fortune of war has placed the power in its own hands.

With regard to the two alternatives of dismantling the French fortresses, or their occupation for a given number of years by the Allied Powers, there appears to us to be no question which of these propositions is the most advantageous to Europe and even to France.

In the first place—the dismantling of fortresses has rarely ever been completely effected. The works are partially destroyed, and may be restored for a small part of the expense at which they had been originally constructed. In the second place—though dismantling the fortresses on the frontier of France would uncover that country, expose it for a time to invasion, an advantage as far as it goes, it would not materially protect neighbouring countries which had no fortresses; and the contest, if it should arise, would depend in that case upon which Power would bring into the field the superior army. Whereas, if the French fortresses were occupied by the Allied Powers, till such time as a barrier could be created by the Allies, they would have the advantage of the security of the French frontier till such time as they had been enabled to create one of their own. In the third place—the occupation of the French frontier by the Allies, to be restored at a given period to the King and his legitimate successors, would be some security for the continuance of his Government; whereas the dismantling the fortresses could not be productive, at anything like the same degree, of such an advantage.

If, therefore, the principle of security ought to be the rule of our conduct, the option between these alternatives is clear. We do not feel that we should discharge our duty, if we did not urge this opinion upon you with all possible earnestness, and desire you to urge it upon the Allies.

We are strongly impressed with the idea that the continuance of the King of France's authority and Government, after the evacuation of the country by the Allies, must be very problematical, and if his Government should then be overturned, and be followed by a Jacobin or revolutionary system, though not that of Buonaparte, what will be thought of those who, with France at their mercy, had left that country entire in point of territory, enriched by all the plunder of Italy, Germany, and Flanders, and had pro-



vided no additional security for the rest of Europe, though in the instance of the Low Countries such security is admitted to be indispensably necessary?

[Castlereagh the best judge of the time to bring forward this question, but inconvenience in delay. French ministers will endeavour to gain influence over the Emperor of Russia and important that there should be some understanding amongst the great Powers before he commits himself to their Government. The policy should be decided before a meeting of the new Assemblies.]

CCIX. [W. S. D. XI. 123<sup>1</sup>.]  
 CASTLEREAGH TO LIVERPOOL. (No. 21.)  
 (Secret and Confidential.)

Paris, July 29th, 1815.

Refers to letter of the 14th, No. 8<sup>2</sup>. In this state it appeared most desirable, if possible, to come to some understanding in the first instance with the Emperor of Russia. Accordingly had another interview with His Imperial Majesty, in which he entered fairly into the question, and seemed disposed to concert his measures with the British government before he should commit himself in any other quarter. If his Imperial Majesty could be brought to adopt the principles for which Lord Castlereagh had contended, thought highly desirable that he should be prevailed upon to take the initiative in imposing them to the other Powers; that by giving him the lead, it would pledge him the more completely to enforce them upon France; whilst the measure being thus made his own, the British negotiators would not have the task thrown upon them alone of repressing the eagerness of the *limitrophe* Powers, who desired to profit by the present state of things to aggrandize themselves at the expense of France.

The paper now enclosed<sup>3</sup> was prepared by His Imperial Majesty's command, and has been since modified, after full discussion between the Russian ministers, the Duke of Wellington, and Lord Castlereagh. In this shape it is agreed to be communicated to the Austrian and Prussian ministers; and that whilst the general principle is thus brought under consideration the same parties should frame together a Projet upon the two

<sup>1</sup> Précis.

<sup>2</sup> CCII.

<sup>3</sup> See CCXI. This "Russian" Memorandum was, as Pozzo di Borgo admitted, largely inspired by Castlereagh and Wellington. Cf. *Sbornik*, CXII. 297.

important practical questions, viz., the military positions to be occupied by the Allies in France for a time to be limited, and the amount and appropriation of the contribution to be required.

Will lose no time in concert with the Duke of Wellington in endeavouring to bring the Emperor of Russia to a satisfactory decision on these points in which, if we succeed, the difficulties in other quarters may be comparatively easy to surmount.

CCX. [W. S. D. XI. 123<sup>1</sup>.]

CASTLEREACH TO LIVERPOOL. (No. 27.)  
(Secret and Confidential.)

Paris, August 3rd, 1815.

May be desirable to be informed of progress in settling plan of the Allies, preparatory to a negotiation with the French Government.

Austrian minister has prepared a Memorandum explanatory of the sentiments of the Court on the Russian paper, which adopts substantially the integrity of France as the basis of the arrangement; adheres to the principle of occupying a line of fortresses for a period of years, but reinforces the Prussian views by giving countenance to the permanent separation of the exterior line of fortresses on the side of Flanders from France; or if that should not be thought expedient, it recommends that Lille should be absolutely dismantled. To the southward it proposes to give Landau to Germany, and to dismantle Strasburg and Huningen.

The Prussian paper is in preparation: it will, of course, go beyond the Austrian in some points; but (from a conversation with Hardenberg) I have reason to believe Prince Hardenberg's views do not essentially differ from those of the other Allied Ministers. Sends a memorandum of the Duke of Wellington, prepared by His Grace for discussion, on the military proposition to be made to France. Thinks his own opinion is in favour of the concentrated position in the North, rather than taking up the more extended line of fortresses along the whole frontier, including Lille. In examining this question, adverts to the force of 100,000 men which the Duke proposes should be kept up for the first year to watch France, and to hold the fortresses retained. Both attach much importance to the military attitude of the Allies being rendered at the outset imposing. If it is, France may subside into inaction; if not, their pride may be encouraged to some new effort to wipe away their disgrace, re-seize their fortresses, and liberate themselves

<sup>1</sup> Précis.

from other onerous stipulations required in our ultimate Treaty. To counteract the impression in France that the Allies would never give up these fortresses it is proposed to occupy them with the troops of the remote Powers.

If Russia and Austria and Great Britain, including Hanover, should furnish the 100,000 men, these, supported *en seconde ligne* by the armies of the Netherlands, of Prussia and Bavaria, would render any sudden offensive project on the part of France hopeless. If such a plan is adopted, and a force of 70,000 men be concentrated in the seven or eight fortresses in front of the valleys of the Scheldt and Meuse, all Europe would have sufficient time, roused by the preparations of France, before she could bring forward a sufficient force to venture into Flanders, etc. [Strategic question then discussed.]<sup>1</sup>

CCXI. [C. C. X. 454.]

LIVERPOOL TO CASTLEREACH.

Fife House, August 3rd, 1815.

I send you an official Memorandum, in consequence of the Russian paper transmitted in your despatch No. 21<sup>2</sup>. Although our reasoning, in some respects, differs from that of the Russian Minister, I trust it will be found there will be no practical difference in our conclusions. But I am convinced that we have not overstated the just pretensions arising out of our situation, and that it will be by not underrating them that we shall have the best chance of bringing the French Government to agree to the arrangement which is proposed, and which is as advantageous for the permanent authority of the King of France as for the general security of Europe.

OBSERVATIONS ON A RUSSIAN PAPER MENTIONED BY LORD CASTLEREACH IN  
No. 21.

[Russian Memorandum somewhat obscure and some of its reasoning liable to serious objection. If France had responded to the declarations issued from Vienna and had contributed to the overthrow of Buonaparte, the Allies might be bound by the Treaty of Paris, and could not have claimed any permanent acquisition; but considering the strong resistance of France and the extent of the sacrifices made by the Allies, no doubt that, within just limits, they are entitled to such acquisitions as are necessary for their own security. Although they may not press this principle if the French Government is ready to agree to a satisfactory arrangement, it is material that it should be held out as one to which they have a right to revert in case unreasonable expectations of that Government should leave them no other alternative.]

<sup>1</sup> Encloses a Memorandum by Wellington on the strategic points involved.

<sup>2</sup> See CCIX.

To come, however, to the practical result of the paper, the Prince Regent's Government have no difficulty in acquiescing in the Russian propositions, provided they are correctly understood in the following sense :—

First. In the present convulsed state of France, no Government whatever, not even that of Louis XVIII., can, in itself, afford to the Allies and to Europe that security which they are entitled to expect.

Secondly. This security, therefore, must in part be obtained by diminishing the means of aggression possessed by the French nation, either through permanent acquisitions of territory by the Allies, or by the temporary occupation of a military line within the country.

Thirdly. If the Allies are willing, under all the circumstances, to waive the demand of any permanent cession of territory, and consequently to acknowledge the integrity of the kingdom of France, as it existed before the Revolution, or as it was settled by the Treaty of Paris, it must be on the express condition that the French Government agrees to the occupation by the Allies of a part of the frontier of France, including some of the fortresses of the first and second order, until such time as a barrier can be created, for the protection of the neighbouring countries, and until the expense of it has been defrayed by the French Government.

Fourthly. It is not unreasonable that the French Government should expect that the contribution which they are to pay should be fixed in its amount, and that, provided it is duly paid, the time for the occupation of their frontier should be limited.

It might be stipulated, therefore, that the amount of the contribution should be [ — ]<sup>1</sup>, and that the time for occupying the frontier, provided the contribution was paid, should not exceed seven or five years.

Fifthly. In order to secure, as far as possible, the continuance of the legitimate authority in France, it should be provided that the Allies were only bound to restore the parts of the frontier of France which they are admitted to occupy, to Louis XVIII. and his successors by rightful inheritance.

Sixthly. The French frontier should be occupied by the forces of the neighbouring Powers ; but the French Government should have the advantage of the guarantee of those Powers which do not occupy the frontier, that the territory will be restored at the time limited, upon the conditions which have been stipulated being duly performed.

The Prince Regent's servants are inclined to believe, notwithstanding the ambiguity which pervades the Russian paper, that the summary of principles above laid down is conformable to the intentions of the Emperor of Russia, as meant to be set forth in that paper.

If they are not mistaken in this respect, an arrangement, founded upon a fair application of these principles, will, as far as regards the question of territory, be perfectly satisfactory to the Prince Regent's Government ; but the value of the arrangement will essentially depend on the strength of the military positions which the Allies are to occupy.

As the arrangement, after being agreed to in principle, might be defeated in detail, by providing military positions inadequate for the three great objects for which they were intended, viz., security for the neighbouring countries against fresh aggression, indemnity for the expense of the new barrier, and the more effectual maintenance of the legitimate monarchy of France, it appears to be very desirable that there should be, as soon as practicable, an understanding with the Allies as to the mode in which it was intended to carry those principles into effect.

<sup>1</sup> Blank in original, and a note appended : " This sum should be sufficient to pay for the expense of the new frontier, and for the occupation of the French fortresses, in the meantime."

CCXII. [*Girwood XII.* 596.]

WELLINGTON TO CASTLEREAGH.

Paris, August 11th, 1815.

[After perusal of the various Memoranda my opinion is, that the French Revolution and the Treaty of Paris has left France in too great strength for the rest of Europe, weakened as all the Powers of Europe have been by the wars in which they have been engaged with France, by the destruction of all the fortresses and strongholds in the Low Countries and Germany, principally by the French, and by the ruin of the finances of all the Continental Powers.]

Notwithstanding that this opinion is as strongly, if not more strongly, impressed upon my mind than upon that of any of those whose papers have lately come under my consideration, I doubt its being in our power now to make such an alteration in the relations of France with other Powers as will be of material benefit.

First : I conceive that our declarations, and our Treaties, and the accession, although irregular in form, which we allowed Louis XVIII. to make to that of the 25th of March, must prevent us from making any very material inroad upon the state of possession of the Treaty of Paris . . . . The French people submitted to Buonaparte ; but it would be ridiculous to suppose that the Allies would have been in possession of Paris in a fortnight after one battle fought if the French people in general had not been favorably disposed to the cause which the Allies were supposed to favor.

In the North of France they certainly were so disposed, and there is no doubt they were so in the South, and indeed throughout France, excepting in Champagne, Alsace, parts of Burgundy, Lorraine, and Dauphiné. The assistance which the King and his party in France gave to the cause was undoubtedly of a passive description ; but the result of the operations of the Allies has been very different from what it would have been if the disposition of the inhabitants of the country had led them to oppose the Allies.

In my opinion, therefore, the Allies have no just right to make any material inroad on the Treaty of Paris, although that Treaty leaves France too strong in relation to other Powers ; but I think I can show that the real interest of the Allies should lead them to adopt the measures which justice in this instance requires from them. . . .

But my objection to the demand of a great cession from France upon this occasion is, that it will defeat the object which the

Allies have held out to themselves in the present and the preceding wars. That which has been their object has been to put an end to the French Revolution, to obtain peace for themselves and their people, to have the power of reducing their overgrown military establishments, and the leisure to attend to the internal concerns of their several nations, and to improve the situation of their people. The Allies took up arms against Buonaparte because it was certain that the world could not be at peace as long as he should possess, or should be in a situation to attain, supreme power in France ; and care must be taken, in making the arrangements consequent upon our success, that we do not leave the world in the same unfortunate situation respecting France that it would have been in if Buonaparte had continued in possession of his power.

[The situation of the Allies, whether the cession is agreed to or not by the King, very embarrassing. If he refused and were to throw himself upon his people, divisions in France would cease, and there could be no possibility of the Allies' disarming. If he agreed, which seems improbable, the experiences of last year provide an illustration of the situation in which we should find ourselves. Last year the Allies were obliged to maintain establishments to guard the cessions ; in France, the general topic of conversation was the recovery of the left bank of the Rhine, and the unpopularity of the Government was attributed to its supposed disinclination to go to war to recover these possessions. With these facts in view, and with the knowledge that the justice of a demand for a great cession is doubtful and that it would be made against the inclinations of the Sovereign and his people, there could be no hope of peace. If we take the cession, war must be considered as only deferred, until France shall find an opportunity of endeavouring to regain what she has lost.] In my opinion, then, we ought to continue to keep our great object, the genuine peace and tranquillity of the world, in our view, and shape our arrangement so as to provide for it. Revolutionary France is more likely to distress the world than France, however strong in her frontier, under a regular Government ; and that is the situation in which we ought to endeavour to place her.

With this view I prefer the temporary occupation of some of the strong places, and to maintain for a time a strong force in France, both at the expense of the French Government, and under strict regulation, to the permanent cession of even all the places which in my opinion ought to be occupied for a time. These measures will not only give us, during the period of occupation, all the

military security which could be expected from the permanent cession, but, if carried into execution in the spirit in which they are conceived, they are in themselves the bond of peace.

There is no doubt that the troops of the Allies stationed in France will give strength and security to the Government of the King, and that their presence will give the King leisure to form his army in such a manner as he may think proper. The expectation also of the arrival of the period at which the several points occupied should be evacuated would tend to the preservation of peace, while the engagement to restore them to the King, or his legitimate heirs or successors, would have the effect of giving additional stability to his throne. . . .

CCXIII. [*W. S. D. XI. 126*<sup>1</sup>]

LIVERPOOL TO CASTLEREAGH.

Fife House, August 11th, 1815.

Acknowledges the receipt of No. 27<sup>2</sup>, with the Duke of Wellington's Military Memorandum on the proposition to be made by Allies to French Government. With respect to the two Projets in the Memorandum, the Cabinet disposed to place entire confidence in whatever may be the ultimate military judgment of the Duke.

However desirous of seeing Louis XVIII.'s Government popular in France, does not feel that they should be justified in sacrificing for this object anything deemed important for the general security of Europe. Doubts whether forbearance on the part of the Allies would have the effect of rendering the King popular, and decidedly of opinion that government may thereby deprive themselves of the means of affording him that support on which his authority must for some time essentially depend. Wishes, therefore, that this question should be decided on military principles, according to what may best contribute to general security.

While ready to give discretion on the non-demand of Lille, if the Duke of Wellington shall be of opinion that the object can be better or as well accomplished without it, the Cabinet is nevertheless of opinion that Lille should in the first instance be required, and that we should only give up our claim upon the French Government consenting to such arrangement as shall be considered entirely satisfactory.

<sup>1</sup> *Précis.*

<sup>2</sup> *CCX.*

Not yet having seen the Austrian and Prussian Projets, ignorant of the extent of the views of those governments ; but informed that they adopt the principles of permanent cessions by France, at least as far as regards the external line of fortresses. We should not forget that these governments have more of common interest with us in the whole of this question than the government of Russia ; and though we have all at heart the consolidation of the legitimate government in France, we should consider that our success in this object must necessarily be very uncertain, and that the security of the neighbouring countries against France may be much more easily attained than the rendering France orderly and pacific

CCXIV. [*W. S. D. XI. 125*<sup>1</sup>.]

CASTLEREAGH TO LIVERPOOL. (No. 31.)

Paris, August 12th, 1815.

Forwards Austrian and Prussian remarks on the Russian note ; also the opinions which have been given in on the part of Great Britain by the Duke of Wellington and him.<sup>2</sup> Not yet had answer to No. 27. Question of Lille, however, still remains open in the alternative of places. The Duke appears to prefer the concentrated position, and in this believes Prince Schwarzenberg concurs.

Has sounded the Ministers upon the principle of restraining France within the frontiers of 1790 ; assigning the *enclaves* to the territory in which they are enveloped. This would restore to Sardinia and the King of the Netherlands the districts severed by the Peace of Paris, and to Germany the important fortress of Landau. These acquisitions, with the dismantling of Huningen and possibly Condé, seems as much as can be attempted without changing the complexion of the measure.

The objection of his proposed measure is the difficulty of execution : is certain it cannot be well executed in other hands than those of the Duke of Wellington. This is the decided opinion of both Emperors : the Emperor of Russia is disposed even to make it a condition *sine qua non* of his leaving a Russian contingent. The Duke is willing to accept the chief command ; his only reluctance is a doubt whether he can manage the Prussians, and whether they will be willing parties to the arrangement. His Grace having the command will render the plan less unpopular in France, and less injurious to the King.

<sup>1</sup> Précis.<sup>2</sup> Memorandum follows.



As the charge will be borne by France, no objection will probably arise to our furnishing our quota in British troops : they will be particularly acceptable in France.

(That you may see how very far the Prussian ideas of dismemberment go, I send)<sup>1</sup> Knesebeck's Memoir,<sup>2</sup> with explanatory map, whence it may be judged what prospect there would be of forcing the King to assign away for ever all the great places of the monarchy. Thinks he had better leave the country.

Has reason to hope the Emperor of Russia will go as far as the Duke of Wellington's proposition ; and if so, how much better it is for Europe to rest its security upon what all the Powers will stand to, than to risk the Alliance by aiming at measures of *extreme* precaution !

MEMORANDUM OF LORD CASTLEREAGH.<sup>3</sup>  
August 12th, 1815.

[Advocates the policy of Temporary Occupation.]

Strong reasons may no doubt be alleged to prove that the military power of France has long been too great for the peace and security of Europe ; that the principles of the Peace of Paris are not strictly obligatory under existing circumstances ; and that Europe owes to itself now to repel the encroachments made by France upon its limits for a century past. Were it clear that what Europe could now reclaim would in itself constitute security, and not provoke new wars by affording to the military temper of France, at no distant period, fresh motives for enterprise, it might be politic to incur the hazard of creating disunion amongst the Allies themselves by the difficulties to which these new distributions of territory would infallibly lead ; but as the influence of such a measure is at best problematical ; as the spirit of the Treaty of the 25th of March, if not the formal acts since executed with Louis XVIII., place that monarch so far in the character of an Ally as to limit the demands which the Powers of Europe can honourably make upon him within the principles of a *sound necessity* ; as the occupation of a commanding position on the French frontiers for an extended period of years carries with it most of the advantages, whilst it obviates many of the evils, incident to the more hostile course of policy, it seems upon the whole to be the wisest principle upon which the Powers of Europe can now act.

It may be stated as an additional motive in favour of this system, that it necessarily preserves Europe in a continued state of alliance for the surveillance of France by imposing upon the Allied Powers as a common duty the occupation and defence of what is ceded for a fixed period to all ; whereas, were the cessions final in their nature, when once melted down into the sovereignties of other states, the probability of uniting all to maintain the point which might be attacked by France would be infinitely diminished, and the question would thus cease to be European.

The continued excesses of France may, no doubt, yet drive Europe at a future day to a measure of dismemberment ; and Europe will effect with vigour and preserve with unanimity such a change in its constitution in proportion as it shall become in the view of mankind a measure of clear and admitted necessity. To effectuate a change so fundamental was certainly not

<sup>1</sup> F. O. Continent 23.

<sup>2</sup> Which demanded that Lille and all Alsace-Lorraine should be ceded by France.

<sup>3</sup> W. S. D. XI. 147. Where, however, a wrong date is given.

the end or purpose contemplated when the Allies entered France ; it has rather grown out of the rapidity and extent of their successes.

The overthrow of the French army, the capture of Buonaparte, the continued union of Europe, and the protracted occupation of a military position in France, seem to provide adequately for the immediate danger, and at the same time to avoid the agitation of any new question which might disturb the settlement so happily effected at Vienna. Let the Allies then take this further chance of securing that repose which all the Powers of Europe so much require, with the assurance that if disappointed in this their primary object by the military ambition of France, they will again take up arms, not only with commanding positions in their hands, but with that moral force which can alone keep such a confederacy together, and which has hitherto proved its greatest strength.

CCXV. [C. C. X. 484.]

CASTLEREAGH TO LIVERPOOL. (Private and Confidential.)

Paris, August 17th, 1815.

I mentioned, in my despatch No. 31<sup>1</sup>, that I had sounded the Allied Ministers here upon the principle of permanently restraining France within the frontier of 1790, assigning the *enclaves* to the country in which they respectively stand insulated ; and this with a view to acquire for Germany the important fortress of Landau, and to recover for the Kings of the Netherlands and Sardinia the cessions made by the Treaty of Paris of certain portions of Belgium and Savoy. I have since had reason to assure myself of the Emperor of Russia's support in favour of this demand, as well as that of the other two Powers. The Emperor thought this suggestion the more reasonable, as it rested upon a principle, and did not open an arbitrary selection of points, in which the local pretensions of the Allies might either stand in competition, or the general demand be swelled by their collective demands.

As I originally adverted to the probability of the Emperor putting himself forward as the protector of Louis XVIII., I think it due to him to observe that he has not shown himself disinclined, after fair discussion, to the adoption of such measures of salutary precaution as have been proposed to him ; and I still think that, by the course I adopted towards His Imperial Majesty, as reported in a former letter, I not only deprived him of that character of being the *exclusive* protector of the King—a relation in which, for the general politics of Europe, it is of great importance he should not be permitted to place himself—but that I have gradually brought him publicly to adopt all the principles of the Allied Powers as his own, and to push them as far as it is at all clear they can be pushed without a dangerous reaction.

<sup>1</sup> CCXIV.

I quite concur with the remark contained in your last letter that the true interests of Great Britain are much more identified with those of Austria and Prussia, in the existing crisis, than with those of Russia; but I must, at the same time, observe that both these Courts require to be narrowly watched at the present moment, with respect to the mode in which they pursue their particular views, in order that we may not be involved in a course of policy in which Great Britain has no principle of common interest with them but the reverse.

<sup>1</sup> [The first point is that neither Austria nor Prussia may, and certainly none of the smaller Powers have any sincere desire to bring the present state of things to a speedy termination, so long as they can feed, clothe, and pay their armies at the expense of France, and put their English subsidies into their pockets, of which last nothing can deprive them previous to the 1st of April, 1816, but the actual conclusion of a treaty with France.

The Austrians, it is true, have latterly halted a corps of 15,000 men in Lower Austria; but they have brought the whole of Bianci's army into Provence, to feed upon that poor and loyal country.

The Prussians have not only brought an entire new *corps d'armée* of 40,000 men forward, much to the annoyance of the King of the Netherlands, on whom they have been feeding by the way, but have reinforcements to an equal amount in full march to fill up their other corps, making their force in France, according to their own returns, 280,000, for which they draw rations.

The Bavarians also, not to lose time, have forwarded troops from Munich to the Loire in waggons, at a moment when their service in the field was out of the question.

The Prussian Minister of Finance, Bulow, told him yesterday that he calculated the Allied force now in France at 900,000 men, and their expense, including forage and waste, at not less than three livres per man per day, which is about 112,000*l* per day, or 36,000,000*l* per year, exclusive of pay and clothing, the latter being provided by distinct requisitions, the former by the revenues of the department occupied.

To this must be added the final contribution to be demanded, which, from what he can gather, is not likely to fall short of 600,000,000 of livres; and if to this is added the charge of 100,000 men to occupy the intended positions in France for a number of years, the pressure is likely to be as heavy in a pecuniary shape as the country can be expected quietly to submit to.]

<sup>1</sup> Précis. Wellington. Supplementary Despatches XI. 127.

I have adverted to the ultimate contribution, for the purpose of observing that there is another point of view, in which our views will not be found altogether in unison with those of the two Powers in question, namely, in appropriating a considerable portion of the contribution to fortifications. You reason the justice of throwing upon France the expense of providing those defences which her position and conduct render indispensable to the security of the neighbouring States. Austria and Prussia state the justice as strongly and preferably in favour of being indemnified for the expenses of the war and for former contributions levied upon them by France. It is quite clear that France cannot meet all these demands ; that the charge upon her must be limited in amount ; and that it will be a question amongst the Allies, in appropriating this fund, which pretension is to give way.

From what fell from Prince Hardenberg, some time since, I apprehend much opposition to my proposal in that quarter ; and I have found Prince Metternich more impracticable upon this point than on any I have ever discussed with him. I hope, however, I have made some impression upon him ; but you must not suppose that this is a question between us and France : it is, in truth, a question much more between us and our Allies, in which, as I foresaw before I left England, we should have to contend, upon grounds of remote precaution, against the immediate pressure of avarice and poverty.

<sup>1</sup> [Has, in addition to support, received assurances from the Russian Minister that the Emperor will agree to his proposition of appropriating one-third of the contribution to fortification, which, considering the remote interest of Russia, is a very liberal proceeding.]

In the management of his troops, the Emperor has been as little open to reproach. His second army was put in motion without any bargain, and previous to the assurance of any assistance from us ; and their march was stopped, and orders sent for their return, upon a representation from Lord Castlereagh. His Imperial Majesty now urges (and for the economy of our subsidies we must be anxious for the same) that a prompt settlement should be made with France, being anxious to march his army back as early in the next month as the state of the negotiations will permit.

Another point in which we must be guarded with those Courts is the impulse they receive from the public sentiment in Germany,

<sup>1</sup> Précis, Wellington. Supplementary Despatches. XI. 127.

from the temper of the smaller Powers, and the desire each feels not to yield to the other the influence in Germany which belongs to what is most popular.

The prevailing sentiment in Germany is favourable to the territorial reduction of France. After what the people have suffered, this is not wonderful; but it is one thing to wish a thing done, and another to maintain it when done. None of these Powers can for any time keep up war establishments, or, having laid them down, easily resume them. If, then, this course increases the chance of early war, the acquisitions may be of short duration; and whilst the chances of peace diminished, we may be obliged, in order to keep France within due bounds, to take the weight of the war on ourselves.]

The more I wish the alternative, the more I am impressed with the wisdom of what the Duke of Wellington states upon this subject, in his letter to me,<sup>1</sup> when he says that he deems the possession of a certain number of French fortresses, for an extended period of time, in itself preferable to the actual cession of the same places, and for this obvious reason, that the one is compatible with French connexion, the other leads to unite all Frenchmen against us, or rather against the Power that shall be found in possession of their spoils; and, as the King of the Netherlands would probably be the first to be attacked, we have more reason to weigh well the course to be pursued.

When I state that the temporary occupation is not incompatible with preserving a useful influence in France, I do it from knowing that the King and his Ministers do not wish to see France without foreign troops—that they admit the Allies cannot leave their troops in France, without the security of a certain number of their fortresses. My belief and hope, then, is, if the arrangement is made with some attention to the feelings and interests of the country, that the King, his Government, and the loyal party in France, will ally themselves with you; and that, thus sustained, the King will be able gradually to establish his authority, which, if accomplished, is valuable beyond all other securities we can acquire. If he fails, we shall not have to reproach ourselves with having precipitated his fall, and we shall have full time to take our precautions. If, on the contrary, we push things now to an extremity, we leave the King no resource in the eyes of his own people but to disavow us; and, once committed against us in sentiment, he will be obliged soon either to lead the nation into war himself, or possibly be set aside to make way for some more

<sup>1</sup> CCXII.

bold and enterprising competitor. The whole of this view of the question turns upon a conviction that the King's cause in France is far from hopeless, if well conducted, and that the European Alliance can be made powerfully instrumental to his support, if our securities are framed in such a manner as not to be ultimately hostile to France, after she shall have given *protracted proofs* of having ceased to be a revolutionary State.

I don't know what impressions the Austrian and Prussian papers may have made in England in opposition to this reasoning ; but, if you should deem it necessary to demand securities against which all Frenchmen must protest, which I do not consider to be by any means the case, with respect to those recommended by the Duke of Wellington, my advice then will be to you and to the Allies to have no reserve towards France. You cannot—you must not. In that case, calculate upon the submission of France but for the shortest interval ; and the only objection I should then to have to state against General Knesebeck's plan is that it does not go far enough. It leaves France nearly entire, both in population and resources, whilst it deprives her precisely of those objects which will revive in every Frenchman, whatever may be his principles, a desire of war at the first favourable moment.

I have troubled you with this long letter, because I think we must make up our minds whether we are to play a game with any portion of France, or against France collectively. If we mean the former, the duty of the negotiator will be to get as much direct security as he finds compatible with that object, in order to gratify what, I have no doubt, is the prevailing temper in England, as well as in Germany. The Cabinet ought to instruct the Duke of Wellington not to look to secure a fortified place the more or the less, which seldom tells for much in the contest of nations, but to confer with the other Powers how we can best reduce the power of France, and most effectively disqualify her from again making the attempt to assail Europe. I have no doubt the middle line would be the most popular, and that, in extorting the permanent cession of one or two fortresses of great name, our labours would carry with them an *éclat* which is not likely to attend them, according to the course we recommend. But it is not our business to collect trophies, but to try if we can bring back the world to peaceful habits. I do not believe this to be compatible with any attempt now materially and permanently to affect the territorial character of France, as settled by the Peace of Paris ; neither do I think it a clear case (if we can, by imposing

a strait waistcoat upon that Power for a number of years, restore her to ordinary habits, and weighing the extraordinary growth of other States in latter times, and especially of Russia) that France, even with her existing dimensions, may not be found a useful rather than a dangerous member of the European system ; but these are the problems you are to weigh. You have now all the materials before you ; you know the Duke of Wellington's sentiments and my own ; and, if you wish us to alter the view we have taken of the question, or have to make any change in the instructions given me on leaving England, there is no time to be lost.

As far as we have gone, I apprehend the securities proposed exceed in amount (Buonaparte being in our hands) what was then required, in the event of his being at large ; but this is no objection, if the thing is right in itself.

CCXVI. [*W. S. D. XI. 130.*]

LIVERPOOL TO CASTLEREACH.

Fife House, August 18th, 1815.

We have received your letters of the 12th inst.,<sup>1</sup> enclosing the Prussian and Austrian Projets on the terms to be proposed to France, and your Memorandum and that of the Duke of Wellington upon them.

I entirely concur with you and the Duke of Wellington in your opinion as to the extravagance of the Prussian propositions under all the present circumstances. I certainly think that the reduction of the power of France proposed in their Projet would be more beneficial to Europe than it would be disadvantageous to France ; and I should not be surprised if events were now to take such a turn as might render it just and expedient for the Allies to insist on the Prussian demands to their full extent. But the contest must in that case assume a new character. The Projet in question is in no way consistent with the relations in which we stand at present to Louis XVIII.

On the other hand the Austrian Projet does not appear to us unreasonable. It is founded on no principle of dismemberment, nor on that of reducing the power of France or violating the integrity of their territory beyond what is absolutely necessary for the security of the neighbouring states. I confess I think that, under all the circumstances, the most wise arrangement would be a combination of the Austrian Projet with that of the Duke of Wellington. . . .

<sup>1</sup>CCXIV.

An arrangement on this principle would have nothing in it which could really be considered as humiliating to France. The proposition for temporary occupation, on which we are agreed, is in fact more humiliating than what it would be proposed to retain. We should ask no more than what a successful war on the frontiers might entitle us to demand, and I doubt very much whether the French expect to be let off more easy than they would be by a proposal of the nature of that above stated.

You have, however, been apprized in the Memorandum of the 3rd August<sup>1</sup> of the arrangement in which we are ready to concur if nothing further can be obtained. But I think that while we attend so much to what is due to the feelings of the French Government, we ought not to be insensible to what we owe to Austria, Prussia, and our other Allies, and likewise to the public feeling in this country, which I cannot conceal from you will be grievously disappointed by the acknowledgment.

[The question of the statues and pictures withdrawn from other countries; very desirable in principle that they should be restored, but aware that this cannot be effected without some prejudice to the King and his Government. If the King is to be called upon to make other sacrifices for the security of Europe, possible to understand the repugnance which may exist to pressing him too far on this point, but if the integrity of French territory is to be observed, he ought to give up the plunder of the Revolution. The intention of conferring on Wellington the command of the force to be kept on the French frontier highly judicious; no objection to furnish a quota of British troops.]

CCXVII. [C. G. X. 495.]

LIVERPOOL TO CASTLEREAGH.

August 23rd, 1815.

I have laid before the Prince Regent and the Cabinet your very able letter, marked Private and Confidential, of the 17th instant.<sup>2</sup> Under all the difficulties which unavoidably attend our present relations with the French Government, we are prepared to concur in the alternative stated in your letter, to which both the Duke of Wellington and yourself give so decided a preference, and, instead of urging the permanent cession of any part of the

<sup>1</sup> CCXI.

<sup>2</sup> CCXV.



French territory by the French Government, we shall be satisfied with an arrangement which secures to the Allies, for a time sufficiently extended, the military occupation of certain of the French fortresses, according to the *projets* in the Duke of Wellington's paper, and which provides at the same time for the rectification of the French frontier, by restoring France to the situation in which she stood in the year 1790, and giving the fortresses *enclavés* in the neighbouring territories to the States to which those territories belong.

We cannot conceal from ourselves and from you that an arrangement on this principle (which I believe to be entirely novel in its character) may be subject to many serious inconveniences ; and we should be most desirous that there should be added to it, therefore, a stipulation for the dismantling of Lille and Strasburg. Such a stipulation need not, in our judgment, mortify the pride of the French nation. It would in no way affect the permanent interest of France, whilst it would add considerably to the temporary security of the Allies ; and we are of opinion that this object is the more deserving of attention, as the other part of the arrangement might, in a great measure, fail, in the event of differences unfortunately arising amongst the Allies, from any change in the policy of their respective Courts, by which any one of the considerable Powers might separate itself from the Alliance during the period specified for the occupation of the fortresses, and might thereby throw the whole arrangement into confusion, or defeat the purpose of it altogether. In short, the principle of temporary occupation must necessarily be so complicated in its nature, that we feel all the importance of annexing to it something which may afford security to the neighbouring States, independent of the contingencies above stated, till such time as measures can be adopted for placing their own frontiers in a respectable state of defence.

You will understand me as not bringing this proposition for dismantling Lille and Strasburg forward as a *sine qua non*, but as wishing it to be urged with all the weight which we feel is due to it ; and, considering how very short our propositions fall of the Austrian and Prussian *projets*, I cannot but entertain a confident hope that, when the French Government are aware, as they must be, of the extent of sacrifice which would have been demanded from them, if it had not been for the moderation of Great Britain and Russia, they will not feel it possible to make any serious resistance to a concession of this nature. . . .

CCXVIII. [F. O. Cont. 24.]

CASTLEREAGH TO LIVERPOOL. (No. 38.)

August 24th, 1815.

. . . [As to the demand for expenses of St. Helena, does not think it wise.] Buonaparte gave himself to us. The Allies, feeling they had to tranquillize the public sentiment in their respective States with respect to this man, desire that Napoleon may be deemed to be the prisoner of the Powers generally, and that they may have a right to send Commissaries to verify his existence, etc. None of them pressed the custody upon us. I took care not to let suffer any question to arise about his passing into any other hands, because in no other could he safely for our own interests be placed. If the custody had been brought in doubt, I have no doubt other Powers would have been willing to take and shut him up in one of their fortresses without making any charge upon us, but we should then have been placing a most serious instrument in hands always of dubious import in the fluctuations of Continental affairs. . . .

CCXIX. [W. S. D. XI. 137<sup>1</sup>.]

CASTLEREAGH TO LIVERPOOL. (No. 40.)

Paris, August 24th, 1815.

Lord Castlereagh requests instructions to bring the negotiations to a conclusion. Despatches Lord Stewart to England. Hoped to have sent a paper of Prince Metternich's upon the idea of Lord Liverpool's letter of the 18th.<sup>2</sup> Prince Hardenberg has not explained himself. Difficulties of restraining the Prussian army, which Prince Hardenberg (*finds himself so wholly incompetent to control, or direct the violent party in the army, that he did not hesitate to avow to Lord Clancarty two days since that he felt himself in the midst of Praetorian bands. At the same time although this state of affairs may give trouble, and occasion delay, the desire of union will, I have the strongest hope, with a proper interference on the part of Great Britain, in the end prevail.*) Refers to his own paper, with "Principles" and "Observations,"<sup>3</sup> and encloses Count Nesselrode's vote of the Emperor of Russia. Views of Prussia. Councils wholly military. Spirit of vengeance against France. Dangerous spirit in the Prussian army *quoad* Europe and their own government. Prussia meditates change in her position. Knesebeck, when he brought his *Projet* to Lord Castlereagh, etc.,

<sup>1</sup> Précis.<sup>2</sup> F. O. Continent 24.<sup>3</sup> W. S. D. XI. 138. Recapitulates all the arguments in favour of a moderate policy.

professed moderation ; but it was clear he thought of extension on the side of Hanover and the Pays de Liege ; Hanover to be indemnified by the Duchy of Luxembourg, and the King of the Netherlands by part of French Flanders. The Prussian object is to augment their possessions ; put Hanover and the Pays Bas between them and France, for their own security ; and involve Hanover and the King of the Pays Bas so irreconcilably with France as to render them dependent on Prussia for support, and then to demand her own terms for her support. Lord Castlereagh advises strongly against such a state of things as can produce this result. It is said France will covet Belgium ; Lord Castlereagh says the Revolutionary party in France will ; but if you take part of old France and add it to Belgium, all France will, as a point of honour, be anxious to regain it. Lord Castlereagh thinks the King of the Pays Bas had better trust to Europe for seven years, and to his fortifications afterwards, for protection. The same principle operates respecting all the small States bordering upon France : it is bad policy to encourage them to endeavour to get a small line of territory, which will only offend France and give them no security. Views of Austria right : desirous of peace ; inclined to court popularity at our expense in Germany ; to give fortresses in France to the King of the Pays Bas ; to secure more of contribution to themselves, as less will be necessary to complete the frontier line of the Pays Bas. She will agree finally with England. Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington wish for decision upon these points. Language of the British here and British newspapers do the King's government great harm. Requests the consideration of the Cabinet on the means of preserving the peace of Europe, and destroying revolutionary spirit in France. Seven years' peace necessary for England. Wishes to share with the Emperor of Russia the credit of supporting the King of France, and prevent the too great union of France and Russia, which would be a serious evil. The difficulties of settlement are becoming daily greater. Prussia has made a requisition for 58,000,000 of livres and 24,000 horses.

CCXX. [C. C. X. 500.]

BATHURST TO CASTLEREAGH.

Downing Street, August 25th, 1815.

[Persuaded that the British principle in regard to the negotiations for peace a sound one, yet strong arguments in the memorials of the Austrian and Prussian Ministers in favour of a more rigorous policy. Nothing, however, more unfounded than

Prussia's objections to a part of the contribution imposed on France being allotted to the construction of a barrier for the Netherlands. The Allies have an unquestionable right to be indemnified by France, but only for the expenses incurred by the violation of the Treaty of Paris; Prussia takes into calculation all that they suffered in the previous wars, but the Treaty must be understood as having settled the account up to that period. The expenses of Great Britain during this last war far greater than those of any of the other Allies, since in addition to her own expenditure she had subsidized all the other Powers. Does Great Britain forfeit right to her share of the proposed contribution because she is willing to devote it to the defence of the Netherlands and the security of Europe, instead of confining it to her immediate advantage? Determined not to give way in this particular. No possibility of reconciling the public to the peace if Great Britain is to pay for the expense of making a barrier when one might have been obtained at the expense of France herself. The public could never understand why Great Britain should be severely taxed in order to preserve the integrity of France. Since the policy of preserving that integrity is to be adopted, it is essential that there is laid upon France the charge to which this forbearance would otherwise expose either Great Britain or her most immediate Ally. Holland cannot undertake it; therefore can now be but one alternative, either France or Great Britain must bear the expense and the British determination is therefore natural.]

CCXXI. [C. C. X. 506.]

LIVERPOOL TO CASTLEREAGH.

Fife House, August 28th, 1815.

Your brother, Lord Stewart,<sup>1</sup> arrived in London yesterday morning, and came down to me soon after to Combe Wood. I had the opportunity there of a long conversation with him on all the points concerned in your dispatches, and we have had a Cabinet this morning, at which he has attended, in order that such of our colleagues as were in town might be correctly apprized of your sentiments and those of the Duke of Wellington upon the present state of our negotiations.

I was inclined at first to hope that my letter of the 23rd<sup>2</sup> instant, which must have reached you after your brother left

<sup>1</sup> He had been sent to England to win over the Cabinet to Castlereagh's views.

<sup>2</sup> CCXVII.

Paris, would have relieved you from all difficulties, inasmuch as it distinctly gives up all idea of permanent cessions from France, except as far as such cessions had been suggested by yourself : and although we recommend the proposal being made for dismantling Lille and Strasburg, it is distinctly stated that this demand should not be brought forward as a *sine qua non* ; nor was it our intention that it should be urged in such a manner as might materially retard the conclusion of an arrangement between the different Powers.

The explanations, however, which we have since had with Lord Stewart have convinced us that considerable embarrassment might arise from a proposition of this nature being even brought forward under the present circumstances, and in the existing state of the negotiation—that it is far better, in the situation in which we now stand, to advance no demand to which we are not determined to adhere—and that it is most expedient therefore, to confine our proposition to the principle of *temporary occupation*, and to that of the rectification of the frontier, according to the suggestion contained in your dispatch, and approved by the Emperor of Russia in the Memorandum delivered by Count Nesselrode.

The terms of *the King or his legitimate successors* may be open to cavil, as it may be contended that any successor approved by the nation is a *legitimate* successor. It was to avoid this objection that the Chancellor suggested, in the memorandum of the 3rd of August, the terms, *Louis XVIII., or his successor by rightful inheritance* ; and we wish you would attend to the adoption of this phrase, or designation, in the instrument which may be to be signed.

We are further of opinion that it cannot be too clearly expressed that the fortresses are not in any case to revert to France, except it shall be under the Government of Louis XVIII., or his successors by rightful inheritance. The explicit recognition of this principle, whilst it explains the motives which have actuated the councils of the Allies, affords one of the best securities for the continuance of the King's authority. I am not aware that I can have anything further to add on this most important branch of your negotiations.

Whatever may be the first popular impression on the result of the negotiation according to the principles which have been agreed upon, your brother will be authorized to assure you that you will be most cordially and zealously supported and upheld by all your colleagues in this country.

CCXXII. [*Gurwood. XII. 622.*]

WELLINGTON TO CASTLEREAGH.

Memorandum

On the Temporary Occupation of part of France.

Paris, August 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1815.

The principal points of difference between the scheme proposed by [Prince Hardenberg<sup>1</sup>] and that proposed by the Ministers of the other Courts for the settlement with France consists, first, in the Prince's desire that certain French fortresses should be ceded to the Allies, and others razed; and, secondly, in the difficulties which exist, according to the Prince's notion, in the execution of the measure of temporary occupation, and in His Highness's notion of its inefficiency to effect its object. In regard to the first point, it is a political rather than a military question, and it is not my intention to say much upon it. I wish, however, that some principle should be fixed regarding the right and expediency of demanding from France the cession of several separate fortresses distributed on the line from the sea to the Alps. I have already taken an opportunity of discussing the right of demanding these cessions, which must be founded upon the clear omission in the declarations and treaties of the Allies of anything to preclude the demand. The expediency of making the demand will depend upon a variety of political and military considerations, among which will be the following: whether the possession of the fortresses named is that which gives France the formidable strength complained of, or if transferred to the Allies would give them severally the wished-for strength; whether it is not a combination of population, pecuniary resources, and artificial strength, which makes France so formidable; and whether the transfer of the last only to certain of the Allies, leaving the two first unimpaired in the possession of France, that is to say, to give the Allies fortresses without additional resources in men to form garrisons and armies to defend them, and resources in money to maintain those garrisons and armies, would not tend to their weakness rather than to their strength, at the same time that the measure would afford to France a just pretence for war, and all the means which injured national pride could give for carrying it on.

If the policy of the united Powers of Europe is to weaken France, let them do so in reality. Let them take from that country its population and resources as well as a few fortresses. If they are not prepared for that decisive measure, if peace and tranquillity for a few years is their object, they must make an arrangement which

<sup>1</sup> F. O. Cont. 26.

will suit the interests of all the parties to it, and of which the justice and expediency will be so evident that they will tend to carry it into execution.

All persons appear to agree that the maintenance of the authority of the King is essential to the interests of the other Powers of Europe ; and, notwithstanding the difference of opinion regarding the extent of the force which ought to be maintained for a time in France, and regarding the difficulties of executing this measure, and after all that has been said of its inefficiency in affording security to the Allies in general, it appears to be generally admitted that it is necessary to adopt it. It is necessary to adopt it with different objects in view ; first, to give security to the Government of the King, and to afford him time to form a force of his own with which he can carry on his government, and take his fair share in the concerns of Europe ; secondly, to give the Allies some security against a second revolutionary convulsion and reaction ; and, thirdly, to enable the Allies to enforce the payment of those contributions which they deem it just towards their own subjects to lay on France in payment of the expenses of the war.

I have enumerated the objects of this military occupation in this order as being that of their several relative importance. In discussing them I will consider that first which I have adverted to in the second instance, viz., the security of the Allies. . . .

CCXXIII. [*F. O. Cont.* 26.]  
 CASTLEREAGH TO LIVERPOOL. (No. 47.)  
 September 4th, 1815.

. . . . [Encloses letters from and to Clancarty concerning the feeling in Brussels.<sup>1</sup>] You may rely upon it, that to have more money to spend and less to set apart out of the contributions for new fortifications, is the true motive which makes these Powers

<sup>1</sup> Castlereagh to Clancarty, September 4th, 1815.  
 "Your letter of the 30th reached me last night by Gagern, whose mission was managed without my knowledge, in that little spirit of German intrigue which is but too prevalent here.  
 "It is curious to observe the insatiable spirit of getting something without a thought of how it is to be preserved, there is not a Power, however feeble, that borders France from the Channel to the Mediterranean, that is not pushing some acquisition under the plea of security and ratification of frontier. They seem to have no dread of a kick from the lion, when his toils are removed, and are foolish enough to suppose that the great Powers of Europe are to be in readiness always to protect them in the enjoyment of these petty spoils. In truth their whole conception is so unstatesmanlike, that they look not beyond their sop ; compared with this the keeping together an European force has little importance in their eyes. This spirit of plunder has been the misery of Germany for the last century." *F. O. Cont.* 26.

so very fond of French fortresses. I asked Baron Gagern, on his return, how the king would relish having these fortresses without the guarantee of England, for that I thought it was a very different question for Great Britain to agree to guarantee the Low Countries to the King, and to include in that guarantee some French fortresses; that the one was an engagement fundamental and inseparable from our policy,—the other was in its nature only incidental and auxiliary, a mere question of expediency, of means to an end, and to the adoption of which, objections of great magnitude existed. This view of the question appeared altogether to damp His Excellency's appetite for such acquisitions.

The fact is that we have now before us demands from every State, however feeble, that either borders or approaches, France desiring to have some portion either directly or indirectly of permanent accession at her expense, and for the conservation of which it is taken for granted that we are to be guarantees:—the more I reflect upon it, the more I deprecate this system of scratching such a Power. We may hold her down and pare her nails, so that many years shall pass away before they can again wound us. I hope we shall do this effectually, and subject to no other hazards of failure than must, more or less, attend all political or military arrangements, but this system of being pledged to a continental war for objects that France may any day reclaim from the particular States that hold them, without pushing her demands beyond what she would contend was due to her own honor, is I am sure a bad British policy,—and that if the States who ambition [sic.] these objects choose to fly at such small game, it ought to be at their own risk, and with their own means and not with ours, but unfortunately if they once get into a scrape with such an enemy, Great Britain may, and probably will, sooner or later be involved, and hence it becomes necessary for us not only to refuse them our guarantee for such purposes, but to dissuade them from pursuing them.

CCXXIV. [*F. O. Cont.* 27.]

CASTLEREAGH TO LIVERPOOL. (No. 53.)

September, 11th, 1815.

[Idea of dismissing Fouché has been put forward by the Ultra Party, especially the Comte d'Artois and the Duke and Duchess d'Angoulême.]

I own there is nothing I regard with more apprehension than the enterprizes of the party in France, at the head of which M.



and Mme. d'Angoulême are disposed so indiscreetly to place themselves. It is even now a great protection to the throne, and may in time when it acquires public men capable of conducting it, and better disciplined to the existing order of things, become capable of governing, but at present it is a mere rope of sand without leaders habituated to office, without any fixed system, but with an inordinate infusion of passion, resentment and spirit of inversion. The weight this party will certainly possess in the assembly, the general power of the Crown and the influence of the Allies, will deter the democratic party from any dangerous projet. In truth I do not believe that those in the Government have any disposition to a republic or to an order of things more popular than that which now exists and in their hands I think the power of the Government so guarded may for the present be safely left, whilst the other party will gradually require consistency. If the existing ministers fail upon trial, the King has a resource which he will use with a better chance of success if he does not precipitate the change, and the reproach of the failure will not be his. If on the other hand without giving them a fair trial the King was to take his own friends—I really believe such is the public feeling, and such their natural intemperance that they would not have a chance to stand a month and that their fall would leave the King almost without resource.

There is also a view of the question which affects intimately the position of the Allies. If the high royalist party get into power you may rely upon it they will drive things to extremities, and that not having the mass with them they will either be the victims of their own rashness or the Allied troops must interfere. I look to the necessity of such an interposition as so great an evil, that I deem it of the greatest advantage to keep the power in the hands of men whom the nation will not so easily confound with the foreigner and the emigrant, a consideration which becomes the more pressing, if we are to have 150,000 men posted in France. . . .

CCXXV. [C. C. XI. 16.]

LIVERPOOL TO CASTLEREAGH.

Fife House, September 15th, 1815.

I can assure you that I am fully sensible of the injurious effect which must result from the general line on present politics taken by our daily papers, and particularly by those which are supposed

to be Government papers.<sup>1</sup> You know, however, full well that there are papers, which are vulgarly called Government papers, in consequence of the support which they give to the Government rather than to the Opposition of the day: there are no papers over which we have any authority, or even any influence on which we can depend.

It is supposed by many at home, and, I have no doubt, generally believed on the Continent, that these papers are in the pay of Government; whereas no paper that has any character, and consequently an established sale, will accept money from Government; and indeed their profits are so enormous in all critical times, when their support is the most necessary, that no pecuniary assistance that Government could offer would really be worth their acceptance. The only indirect means we possess of having any influence over the editors is by supplying them occasionally with foreign intelligence, and by advertisements; but, with respect to the former, it is notorious that some of the papers which are not connected with Government have always had the earliest foreign intelligence; and, with regard to the latter, they know full well that the public offices will necessarily be obliged, sooner or later, to insert their advertisements in the papers which have the greatest sale, and they hold in consequence very cheap any menace to deprive them of this advantage. . . .

CCXXVI. [W. S. D. XI. 165.]

CASTLEREAGH TO LIVERPOOL.

Paris, September 21st, 1815.

In my dispatch No. 54<sup>2</sup> I informed your Lordship that Prussia stood out upon three points: 1st. The demand of 1200 millions, under the head of contributions, instead of 600 millions; 2nd. The transfer of Luxembourg to Prussia; and 3rd. The cession by France of Saarlouis to the same Power.

<sup>1</sup> Talleyrand had protested to Castlereagh about the tone of the English Press. Castlereagh forwarded the protest home "in the hope that some means may be adopted of keeping some at least of the English papers a little more correctly informed and of moderating a system of defamation which can be productive of nothing in France, as far as the British Press can have any influence, but confusion and civil war. I understand from the other ministers that the intemperance of the English newspapers does even more mischief in Germany by aggravating the passions especially of the middling ranks, already sufficiently exalted by their sufferings and by their successes." Castlereagh to Liverpool, September 11th, 1815. F. O. Cont. 27.

<sup>2</sup> Of September 14th, as stated above. F. O. Cont. 27.

The importance of preserving harmony amongst the Four Powers, and a desire to be enabled at last to make our proposition to France before the assemblies met, made us all desirous of sacrificing somewhat to procure unanimity. It was accordingly agreed, after much discussion, that Prussia should reduce her pecuniary demands to the level of the other Powers ; and that they, in return, should undertake to press the point of Saarlouis upon France, and to use their good offices with the King of the Netherlands as to Luxembourg. The King of Prussia urged the cession of Saarlouis with the more earnestness, as the Military Council were of opinion that no equivalent position for a fortress presented itself within his own frontier.

This concession to Prussia necessarily entailed an extension of our demand beyond the ancient frontier in other quarters. Having once opened the principle, we could not, in justice to the King of the Netherlands, omit to demand Condé and Givet as points immediately interesting to him. It was also thought right to include an improved frontier for Switzerland, and the military possession of Monaco for the King of Sardinia, in our proposition to the French government.

I have reason to believe that the Plenipotentiaries on the part of France will reject the principle of making any cession whatever of the ancient territory ; that they will admit the principle of ceding their late acquisitions ; that they will admit the principle of temporary occupation ; and that they will admit the principle of pecuniary indemnity. Beyond this I do not believe the King will go without the express advice of the assemblies ; nor will his Ministers, in the present posture of the government, be disposed to make themselves responsible for any measure which does violence to the national prejudices.

CCXXVII. [*F. O. Cont.* 28.]

CASTLEREAGH TO LIVERPOOL. (No. 65.)

September 25th, 1815.

[The change of government in France,<sup>1</sup> which has created general alarm in the public mind. Probable that the ministers anticipated their dismissal by resigning. Extraordinary and unjustifiable that, in such a state of things, a negotiation with the Allies should have been undertaken since the ministers could hardly consider themselves as in office when they offered to receive

<sup>1</sup> The resignation of Talleyrand and Fouché. Richelieu was not appointed to succeed Talleyrand till the beginning of October.

our overture. The King not sufficiently firm to pursue a line of principle and, distracted by family and party impulses, has all the disadvantages of a popular government without taking the benefit of being sheltered by the constitutional system in the difficulties which surround him. . . .

Castlereagh's interview with the King.] I found His Majesty at first tres exalté in his manner and shewing great soreness upon the propositions made to him. I represented that the Allied Sovereigns would never have thought of making any proposition to his Majesty which they conceived could be either dishonourable or ruinous for him to accept. That their proposition appeared from the answer to have been misconceived, that they founded their claims in no degree upon the right of conquest, but upon the two principles of indemnity and security, the power of which the French note admitted, whilst upon the second, by far the most important of the two, it was wholly silent; and yet of this latter principle after such a convulsion, the dangers of which could not be expected soon to pass away, even the ties of friendship and alliance could not exclude the consideration.

I stated to the King how long and diligently we had laboured to reduce the precautionary arrangement to the minimum that could be reconciled with the safety and feelings of our respective nations. That in order to avoid the necessity of demanding the permanent cession of an extended proportion of the defences of France, the system of temporary occupation had been devised. That it was necessary however to combine this with some system of permanent security and that, in framing this, instead of asking for any fortress that detached any considerable portion of the ancient territory from France, we had asked for none that were not either without or upon the frontier, and that, in order to limit as far as possible the amount of our demand, we had adopted the expedient of accepting money as the means of construction within our own frontier.

I found that the separation of the demand for fortification from the contributions, had been felt as a great humiliation, viz., the giving money to erect defences against themselves. I told the King the motive of so stating the proposition was to justify the Allied Governments in the eyes of their own people for not pushing their views further, by shewing them that measures had been taken to effect the same end though by other means, but that if His Majesty wished to give an equal sum under another name, I was persuaded the Allies would cheerfully accommodate in the form, provided the substance was secured.

[Upon the pecuniary part<sup>1</sup> of the arrangement the King was more *coulant*. Castlereagh insisted that they were moderate, and that France had easy means of meeting them by selling the forests, adding to the debt, etc.] Before I withdrew the King returned with considerable earnestness upon the wounded pride of the nation, and the eternal reproach he should incur by ceding any part of the ancient territory. I ventured to submit that there was a just and rational pride which it would be unwise in the Allies to expose His Majesty to the necessity of wounding, but there was a pride growing out of and belonging to the Revolution, to which violence might reasonably be done and perhaps ultimately with advantage to His Majesty's interests. I instanced the dispersal of the Louvre collection as falling within the latter principle, as also that principle of inviolability which France since the Revolution had attempted to assume in favour of her possessions, without admitting the same in favour of any other nation, that to maintain such a principle in the extreme was offensive to other Powers, whilst it was the interest of His Majesty, by conciliating and managing feelings on both sides to encourage Europe to persevere in the support of His Majesty and of the cause of order and good government in France. [Told the King his instructions precluded him from negotiating on the basis he wanted, viz., the inviolability of France. The King asked Castlereagh to write home for fresh instructions, but he said that recent events were more likely to strengthen than to weaken them. Left the King in a better humour than he had hoped for at the beginning.]

<sup>1</sup> The demand had been reduced to 800 millions of francs. This was shortly afterwards reduced to 700 millions. By October 1st the outlines of the Treaty had been agreed with the Duke of Richelieu, though the Treaty was not signed till November 20th. Castlereagh summed up the results in a dispatch of October 1st.

(1) Entire defeat of the French Army and capture of the French capital "principally by the armies of Great Britain."

(2) Surrender and imprisonment of Napoleon Buonaparte.

(3) Entire dissolution of the French Army.

(4) Permanent cession of 5 fortresses and all the territory acquired beyond the frontiers of 1790 by the first Peace of Paris.

(5) Temporary occupation for five years of 14 French fortresses. [The period could be, however, and was reduced to three years.]

(6) Maintenance of an Allied force of 150,000 men by the French.

(7) Indemnity of 700 millions of francs.

(8) A total charge of 70 or 80 millions sterling imposed on France before she could get back her fortresses. (Because she had also promised to satisfy certain private claims, but the total amount was eventually settled in 1817 for 200 millions.)

(9) Renewal of the Treaty of Chaumont.

(10) Restitution of the works of art to their previous owners.

And he hoped that the Cabinet would be satisfied with his work. F. O. Cont. 28.

CCXXVIII. [W. S. D. XI. 175.]

CASTLEREACH TO LIVERPOOL.

Paris, September 28th, 1815.

You will receive enclosed a *lettre autographe*<sup>1</sup> from the three Allied Sovereigns addressed to the Prince Regent, which I have been desired to transmit. It was delivered to me by Prince Metternich, the communication being understood to be made to His Royal Highness through the medium of the Emperor of Austria, as the senior Emperor.

To explain the nature of this rather novel proceeding, I have obtained copies both of the letter and its enclosure, deeming it material to accompany it with such explanations as may assist His Royal Highness in making to it a suitable reply. I have, then, to acquaint you that although the Emperor of Austria is the ostensible organ, the measure has entirely originated with the Emperor of Russia, whose mind has latterly taken a deeply religious tinge. Since he came to Paris he has passed a part of every evening with a Madame de Krudener, an old fanatic, who has a considerable reputation amongst the few highflyers in religion that are to be found in Paris. The first intimation I had of this extraordinary act was from the Emperor himself; and I was rather surprised to find it traced back to a conversation with which I was honoured with the Emperor when leaving Vienna. You may remember my sending home a *Projet of Declaration*<sup>2</sup> with which I proposed the Congress should close, in which the Sovereigns were solemnly to pledge themselves in the face of the world to preserve to their people the peace they had conquered, and to treat as a common enemy whatever Power should violate it. The Emperor told me that this idea, with which he seemed much pleased at the time, had never passed from his mind, but that he thought it ought to assume a more formal shape, and one directly personal to the Sovereigns; that he had communicated that morning to the Emperor of Austria his sentiments upon this subject, and that he would speak to me further upon it in a few days.

Prince Metternich, the following day, came to me with the *projet* of the treaty since signed. He communicated to me in great confidence the difficulty in which the Emperor of Austria felt himself placed; that he felt great repugnance to be a party to such an act, and yet was more apprehensive of refusing himself to

<sup>1</sup> This forwards the famous Treaty of the Holy Alliance by which the three Sovereigns promised to act towards one as Christians and recommended their peoples to do the same.

<sup>2</sup> See CLXXIV.

the Emperor's application ; that it was quite clear his mind was affected ; that peace and goodwill was at present the idea which engrossed his thoughts ; that he had found him of late friendly and reasonable on all points ; and that he was unwilling to thwart him in a conception which, however wild, might save him and the rest of the world much trouble so long as it should last. In short, seeing no retreat, after making some verbal alterations the Emperor of Austria agreed to sign it. The Emperor of Russia then carried it to the King of Prussia, who felt in the same manner, but came to the same conclusion.

As soon as the instrument was executed between the Sovereigns, without the intervention of their Ministers, the Emperor of Russia brought it to me, developed his whole plan of universal peace, and told me the three Sovereigns had agreed to address a letter to the Prince Regent, to invite him to accede, of which intended letter His Imperial Majesty delivered to me the enclosed copy. The Duke of Wellington happened to be with me when the Emperor called, and it was not without difficulty that we went through the interview with becoming gravity.

Foreseeing the awkwardness of this piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense, especially to a British Sovereign, I examined with Prince Metternich every practical expedient to stop it ; but the Emperor of Austria, with all his sobriety of mind, did not venture to risk it. When it reached me, in fact, the deed was done, and no other course remained than to do homage to the sentiment upon which it was founded, and to the advantages Europe might hope to derive from three such powerful Sovereigns directing all their influence to the preservation of peace ; that I was confident the Prince Regent would unite, *coeur et d'ime*, with his august Allies in making this the basis of all his policy, and that I would lose no time in laying before His Royal Highness this solemn pledge of the pacific and moderate spirit which actuated their councils.

I ventured to express to the Emperor my satisfaction that the Sovereigns had not given to this instrument an official character ; that this might have rendered its production as a State document necessary ; that it was better it should pass as an autographic communication of sentiment between Sovereign and Sovereign, binding upon their own consciences in the general management of their affairs, than that it should be exposed to public discussion as an act advised by their Ministers. I had, in truth, taken pains, through Prince Metternich, to keep it, if it must go forward, in this channel ; foreseeing that, as Wilberforce is not yet in possession of the Great Seal, even if I should receive the Prince's

command to countersign it, it might find some difficulty in passing through the ordinary course of office.

Upon the whole this is what may be called a scrape ; and yet in the long run it may be attended with more beneficial results than many of the acts which are in progress, and which are of a character better to suit the eye of Parliament. The fact is, that the Emperor's mind is not completely sound. Last year there was but too much reason to fear that its impulse would be to conquest and dominion. The general belief now is, that he is disposed to found his own glory upon a principle of *peace and benevolence*. Since the point of Poland was disposed of, there has been nothing in his political conduct in the progress of arrangements which indicates another purpose, and he really appears to be in earnest. It is, at all events, wise to profit by this disposition as far as it will carry us ; and this is peculiarly the feeling of Austria and Prussia, who hope to keep down, "now that they are compatriots," much of the spirit of frontier jealousy which has hitherto embarrassed them.

With the letter and Treaty you will also receive a *Projet* for the Prince's accession which the Emperor sent me this morning, before his departure. I am desired by the Emperor of Austria, through Metternich, to express his earnest hope that the Prince will not refuse himself to this overture, however much he may feel, with him, the embarrassment of the proceeding ; that he thinks good may come of indulging the Emperor, and that real danger might result to the Alliance from a refusal. My own opinion very much concurs with that of His Imperial Majesty ; and in weighing difficulties on both sides, I think no person will blame the Prince for not refusing himself to a *proposition so made to him*, where the objection lies rather against the excessive excellence than the quality and nature of the engagement : but then, I think the Prince must take it upon himself, and sign it without the intervention of his Ministers, as an autographic avowal of sentiment between him and the Sovereigns his Allies, tending to preserve the tranquillity of Europe. To decline doing so, after a late explanation might produce very unpleasant consequences.

The Emperor told me with great delight that there was nothing had given him so much satisfaction as to affix his signature to this bond of peace, in, he believed, the most *irreligious* capital in Europe.

I confide this communication to your management, and hope the Prince Regent may find himself enabled to avoid disturbing the harmony which at present subsists between him and his Allies.



CCXXIX. [W. S. D. XI. 183.]

LIVERPOOL TO CASTLEREAGH.

Walmer Castle, October 3rd, 1815.

I have received your letter<sup>1</sup> with the enclosures, containing an autograph letter from the Emperors of Austria and Russia and the King of Prussia to the Prince Regent; the copy of a Treaty signed by their Majesties at Paris on the 26th of September; and the Project of an Act of Accession by the Prince Regent.

I have laid the same before the Prince Regent, and we have had a cabinet to consider what is fit to be done in consequence.

I forbear discussing the question of how far it might not have been more advisable, on every account, to prevent such a proceeding altogether. The work is done; and it is one thing to wish it not to have been done, at least in such a manner, and another to refuse being a party to it after it is done.

It is quite impossible, however, to advise the Prince to sign the Act of Accession which has been transmitted to him. Such a step would be inconsistent with all the forms and principles of our government and would subject those who advised it to a very serious responsibility.

[A Treaty is an act of State, and the King or Regent of Great Britain can only be a party to an act of State through the instrumentality of others, who are responsible for it. Neither can he accede to a Treaty personally; he must authorise a plenipotentiary to accede to it in his name and on his part, and it would be an incongruity for the Sovereign or Regent of Great Britain to accede to a Treaty through a plenipotentiary which the other Sovereigns had signed personally. The best course for the Prince to adopt is to write an autographical letter to the three Sovereigns according to the enclosed draft. This will obviate all these objections as well as those which would arise by the Prince refusing to be a party in any way to the act. By this letter, he gives his full sanction to all the principles which the other Sovereigns are desirous of consecrating. In transmitting the letters, the reason for the necessity of this course to be fully explained.]

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRINCE REGENT TO THE EMPERORS OF AUSTRIA AND RUSSIA AND THE KING OF PRUSSIA.

I have had the honour of receiving your Imperial Majesty's letter, together with the copy of the Treaty signed by your Majesty and your august Allies, at Paris, on the 26th of September.

As the forms of the British Constitution, which I am called upon to administer in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty my father, preclude me from acceding formally to this Treaty in the shape in which it has been presented to

<sup>1</sup> CCXXVIII.

me, I adopt this course of conveying to the august Sovereigns who have signed it my entire concurrence in the principles which they have laid down, and in the declaration which they have set forth of making the Divine precepts of the Christian religion the invariable rule of their conduct in all their relations, social and political, and of cementing the union which ought ever to subsist between all Christian nations; and it will be always my earnest endeavour to regulate my conduct in the station in which Divine Providence has vouchsafed to place me by these sacred maxims, and to co-operate with my august Allies in all measures which may be likely to contribute to the peace and happiness of mankind.

CCXXX. [F. O. Cont. 29.]

CASTLEREAGH TO LIVERPOOL. (No. 80.)

Paris, October 15th, 1815.

I have before apprized your Lordship that it was in contemplation before the Allies separated, to contract fresh engagements with each other, in the spirit of the Treaty of Chaumont, but applying the same to the existing state of affairs.

The Emperor of Russia expressed particular approbation of this measure as suggested in outline in the Memorandum which was transmitted home by Lord Stewart and His Imperial Majesty subsequently directed that the enclosed Projet marked No. 1<sup>1</sup> of such a treaty to be communicated to me.

However satisfactory it was to observe the Emperor enter with so much cordiality into the support of the Bourbons, and of the established order of things in France, it appeared to me that the proposed draft of a treaty was open to very considerable objections: 1st. As not being sufficiently definite in the scope and nature of its stipulations. 2ndly. As bearing on the face of it too strong and undisguised a complexion of interference, on the part of the Allied Sovereigns in the internal concerns of France, without sufficiently connecting such interference with the policy which a due attention to the immediate security of their own dominions prescribed. 3rd. That it appeared to make the Allies too much umpires in all constitutional struggles in France by professing a determination to support *with all their efforts* both the monarch and the charter. 4thly. That it gave the King too direct and unqualified a power over the Allied force stationed in France and thereby exposed the Allies to be improvidently compromised on questions of internal policy; and 5thly. That it presented but an indiscreet view of the extent of means, with which the Allies

<sup>1</sup> F. O. Cont. 29. Besides the points enumerated by Castlereagh it is to be noted that this Projet limited future meetings of the Powers to the question of the execution of the Treaty of November 20th, 1815.

were prepared to support their engagements as well as of the particular objects to which these means were to be directed.

I therefore thought it necessary to deliver in, for the Emperor's consideration, the enclosed counter-projet No. 2<sup>1</sup>, in which I have endeavoured to confine, where the engagement is explicit, the *casus foederis* as far as possible to known and defined obligations already resting upon other Treaties, leaving all future convulsions in France, which assume a character distinct from those already pronounced upon by Treaty, to be dealt with upon a principle of concert, and with reference to the particular circumstances of the case. It is impossible upon such unforeseen events to adopt an universal proposition, to stipulate too cautiously would weaken the King—to contract a prior too boldly in his support would involve us too deeply in the contention of France, certainly embarrass us in Parliament, and might encourage the Royalist party to presume very indiscreetly upon our support.

As the Treaty is now framed, especially in the exclusion of the family of Buonaparte, I think it will give a very powerful appui to the King, coupled with the article of the Treaty with France which limits the claim of retrocession of the fortresses to the regular succession.

It will also make the Jacobins feel, in truth the whole nation for they all require this admonition, that they cannot break loose again or escape from the fulfilment of the Treaty now made, without being committed with all Europe, and bringing down again a million of armed men upon their country.

I have endeavoured to keep the internal affairs of France in the background, and to make the colour of our political attitude and of our contingent interference as European as possible. I have at the same time, in order to soften the aspect of a Treaty which is necessarily directed against France, recognized sufficiently the principles of concert with the legitimate sovereign, so as to mark, that it is not against the government or the nation, but against an eventual faction in France, that our precautions are directed.

I am not aware that any further elucidation of this question is necessary. I forward the Projet and counter-projet by a special messenger, in the hope that I may have the advantage of receiving the sentiments of His Royal Highness' servants upon this subject before I am called upon to carry the measure into execution.

<sup>1</sup> This is practically the same as the Treaty subsequently signed. Castlereagh substituted a new form of words for Article VI., which extended the future reunions of the Sovereigns or their ministers to any matter which they might care to discuss. It is thus the British minister who is the real author of the "Congress-System."

I feel a strong persuasion that nothing can keep France quiet and within bounds but the strong hand of European power, and that a Treaty of this nature signed by the four great Powers (which happily at present implies the military power of all Europe extra France) will be more operative to that purpose, even than the instrument which we shall sign with the French Government itself. It is the fear of our union that will keep France down, and the knowledge that the Duke of Wellington commands only the advanced guard of the force against which they will have to contend, if they again involve themselves in war.

Such a Treaty is the more desirable in as much as it will be signed with I believe a most sincere and earnest desire on the part of all the four cabinets to preserve their union, and to fulfil the purposes of the concert. It may be right that I should take this occasion of stating to your Lordship what has occurred as to the mode to be observed in regulating the conduct of the allied troops to be left in France. It is proposed to give the Duke of Wellington a full discretion under such instructions as can be previously agreed upon, to act as he deems best, without waiting orders from the respective courts : that the ministers of the four Powers resident at Paris should constitute a commission for the purpose of jointly corresponding with him, and keeping him informed, not only of the events passing, but of their sentiments upon them, and that whatever wishes or representations the French Government may have to convey to the Duke should pass through this channel,—the King and government being distinctly informed, that whilst he may implicitly rely on the most cordial support, whilst he preserves good faith with the nation, which we doubt not it is His Majesty's sincere intention to do, that he must not expect the aid of the Allied armies, if he is hurried, as has happened in Spain, into indiscreet and intemperate measures, and thereby involves his government in intestine warfare.