Introduction

THE FAILURE OF 1918

Soon after the guns of the First World War were silenced, it appeared that there was no real agreement among people as to what the war had been about, and that there was even less agreement upon solutions to problems presented by the peace. There seemed to be no realization that these problems might be new and that their solution might entail novel measures.

Even now it is not certain what kind of a war that first war was. Doubtless many men had fought for high ideals and had wanted desperately to make the world safe for democracy, to defend the rights of small nations, and to frame a lasting peace. But the statesmen charged with liquidating the struggle at the Paris Peace Conference seemed to reject these ideals in their preoccupation with economic and political advantages or the extension of their countries' spheres of interest.

There was, indeed, a heroic effort to establish a League of Nations to replace the "international anarchy," but this proved to be the work of a visionary few. The "realists" placed no faith in it. And behind its beautiful facade, they rebuilt their world along the only lines they knew and were guided by the principles of selfish individualism and economic nationalism that they had been taught to revere. Even the United States soon washed its hands of the whole affair, discarded President Wilson's beautifully phrased maxims, disowned his vision of a League, and settled down alone in a vain effort to recover economic normalcy and collect the war debts. In retrospect, the conflict began to look more and more like any other test of strength between competing empires.

Viewed in this light the war appeared doubly tragic, for the very advantages which the warring powers had sought to gain had been largely consumed during the four long years of bloodshed and destruction. The legacy of the struggle, even for the victors, was unemployment, inflation, industrial dislocation, contracted markets, depression, and colonial unrest. But no one knew this then. At least

no one anticipated these disasters with any effective remedy. Instead, the nations groped blindly for a return to conditions that were past, and they clung to ideals and usages that were obsolescent.

Herein lay the tragedy of the years of peace. It was assumed that the old order would ultimately return as it had been, that democracy, individualism, capitalism, and peace remained the ideals of respectable men and that most men were respectable. Consequently, social unrest and international aggression here and there were viewed complacently as tempests in isolated teapots. The revolution in Russia, the Fascist march in Italy, and the rise of the Nazis in Germany did not disturb people in the democracies from their lethargy. Japan's aggression in China was protested only weakly. Italy's invasion of Ethiopia was opposed only half-heartedly. The Spanish Civil War was allowed to degenerate into a practice session for Axis armies. Nothing was done to save Austria. And Czechoslovakia was sacrificed.

Until it was too late, most people in western Europe and the United States regarded these events as adjustments within the framework of existing society, regrettably violent, but necessary, and of little concern to the rest of the world. They failed to apprehend the pervasiveness and revolutionary character of the forces responsible. The cause of this unrest and aggression was adjudged to be economic distress, and the palliative was conceived to be stop-gap measures to mitigate the worst suffering until a general prosperity would somehow gradually return. Meanwhile, unfortunately, the wrath of the dispossessed was directed not only at the evils of liberal society—at selfish individualism and political irresponsibility—but at the whole fabric of that society itself—against the very ideas of democracy, liberty, individualism, and capitalism without qualification.

The First World War had loosed strong forces that would surely have transformed this society, but the peace had not directed them into paths that were constructive or socially useful. They became revolutionary and destructive and made a second war inevitable.

IMPERIALIST AND IDEOLOGICAL WARS

Imperialistic wars, like dynastic struggles, are usually limited wars. They are fought for colonies or markets, industrial supremacy or trade monopoly, added territory or prestige. They do not, as a rule, threaten the conquered nation's domestic regime nor destroy its economy. The defeated nation may be temporarily eclipsed, suffering a loss of wealth and prestige, but it need not lose its right to control its own affairs. This kind of war is possible when the combatant powers are in fundamental agreement upon the desirability of maintaining existing institutions. As long as governments are led by men with similar backgrounds and ideas, similar economic interests and political beliefs, wars are seldom pressed to a point where they involve revolutionary changes in society. The colonial and mercantilist wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for instance, left the governments and societies of the combatants almost completely untouched. But this could not be said of the religious wars which preceded them, or of the French revolutionary wars which followed. These wars were fought for more than economic or political advantage. They were fought over ideas, over a complete way of life.

The insertion of this ideological factor into warfare removes the limitations which characterize imperialist wars. Superimposed upon the economic and political aims of the belligerents is the effort to force a series of beliefs upon the enemy and to change fundamentally his way of thinking and living. No mere indemnity, trade monopoly, or cession of territory will satisfy the aggressor. He proceeds with militant missionary zeal to convert his victims by indoctrination or brute force. The consequences are basically revolutionary, for the purpose of the war is not to weaken the enemy but to transform him.

It was indicated above that the conflict of 1914 and the peace which followed were essentially imperialist in nature. They climaxed an era of political and economic imperialism. There were indeed deep-seated ideological differences separating the combatants, but they were ill-defined. The basic disagreements between the Germans and their enemies were neither so large nor so apparent as they appeared in 1939. The aims of the Allies were more

frankly territorial and expansionist then than now. Consequently, the ideals for which many men fought were overshadowed in the end by more sordid economic motives. In the struggle which began in 1939, however, there were fewer basic agreements between the belligerents than before. There were economic aims and ambitions to be sure, but what seemed more important even than these was the fact that victory for one side would result in the overthrow of the social, political, and cultural institutions of the defeated nations, and that the victor's ideology would be imposed upon the vanquished.

Such ideological conflicts are not novel phenomena. The Mohammedan wars of conquest, the Crusades, European religious wars, the French revolutionary wars, and even the American Civil War were all conflicts of this sort. Economic and political motives were present in each case, to be sure, but the addition of an "idea" —whether religious, political, or humanitarian—transformed what might have been limited wars into struggles of exceptional violence and intensity. The resistance of the defenders and the fury of the attackers was fanatical; for the aggressors had a cause to advance, and the implications of defeat for the victims were overwhelming, affecting each individual in his way of life. In this respect an ideological war must be a "total" war.

Not only are such wars unusually violent, but they more readily overstep the bounds of geographical limitation. It is hard to imprison an idea, like a business, within a political boundary. And in this day of rapid and simple communication, when ideas fly along electric wires or through the air like magic and when distance has been shrunk to insignificance, the localization of an idea has become impossible, and the localization of an ideological war very unlikely. Partly for this reason, the present struggle has become global as well as total.

Ideological aggression is based upon the belief that a particular nation or religion or political creed is superior to all others. The adherents of the creed form a movement which, upon reaching power in its own state, readily destroys existing laws and institutions, permitting only those to remain which do not clash with the new ideology. The mass of the people is then indoctrinated with the basic concepts of the movement and enlisted in the cause.

When the ideology is firmly established in the minds of the people and the institutions of a country, the movement is prepared to expand. Missionary or propagandist work abroad commences, to be followed by the sword, and to be concluded with political and cultural "coordination." Once this process of expansion has begun and the forces of opposition have risen against it, it is hard, nay dangerous, for either side to stop short of a conclusion that imposes one ideology or the other upon the conquered. Consequently, an ideological struggle today, when the nations of the world are neighbors, almost inevitably becomes world-wide.

In the twenty years following the First World War, the forces of dissatisfaction crystallized their beliefs into systems that may roughly be labeled "totalitarian." Totalitarianism does not wish to reform democracy but to destroy it, and the world will probably never rest easily until one system or the other has been victorious. The civilized world cannot remain half slave and half free.

Unfortunately too many people in the democracies did not realize this until too late. Through lack of information or understanding, they ignored the terrible appeal of the new ideology and its dynamic force. Very soon they were faced with the alternative of opposing it by arms or of being "coordinated" by it. Ultimately they united against it in war. They stated their principles in such declarations as the Atlantic Charter, and they developed a planned military economy, armies, and navies to defend those principles.

In view of the fact that this titanic struggle should determine whether democracy or totalitarianism is to survive, it is permissible that an attempt be made to clarify the ideological issues involved. These issues have more than a temporary significance, for they are closely involved in any postwar settlement. The military defeat of the Axis powers will not automatically eliminate their ideological convictions. The peace will not be won until these convictions are dealt with. And this can only be done if the origin and nature of the ideologies in conflict are understood and the conquered totalitarian peoples can be convinced of the lasting values in a democratic world order.

POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

The word "ideology," exactly defined, means the science or study of the evolution of human ideas. But the term is often used today to indicate a sociopolitical philosophy that is based upon a particular set of social and moral theories which imply specific methods of thinking and acting. The fundamental concepts of a democratic ideology, for instance, are belief in the dignity of man and the worth of the individual, belief in free speech, free discussion, free worship, representative government, and belief in compromise and conciliation as rules of social and political conduct. These beliefs are the basis of a democratic society. Members of such a society are expected to respect these ideas and conform. The totalitarian ideologies of which we spoke above are much more absolute and intolerant, and their conception of society is decidedly different.

Italian fascism was based upon the idea of a total state, and it derived its spiritual substance from this purely political concept. The organized state was an object of worship whose grandeur was reflected upon the individuals who lived within its sovereignty and to whom each citizen happily surrendered his individuality—in theory. The state was the personification of society, and in Fascist thought, according to Alfredo Rocco, a philosopher endorsed by Mussolini, "Society is the end, the individuals the means, and its whole life consists in using individuals for its social ends. Individual rights are recognized only in so far as they are implied in the rights of the State." And Mussolini stated without qualification that "the State is the absolute, individuals and groups relative."

Such an ideology was anticipated in a way by Machiavelli, whose advocacy of political ruthlessness and indifference to morality was approved by Fascist thinkers. In 1936, after the formation of the Axis, "cultural agreements" between Germany and Italy imposed upon Fascism some features of Nazism.

Nazi ideology was based upon belief in the superiority of the Nordic race, the mystery of German blood and soil, and the leadership principle. It was practically a religion. Leaders took the place of priests, and the supreme leader became godlike. This ideology seems to be a reversion to primitive tribal concepts, but its presence

may be detected through much of Prussian history. The German spirit and race, according to Nazi philosophers, was the mystical basis for worship, whereas the Christian mystery of salvation and the precepts of meekness and charity were to be despised. Although the Nazis made some effort to establish Christ as a Nordic, they preferred to substitute for the teachings of the Bible a kind of pagan nature religion peopled with ancient Teutonic deities and spiced with romanticized militarism.

This vague and mystical race creed had very real political significance. In its name National Socialists claimed that race and not nationality was the basis of culture, and that Nordic culture is responsible for the growth of Western civilization after the Mycenaean age. Consequently political boundaries were meaningless to the true Nazi, and the German Reich extended wherever descendents of Germans lived or Nordic cultural influence could be traced.

The ideology of Marxism which, in modified form, determines the way of life in the Soviet Union is quite different from these Nazi and Fascist creeds. The Soviet state organism is not an end in itself, nor is it the object of any mystical reverence. On the contrary, Russian communism provides a very realistic approach to human institutions. It is completely economic and social, and it supposes happiness to be the result of material, rather than spiritual blessings. Its aim is, therefore, a prosperous and classless society with the greatest possible production of material, and subsequently cultural, benefits. The individual welfare is the end, and the state is the means to achieve the common goal.

Japanese Shintoism, in contrast to these European ideologies, merges political and religious creeds into one. Japan is a theocratic nation where national pride is equivalent to religious piety. The emperor does not symbolize deity, he is god himself. Shintoism is the product of many centuries, but it is the ideological basis for Japanese expansionist policies in the twentieth century. According to it, Japanese leaders are the executors of a divine will, which is to establish the eternal peace of the Orient (at least) under the emperor's banner. Within Japan itself, the cult of ancestors precludes any great change in the existing social and economic system, since what pleased the ancestral gods when they were alive can hardly

be criticized by their lowly descendents. And since state policies are accepted by the people as an expression of the divine will, they are carried out in a spirit of truly religious devotion.

Modern ideologies have become the sources of much revolutionary impetus. As political religions, they embody all the aggressiveness, fanaticism, and intolerance of rabid sectarianism. They came to power under conditions of social and economic stress, but they have developed a dynamic energy and a character that makes it possible to consider them as cultural phenomena in themselves.

In an age of materialism, there is a tendency to disregard the independent influence of an idea on the actions of individuals or social groups. But no one acquainted with the missionary zeal of early Christian, Mohammedan, or Buddhist proselytists, for example, can honestly deny the magical power of religion to guide men's actions and impel them to deeds of brutality and cruelty as well as heroism and self-sacrifice. Surely the early Crusaders, who mortgaged their worldly goods, left home and family, and faced hardship, privation, and death on foreign soil, were motivated by more than lust for economic gain. They were driven by the power of an idea preached by the church militant.

The devotees of a twentieth-century "New Order," although their motivation is less noble, are similarly influenced by their political faiths. They work and preach and fight to spread their political gospel and to revolutionize the world. They are ruthless and cruel; they have little respect for the lives or property of infidels or heretics. They reject the ideals of social and political democracy and seek to destroy them. They supplant the pseudo science of "race" for the spiritual values of humanitarianism thereby ignoring or revoking centuries of costly and laborious progress.

TOTALITARIANISM

Totalitarianism is a system of government under which every branch of life is organized and integrated with the rest, according to a complete ideological program. It implies the synthesis of all political, economic, social, intellectual, and religious functions of society into a harmonious (or monotonous) whole, in conformity with a specific set of principles. It allows no deviation from this dictated norm. Consequently, it is the antithesis of individualism.

Democracy, on the other hand, is based upon individualism and consists in a reconciliation of the interests of the free individual with those of the state. Moreover, it is based on reason and stems from the rationalist thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But totalitarianism is the negation of rationalism. It is founded on faith in an exclusive ideology and it forbids the use of independent reason if the result is contrary to the "faith." It ignores individual interests unless happily they coincide with those of the state. It restricts the individual's thought and action and is intolerant of nonconformity. The citizen who believes is saved, and the doubter is damned The executors of the political gospel are the "*elite*" who are members of the "party" or the ruling class. Since uniformity is required, there is only one party. In a totalitarian government, most officials must be party members, and voters possess the dubious privilege of casting their ballots for the one and only list of candidates.

Similarly, all other human actions and endeavors are simplified, controlled, and coordinated with the prevailing idea of the state. Mussolini expressed the essence of totalitarianism when he wrote: "The Fascist conception of the State is all-embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values can exist. . . ."

The uniformity which this theory requires is imposed by the party, acting through both official and unofficial channels. The emotional and legal basis for enforcement is supplied by the state's secular religion, or ideology. All organizations, associations, unions, or societies must not only submit to the creed, but they must support it actively. Insofar as the church, be it Jewish or Christian, represents a rival organization or a competing ideology, its existence is intolerable in a completely totalitarian society. If the church teaches equality before God or places humanity before the state, it must be silenced. For humanity, in the totalitarian ideology, is simply a biological term, not a spiritual conception. Actually the churches have not proved difficult to control. Totalitarian practice has wavered between simply excluding them from political and social affairs on the one hand, or outright persecution and suppression on the other. In totalitarian theory, however, true religious belief is supplanted by faith in a secular messiah who is the leader of the state, the political redeemer. So like a religion is the move-

ment that even the language of the totalitarian demigods has the ring of ancient prophecies—full of sound and fury, promises, cajoleries, and threats.

The methods of enforcing belief, or suppressing opposition, and of restricting individual freedom are those of propaganda, organization, and coercion. The totalitarian state insists upon thorough indoctrination and leaves no aspect of cultural, social, or economic life untouched by its agents or uninformed of its ideas. No professional or vocational group, no field of industry or commerce, no branch of the arts, no educational institution, no labor union, no family circle escapes this all-embracing control. Party cells are organized within the smallest units of every group, and the people are expected to cooperate. Dissidence or non-cooperation is treated with large doses of propaganda, or the cruel efficiency of the political police. Pressure is exerted through threats of economic or social penalties, or "training in coordination" in a concentration camp, or, often enough, torture and execution.

The machinery which totalitarianism employs to enforce its rule has similar aspects in the various totalitarian nations but varies in details.

In Italy the authoritarian state existed first, and the party grew up within it. When Mussolini usurped power in 1922, the Fascist party was poorly organized and the Fascist ideology was yet to be formulated. But the Fascist party became the most influential institution in the country. Trades unions were replaced by a system of centralized syndicates and corporations by means of which both labor and management, and the professions too, were incorporated into the machinery of the state.

As party leader, Mussolini dominated the state, sometimes in the name of the government and at others in the name of the party. Although he maintained that the Fascist state summed up "all the manifestations of the moral and intellectual life of man," his regime was characterized by crass opportunism and a Machiavellian disregard of morality. The interests of the state seemed to justify the use of any means.

In Germany the National Socialist party and the government were closely affiliated, but neither completely absorbed the other. The famous, incorruptible Prussian bureaucracy was too strong to

be overcome either by the Weimar Republic or the Nazi party. The party, to be sure, assumed enormous power, but a dual type of administration remained in which all important government offices were duplicated within the party organization. But this did not make the German state the less totalitarian.

Of all totalitarian systems, Germany's was the most efficient and the most comprehensive. The party program, Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, and Rosenberg's *Myth of the Twentieth Century* provided the ideological basis, and an obedient bureaucracy carried out the orders of the party to the state. In practice this proved to be a most effective system for translating an ideology into government policy. Supplemented by an omnipresent and omnipotent secret police, it thoroughly coordinated public life and left the individual no liberty and almost no conscience of his own.

Japanese totalitarianism requires no particular party organization because its national creed, Shintoism, is accepted by all the ruling groups. Japanese politicians do not possess much influence as such. State policies are determined, and the administration is supervised by the military clique, secret societies, and the feudal aristocracy, all of whom embrace Shintoism. In the name of the sacred person of the Emperor, whose will they claim to execute, the authorities carry out those policies dictated by the national ideology. Fulfillment of duties imposed and subordination of individual interests and ideas are assured in most cases by the spirit of Bushido, Japan's militaristic honor code. Any real interference with imperial policies is dealt with by a strong police.

Shintoism and Bushido are integral parts of Japanese culture and explain much of the unity of Japanese thought and action. Moreover, the emperor, in addition to being revered as a god, is also respected as the head of the Japanese family. Herein lies further motivation for subordination of the individual to the imperial will. The result is a most pertinacious brand of totalitarianism that will doubtless withstand all but the most determined assaults of the democracies.

One does not need to be a Fascist to feel that much is not perfect in the world today. There is probably general agreement the world over that some of our problems demand novel solutions. There would also be agreement that the selfish interests of individ-

uals ought not to be allowed to hinder the development of society as a whole. And it is obvious, even in the United States, that the state has become the repository of increasingly larger powers and greater cultural influence.

But totalitarian philosophers drew conclusions from these truths that do not seem justifiable. They rejected all individualism, they refused to look upon a man as a separate ethical unit with worth and dignity in himself. And they magnified the importance and power of the state, both as a practical fact and an idea, to the exclusion of the individual altogether. They practically outlawed all those who could not become part of a vast totalitarian mass mind. Their reasons were that democracy, according to them, was utterly incapable of solving the social and economic problems of the twentieth century without destroying itself.

SOVIET PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP

The status of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics requires special definition because it contains elements of both totalitarianism and democracy. Historically, the Soviet Union was the first modern nation to initiate a totalitarian ideology and it was the first to institute totalitarian government. Marxian doctrines demanded the liquidation of the nonproletarian classes under a "dictatorship of the proletariat" in order to achieve a "classless society." Only the proletarian class was deemed capable of leading the U.S.S.R. and the world to this goal. A one-party system was established, based on the principles of the Communist party of the Bolsheviks. The members of this party were selected according to their revolutionary achievements and proletarian backgrounds.

This party dominated the state which it had created. It imposed its ideology upon the nation through the machinery of government, education, and law enforcement. However, the form and methods of this dictatorship changed over the years. Inasmuch as it regarded itself as a temporary means to an end, it adapted itself to changing conditions in political, social, administrative, and even economic fields. Ideologically, its international ambitions were gradually eclipsed by a growing nationalism; politically, isolationism and collaborationism followed each other back and forth; administratively, the original decentralization of government was changed

first into centralization and then back again into decentralization. Only the ideological foundations of Soviet Marxism remained firm, the avowed goal being the improvement of the human lot through the ultimate achievement of a social Utopia rather than the glorification and perpetuation of the state at the cost of the individual's freedom.

Absolute dictatorship of the party, which supposedly represents the interests of the working class, is seen as a stage of transition between a dying capitalism and budding communism. Soviet socialism, therefore, is not rigidly fixed like National Socialism but fluctuating, transmutable, and opportunistic. Strange as it may seem, this flexibility, not to mention its basically humanitarian goal, relates Soviet authoritarianism more to certain democratic features than to Nazi-Fascist despotism, although the political methods of the Bolsheviks have little in common with the democratic conception of individual rights.

DEMOCRACY

Democracy is both a political science and a social philosophy. It is a form of government, and it is also a way of life. Unlike totalitarianism, it does not lend itself readily to definition in terms of rules and regulations that all point to a single and strictly definable goal. Democracy is flexible and elastic, and sometimes it gives the appearance of being quite unstable. It depends, for instance, upon the maintenance of a perpetual balance between such contradictory concepts as minority rights on the one hand and majority rule on the other, spiritual equality on the one hand and physical inequality on the other, individual rights on the one hand, and social duties on the other. Moreover, democracy allows equal validity to traditionally established principles, represented chiefly by the state, and also to new ideas represented by any popular demands for reform. Consequently, individuals and groups within a democracy enjoy a latitude of thought and action that is foreign to totalitarian states where the individual is encouraged, if not required, to identify himself completely with the state and its rigid ideology.

There are, however, certain beliefs that are fundamental to democracy, and any thought or action must remain within the framework of these beliefs in order to remain democratic. Democracy is,

first of all, a recognition of the dignity and worth of the individual. Its other aspects follow from this fundamental concept.

Since the individual is the first consideration, the democratic state is important only as an agency to advance the interests of the citizens. The government is the elected servant of the people, rather than their ruler. And the state is, therefore, no end in itself, no mystery to be worshiped, no master to be served, and no entity apart from the sum total of the individualities that comprise it.

Authority in the democratic state rests in the hands of the people, who are sovereign. Technically, this sovereignty is exercised by means of the suffrage and representation. Delegates of the people are elected by majority vote, and they are supposed to carry out the will of the people. This they also do by majority vote. Such a procedure rests on the assumption that there is such a thing as a will of the people, although the people are individuals and, in reality, they probably have a lot of different wills. Furthermore, democratic practice assumes that, whatever theoretical questions may be raised about the nature of the people's will, it can be discovered by majority vote. But this majority agreement is hardly possible without a deal of argument, adjustment, conciliation, and compromise. This readiness to adjust differences by mutual concession, this respect for the other man's opinion, and the conviction that the resulting agreement represents a close approximation to the will of the people, is fundamental to democracy. It assumes that the people themselves know what they want, and that what the majority want is good for all. It assumes, moreover, that the ordinary man is able and free to exercise intelligent choice. Consequently, democracy rests upon a profound faith in the capacities of human nature. As John Dewey once said, it rests upon "faith in human intelligence and in the power of pooled and cooperative experience."

Even granted that a majority vote will portray the will of the people, the issues which are to be decided by a manifestation of the public will are frequently so complex, and the political unit is so large, that the people's will is very hard to discover. Indeed, the technicalities of the social and economic problems confronting modern governments are so intricate nowadays that the people can prescribe only the broad outlines of the policies they wish to have

adopted. Particular issues require the application of specialists who are not always to be found among the elected delegates of the people. One of the problems of present-day democracy is to make the work of specialists responsive to the will of the people. It may be that, at some future date, parliamentary government, which has been the traditional form of democracy, might have to be altered. But experience up to now seems to indicate that representative legislatures are capable of ensuring that the basic policies of the nation are determined by the people as a whole. Much technical work is done in committees, the members of which acquire by study and experience the status of specialists themselves, and the committees make wide use of the knowledge of experts whom they consult. Much technical administrative work is left in the hands of experts now, and no violence is done to democratic principles as long as such work is always subject to guidance and review by the people or their representatives.

In spite of the strain placed upon governments in recent times, the suspicion that the common people are incapable of self-government has not been confirmed; nor has time justified the belief that government should be left to an oligarchy of birth, money, or brains. The history of the United States, if nothing else, indicates that there can indeed be a government "of the people, by the people, and for the people," even in the complex society of today.

The democratic state must be flexible in order to be responsive to the will of the people, which may change with changing times. The idea that popular sovereignty enabled the people freely to alter their government or their constitution whenever they felt that it no longer served their best interests was part of the liberal thought stemming from English experience in the seventeenth century. Thomas Jefferson even suggested that a democratic constitution ought to be modified every nineteen years when a new electorate had grown up.

"Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence," he wrote in 1816, "and deem them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. . . . But I know also that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind."

The experience of democratic countries, however, has been that

radical constitutional revision is not a frequent necessity so long as the elected administration and an intelligent citizenry interpret or amend a constitution according to changing conditions. A constitution is a framework, based upon a philosophy of politics and upon immediate needs. It remains a framework offering the people points of departure and a good deal of discretion as to interpretation.

Actually, the precise form of the government is not important so long as the choice of basic policy is left to the people. Democracy in the past has appeared in a variety of forms. Athenian democracy was aristocratic and exacted high qualifications for participation in politics. Great Britain today is a democracy in which the institution of monarchy and the concepts of class and aristocracy have been retained. On the other hand, the Third French Republic carried the principle of individualism to extreme lengths until it resulted in almost complete disregard of personal obligations to society and the nation.

Moreover, the form of a state is not so important now as it was when monarchy meant tyranny and republic was synonymous with liberty. Monarchies, like the British, can be liberal, and republics, like that established at Weimar, can lead to autocracy. It is not the form, but the spirit, that makes a government democratic.

The spirit of democracy, based on respect for the individual, is contained in two fundamental concepts, liberty and equality. Unfortunately, liberty and equality have meant many things to many men, and it is necessary to define more precisely what kind of liberty and what kind of equality are democratic. Abraham Lincoln once said,

> We all declare for liberty; but in using the word we do not all mean the same thing. With some, the word liberty may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself and the product of his labor; while with others, the same word may mean for some men to do as they please with other men and the product of other men's labor. Here two, not only different, but incompatible things, are called by the same name—liberty. And it follows that each of the things is, by the respective parties, called by two different and incompatible names—liberty and tyranny. . . .

A conventional definition is that liberty comprises the freedom of an individual to do whatever he wishes, without hindrance, as

long as he obeys the law. The question remains where, in a democratic society, the law should end and freedom begin. One answer has been to regard the law as the expression of a social conscience, or a statement of what, at a particular moment, is regarded as injurious to society. In democracy, where the individual is treasured highly, a hindrance to the development of any individual's greatest potentiality might be regarded as injurious to society. But there is a wide divergence of opinion as to how best to provide for the free development of individuals, as to where some should be restrained in order that others might be more free to grow, and think, and act. Opinion differs not only among members of the same democratic society, but it differs within society as a whole from one generation to another. Consequently, the appearance of liberty may change, even though the fundamental concept remains the same, and it is true, as Theodore Roosevelt once said in a message to Congress, that "what would have been an infringement upon liberty half a century ago may be the necessary safeguard of liberty today."

In another sense, it may be that freedom consists in a man's ability to liberate himself from the bondage of selfish desires. A man who could so discipline himself would, of course, be free to do whatever he wished because, by definition, he would not wish to injure society or any individual in it. Since such self-restraint is too much to expect of the ordinary mortal, the law appears as a support for human frailty.

Fundamentally, however, liberty depends in large measure upon an individual's sense of responsibility to his fellow men. This sense is probably not natural or innate; it is more likely to be the consequence of thought, experience, and education. If so, liberty cannot be decreed by law, of course, but liberty itself depends upon the recognition by intelligent citizens of their responsibilities to others, and true freedom is the freedom to live in the consciousness of this responsibility.

The ideal of equality is even more difficult to define. Equality was declared by rationalist philosophers to be a natural law. But there are so many patent inequalities in the human race that the equality of which John Locke and Thomas Jefferson wrote was obviously an equality of a very limited sort.

In the face of eternity all humans are probably equal. And if men

are regarded spiritually as children of God, they are certainly entitled equally to a dignified life and to salvation. But as social or physical beings, citizens of a democracy are certainly not equal. The subtle differentiation between spiritual equality and physical inequality is a unique feature of democratic philosophy. It was unknown to the Athenians, and their democracy remained primarily intellectual and political without becoming social and spiritual. The distinction emanated rather from the teachings of the New Testament, whose Christian ethics constitute a large part of the liberal tradition today.

Translated into social practice this spiritual equality is a very limited concept. Abraham Lincoln, in referring to the Declaration of Independence, once explained its limitations as follows:

> I think that the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all men but that they did not intend to declare all men equal in all respects. They did not mean to say that all men were equal in color, size, intellect, moral development, or social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness in what respect they did consider all men created equal—equal in certain inalienable rights which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

Each of these equal rights is, of course, open to subtle differences in interpretation. The right to life may mean just the right to be protected against murder or mayhem, or it may mean the right to live decently. The right to liberty may mean the equal right to do anything technically within the bounds of a few elementary laws, or it may mean the equal right to live in a society where each member is conscious of an obligation not to harm or exploit his fellow man. It may also include the right to share equally in the political life of the community and to help in defending his own and his neighbor's liberties. And the equal right to pursue happiness may mean just that, or it may mean the right actually to have a little happiness, which is quite a different matter.

Traditionally, however, the right to pursue happiness is regarded as the right to equal economic opportunity—not economic *equality*, but equal economic *opportunity*. The conservative interpretation of this ideal asserts that no arbitrary obstacles such as caste or class distinctions, no privileges of blood or religion, nor legal discriminations should bar any individual from his chosen vocation

or his own particular method of trying to find happiness—as long as it is not definitely antisocial. A more progressive interpretation would assert today that each individual is entitled to more than that, and that he should have the right to work, to have medical care, recreation, and financial security. Again, what one generation regards as an adequate guarantee of the right to pursue happiness might appear quite insufficient a half century later. The fundamental factor is the ideal of individual dignity and happiness and the opportunity for each one to achieve his own happiness in his own unique fashion.

Democracy is indeed a complex and probably very expensive type of social and political organization. It places a great burden on the individual, demanding time, patience, intelligence, a sense of social responsibility, and a spirit of compromise. In return, the individual is rewarded with the broad recognition of his own dignity and worth.

Such a complex and delicately balanced society is the result of the intellectual and social experience of centuries. It is a far cry from the primitive tribalism of ancient man. And it is a far cry too from totalitarianism which is, in many respects, primitive tribalism in technological dress. Moreover, democracy is not static. It is adaptable, evolutionary, and dynamic. To be maintained, it must be studied, cultivated, and fought for.

TOTALITARIAN ECONOMY

Totalitarian states exercise a rigid control over the economy as well as the political and cultural life of the nation. The nature of this control varies, but in each case the state dominates capital and production. Private enterprise, as it exists in capitalist democracies, is eliminated or severely restricted, and the national economy is regulated in accordance with the nation's ideology and political ambition. The Nazi-Fascist states, therefore, are not capitalistic in the traditional sense, although monopolistic capitalism does flourish in Japan where the leaders of industry and the military caste are united by a feudal family organization and are generally agreed upon Japan's national ambitions.

The Nazi-Fascist powers control industry, commerce, and agriculture; but they do not own them and they do not accept such

full responsibility for those employed by supposedly private enterprise. "National Socialism," however, is not an empty phrase, as some of its enemies insidiously assert. The left wing of the Nazi party, weakened in the purge of 1934, remained popular with the majority of Nazi sympathizers, and it was always strongly represented in the government. Hitler himself was never friendly toward capitalism; and the Nazi party program had frankly socialist paragraphs in it. The Nazis enacted no legislation against capitalism as such, but the powers of the government were so sweeping that big industry, the commercial trusts, and the landed estates lost their former independent influence.

It was not so much the social program of the Nazis, however, but the military and geopolitical ambitions of the government which necessitated the regulation and domination of free enterprise by the party and the state. As soon as the National Socialists acquired power in 1933, capital, industry, and commerce were coordinated with the state's military designs, and a regular wartime economy was adopted. Free capital constituted a power that might be a source of disturbance or resistance. Consequently it was encouraged only when it was completely identified with the party. The party, the state, and many individual party members thus became "capitalist." They reaped profits and accumulated wealth. But their wealth and industrial ownership had little value as a political instrument. It was the reward of political reliability rather than any means to acquire influence in the government.

This transformation of private capitalism from free enterprise to dependence upon the party or the state was carried out relentlessly. Private entrepreneurs were restricted in the conduct of their businesses to such a degree that they became little more than agents of the government. Even before the war, they were taxed heavily; they produced only what they were allowed to produce, and they sold when the government wished them to sell; they had no power of their own to engage or to dismiss workers; and they were required to maintain an expensive bookkeeping system for government inspection. These handicaps were increased or diminished by the authorities accordingly as the individual owner conformed to the party dogma and organization.

Under such circumstances, private capital existed in the National Socialist state, but it was entirely controlled by the government, and the rewards for capital investment depended largely upon the political purposes of the state. This situation was the result not only of the party's semisocialist program and the requirements of a military economy, but also of the party's totalitarian philosophy which excluded independent and "uncoordinated" activity on principle. The liberties associated with traditional capitalism—the freedom to accumulate profits, to invest them freely, and to control the investments without undue interference—these are incompatible with totalitarian principles, and they were restricted in Germany on every hand. Profits were indeed accumulated and invested, but only at the sufferance of the party. Many men became wealthy, but the possession of their wealth, or at least the control of their investments, depended upon their command of political influence. In other words, the sources of power in the Nazi state were political, not financial or economic.

Like National Socialism, Italian Fascism was also ideologically opposed to the concept of free enterprise. Moreover, it included some elements of socialism, although it began its active career as the ostensible defender of capitalism. But in Fascist Italy the military and imperialistic activity of the state remained within conventional bounds for several years and did not require the ruthless introduction of a war economy, and the influence of the Roman Catholic Church was large enough to discourage economic radicalism. Consequently, a totalitarian economy developed more gradually until close association with Germany and military sacrifices in Ethiopia precipitated a more thorough control of capital and industry in the mid-1930's. The organization of the corporate state at this time, with the entire population regimented into occupational syndicates, brought with it a corporate economy and signaled the virtual end of free enterprise. Fascist Italy's economic philosophy, however, was never so radical as Germany's, and the Italian people inclined more toward individualism than uniformity, in spite of Mussolini's exhortations. Had Italian Fascism remained in power for several more decades, doubtless the strength of the state would have increased and the influence of the church would have dimin-

ished, the national economy would have lost most of its capitalistic character and been more definitely state controlled.

No such tendency was visible in Japan, however. Japanese industry and commerce were subjected to war conditions for more than a decade, but the essential elements of private capitalism did not change. Although armaments and war industries were indeed under government supervision, enterprise was free and thriving, and Japan's totalitarian imperialism was based on an economy that remained substantially capitalistic. This unique situation was possible because both national imperialism and capitalism in Japan were supported by the same minority at the top of Japan's feudal caste system. This minority controlling the government opposed socialism as faulty materialism and as a completely improper idea, but the masses of the people were largely unaffected by socialist thought anyway. They were disinclined to social change and made only ineffective efforts to better their conditions; they remained economically enslaved, and the feudal lords of industry and agriculture easily maintained the *status quo*. The Japanese leaders combined modern technology with an almost medieval organization of society; they developed the techniques of the industrial revolution without introducing the spirit that brought this technique about. Consequently, the people remained the ready servants of imperialist and capitalist overlords, respectful of the religious tradition on which authority was based and reluctant to change conditions inherited from their ancestors. Under these circumstances, the capitalist system was readily fitted into Japan's totalitarian regime.

Nonetheless, totalitarianism in general remains anticapitalistic because it is anti-individualistic. And the more precise the totalitarian ideology, the stronger is the tendency of the state to dominate capital and production. Moreover, since the power of production and the power of money left to operate freely would constitute a danger to totalitarian rule, totalitarian leaders are compelled to eliminate or at least control these sources of possible opposition.

The attack upon capital carries an immense popular appeal and —except in Japan—has been stressed in propaganda for the masses. But the totalitarian opposition to capitalism is more than a demagogic device to obtain popular support. It is a basic and immutable feature of totalitarian philosophy.

SOVIET-MARXIAN ECONOMY

Soviet Russia's economy is more the author than the product of the Soviet ideology, because economic dogma first brought into being the political organization which now rules the Soviet state. Here for the first time a socialist economy was established on a nation-wide scale. It was not communism, to be sure, but the state expropriated private enterprises, real estate, and farms and became the owner of all the means of production. There was no need to expropriate utilities since, as in most other European countries, they were state or municipal owned before the revolution.

The ultimate aim of Marxism, upon which Soviet ideology is founded, is the establishment of a "classless society" where money would be needed, if at all, only to facilitate the exchange of services for commodities. In the end, everyone would receive satisfaction for all his needs. However, it was recognized that before this end could be reached, there would have to be a transitional period in the development toward the communist society during which everyone would be given equal opportunities and a guaranteed minimum of subsistence for all those who are working. After 1921, the Soviet government, moreover, began to reward its citizens according to their merit rather than according to their needs, with the result that there have appeared vast differences in income.

Nevertheless, the accumulations of money which, in a few cases, were made possible by this system are of no value from the capitalist point of view. Since the state owns all the means of production and distribution, and private profit from any business enterprise is therefore impossible, money in private hands is only a medium of exchange, and its possession carries with it no power as it does in capitalist states. It can be spent, provided there are goods for sale; it can be saved, but not invested. That is, it may not be invested in private enterprise where labor would be exploited, according to Marxist theory. It may be invested in state securities, but a man may not live from the interest on these securities unless he works. For without a job he cannot be a member of an occupational organization; and without membership in such a "trade union" he may not provide himself with the necessaries of life. The Soviet Constitution of 1936 says, "He who does not work shall not eat."

Of course, those who produce the most, either in industrial, agricultural, or cultural pursuits, make the most money. But much of the time their aim is more idealistic than materialistic; that is, they are ambitious to produce for the "socialist fatherland," and they are constantly aware that they do not work in the interest of any private person or concern, but for the whole community, or the state. If pressed, they might argue that they are the state, and that in consequence they labor for their own welfare.

Such an economic system requires an enormous bureaucracy to administer the state's enterprises. This is obvious, since everyone is technically a public employee, and the manager of a coal mine, or the chemist in an industrial plant are as much government officials as a third-class postmaster or a clerk in the foreign office. For all these employees—and this means everyone—the state accepts both occupational and social responsibility.

ECONOMY IN DEMOCRACIES

Such tyrannical forms of economy as we have just described are excluded from democracies by the nature of democratic philosophy. Individualism in the economic sphere prescribes the widest possible latitude for the exercise of free enterprise and the development of individual initiative. On the other hand, democratic thought also requires that this individualism be tempered with social responsibility and that the welfare of the people be unimpaired by the actions of the few. At times these requirements appear mutually exclusive, but the contradiction between them is resolved by compromises whose terms vary with time and place. The modest limitations imposed upon free enterprise in the nineteenth century are regarded as inadequate today. In fact, the changes in liberal economic thought during the past hundred years constitute one of the remarkable developments of the democratic ideology.

Before the First World War, capitalist economy was almost universal. Its principles and its characteristics were much the same, whether found in republic or autocratic monarchy. But in the years after 1918, Soviet Russia departed radically from capitalism, and in certain other areas, notably those which later developed authoritarian regimes, movements away from economic individualism became noticeable. Free enterprise was curtailed, and there soon ap-

peared those economies controlled and directed by the state for primarily military purposes which we have labeled "totalitarian."

In the countries which remained democratic, meanwhile, the economic system remained essentially one of capitalism and free enterprise. Much of the effort of statesmen in the postwar years was expended in a vain effort to revive the system of untrammeled capitalism which the war had so altered. These men felt no compulsion to coordinate a vast economy for the production of guns instead of butter. In fact, they pared their military expenditures to a minimum, condemning the investment of capital in armaments as unproductive and sterile.

But the old liberal economy did not return. Monopolistic trusts and cartels continued to grow, thereby undermining the very freedom of enterprise which created them. These were the businessman's remedy for the evils of cut-throat competition. But people became suspicious of the influence of capitalist coadunation; the small entrepreneur resented the shrinkage of his own opportunities; and most governments took steps to regulate or break up large combinations. Antitrust laws had constituted one of the departures from a laissez-faire philosophy in the past. The strengthening of such laws or some more effective legislation for the same ends appeared inevitable.

Another limitation upon the ideal of free enterprise appeared in the spread and intensification of social legislation. Most democracies after 1918 avoided orthodox socialism, but social-insurance programs were expanded, and social services and cooperative organizations grew rapidly, notably in the Scandinavian countries and in Mexico. Totalitarian states developed social services too, but they did so without protecting the independence of the individual, and very frequently it was for purposes of propaganda and indoctrination. They made much, for instance, of their elimination of unemployment; but they did not explain that they had managed to accomplish this result by means of military drafts, labor service, party jobs, war industries, and even slave labor.

Within the democracies the provision of social services and laws to regulate trusts went forward, but neither adequately bridged the widening gap between capital and labor, and the doctrines of socialism attracted a growing proportion of the masses. In the nine-

teenth century Karl Marx had systematized a revolutionary socialist philosophy, and the success of the Russian revolution after 1917 did much to encourage socialists elsewhere. Many did not become socialists, of course, but large sections among the democratic masses, having finally destroyed political privilege and acquired equality in the matter of suffrage, now sought to break down economic privilege and to establish a more democratic economy with more equality of opportunity and more recognition for the services of labor.

Nevertheless, economic individualism prevailed as a policy in the democracies until the Second World War, when military necessity dictated central planning and regulation.

Had the capitalist system been more responsive to social tensions, more aware of the dangers in totalitarianism, and less fearful of reform, adjustments might have been made sooner that would have enabled the democracies to resist the impact of German aggression with more success. The democracies would not, of course, have adopted the kind of military economy that enabled the Nazi state to wage war with such efficiency. But they might have avoided the effects of economic discontent and civil unrest which, for instance, paralyzed France in the 1930's. Many French capitalists, anxious for the protection of their privileges, looked to Fascism or some kind of political reaction for relief. They refused to conciliate French labor, but they cultivated relations with Germany and Italy, and in so doing they doubtless undermined French productive power and national morale. The feud between classes became so bitter that neither was enough concerned with the welfare of the other to be concerned for the nation as a whole. This unhealthful atmosphere was partially responsible for the tragic fortune of France in 1940.

The people of the United States recognized the need for economic reform after the decade of uninhibited prosperity that ended in 1929. The Roosevelt administration, elected in 1932, adopted a series of social and economic measures, some of which were temporary and others intended to be permanent. These were hastily devised, but many of the policies which were branded as revolutionary at the time have been accepted since. Most of the reforms were already commonplace in Europe, but they were a new departure

for the United States. Judged by European standards, they were not radical, but they remedied the worst evils, and they were carried out by thoroughly constitutional means.

The Second World War has brought further changes in our economy. What permanent results the emergency coordination of enterprise by the state will have it is too early now to predict, but there will doubtless be some. Furthermore, the problems of economic rehabilitation loom so large that planning and regulation of a sort will probably be necessary for a long time. The experience of the 'thirties indicates, however, that the necessary changes can be adopted by compromise and through orderly democratic processes, that more social benefits will be guaranteed than now, but that much room for individualism and free enterprise will remain.

Democracy in the past has been the stronghold of individualistic capitalism which developed characteristics at times that were hardly compatible with the principles of democratic philosophy. Ideas about the equalization of economic privilege, however, have spread, and there is a greater readiness now than in the past to recognize the claims of the common man to happiness, and to acknowledge the pertinence of democratic ideas in all fields of life. These tendencies have been crystallized by the Axis attack upon democracy.

CONCLUSION

The great changes in human society within recent times resulted in the formulation of new political ideals and new social concepts. Some of these new viewpoints were irreconcilable, and open conflict between them was almost inevitable. Conflict was made more nearly inescapable by the technological revolution of our age. Improved communications brought into close contact parts of the world which seemed remote to previous generations. The earth used to be divided into definite geographical spheres which were relatively isolated from one another, but this compartmentalization has disappeared.

One consequence of this revolution has been the growing similarity of social and economic problems the world over. Another more important consequence has been the increased concern felt in one country for conditions and reforms in other lands. Contention over the proper organization of human society has become

world wide. Proponents of national imperialism, communist internationalism, expanding totalitarianism, laissez-faire liberalism, pacifism, militarism, international and supranational organization discussed their ideas for years. When in the end the ever-growing interdependence among the nations made a clash inevitable, two groups of ideologies faced each other, both containing a variety of political trends but each representing and defending a fundamental platform. One group fought for the Nazi-Fascist brand of totalitarianism; the other for the ultimate goal of a social democracy.

To give the reader an idea of the abyss which separates the most representative of the nations within the two hostile groups, American democracy and Nazi totalitarianism, the following chart is presented:

NAZI TOTALITARIANISM	AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
a. The State	
The state is supreme, and the individual is a servant of the state.	The people are sovereign, and the state is the servant of the people.
The one-party system and "plebiscites" instead of elections stifle any expression of the public will.	A plural-party system enables the people to speak through frequent, free, and secret elections.
The constitution is ignored in favor of a party program that is interpreted opportunistically.	The constitution guarantees justice based on laws enacted through the democratic process.
A rubber-stamp Reichstag, composed of militarized party members, listens to the Fuehrer and votes unanimously.	A two-chamber Congress debates freely, initiates legislation, and accepts or rejects advice of the administration.
Citizenship depends upon race, blood, and political conformity.	Citizenship is not denied on account of race, religion, or previous condition of servitude.
b. Culture	
A secular religion is based on belief in German racial supremacy, unity of German blood and soil, and the leader principle.	A Christian culture is the basis for ideals of humanity and the recognition of human dignity everywhere.
The state is antireligious, fostering a kind of national paganism, persecuting the churches and religious leaders.	The state is separated from the church and guarantees freedom of worship and free activity of all sects as a basic right.
	Diversity of thought is encour-

Thought is channelized and individual inquiry discouraged; the aim of culture is uniformity.

Education is a process of developing intellectual sterility and political loyalty.

aged as the basis of intellectual progress.

Education develops individualism and a critical approach to citizenship.

c. Society

Public opinion is regimented by censorship and the standardization of all news.

Appeals to hate and prejudice are normal, foreign cultures are misrepresented and reviled.

Equality of sexes is suspended, and women are relegated to the biological function of procreation.

Public opinion actuates policy; freedom of speech, press, and assembly are guaranteed.

The ideal is a fair, just, and sympathetic approach to the problems of other peoples.

Women have gained full equality, and child-bearing is left to individual choice or fortune.

d. Economy

Business is regimented and controlled according to the political and military purposes of the state; profits exist, but not free enterprise.

Labor is regimented into state-controlled political organizations, occupational groups, or corporations.

Profits and free enterprise are regarded as essential but subjected to some limitation; drastic regulation is a war phenomenon.

Labor's right to organize and bargain collectively is provided to counterbalance the power of capital.

e. Foreign Policy

Political, economic, and ideological domination of the world is a freely expressed ambition.

The "New Order" is a world compelled by fear or force to accept the authority of the German state.

Respect for the rights of other nations, and the ideal of self-government are guiding principles of a "good neighbor policy."

The President and Congress support an international organization based on principles of compromise and cooperation.

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