

LECTURE II

SOME PROBLEMS OF MANUSMRTI

Manusmṛiti has had a position of pre-eminence not only in *Dharmaśāstra* but even in the literature of Hindu speculation. Alone among the smṛtis, its dicta have been cited as authority in the literature of Indian philosophy. The designation of the class of which it is the most illustrious work, *vis.*, smṛti, is given in Indian philosophical literature—contrary to Manu's own definition of *śruti* and *smṛti*,—to even the ancient depositories of tradition like the Purāṇas.¹ One of the attractions of the Great Epic, for which its semi-divine author (Vyāsa) made the claim—"all that *is* is in this work, and all that is not in it is not",—is that it has been regarded as a *Dharmaśāstra*. To-day, the parts of the *Mahābhārata* which are most frequently read or cited are, after the *Bhagavadgītā*, not the attractive narrative sections or the sublime and simple poetical interludes, or the homilies, but those, which like the smṛtis deal with the duties (*dharma*) of all, in the sense of *Rājadharmā*. What the *Mahābhārata* holds up by express precept and description, by parable and story, by homily and narrative, as regards the duties of men,—which *Dharmaśāstra*, deals with—is done by way of concrete illustration in the older epic, the *Rāmāyaṇa*. For conduct and behaviour that rise to the highest levels of *Dharma*, we look to the practice of Śrī Rāma and of those who saw in his physical and moral perfection the warrant of manifest Divinity. The points in the story on which even to-day its commentators and readers are most exercised are those in which practice (as depicted in the poem)—for example the suicide of the saintly Sabarī,² the slaying of Tāṇakī,³ the honour shown to the *nigāda* Guha,⁴ the instruction to Sumantra to give Daśaratha an explanation that was not true⁵, the performance of funeral rites for

1. Rāmānuja (*Śrībhāṣya*, I, i, 1) describes his citations from the *Bhagavadgītā* as from *smṛti* but seems to differentiate between *smṛti* and *purāṇa*. Śaṅkara, following *Brahmasūtra*, IV, ii, 21, describes *sāṅkhya* and *yoga smṛtis*, and cites *Bhagavadgītā*, VIII, 24-28 as from a *smṛti* (see Thibaut's *Vedānta Sūtras*, Vol. II, p. 381).

2. *Rāmāyaṇa Aranyakāṇḍa*, LXXIV, 33.

3. *Ibid.*, *Bālakāṇḍa*, XXVI, 26.

4. *Ibid.*, *Ayodhyākāṇḍa*, L^a 33 ff.

5. *Ibid.*, XL, 46-47.

Jaīāyū,¹ the salutation of a *ksatriya* by Hanumān disguised as a *bhikṣu*,² ambushing Vāli,³ and Sītā's denial of knowing the identity of Hanumān⁴—seem to conflict with the ethical injunctions in smṛti. The accounts given of *śrauta śrāddha*, and domestic rites in the *Rāmāyaṇa* tally with those in extant *gṛhya* and *śrauta* works, and it is against probabilities to suppose that they were interpolated from the latter. It demonstrates only the antiquity of the ritual.

The influence which *Manusmṛti* has had on the lives and ideals of Hindu India for centuries can well be compared in regard to its extent and thoroughness to that of Confucius in China. But the Chinese sage was a historical person, and, the teachings attributed to him are probably those which actually emanated from one who was raised above his contemporaries by his superior wisdom and moral elevation. The 'author' of *Manusmṛti*, if Manu can be so called, in spite of the tradition recorded in the smṛti itself,⁵ is a semi-divine being about whom conflicting traditions had sprung up even in remote antiquity. Modern students of comparative religions and laws have pointed out a resemblance, which is more than merely phonal, between Menes, Manu and Moses, as the traditional lawgivers of three ancient peoples. A modern student of *Manusmṛti*, who has made a comparative study of the laws and the trade regulations of Manu and of the ancient Sumerians, has suggested that the source of the latter lay in the former; and he is for putting back the work of Manu or at least the substance of it, to the third millennium B. C. The discoveries at Mohenja-daro and Harappa have disclosed the existence in so early an epoch, which is usually held to have preceded by a long interval the 'invasions' of the Aryans, of a type of culture which shows considerable advance in agriculture and trade, and in legal ideas connected therewith. This is only an illustration of the manner in which the intense study of the smṛti reacts on some minds. Scholars who are facile in finding the sequential relations of legal works from the 'advanced' or 'primitive,' character of the jural ideas found in them, would be puzzled to explain some features of *Manusmṛti*, which disclose ideas more modern in substantive and adjective law, and especially in criminal law, than those found in advanced modern communities. A lawyer who has made a careful study of the works named after Manu and

1. *Ibid.*, *Aranyakāṇḍa*, LXVIII, 22-31.

2. *Ibid.*, *Kiṣkindhākāṇḍa*, II, 2-3.

3. *Ibid.*, XVI, 37; XVII, 14-52 (Vāli's indictment of Śrī Rāma).

4. *Ibid.*, *Sundarakāṇḍa*, XLII, 8-10.

5. *Manusmṛti* I, 58-61, 102, 119; V, 1-3; XII, 2, 126.

Yājñavalkya has pointed out how in some respects these ancient books have anticipated recent developments in law, and have been found good enough to guide modern judges in laws other than personal, in which of course it would be natural to seek for light in ancient smṛtis, even after the personal laws of the Hindus have been changed out of recognition by judicial decisions¹. Normally a legal treatise will reflect the ideas of the time in which it appears. This will be true of at least a great part of it; for, it may contain ideas of a bygone age, which appear as survivals; or it may be in advance of the times. The second feature is unlikely in a work that aims at wide influence.

In any attempt to appreciate the teachings of *Manusmṛti* a correct understanding of its background—religious, economic, political and social—is a pre-requisite. But certain questions relating to the authorship of the *Manusmṛti*, its age and antiquity, causes of its widespread reception, authenticity and homogeneity demand a prior consideration.

Manu in literature and tradition, Vedic tradition.

The name *Manu* goes back to the *R̥g Veda*. He is the hero who is the father of the race of man, 'Father Manu', after whom men are known as *manavāḥ*. One tradition represents him as the son of the Āditya Vivasvat (hence his title *Vāivasvata*), and another as the son of the Self-existent Supreme Being (hence his title *Svāyambhūva*). He is called also *Sāvarṇi* because he was born to *Vivasvat* by a female of his own *varṇa* (*savarṇā*). In the *Taittirīya Saṁhita* (III, 2, 8, 1, 1V, 1, 9, 1), he is invoked in sacrifices as a *Prajāpati* ('Lord of Creatures', i.e., creator of living beings)². In the *Maitrāyaṇa Brāhmaṇopaniṣad* (V, 1) he is identified with the Supreme Self, *Brahman*. These are his aspects as a divine being. On the human side he appears as a *ṛṣi* (*R̥g Veda*, I, 80, 16, 1, 12, 16)³ or as the hero-king of the great flood in which the human race was destroyed, leaving him as the only survivor, and who *recreated* through *Idā* (who sprang from his sacrifice) the human race, or as a father who divided his property between his sons in his own lifetime⁴ (*Tait. Sam* III, 1, 9, 4) and as a man following the prescribed customs (*Śata. Br.* I, 8, 1). He is referred to as a king, the father of king Pururavas by *Idā*, the father also of a king named Śaryūta and of king Ikṣvāku (the ancestor of the famous Solar dynasty of Ayodhyā),

1. K. P. Jayaswal, *Manu and Tāyānalkya*, 1930, *passim*.

2. प्रजापते नमस्ते स्वाहा (शैबिरिमहर्षिता, ३, २, ८, १; ५, १, ९, १.)

3. नामवर्ता मनुषिता दध्मद् विद्यमस्त (ऋग्वेदसंहिता, १, ८०, १६;)

नामिः पुता मनने गात्रमीमदुः (ib. १, ११२, १३)

4. मनुः पुत्रेभ्यो दार्षे व्यसजत् (शै. सँ., १, ९, ५)

and as anointed as king by Prajāpati himself. He is said to have introduced the fire-sacrifices and *śrāddhas*. He is credited with the 'discovery' of several Vedic hymns. The designation of *Śrāddha-deva* applied to Manu in the *Mahābhārata* (XI, 121, 29) is reminiscent of the legend. The *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* states that its last section was first revealed to Kaśyapa Prajāpati by Brahmā (Hiraṇyagarbha), who communicated it to Manu, who broadcast it to mankind. In the *Bhagavadgītā* the Lord (*Bhagavān*) states that the *yoga* was first communicated by him to Vivasvat, who communicated it to Manu, who passed it on to Ikṣvāku, from whom 'royal sages' derived it in succession from generation to generation (IV, 1-4)¹ till knowledge of it became lost to men. The oft-repeated Vedic dictum—'Whatever Manu has spoken is medicine'²—implies that Manu was the author of many injunctions or rules of conduct whose beneficial effects are testified to in the statement. That his practice created a precedent to be followed is signified in the passage in *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* (III, 1, 9, 4), which declares that he divided his property between his sons, or the śloka in the *Nirukta* (III, 4) which affirms that "according to the sacred law, inheritance goes without distinction to sons and daughters, as declared by Manu Svāyambhuva at the beginning of creation."³ That the rule here ascribed to Manu is not only not found in *Manusmṛti* but is opposed to its rules of inheritance, is irrelevant, as the point in the statement is that Manu was believed to be an authority on the law. In the citations of the very words of Manu in *Dharmasūtras*, in regard to mutually contradictory doctrines as well as to doctrines for which there is no parallel in *Manusmṛti*, we have to see (as Bühler pointed out)⁴ the beliefs in laws originally laid down by Manu and the indisputability of any dictum or practice

1. इत्ं विवस्वते वोम प्रोक्तवानहमव्ययम् ।
विचरामनवे प्राह मरुतिश्शक्रोऽम्बोद ॥ (सप्तदशोऽ, ४, १); also *Ibid.*, IV, 2.

2. यदे किञ्च मरुत्तर्जनीत् सज्ज्ञेयम् (तै. सं., २, २, १०, २);
मयुर्बे पतिकिपिदवदत्तज्ञेयमदृतावे (शाण्क्यभाष्यम्, २३, १३, १०)

यः कश्चिदकल्पयित्वा ननुना परिकीर्तितः ।
स सर्वोऽपिहितो वेदे सर्वज्ञानमदी हि सः ॥ (२,८)

3. अदिशेयम नियुनाः पुत्रा दान्यद दति । तदेतद्ब्रह्म—शोकाभ्यामभुक्तम् । " अहोऽस्मिन्वदि
ब्रह्मददपिनामते । आत्मा नै पुत्र नामालि स जीव शरदः क्षतम् ॥" इति ।

" अदिशेयम नियुनाः पुत्राणां दातो भवति परमतः ।
नियुनानां विसर्गादी मनुः स्वार्थयुतोऽम्बोद" ॥
(निरुक्तम्, ३,४=p. 251. Ed. Bhandarkar).

4. Bühler, *Laws of Manu*, p. LXIII.

that could claim his authority. This is the spirit in which the very words of Manu (*Manuśāstrāṅgī*) are cited in Dharmasūtras. The Vedic legend of Manu's invention of *śrāddha* is explicitly stated thus in Āpastamba: "Formerly men and gods lived together in this world. Then the gods in reward for their sacrifices went to heaven, but men were left behind. Those men who perform sacrifices in the same manner as the gods dwell (after death) with the gods and Brahma in heaven. Now, seeing men left behind, Manu revealed this ceremony, which is designated by the word *śrāddha*."¹ Gautama (XXI, 7) cites a rule that is found in *Manusmṛti* (XI, 194-92, 104-105).² The Vedic text of the equal division of his property between his sons by Manu is mentioned by both Āpastamba (II, 14, 11) and Baudhāyana (II, 3, 2). The authority of Manu is apparently relied on by Baudhāyana for the sin of the father who keeps his daughter unmarried after she attains puberty (VI, 1, 13).³ Vasiṣṭha has several citations from or references to Manu. The legend of Manu's revealing the *śrāddha* may be compared to the declaration of Manu in *Manusmṛti* that the ten sages, whom he created (I, 37), created in their turn the manes (*pitaraḥ*) for whom *śrāddhas* are intended.

Manu and the Mahābhārata.

The close affinity between the Great Epic and *Manusmṛti* makes the occurrence in it of the name of Manu of special significance. Twenty-four citations from Manu occur in it. Of these, sixteen simply refer to a Manu, without any descriptive epithet; one refers to an opinion of Manu Prācetasā in his 'account of the duties of kings' (*rājadharmeṣu*); seven are ascribed to Manu Svāyambhūva, and they relate to ordinary smṛti topics. The Epic makes Manu Vaivasvata, the hero of the Deluge. He is said, in another legend in the Epic, to have been given by the Creator a sword which contained Dharma within it (*dharma-garbha*). He was to protect all creatures

1. सद्यदेवमनुष्या अस्मिन्नोके पुरा बभूवुः । वयं देवाः कर्मनिर्दिष्टं वायुर्वायुभक्त मनुष्याः । तेषु वै कर्मणिप्रारम्भे सद्य देवैर्भक्षणा वायुभिश्च ज्ञेयं भवन्ति । अथैतन्मनुः श्राद्धशब्दं कर्म प्रोवाच । प्रजापितृभ्यस्तं च ॥ (आपस्तम्बधर्मसूत्र, २, ११, १)

2. त्रीणि प्रथमान्दीनेरवसानि मनुः (गीतगोपनीयसूत्र, २१, ८.)
The reference is to the three first *mahāpātakas*, as defined in *Manusmṛti*, IX, 235 and XI, 56.

3. श्रीणि वर्णाभ्युत्तमतीं यः कर्मां न प्रयच्छति ।
स तुल्यं भूयस्त्वानि दीपमृच्छसंशयम् ॥ (४, १, १३)
Compare *Manusmṛti*, IX, 90-91.

with this sword. As Manu is a king, his receiving this sword is a symbol of his being vested with the power of punishment, and it recalls the similar legend (*i.e.* of the creation by Brahma of *Daṇḍa* or Punishment) and of the king being made to wield his rod (*daṇḍa-dhara*). The *Bhagavadgītā* refers to the 'four Manus' (*catvāro Manavaḥ*). The *Purāṇas* develop the lists of Manus and make them out to be fourteen in all, each of whom is 'regent' of a vast time-cycle (*manvantara*). Of them six have already ruled, with seven more yet to come before the *kalpa* is finished. Of these, the *Svāyambhuva* is the first, and *Vaiṣvata*, the regent of our time, is the seventh. The six are descendants of the first Manu (*Svāyambhuva*) and are named respectively Svarociṣa, Auttama, Tāmasa, Raivata, Cākṣuṣa and Vaiṣvata (I, 61-63). *Svāyambhuva* claims (I, 33) to have been created by *Virāḥ* and to have himself created ten sages (*Marici*, *Atri*, *Angira*, *Pulastya*, *Kratu*, *Pracetasa*, *Vasiṣṭha*, *Bṛghu* and *Nārada*) who, in turn, created seven (?) other Manus (I, 36). It will be noted that *Pracetasa Manu*, whose dicta on *vājadharma* are quoted in the *Mahābhārata*, is not in the list of seven or fourteen Manus, but among the ten sages, who created the Manus, but a Manu created by him would be *Pracetasa Manu*. In the account of the Creation given briefly in *Manusmṛti* (I, 1-110), and more fully in the *Purāṇas*, vast time-cycles of the duration of many billions of human years are mentioned, for each of which a Manu is creator and guardian. He not only creates all animals, plants, etc., but makes regulations for them. "Manu *Svāyambhuva* composed the institutes of sacred law that pass by his name in order to settle clearly the duties of the *Brahmaṇas* and those of other castes." (I, 102). The *varṇadharmas*, are therefore held to rest ultimately on divine sanction, and their institution is also the work of Divinity. The task of *Svāyambhuva Manu* was to declare the duties laid down by the Supreme Being. The ultimate sanction for the *dharma* outlined in *Manusmṛti* is thus held to rest on God, who is also (according to the *Puruṣasūkta* and its paraphrase in *Manusmṛti*, I, 87) the author of the *varṇas*, each *varṇa* having been born from a part of his divine person.² For each cosmic period or *manvantara*, the Manu of the epoch is the expounder rather than originator of the system of the Universe and its regulations.

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1. सत्यं कर्मविवेकार्थं शेषाणामनुपूर्वशः ।
स्वार्थयुगे मनुर्धामानिदं शास्त्रमकल्पयत् ॥ (१, १०२)
 2. सर्वस्यास्य तु सर्वस्य शुक्लस्य स महाभूतिः ।*
सुखमाहृत्स्वज्जानां धृक् कर्मोपकल्पयत् ॥ (१, ८६)

Immortality is postulated in the *Purāṇas* for all the Manus, and the original sages who were created by Svāyambhuva Manu. It makes them the eternal custodians of tradition and the appointed regulators of laws. "The knowers and doers of *Dharma*, well-instructed and distinguished beyond others, who remained behind at the end of the previous *manvantara* and now stay on in the world cycle, in order to maintain unbroken this chain of worlds, kingdoms and races, and to preserve the ancient *dharma* from falling into decay and ruin, by constantly instructing the newly created in their duties—these are the Manus and the seven sages. Out of his memory of past ages, our Manu declared the *Dharmaśāstra* suited for the present cycle."¹ The Manus of past *manvantaras* do not pass away, and the Manus of the future are already born and await the time for their assumption of regentship. The word 'Manu' is therefore, as has been pointed out by Medhātithi, the name of an office rather than of a person. An unbroken tradition is maintained by the succession of Manus, and the chief function of a Manu is to keep it up. The work of the first Manu continues in that of the seventh, Vaivasvata, who governs the current *manvantara*. This is why *Manusmṛti* claims to be revealed by the original Manu of this *kalpa*, even though it is intended for those under the sway of his seventh successor. To support the infallibility of the original Manu, whose dicta are held to be contained in the present *smṛti*, he is referred to as omniscient (II, 7), as identical with Agni, Indra, Vāyu and the Eternal Brahman, (XII, 125) and as a king who gained sovereignty by righteousness. The ultimate source of all knowledge and all rules is the Veda (VII, 42). All that Manu says must be regarded as contained in the Veda. Bṛhaspati declares that pre-eminence is due to Manu's work on *dharma* because it is filled with the Veda, and any *smṛti* opposed to the sense of Manu is not esteemed.³

The Idea of Progress.

If the tradition thus recorded, it is explained that each *kalpa* repeats what happened in a previous *kalpa*, and there is continuity in tradition between *manvantara* and *manvantara*. What we crudely call 'creation' is in the Hindu view but the systole and diastole of the

1. भार्गवपुराण, अ. १४५

2. सर्वमानस्यो हि सः (१, ७)

3. वेदायैऽभिदत्त्वात् प्राणायं च मनोः स्मृतम् ।

मन्वैर्विस्तृता तु वा स्मृतिः सा न शक्यते ॥

(इहस्मृतिस्मृतिः, G.O.S. LXXXV, संस्कार, १३)

Universe, its evolution and involution, coming up after a *mahā-pralaya* and proceeding to another such dissolution. Within a *manvantara* we have vast cycles of time known as *yugas*, which form a quartette of tapering lengths of years for each of the four and of diminishing virtue. The first is the Golden Age and the last the Iron Age, 'the age of Kali.' We are now in it. The regulations that are made are providentially devised to suit the conditions of each age. Men were not only more virtuous in the earlier ages than in the later, but they were more long-lived. Their powers of overcoming the drag of sin were greater. The rules that are suited to one age may be unsuited to others. This is picturesquely stated in the dictum that for each age there is force in one *predominating* moral quality or action, *viz.*, austerities (*tapas*) in the first age, divine knowledge (*jñāna*) in the second, sacrifices (*yajña*) in the third and charitable gifts (*dāna*) in the last. The implication is not that one alone has to be practised in an age, but that all are prescribed for all time, the one indicated for a particular age having more power in overcoming the defects of men in that epoch. In western countries the Golden Age was put in the remote past. In Hindu belief the Golden Age is both in the past and in the future, because the Age of Iron must, in the unending cycle of ages, be succeeded by the Golden Age. Another implication of the *yuga* theory is that duties are adjustable to circumstances. They are not to be changed by human volition. Different modes and morals are divinely indicated for each period. Diminishing power makes it impracticable for the degenerate men of a later age to bear the moral strain of the earlier. Hence many rules that are found in *smṛtis* even now are to be rejected on the ground that they refer to another age (*yugāntara-viśayam*). The permission or duty to slay a manifest assassin, even if he is a Brāhmana, which we find in the same *smṛtis* which prescribe Brāhmana immunity from capital sentence, is dismissed as suited not to the present age but to a former.¹ The theory of 'age-contraction' (*yuga-hrāsa*) implies not merely a diminishing length for each *yuga* but a corresponding diminution, in longevity, strength and stamina for those who live in it. In course of time, this doctrine (of which the germs are found in *Manusmṛti*) was developed by later *smṛtis* and commentators into a long list of nearly fifty-five forbidden usages of Kaliyuga (*Kalivarjya*). The first digest in which the enunciation and enumeration occur is the *Smṛtyarthasāra* of Śrīdhara (c. 1200 A.D.) but the ideas are in the *germ* even in the *Mahā-*

1. See my paper on "Ātāṭyicādhā or the Right of Private Defence in Dharmaśāstra" in the *Kunhan Raja Presentation Volume*, 1946, pp. 196-232.

bhārata and *Manusmṛti*. The idea is that increasing weakness, physical and spiritual, demands relaxation of rules in favour of those who live in the later ages. The recommendation of gifts (*dāna*) and faith (*bhakti*), in preference to *yajña* (sacrifice) and *prāyaścitta* (expiatory penance or rite), the adoption of the principle of substitution (*pratimihī*), by which in the absence of anything that is prescribed a substitute for it can be used instead (in a *hṛcchra* penance, for example, a money gift to the person who is supposed either to do the penance in the place of the donor or to take over the demerit for which the *hṛcchra* is indicated) and a recommendation to drop certain institutions or ceremonies on the ground that they are unsuited to the growing weakness of *Kaliyuga* (*kālvarjya*) are illustrations of the action of the principle. Under the principle, women and Śūdras (owing to their physical and spiritual weakness) are given lighter penances and easier means of attaining the same results as men of higher castes. We find it already in operation in the distinction between *dvija* (twice-born caste) and Śūdra and the literature open to each class. The famous rule of Manu (II, 24)¹ which permits a Śūdra to live anywhere (*i.e.* in regions in which a *dvija* is not allowed to live) is an instance in point. So is the rule of Manu (X, 126)² that a Śūdra does not commit any offence entailing loss of caste, *e.g.*, by eating garlic, or drinking wine. The religious instruction that a *dvija* acquires painfully through a long period of studentship, the Śūdra can get by hearing recitations of the epics and *Purāṇas*. The śloka which indicates for each *yuga* a special *dharma-pravṛttaka*, which occurs in *Parāśarasmiti*³ and is ascribed by the *Ācāraratna* to Brhaspati ('in *Kṛtāyuga* the duties to be followed are those laid down by Manu, in *Tretā-yuga* by Gautama, in *Dvāpara-yuga* by Saṅkha-Likhita and in the *Kaliyuga* by *Parāśara-smṛti*') is not a denial of the value of *all* smṛtis (including *Manusmṛti*) in *all* ages, but a recommendation of one specific *smṛti* for the *Kaliyuga*, *viz.*, that of Parāśara, who has laid down (I, 33) that the twice-born in every *yuga* only reflect the *dharma* standard of that age, and cannot be reproached for it.⁴ The sacrifice of cows

1. यद्दत्तु वस्त्रम् कर्मिणम् वा निवसेत्सुभ्रूषिताश्विनः ॥ (२, २४)

2. न शूद्रे पापकं किञ्चिन्न च संस्कारस्मरति ।
वास्यधिकारो धर्मोऽस्ति न धर्मसिद्धिष्वनम् ॥ (१०, १२६)

3. कृते ह्य मानवा धर्मस्त्रिणां पीतयाः स्मृताः ॥
दास्ये चाङ्गलिहिताः कर्त्तुं पाराशराः स्मृताः ॥ (पराशरस्मृति, १, २५)

4. युगे युगे च ये धर्मोस्तत्र तत्र च ये द्विजाः ।
तेषां सिद्धा न कर्मिणा युगकृत्वा हि ते द्विजाः ॥ (पराशर, १, ३३)

and many dubious acts done in ages of the past, which now perplex us, are explained away by the principle that such acts did not bring misfortune to those who did them in the ages long past because of the 'power of their superior lustre' (*tejovīṣṭa*) which enabled them to overcome the bad effects. A married woman has many domestic duties which stand in the way of her performing numerous *vratas* (vows) involving starvation and other austerities. Parāśara (IV, 17) prohibits them for married women. The Sūdra may clear himself of the effects of a sin by a mere gift, instead of doing the elaborate penances that are prescribed for *dvijas* (VI, 51).² The idea is different from that which lays on a king a personal duty to enforce *Dharma* on all his subjects. As he does it well or ill, his epoch becomes analogous to a Golden Age or the reverse, and it is signified by such expressions as the much misunderstood dictum of the *Mahābhārata* (XII, 69, 103)—*rājā kālasya kṛāṇam* (the king is the creator of the age) or of the *Sukraniti* (IV i. 90 ff)—*yugapṛavartako rājā* (the king starts the age).³ Acting under the sanction allowed to the conventions of those learned in *Dharma* (*darmajñāsamaya*), a number of ceremonies, which seem to be beyond the capacity of the men of our times, or practices that are abhorrent to our sense of right, (like the levirate or *niyoga*) are placed outside the duty enjoined for those in *Kātyuga*. In *Manusmṛti*, *niyoga* is treated as an existing practice, and sons by the device are named and dealt with for inheritance, but the institution is explicitly condemned (IX, 64-68) for *dvijas*. Manu mentions that this '*paśu dharmā*' ('morals of the farmyard') had been in vogue in the days of a bad king of the remote past,⁴ in whose time the dread mongrelism (*varṇa-*

1. पत्नी जीवति वा नारी धर्मोभ्य ऋतमाचरेत् ।

आयुष्यं इत्ते मर्तुः सा नारी नरकं ज्ञेयम् ॥ (*Ibid.*, ५, १८)

2. शूद्राणां नोपवासः स्वात् शूद्रो दमिनं श्रुष्यति । (*Ibid.*, पृ. ६, ५१)

3. See the Note on these dicta in my *Rājadharmā*, pp. 102-104.

4. नान्यस्मिन् विषया नारी नियोक्तव्या द्विजादिभिः ॥ (९, ६४)

अथं द्विजैर्हि विद्वद्भिः पशुधर्मो विमार्हितः ।

मनुश्राणामपि शोको येन राज्यं प्रस्थासति ॥ (९, ६६),

स महोमखिलां युजन् राजर्षिपवः पुरा ।

वृणां च संहरं चक्रे कामोपहृतचेतसाः ॥

ततः प्रवृत्ति यो मोहात् प्रतीवर्तिकां शिवम्* ।

नियोनयत्सपत्नीं तं विपार्षितं साधवः ॥ (९, ६७-६८)

sāṅkṛā) became common. Bṛhaspati (p. 194) explains Manu's position in condemning the levirate, after mentioning its continuance, as due to the view that in the first two ages (*Kṛta* and *Treta*) men were endowed with power springing from their austerity and learning, of which those of *Dvāpara* and *Kali* ages are lacking, resulting in lack of power to overcome consequences of the acts.¹

Among modern writers there is a disposition to commend the rules of *Kalivarjya* on the score of their being progressive. The ancient attitude to them is fundamentally different from the modern. The practices, which (though upheld by *smṛiti*) are treated as unsuited to our degenerate age, are also condemned but as wanting in authority. By the convention of the elect (*dharmaṅga-samaya*) they are considered as beyond the shrinking strength and stamina (physical and moral) of our times. Every one of the practices, whose discontinuance is urged under this rule of *Kalivarjya*, will not appeal to a social reformer. Thus, among the practices that are to be *dropped* are the remarriage of widows, intercaste *anuloma* marriages and sea voyages. Their rejection in the modern view, is not only unprogressive but reactionary. The rejected items are not on a par with other inhibited practices like human sacrifice, religious suicide, drinking of spirits, pious improvidence (*advastanika*) and needless asceticism. It is puzzling to see both humane and retrograde customs, rejected on the same principle in *Kalivarjya*¹

The modern difficulty in appreciating the constituents of *Kalivarjya*, and in reconciling the progressive and reactionary elements in it, arises from lack of understanding of fundamental differences of outlook, leading to the adoption of altogether different scales of values. Like a modern thinker, the ancient Hindu aimed at the good of the world (*lokasamgraha*) and put a premium on unselfish, altruistic work. He attached equal importance to provision of charitable works of public utility (*phāra*) as to ritual sacrifices (*īṣṭā*). In modern estimation, the aim of social advance is to secure the maximum of increase

1. वक्तो विद्योमो मनुना विधिदः स्वयमेव वृ ।
 युगहासादवशम्योऽयं कर्तुं सर्वैर्बिभानतः ॥
 तयोश्चानवमावृष्णः कृते जैताशुभे नराः ।
 द्वारे च कञ्चो नृणां सक्तिहन्ति विनिमित्ता ॥
 (बृहस्पति, अथर्व, २५, १६-१७)

in wealth and the material objects of well-being, an increase in our knowledge of the secrets of nature and greater command over nature's forces, with wider application of science to war and industry. Our standards are material and largely external. The old Indian belief was different. The contrast between the East and the West comes out in many ways, even on a superficial comparison. Religion dominates all Indian ideas. While happiness (in a Hedonistic sense) is the Western criterion, duty is the Indian. In the Indian view man is a soul disguised in a body. The body perishes but the indweller, the 'self', survives eternally. What is 'good' is not what *seems* 'good' to the perishable, but is 'good' to the imperishable. Worldly prosperity is no index of man's advance. It is delusive, and is *āsurī*, demonic, not *daiṇī*, divine. Indian thought thinks not in terms of countries, nations or peoples, but of the universe; not of the short span of human life but of eternity. The only advance that is real and lasting is the spiritual, the 'ascent,' of the self. An advance in spirituality coupled with one in morals, is the real index of progress. The self (*ātman*) has a goal so remote in Time that it is invisible, and is gained by conquest of the trend to re-birth (and all that it implies) and the ultimate approach to and merger in the Supreme. Nothing that is thought, felt or done is lost; all make a permanent impression, and their effects cling to the self through Time. The supreme purpose of those who enjoy a vision that is denied to ordinary folk is to indicate the ways in which the ultimate goal can be reached. Anything that makes his approach to the distant goal easier, quicker and more certain is what one should do; anything that retards it is what one must avoid. The catalogue of duties, which constitute *Dharmaśāstra*, is intended to help in the attainment of this end. The purpose of social organization, and the disciplined life of the *āśramas* have also the same aim. The appointed means are mainly disciplinary, and the inculcation of standards of value different from our present day scales. They take note of the strength and weakness of every person and appoint means suited to each. They are integrated to a complete philosophy, and the declaration of their derivation from a divine source is only an emphatic way of asserting their supreme necessity for the uplift of the self. *Dharmaśāstra* and *Darśanaśāstra* (philosophy) share this aim, and their prescriptions are the same, with stress on the superior validity of one or another means of grace. They agree in indicating the ways to the goal by the broad roads of *Yōga*, *Bhakti*, *Karma* and *Jñāna*. Leaving aside the precise definitions in the *darśanas*, the purposes of the four may be stated to be the training of the mind, the heart and activity, and their sublimation.

The methods of approach in smṛti and philosophy to the means of attainment of the end differ. A smṛti merely describes the modes and indicates the outlines of the processes or technique of each; the *darśana* expounds the principles and supports them by reference to reason as well as scriptural authority. When philosophical schemes were elaborated for study and differentiated from one another, antagonism, or at least inherent rivalry, was postulated between them. This seemed obvious by the stressing of its own mode of realization by each *darśana*. It is otherwise in a smṛti. Its approach is synthetic and inclusive, with an emphasis naturally on *harma*, in the sense of both moral duty and enjoined rites, as they accord best with the concept of *Dharma* based on Vedic injunction. With the exception of the *Bhaktināga*, we find the other three in *Manusmṛti*. Indian thought realizes that the self has a body, which is liable to weakness and temptation and needs to be trained. The appropriate training to enable it to reach its goal is behind the constitution and rules of every *varṇa* and every *āśrama*. Discipline is the common denominator of all the rules and the entire system of *varṇāśrama-dharma*. It is the universal regulator. Pleasure, if it is not coarse and does not retard the progress of the self, is permissible. Aimless asceticism is not the teaching of *Dharma*. Higher ends and means must prevail over lower. Acute study and knowledge of the relations between mind and body and between man and his environment, and of the physical bases of emotional, intellectual and spiritual life, are behind the meticulous regulation of such things as time for connubial intercourse, continence of man and woman, lawful and forbidden food and drink, clothing, the quantity and type of nourishment that is permissible to different persons, the 'modes of life for different persons according to their *adhikāra* (duty or function), the amusements that are lawful, and the detailed code of ethics and etiquette. In Indian belief a person's relations extend both vertically and horizontally, in space as well as in time. He is a link between ancestors and descendants. Man is midway between the sub-human and super-human worlds. There is belief in the inter-connection between action in one plane and in others. Such relationship has to be conceived as not of two, or even three dimensions but of many. Cosmic relationships defy human analysis. Their realization is either intuitive or empirical. What the sages have said is based on both. The wide scope given to the intuition of the erudite and the elect (not of the half-human or savage being) in the determination of *Dharma*—ranging from spiritual to civic duties—is due to the hypothesis of the reliability of the intuitions of such persons. Since the vehicles in which the self can march to the goal are the body and the mind, both have been

subjected to intensive study by the framers of the rules of *Dharma*. It is not only in the rules for the observation of the conduct of witnesses in an enquiry or in those for the determination of persons fit to be chosen as partners in marriage that we find proof of profound study, and of empiricism which has been translated into tradition. We find it also in a study of sex-behaviour, of the psychology of adolescence and of those who have reached the climacteric, and of the reaction of function on mental content and disposition. Details, which look wearisome, when crudely translated and superficially studied, will be found to be based on time-worn experience. In every detail or rule, there is only one aim: how to come nearer the attainment of the *summum bonum*, and how to conserve the spiritual strength, overcome weakness, and lift up the self. Whether in any specified condition or circumstance the path of activity (*prayitti*) or that of renunciation (*niṛtti*) is the better, and whether one may be satisfied with being raised by good deeds or scrupulous attention to enjoined rites to the *bhoga-bhāmi* of the world of the gods, or should aim higher, are matters that come within the scope of *Dharmaśāstra*. It will be noticed that a *phala* (result) is specified for every act, good or bad, and for every omission of enjoined duty that is unexpiated. Their enumeration in a *smṛti* is wearisome to a modern reader. But for one who knows *Dharmaśāstra* and looks to it for guidance, they are of great significance. So are the catalogues of sins, and of the means of expiation of sins. In general, a sin springs either from an infringement of enjoined duty (*Dharma*) or the omission of a duty that is imposed on a person. The ways of overcoming sins are seven: by undergoing suffering, either as the natural consequence of the offence or otherwise, by undergoing civil penalties (since punishment purifies), by post-mortuary suffering in other worlds ('Hells'), by countervailing measures which create a stock of merit to balance the sins (as by charity, pilgrimage, penances, austerities, vows, *Manu*, XI, 236-240), by prayers and ritual, by penitence and public confession (e.g., *Manusmṛti*, XI, 228-233) and above all by leading a life of virtue and unselfishness. There is the belief that in determining his future birth a man's actions in this life have a decisive influence. The recital of the forms which various offenders assume in the next incarnation, which is wearisome for us to read, is part of a *smṛti*; for, it was part of the wide-spread belief of the times.

The mistakes that are usually made by modern students of *Dharmaśāstra* are mainly two: they judge the ideas and belief of other days by those of their own; they do not often appreciate the *rationale* behind injunctions or institutions that do not appeal

to them. There is also the temper of superiority or condescension which is difficult to overcome, and which makes a modern student miss the significance of what sympathetic understanding might reveal. These are sins against the historic spirit, often committed, like common sins, in the name of the virtues they transgress. The combined effect of these is not only insufficient understanding or inaccurate perception of the value and meaning of rules or institutions and their effects, but application of faulty methods of textual criticism.

Though a smṛti is not expected to prove a work of philosophy or theology, and expound a complete scheme of life, it must be based on the acceptance of one. It must have a metaphysical background. In Hindu belief, all wisdom and all knowledge are contained in the Veda. To challenge the omniscience of the Veda is impiety and exposes the doubter to the charge of heresy. No amount of doctrinal divergence will make a Hindu a heretic, if he does not deny this. If he does, he is a heretic (*veda-bāhya*, *veda-nindaka*), and an atheist (*nāstika*). The highest compliment that can be paid to any canonical work is to describe it as containing the cream of the Veda. The *purāṇas*, the epics and smṛtis claim to be so. The wisdom of the Veda is not to be gathered from a superficial understanding of its verbal meaning, though to know even that is better than learning the Veda only by rote. It is the proud claim of *Manusmṛti* (II, 7) that all the duties described by it are based on the Veda, for its 'author' Manu was omniscient (*sarvajñānamayo hi sah*). It is unnecessary to try to find a passage in the Veda for every statement in *Manusmṛti*. It is in the sense of the Veda as expanded in *itihāsa* and *purāṇa* that its source may be found. The two types of literature are among the springs of tradition and duty. They are the records of cosmic history, in a sense more profound than and different from our conception of world history. They deal with the rhythmic swing of the coming and going out of Being (*pravṛtti* and *niṣṛtti*). Their concern is not merely with the story of short-lived generations of men, which pass away far too quickly, or with the genealogy and story of regal lines. Creation, dissolution and the ages of the world are not less, in fact more, their concern. History (limited to what it now is) is the story more of the bodies than of the souls of men. The body dies but the soul, the self, is immortal. Death is not extinction. To know the story of one cycle of time is to know all, because the repetition of the cycles stretches from infinity to infinity. Seen against the background of the story of cosmos, the struggles and the rise and fall of empires and dominions seem petty and futile. The great conquerors and kings have passed away. The author of the

Viṣṇupurāna repeats in ringing words the disappointment of the study of human or dynastic history, that it has retailed, and condemns it as the vanity of vanities.¹ What survive are not the body and perishable institutions, but the *puṇya* or *pāpa*, merit or sin, that result from action (*karma*) and that adhere to the self till it is absorbed. The most practical of studies will therefore be that which enables the self to transcend its obstacles and reach its goal. Among the ways discovered for realizing it is the pursuit of duty (*Dharma*). Intuition of it is enshrined in the Veda and cognate literature, from which Manu's work and others of the kind must, according to Hindu belief, be interpreted.

This is the reason why (without any trace of self-consciousness) *Manusmṛti* prescribes its own study for the teachers and custodians of knowledge and tradition, *vis.*, the Brāhmaṇas.² If the wisdom of the teacher, who by example and precept, by instruction and practice, guides the lives of those whom he is appointed to train, is ensured, then that of the community is safeguarded. He who learns the smṛti must be already erudite (*vidvān*). He must be a man of austere righteousness; ³ for *ācāra* (conduct) is the transcendent law* (*ācārah paramo dharmah*) whether it is in harmony with what is enjoined by the Veda or the smṛti. The man who is soulful (*dāmanavān*) should conform to the highest tradition in his own conduct, *i.e.*, adherence to "principles. *Manusmṛti* is comprehensive, for in it has been stated "the good and bad qualities of human actions and the immemorial rules of conduct (*sāsvataḥ ācārah*) to be followed by all the four *varṇas*" (I. 107).⁵ It details the *svadharmas* of every one. By daily study of it and by teaching it daily a learned Brāhmaṇa will increase social welfare and his powers of understanding, earn fame, and attain longevity and ultimately supreme bliss (*nirāśreyasam param*). The student of *Manusmṛti* is further said to sanctify his

1. *Viṣṇupurāna*, IV, 24, 123-151. Dr. Jayaswal, "History of India, 150 to 350 A. D." p. 209, has cited with a free translation extracts from this eloquent passage.

2. विदुषा ब्राह्मणेन्दुसंश्लेषेण प्रवक्षतः ।

द्विभेदवशा प्रवक्तव्यं सम्यग्साधनेन केनचित् ॥ (१,१०३)

3. इदं शास्त्रमर्थवानो ब्राह्मणः संसितमनः । (१,१०४)

4. आचारः परमो धर्मः श्रेष्ठकृतः स्मार्तै एव च ।
समाहृतमिन्द्रदा युक्तं मिल स्वादात्मनार्त्त्रिकः ॥ (१,१०८)

5. अस्मिन् धर्मोऽखिलेनोक्तो युगदेशै च कर्मणम् ।
बहुमानपि वर्णानामाचारस्यैव शासतः ॥ (१,१०७)

ancestors for seven generations and his descendants for seven generations.¹ "He alone merits the whole earth" (*prvīm api so arhātī*, I, 105). He who studies the work diligently and lives up to its injunctions is untainted by sin, from thought, word or deed (I, 104).² The daily recitation of the work will ensure virtuous conduct and the attainment of all one's wishes (XII, 126).³ It is noteworthy that while the earlier statements are made of the *teacher*, who has to be a Brāhmana (as the *smṛti* is like a Veda, which a Brāhmana alone can *teach*), the fruits of daily recitation are promised to all the twice-born (*dvija*). The same destiny is held out to the diligent teacher of *Manusmṛti* as to the Brāhmana who combines austerity and Vedic learning (XII, 104).⁴ It is only those who know their own duties and the duties of others that are efficient wardens of society. It is in this sense, and not in that of upholding (as suggested by Dr. K.P. Jayaswal) the Śunga usurpation, which contravened the fundamental *varṇa-dharma* as well as the *sāmānya-dharma* laid down by himself, that Manu declared: "Command of armies, royal authority, the office of judge and sovereignty of the whole world he only deserves who knows the Veda science (*vedaśāstravit* XII, 100).⁵ The source of all *dharma* is the Veda, and he who has mastered the Veda, is a master of *Dharma* lore. As all *dvijas* are entitled to a knowledge of the Veda, and it is upto one of the second and third *varṇa* to attain (as King Janaka did) mastery of the Veda the glorificatory statement will apply equally to him. It is in essence only a magnification of *Dharma* and its revealed source.

Traditions of the origin of Manusmṛti.

The present text of *Manusmṛti* is divided into twelve books of unequal length, and comprises 2695 ślokas. It is the largest *smṛti* extant. It gives a short enumeration of its chief titles or topics at the

1. पुनाति पदं किं वर्यांशं सप्त सप्त पराशरम् ।
प्रथिवामपि वैदेर्मां कृत्स्नापि कोऽपि सोऽर्हति ॥ (१,१०५)
2. मनोवाच्ये ह्येनित्यं कर्मदोषैर्न लिप्यते । (२,१०४)
3. इत्येवमात्मनं शास्त्रं सृष्टुमीकं पठन् द्विजः ।
भवत्वाचारशास्त्रं वेदिषं प्राप्नुयाद्भृतिम् ॥ (१२,१२६)
4. तपो विद्या च विप्रस्य निःश्रेयसकरं वरम् ।
तपसा क्लिप्तं हन्ति विषयास्तपसश्च्युते ॥ (१२,१०४)
5. तेनाश्रमं च राश्रमं च दण्डनेतृत्वमेव च ।
सर्वलोकाधिपसं च वेदशास्त्रविद्वन्ति ॥ (१२,१००)

end of the first book (I, 111-118), which tallies with the actual contents. This specification of contents was obviously intended to prevent the incorporation of other subjects. This practice is not unusual; for example the *Arthasāstra* of Kauṭilya gives a *vyāyaya-nirdeśa* at the commencement of the work. In later times, every *nibandha* (digest of *Dharmaśāstra*) followed the practice. The oldest extant commentary on the smṛti is that of Medhātithi, who lived probably in the 9th century A.D., about two centuries after Asahāya, whose commentary on *Manusmṛti* has not survived. Other commentaries on the smṛti seem to have existed in the days of Medhātithi, which are also lost (e.g., Bhāguri, Bhartr-yajña) and the text seems to have been settled before their time. It is almost identical with that which later commentators followed, and which now passes as *Manusmṛti*. We have in the verses of Brhaspati a check on the doctrines of Manu, and the reconstructed Brhaspati¹ confirms the text of Manu which has come down to us. It has undoubtedly been deemed authentic for over fifteen centuries at least. "No one can doubt for a moment that the extant *Manusmṛti* was an authoritative work in the seventh century."²

The work gives an account of its own derivation. Its contents were communicated by Brahma to Manu Svāyambhuva, the *first* Manu, who taught them to the ten sages who were appointed by him to create living beings (I, 35, 58). Manu had himself composed the *śāstra*, and when he was approached by the sages to declare the eternal laws, he commissioned his mind-born son and disciple Bhṛgu (one of the ten sages) to recite the laws to the other sages. It is therefore in the form of a monologue by Bhṛgu, occasionally interrupted by the sages, who ask for elucidation of some points (V, 1-3; XII, 1-2). The implication is that the substance of the original composition of Manu was conveyed by Bhṛgu practically in Manu's words. There are eighteen instances in which Bhṛgu cites the actual words of Manu, and they occur in seven out of the twelve books.³ The subjects dealt with in these citations are not however of such importance or uniqueness as to demand the very words of Manu. The description of the quotations as the actual words of Manu has no special significance, except as implying that the rest of the work represents a paraphrase or

1. G.O.S., Vol. LXXXV, 1941.

2. P. V. Kane, 'History of *Dharmaśāstra*', Vol. I, p. 150.

3. III, 222; IV, 103; V, 41, 133; VI, 54; VIII, 124, 139, 168, 204, 242, 279, 292 and 339; IX, 158, 182, 239; and X, 63 and 78.

condensation of the original composition of Manu. Its authoritative-ness is equal to that of the original, as it was recited in the presence of the semi-divine author. An invocatory śloka,¹ which is found in some editions of Manusmṛti, has led to the explanation that the text of the smṛti, as we now have it, is the reproduction of what was recited by a pupil of Bṛghu, who must have been among those to whom the work was taught by that sage.

The significant points in the tradition, which rests on statements in the smṛti itself, are : firstly, it contains the *Dharma* laid down by the Supreme Being and taught to Manu Svāyambhuva in the beginning of this cosmic cycle (*kalpa*), billions of years ago ; secondly, its authenticity and authority are vouched for by the legend that it was recited in the presence of Manu himself, by a pupil deputed to recite it before sages who wished to get the revealed law from the fountain head ; and in its present form it represents the third or fourth version of the original divine dictation. Apart from Manu's own declaration that he had received the law from the Supreme Being (as a guide to his own regentship and that of future Manus), at the very beginning of things, the supreme authority that attaches to Manu's work is reflected in the Vedic statements commending all that Manu said, in the claim to omniscience made by Manu himself and in the dicta of Bṛhaspati and Angiras that no rules opposed to those of Manu have validity.

There is evidence in *Manusmṛti* itself which seems to go against the claim it makes to so remote an antiquity. There are references in it to the Vedas, Vedāṅgas, *Dharmaśāstra* ("Dharmaśāstra is śmṛti", II, 10), works on *Dharma* (*dharmaśāstraṅi*), *khila* of the Veda (c.g., *Sṛśākti*), histories (*abhyāsa*), the epics (*itihasa*) and the *purāṇas*, which the performer of a *śrāddha* is asked to recite for the benefit of the manes (III, 235),² the experts in *Mīmāṃsā* (*mīmāṃsaka*), and etymology (*śarukta*) as well as he who can recite *Dharmaśāstra*, (*dharma-pāṭaka*) and the logician (*hetuka*), who are among those required to constitute the *pariṣad* (XII, 111),³ to the opinions

1. स्वामंजुषे नमस्कृत्य ऋषिगोष्मिन्निवेद्ये ।
मनुमणीतान् विविधान् पमोन् ब्रह्मणि शश्वतान् ॥
2. स्वाभ्यासं श्रवणं चिन्त्यं पर्मसाक्षादि वैतु रि ।
शास्त्रानामोतिदासांश्च पुराणानि खिलानि च ॥ (३, २३२)
3. त्रैविद्यो वेदुक्तस्तर्को नैरुक्तो पर्मपाठकः ।
ब्रह्मशास्त्रिणः पूर्वै चरितस्त्वद्दशवत् ॥ (१२, १११)

of authorities on Dharma like Atri, Gautama ('son of Utathya'), Śaunaka and Bhṛgu, as to when a Brāhmaṇa who marries a Śūdra woman becomes an outcaste (III. 16),¹ to the teachings of Viśvānāsa (who is said to have laid down the rules for hermits, (VI. 21)² and to the rate of interest fixed by Vasīṣṭha (VIII 140), which is given in the extant smṛti of Vasīṣṭha (II 51)³ Of these, three (Atri Vasīṣṭha and Bhṛgu) are among the ten great sages created by Manu Svāyambhuva, who in turn created the seven Manus (I. 35-36).⁴ There are allusions to heresy, heretics and heretical books⁵ and to "despicable systems of philosophy not founded on the Vedas" (XII. 95).⁶ There are references to the atheist (*nāstika*)⁷, atheism (*nāstikyam*)⁸ kingdoms over-run by atheists⁹ (*nāstikākrāntam rāṣṭram*) and Brāhmaṇas who are atheists¹⁰. The caviller of the Vedas (*vedanindaka*)¹¹ and works on duty composed by those who deny the Veda (*Veda-bāhyāḥ smṛtayaḥ*), are mentioned, a description that might appear to fit the *Vinaya-piṭaka* and *Abhidhammapiṭaka* of the Buddhists. Divergences of doctrine are alluded to, e.g., option on the disposal of the *śrāddha-piṇḍa*;¹² the relative claims of the 'soil'

1. शूद्रविदां पल्लवैश्चैवधृतमवस्थ च ।
जीनकस्य सुतोत्पत्त्या तदपत्यतया सृणोः ॥ (३,१६)
2. वैश्वानरमते स्थितः । (६,२१)
3. वसिष्ठविहितां वृद्धिं सुजेय विपविषयेनीम् ।
अशीतिभाग शूद्रोऽयान्मासाऽऽर्धुषिकः शते ॥ (८,१४०)
4. मरुपिमन्थद्विरेदी पुण्यस्य पुण्यं कुरुम् ।
अथैतस्य वसिष्ठ च शूद्र नारदमेव च ॥
एते मनुष्ये सुतान्मानुष्यन्भूरितेजसः ।
देवान् देवनिजावीथं महर्षीणां निततेजसः ॥ (१,३६-३६)
5. पापविधेः विमर्शस्थान् वैश्वानरमतेऽपि नान्तरम् ।
हेतुकार्थं वदन्तीति वाग्दाम्निना नान्तरम् ॥ (४,३०)

See also IV. 61, V. 89-90, IX. 225, XI. 66 and 8, 30, XII. 95-96.

6. वेदवासाः स्मृतयो वाक्सा कुरुष्वः (१६,१५)
7. II. 11.
8. IV. 163; XI. 66.
9. VIII. 22.
10. III. 150.
11. II. 11; III. 161.
12. विष्णुनिर्वाणं केचिपरस्तादेव कुर्वते ।
वयोभिः सादशनस्यन्ते प्रक्षिप्यन्त्यनशेऽप्यु वा ॥ (३,२६१)

and the 'seed'¹ and to the interpretation of the term *bharti* or lord in relation to a father's rights over a son.²

Such allusions and references will appear incongruous in a work which claims to represent the dicta of the 'father of mankind' and to be incompatible with the primeval age of the law emanating from him. It is noteworthy that this aspect has not struck the acute commentators on *Manusmṛti* or later Hindu writers, who have accepted without question the legend of its origin and its paramount authority. We, who do not share the faith in these, will see in such references only proof of the composition of the entire work in an age in which such knowledge of the matters or persons alluded to would have been natural, and in which divergences of view might be predicated along with heresy in its many forms. It is otherwise with the scholiasts. Omniscience is claimed by Manu for himself, and it is admitted by the orthodox, among whom the commentators on *Manusmṛti* and writers on *Dharma* would be classed. Omniscience implies a knowledge of the past as well as of the present and the future. A work on *Dharma* has to lay down the conduct appropriate to epochs in which *Dharma* decays, and heresy becomes rampant as well as schismatic views. Further, the theory of the repetition of the features of each cyclic period of creation in all *future* cycles, would make the memory of Manu of the past degeneracy an indication of future decadence. Indian commentators (like Śabara, Viśvarūpa and Medhātithi) are acute and critical by nature, and are not likely to overlook obvious inconsistencies. Medhātithi, for instance, did not seem to have held the view (as pointed out by Dr Jayaswal)³ that all that is found in *Manusmṛti* represents the very words of the divine sage. He refers to the author as "a man named Manu" (*Manur nāma kascit purusa-viśeṣaḥ*, I. 1).

Besides the story of its origin that *Manusmṛti* itself furnishes there are other legends, which bring a work of Manu on *Dharma* among

1. शौचकेन प्रसंसितेन ज्ञेयमन्ये मनीषिणः ।
 भ्रातृक्षेत्रे तथैवान्ये तत्रैव तु न्यवस्थितिः ॥
 अक्षेत्रे वीजमुत्पद्यन्तोरैव विनश्यति ।
 मनीषकनापि क्षेत्रे केषलं स्वच्छिन्नं भवेत् ॥
 यस्याद्दीप्तप्रभावेण विवेकज्ञा कषयोऽभवत् ।
 पूषिताश्च प्रसस्ताश्च तस्माद्भोज प्रशस्यते ॥ (१०,८०-८२)
2. महर्षेः पुत्र विद्यानतिल मुनिर्देव तु सर्वैरि ।
 साहस्रपादकं केचिदपरे क्षेत्रिणं विदुः ॥ (९,१२)
3. *Manu and Yajñavalkya*, p. 44.

those divinely composed on the *purāṣārthas*. Thus the *Mahābārata* ¹ gives two accounts. In one the Supreme Being is said to have composed a huge work on Dharma which was summarized successively by Manu Svāyambhuva, Uśanas and Bṛhaspati. In the other legend Brahma is credited with the composition of a work in a hundred thousand chapters, which dealt with *Dharma, Artha* and *Kāma*, and this was successively abridged into 10,000, 5,000, 3000 and 1,000 *chapters* by Viśalākṣa (Śiva), Indra, Bāhūdantaka, Bṛhaspati and Uśanas. A similar tradition as regards Kāmaśāstra, along with works on the other two *puruṣārthas* is given by Vātsyāyana.² The introduction to one version of *Nārada-smṛti* states that "holy Manu" composed a book in 100,000 ślokas and 1,080 chapters and delivered it to the sage Nārada. Reflecting that so huge a work could not be remembered by mortals, Nārada condensed it into 12,000 ślokas, and delivered the abridgement to Mārkaṇdeya, who reduced it to 8,000 ślokas, and delivered the abridgement to Sumati, son of Bṛgu, who realizing that the longevity of men had been reduced in the transit of the ages, reduced the work still further to 4000 ślokas. The last abridgement is meant for mortals, while the original work still exists in the worlds of gods and superhuman beings. The extant *Nārada-smṛti* (to which this preface is attached) claims to be the ninth book of the original (in twelve thousand verses) that Nārada had composed. The present text of the Smṛti is about a thousand ślokas long, and deals only with law proper, and the claim seems to be supported.³ The approximation of the length assigned to Bhārgava Sumati's version of the extant *Manusmṛti* makes Dr. Jayaswal regard it as the composition of a historic person, Sumati, who composed the present version of Manu in the Sunga age.⁴ A fifth tradition found in two *purāṇas* (*Bhaviṣya* and *Skanda*) states that there are four versions of the original smṛti of Manu Svāyambhuva, and these are respectively by Bṛgu, Nārada, Bṛhaspati and Angiras.⁵ This tradi-

1. *Sūktīyava* CCCXXXVI, 38-46, LIX 80-85. .

2. प्रजापतिर्हि प्रजाः सृष्ट्वा तासां स्थितिनिश्चयनं त्रिवर्गस्य साधनम् अष्टम्यानां षष्ठसहस्रेण प्रोवाच । तस्यैकदेशं स्वायम्भुवो मनुः धर्मोपकारिकं दृष्ट्वा चकार । पृथक्स्थितिः अर्थाधिकारम् । महादेवानुचरत् ॥ नन्दो सहस्रनाम-भाष्यानां दृष्ट्वा कामसूत्रं प्रोवाच ॥ (शास्त्रावलीयकासूत्रम्, १, १, ५-८)

3. *Nārada-smṛti*, ed. Jolly, 1880, pp. 1-3.

4. *Manu and Yājñavalkya*, pp. 44-45.

5. The following śloka from *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa* occurs in Hemādri's *Dānakhaṇḍa* (Bib. Ind.), p. 528.

सर्गनीया नारदीया च साईस्सवाहिरस्सव्यरि-
स्वायम्भुवस्य शास्त्रस्य चतस्रः संहिता मताः ॥

tion probably springs from the obvious foundation of the extant smṛtis of Nārada and Brhaspati on *Manusmṛti*, which they supplement. The order of enumeration, however, places Nārada *before* Brhaspati (a sequence generally accepted by modern writers) but I have tried to show that it should be reversed, as Brhaspati is cited by Nārada.¹ The version of *Nāradasmṛti* (which is only about two-thirds the length of Jolly's text) with the ancient commentary of Bhavasvāmin,² shows many variants from the *Nāradasmṛti* for which the ancient commentary of Asahāya is partially available. Bhavasvāmin's text clearly has the tradition in mind, as it is described as *Nāradya Manu-samhitā*, the Nārada version of Manu's work. I have found most of the quotations in the *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, as often in the version of Bhavasvāmin as in that of Asahāya.

The legends have this significance. They establish the ancient belief in the divine origin of Dharmaśāstra and its authentic promulgation by Manu Svāyambhuva, from whose work later versions were derived. *Manusmṛti*, as we now have it, by claiming to be the authentic work revealed to Bhṛgu, gained the power to over-ride all rivals by its emanation from the Father of Men and the Creator. The claim of divine origin or inspiration has had several consequences. By referring back all laws to one primary source, of which an authentic text exists and can be consulted, it secured uniformity in usages and law. The older customary laws tended in course of time to approximate themselves to those of the divine smṛti, and though the bewildering variety of customs did not altogether disappear, there was a tendency for their gradual reduction and amalgamation. The theory of divine origin secured for the injunctions of smṛtis both a stability and a force that they could not have otherwise obtained, as mere human works. The supersession of the older *sūtra* works by smṛtis, for daily guidance, was the result. Basing laws on a source that does not admit of change contributes to social stability. But it is at the expense of unadaptability to altered conditions, as civil authority has no power to change laws by legislation. But the pressure of hard necessity finds a way out. The hypothesis of a divine, and infallible, source, carries with it the corollary that the laws promulgated will suit all times and circumstances and will be

1. See my Introduction to *Bṛhaspatismṛti* (1941), pp. 138-141.

2. Published by Sāmbaśiva Śāstri in the Trivandram Sanskrit Series in 1929. Dr. Kane does not use it but *Dharmakośa* does. More of the citations in the *Kṛtyakalpataru* from Nārada are found in this version than in the text of Jolly, based on Asahāya.

just and equitable. Where they apparently fail in these respects, investigation or interpretation can discover ways of reconciling them with the demands of the moral imperatives. The smṛti contains the warning against literal interpretation, and advises the use of logic (*nyāya*) and intelligent interpretation (*nyūktī*) as well as the institution of bodies (*parisad*) to resolve disputed points of law and give decisions on matters that are not dealt with in the book itself.¹

Redactions of Manusmṛti

Tradition by describing the passage of the contents of the original divine smṛti through Manu, Bṛhgu and possibly a pupil of Bṛhgu, may appear to open a way for modifications of the original rules in the process of transmission. This is ruled out by the ascription of the recapitulation to persons with divine power. Modern students of *Manusmṛti* consider that revisions of the work are proved by the presence of contradictory views in certain matters. *e.g.* *nīyoga* (IX. 59-63 and 64-69), a Brāhmana marrying a Sūdra woman (III. 12-13, 14-19), forms of marriage appropriate to each *varṇa* (III. 23-26), eating meat (V. 27-56), the relative status of teacher and father (II. 145-146), and the birth of Bṛhgu (I. 35 and IX. 32-56). It does not appear to be right to take such instances as proving the incorporation of contradictory statements at different times, in successive editions of the work. It ascribes clumsiness to editors. In a revision one would expect obsolete matter to be cut out, not controverted. It is more natural to take such cases as reflecting actual or possible differences of view, which the smṛti tries to resolve. Mr P.V. Kane rejects the theory that *Manusmṛti* underwent several recasts, and considers that one revision will account for the 'conflicting' statements in the smṛti on which the inference is based.² He rightly draws attention to the traditional practice of setting side by side conflicting or divergent views, and indicating either preference or option. The story in the *Nārada-smṛiti* that it is a version of Manu's original code looks plausible, as it explains the fragmentary character of Nārada's extant work, which deals only with *Vyavahāra* and omits other topics deemed by general agreement to be necessary in a complete smṛti. But it makes the extant fragment not part of the Code meant for men, but that which is intended for the gods! It thus proves too much. Bhavasvāmin is unaware of the story, or at least does not give it, though the colophon

1. For the constitution of a *Parisad* see *Manu*, XII. 108-113.
2. *History of Dharmāśāstra*, Vol. I., pp. 148-151.

of his commentary describes it as that on the *Nāradya Manusamhita*. His text is only about two-thirds the length of that dealt with by Asahāya. While the modern view of revisions postulates additions to the content and elaboration, the old traditions, utilizing the belief in declining powers in succeeding *yugas*, represent each succeeding recension as a condensation of the preceding. The stories are unknown to the author or editor of the extant *Manusmṛti*, and are suspect, on the ground that they attempt to give other *smṛti*s the authority that Manu's enjoys. The many verses which pass as those of Brhan-Manu and Viddha-Manu may be genuine in at least some cases and represent floating ślokas in circulation and ascribed popularly to Manu, which are not found in *Manusmṛti*, like the verses ascribed in the *Mahabharata* to Manu and not found in *Manusmṛti*. The declared aims of *Manusmṛti* are comprehension and completeness in detailing the duties of every one. It is addressed to all persons, and its study is described as a duty of Brāhmanas, particularly of those who have to teach others. It has not the narrow audience of a *kalpasūtra* before it. Constant study of a work, which was made an obligatory study, in epochs in which there were expert reciters of *smṛti* (*dharmaśāstra*) would safeguard the text from corruption and stabilize it.

Alleged Interpolations in Manusmṛti.

Dr. Bühler, after an exhaustive survey of the contents, rejects about half the extant text as interpolation. His arguments are in substance two: *Manusmṛti* is a versified form of a *sūtra* book which belonged to the same school as that to which *Viṣṇusmṛti* belongs. Accordingly, by a comparison with *sūtra* books and *Viṣṇusmṛti*, the portions of *Manusmṛti* which may be regarded as added can be separated and rejected. Secondly, certain topics are Purāṇic in character and not relevant to the subject of the *smṛti*. The theory of Bühler that *Manusmṛti* is a versified version of an original *Manava Dharmasūtra* is now rejected as unproved and improbable. It overlooks the purpose of both the older *sūtra* form of composition and the later versified *Dharmasūtras* like the *smṛti*s bearing the names of Manu, Yājñavalkya and Dharmapāni. In a *sūtra* book, which serves the purpose of a syllabus for oral exposition, the space given to any item should not, properly speaking, be deemed to reflect its importance in the view of the author or head of the school; nor can differences of viewpoint be inferred between two schools by merely comparing their respective aphoristic syllabuses. The versified *samhitā* aimed at a wider audience than the *kalpasūtra* and at an audience which would not be under the guidance of a teacher. Its greater fulness is not a proof of the importation of new matter, that

was unknown to those who orally expounded the *dharma* and *gṛhya* aphorisms. Even versified *samhitās* differ from one another in the space given by them to the elaboration of particular topics, for, they too would be subject to oral exposition, on which later on commentaries will be based. That such *bhāṣyas* existed for other branches of learning we know. That they existed for *Dharmaśāstra* is a permissible deduction from the lines of development of Indian literature. The individuality of writers will be indicated by their improving on existing works, by incorporating more of the matter passing orally, in their works than other, older, writers. Yājñavalkya's *smṛti* is fuller on *Yoga* than Manu's. His language is more precise. It is not right to postulate development of doctrine merely from differences of views on any specific matters between *smṛti* and *smṛti*. They can differ in precision of expression and capacity to convey unambiguously what they intended to teach. The view now generally held is that legal ideas become more developed in course of time, and the development is reflected in the larger space given to definition, classification and elaboration of details in later *smṛtis* than in earlier, in Bṛhaspati, Nārada and Kātyāyana for example, as compared with Manu and Viṣṇu. It seems plausible, but it overlooks the fact that every *smṛti* did not necessarily reflect current practice or juristic ideas that emanated from the brain of its author. The first view is contradicted by the presence of archaic and modern matter in the same work, and of developed doctrine in earlier and undeveloped in later works. The second view overlooks the fact that most writers on Dharma must have cherished the belief that they were incompetent to innovate. The more natural explanation is that a later writer supplies, not from his own experience or inner consciousness, matter not found in earlier treatises, and seeks to make up for omissions or summary statements, by his own fuller exposition of the legal or ceremonial practices that were current and held to be based on valid authority and to be consistent with the extant *corpus* of Dharma. A comparison of the *Kautiliya* and a *smṛti* far removed from it in age, like *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* will not reveal any marked difference between the two ages in the way of refinement of legal and moral ideas and development of institutions. In a vast country like India, there have been many different cultural levels at the same time in different parts of the country. That fact has always been taken note of in *Dharmaśāstra* and *Arthaśāstra* in the recognition of usages that do not conflict with Dharma or morality. In the Introduction to my reconstruction of Bṛhaspati's lost *smṛti*, I have tried to show that (contrary to accepted ideas of their relative chronological position) the *smṛtis* of Bṛhaspati and Kātyāyana are older than that of Nārada

notwithstanding the circumstance that in elaboration of civil law Kātyāyana is fuller and more precise than even Nārada, and possibly Yājñavalkya. If all smṛtis said the same things with the same emphasis on specific points, there will be no scope for individuality or for new smṛtis. The purpose of a new writer is not to *create* new laws but to state more fully or better what has been stated by earlier writers. Historical writers who reconstruct the social life of a period do so on the basis of smṛtis the composition of which is ascribed conjecturally to that period. On the other hand, they assume that the views in such works are personal. Both points of view overlook the repercussion on life of centuries of study and adherence to works on Dharmaśāstra, and the probability of the evolution of conformity to it in actual life. They also miss the hypothesis (which is *not* a 'legal fiction') of concord in all works on of Dharmaśāstra.

Buhler's Excisions.

When Buhler wrote forty years ago, the *Arthaśāstra* of Kāutilya was unknown. It will take us far out, if we undertake a review of the data for establishing the authenticity and date of this remarkable work. Even without the commentaries (as in the case of smṛtis) that would elucidate its provisions, it reflects a very highly developed administrative and legal system. In many respects it is in accord with *Manusmṛti*, and differences are explainable on the score of divergence of view-points between the two *śāstras*. I have already dealt with the erroneous views which have become popular about the nature and authority of *Arthaśāstra* and of the wrong interpretation of such ideas as *secular* and *religious* in regard to allied forms of complementary literature. Had Buhler lived after the discovery of the *Kāutilya*, some modification in his point of view and conclusions will have been made. The small space given to procedure or adjective law in Manu is held to indicate its early date (Buhler, p. xcix). "As regards procedure" (says he) "the *Manusmṛti* pays more attention to the moral side of the duties incumbent on the judge and the other persons concerned, than to the technicalities, which are more clearly and minutely described in the Dharmaśāstras of Yājñavalkya and Nārada." This is an indication of difference of aim, not of difference of knowledge or of evolution of ideas on law and procedure, Buhler ascribed Manu's work, as it now exists, to c. 100 B.C. at the earliest. Is it meant that no elaboration of procedure had taken place then or earlier? It is not a justifiable use of the argument of silence.

Throughout *Manusmṛti* the stress is on general, moral and metaphysical points. It might savour of bathos if a revealed book

of enjoined duty became, in spite of its already large bulk, a work on judicial procedure. Adjective law largely depends on conditions in which the administration of justice is carried on and the persons who are affected by it. These are more liable to change than fundamental, ethical and legal principles, which are the prime concerns of Manu.

Among the portions of *Manusmṛti* that Buehler considered to have been interpolated the most conspicuous are the cosmological, metaphysical and theological parts comprising almost the entire first parts of the second (89-100) and twelfth books. He declares that no *Dharmasūtra* begins with an account of its own origin, much less with an account of creation. This overlooks two points: that a *Dharmasūtra* represents the syllabus of a small part of the instruction given to a pupil, and that the rest of the *kālpa* as well as the subjects of the curricula of the average *Brahmacārīn* would supply just the missing theological or metaphysical knowledge. Such knowledge is basic. Manu attributes the social danger of heresy and infidelity to an absence of such beliefs. The unbeliever is a social danger and has to be externed from the state, as his lack of belief in the ultimate basis of social and ethical duties constitutes him into an anti-social person. India has never placed any embargo on the mind. But a social thinker is entitled to point out the risk to society of a mere attitude of negation (*nāstikya*) leading those who hold it to defy the conventions on which social order is built. Manu notes the existence of heretics in large numbers, and of the unstable condition of the kingdom in which they abound.¹ It is to overcome the results of an unchecked tendency to question the very foundations of religion and morality that he condemns those who apply dialectics to the authority and sanctity of Veda and smṛti, while he has no prejudice as such against *hetuśāstra*, and provides for a logician in every *pariṣad*, which is to declare the law (XII, 111) and accepts the fundamental *pramāṇas* of Nyāya (XII, 105). The *sūtras* are textbooks by human authors. *Manusmṛti* claims divine authority behind it, and aims at a universal appeal. The validity of its authority, no less than its teachings, rests on theological and metaphysical foundations. The divergent duties imposed on *varṇas* and *dśrmas*, have all of them their foundation, or justification, in fundamental assumptions that constitute the background of the minds of those who laid down the laws, and those who followed them. As a book that is one of many taught in a complete scheme of education, a *Dharmasūtra* can

1. ब्राह्मण-धर्मसूत्रविषयं भारतेकानान्यमस्ति नमः ।
विनयप्रसादात् तत् कृत्स्नं दुर्मिथ्याभिधीयते ॥ (८, २२)

merely allude to these beliefs and assume knowledge of them in the learner and teacher. But it is not so in a work intended for wide study.

The suggested rejections, on the score of interpolation, are curiously just those parts of the smṛti which are needed to supply the background for the social and political system which it is the object of the book to uphold. Among the other unwarranted suggestions for omission as interpolations are the account of *Naima* (II, 1-11) which has to be taken with that of transmigration and *kaṁavipāka* and the verses on the *oṁkāra* and *sāvitrī* (II, 76-87). The account of the 21 hells is rejected, and in short the entire background is rejected. The two grounds usually adduced for eliminating passages are either that it is wanting in *Dharmasūtra* works or goes into details. It is needless to expatiate on the theory. It is evident that the text of *Manusmṛti*, as we now have it, has been unchanged practically from the date that Buehler and others assign to it, *viz.* c.100 B.C. It is curious that the passages that are to be rejected, because they have a philosophical or theological flavour reminiscent of the Upaniṣads, are deemed worthy of being treated as interpolations, according to MM, P. V. Kane (I, p. 149) because they "have the flavour of modernism (?) about them."

We may close this lecture with a few words about the date of *Manusmṛti*. For external evidence, we have citations from it by Aśvaghōṣa and the *Dhammapāda*, an anonymous citation of a verse from it in the *Mahābhāṣya*, an early Cambodian inscription which cites Manu (II, 136) without naming him, and gives the gist of Manu (III, 77-80), and Vatsyāyana's reference to Manu. One of the aspects not touched on is the similarity in many passages between Manu and Kauṭilya, and in the Tamil aphorisms of the early Tamil ethical writer, Tiruvalluvar, for whom a date in the 2nd century A.D. is assigned. In internal evidence, reliance is laid on the alleged mention of the Chinese, Parthians, Yavanas, and Śākas (X, 43-45) in the enumeration of kṣātriya tribes or people, who had become *vṛśalas*, by neglect of their enjoined duties (*kriyālopaṭi*). In Medhātithi, the name of Pallavas appears as *Paṅkava*, and in Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* as *Paṅgrava*.¹ Such passages, containing enumerations, are easily interpolated or altered, in the interests of invaders who wished to be brought into Manu's scheme. If they are genuine and not interpolated, the extant version cannot be older than the 2nd century B.C. and would approximate to the date suggested by Buehler as an upper limit.

1. *Manu and Yājñavalkya*, p. 27.

It is noteworthy that, judging entirely from its content *viz.* ignorance of places south of Hindusthan, when Ceylon was occupied in 500 B.C., the omission to refer to the worship of Purāṇic deities like Śiva (who are mentioned in early Buddhist literature), imperfect knowledge of the *śix darśanas*, omission to mention the names in the great epics, Max Duncker¹ was inclined to date *Manusmṛti* soon after 600 B.C. Undoubtedly, a work that denounces the Licchavis cannot have been composed in the Gupta period, when the emperors boasted of their Licchavi connection. Its "awkwardness" in enunciating rules of judicial procedure, which is taken along with its omitting two out of the usual eighteen titles of law, is held to be a sign of early date. If we accept Bühler's dictum that *Manusmṛti* shows a period in which the systematic treatment of law had begun but had not advanced, the argument can be used for putting *Manusmṛti* before the *Kautiliya*. Speculations about the native country of the author are inconclusive. They are also irrelevant. The feature of historical validity in *Manusmṛti* is that for nearly two thousand years it has enjoyed a position of paramountcy among the books, which aimed at guiding the daily lives of Indians, and its social and political systems have had remarkable constructive results.

The reasons for its great influence, apart from its claim to be divinely inspired, are obvious. It deals more with civil matters (982 ślokas out of 2685) than any older work. It is non-sectarian. It was not composed by order of any ruler, and so had no limited influence. It relies on the oldest sanctions, *viz.* those of the Veda. It nowhere inculcates the worship of Purāṇic deities. Its tone is ethical. It deliberately aimed at wide influence by being prescribed for study by those, who, in the social order, were the teachers and leaders of society. Above all, it enjoyed the prestige and power natural in a work that claimed as its author the parent of mankind.

1. Max Duncker, *History of Antiquity*, Trn., Abbot, Vol. IV, pp. 95-196.