

## CHAPTER XI

### GALLI POLI

WITH dead-lock on the western front, the capture of Constantinople seemed a very tempting objective. By opening a passage to the Black Sea it would have put the granaries of Russia at the disposal of ourselves and our Allies. At the same time it would have made it much easier to supply Russia with those munitions of which she was so in need and which could only be landed at North Russian ports on the Arctic or else at Vladivostok. By severing the connection between Europe and Asia on the other hand it would have stopped supplies which were able to pass freely between Germany and Anatolia once Serbia was crushed. The Turk, though a fine soldier when ably led, would have been very helpless in modern warfare without German efficiency and German munitions. Serbia in fact might have been saved as Bulgaria, waiting to see which way the cat would jump, might have ranged itself on our side instead of with Germany.

Once Turkey entered the war the Bosphorus provided a flank lending itself to combined sea and land operations which we were particularly well fitted to undertake; and Russia, hard pressed, was anxious for her allies to make a diversion in this quarter.

France needed every man to defend her invaded soil and it was left to our War Office and Admiralty to discuss plans for a combined attack on the Dardanelles. There was much vacillation. At first it was proposed to send out the 29th Division, but all our newly raised troops were committed to France where there were constant calls for men. The decision was rescinded, and only after the Admiralty had started operations at the Dardanelles single-handed did Lord Kitchener at the War Office finally agree to cooperate.

The first step therefore consisted in the despatch of a squadron of British battleships of pre-Dreadnought type and of little value in a naval battle, together with a few French men-of-war, to attempt

the passage of the narrow straits opening into the Sea of Marmora.

On the 19th of February 1915 the forts at the entrance were quelled and, after sweeping for mines, the fleet advanced and attacked the defences at the Narrows opposite Chanak, only a mile wide, on the 18th March. Here, after carrying out an intense bombardment, it was compelled to withdraw after several ships had been sunk by mines and hundreds of lives lost.

Thus ended a naval demonstration whose only effect was to cause the Turks feverishly to strengthen the Peninsula and pour in troops and munitions. General Liman von Sanders, military adviser to Turkey, was placed in command and powerful entrenchments were built.

There can be no doubt now that the proper course at this point would have been to abandon the attempt. But operations of war, once undertaken, cannot be broken off without loss of prestige and morale. The War Office, hitherto adamant, undertook to try and make good where the Navy had failed; even though it was realized that the systematic reduction of Gallipoli would need a large army at a time when we could ill afford to dissipate our forces and had far from enough munitions for the western front.

The 29th Division (the last formed from fragments of the regulars) was already on its way. To it were joined Australian and New Zealand troops (the nucleus of the Anzac Corps) who had been landed in Egypt to defend it from Turkish raids, and arrangements were made to send further large reinforcements.

But it was a lengthy business to get all in readiness for such large bodies of troops to land on a hostile shore, and meanwhile Gallipoli was being made more impregnable with each day that passed. Finally, during April, the whole were concentrated in a huge fleet of men-of-war and transports at Mudros Bay in the Island of Lemnos. In the early hours of the 25th the armada sailed for Gallipoli and at break of day the troops landed from boats on the open beach, the Regulars at Cape Helles and the Colonials at Anzac. Lightly held trenches

lining the shore were carried at the point of the bayonet under cover of our naval guns.

This *coup de main* took the Turks by surprise; but no sooner were attempts made to advance inland and scale the more strongly manned heights, when the fire of our guns were less effective, than a far more determined resistance was met. Time after time did the troops breast the slopes and assail prepared positions. All was of no avail; the most that could be done was to cling precariously to the ridges first gained.

Nothing in the whole war was more heroic than the conduct of the British troops and the Anzacs, splendid fighters full of courage and endurance, during these assaults where they lost so heavily. The Turk, as he showed at Plevna, is a very stubborn fighter when entrenched. Without an intensive bombardment to beat down opposition by means of heavy howitzers, it was impossible to advance under such a murderous hail. But, even had it been possible to land these, we were at this time desperately short of munitions. There were present only a few light pieces of ordnance, far from enough ammunition and in particular a dearth of high explosive.

This is not the place to describe the operations that followed. It must suffice to say that although we poured in one reinforcement after another, until eventually twelve divisions and a mounted division were employed and largely consumed at Gallipoli, our experience of the 25th April was repeated each time we renewed the attack. The Turks also were reinforced and had both the heavier artillery and the high ground. But even with those advantages they were repulsed with loss whenever they indulged in counter-attack.

A last great concerted effort took place in August, chiefly from a new point of departure in Suvla Bay where the IXth Corps was landed. There were grave errors of judgment, the weather was stifling and water scarce. The first day was wasted, giving the Turks time to rush fresh troops to oppose this new front, and the attempt was a complete failure.

Then at last we began to abandon hope. The troops had lost their first fine confidence. The life blood of Servia had been drained, leaving the way open for heavy German ordnance to be brought to aid the defenders. Most of the small extent of ground we had won lay fully exposed to the enemy's high-sited artillery. It was only possible to land the barest necessities of human life. Dysentery appeared. With the autumn came gales and blizzards from which there was no adequate shelter. Sickness increased and the plight of the troops became daily worse.

Thus matters dragged on their weary course until shortly before the end of the year 1915 when, after a visit from Lord Kitchener, it was decided to cut our losses and give up the attempt.

It was a very ticklish business to get the troops disengaged and safely away where every point of departure was searched by gun fire. While the operation was going on an attack might have led to appalling loss. Many ruses were employed to persuade the Turks not to attempt a sortie. Tents were left standing and movements carried out by night till only a skeleton force remained. Then the last occupants of the trenches were withdrawn and safely embarked, and the expedition sailed to Egypt for well earned rest and recuperation after thousands of lives had been sacrificed all to no purpose in this disastrous campaign.

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Against this grim background we can now sketch in the features of Ordnance work. It can well be imagined that there was no scope for any elaborate organization such as was to be found in France.

Very little was known at home as to the conditions likely to be met, but it was at least realized that a landing would be opposed and that no attempt could be made at the outset to establish an Ordnance depot on shore.

The steamship *Umsinga* of some three thousand tons was therefore chartered and fitted out at Tilbury as a floating depot. As her holds were deep, with only one between deck, an extra deck was built in each, making

four floors all told. In this way, space could be used to better advantage for an assorted collection of goods, any one of which might have to be got at a moment's notice. A plan of each deck was prepared and stores were arranged by sections of the vocabulary, due regard being paid to weight so as to maintain an even keel. Lieutenant Colonel McCheane was appointed C.O.O. with a staff of some hundred and fifty of the A.O.C.

On arrival at Mudros, where the troops were assembling, the cargo was still further adjusted to facilitate work, a travelling workshop was fitted up on the main deck, and a few odds and ends wanted at the last moment were supplied. Here also it became known that two landings at different points were to be made. A second vessel, the *Anglo-Indian*, was placed alongside the *Umsinga* to which part of the stock and a detachment under Major Basil Hill were transferred, so that a store ship should be available at each landing. This operation was carried out during the night of the 24/25th April and on the following day the *Umsinga* sailed for Helles while the *Anglo-Indian* followed up the Anzacs.

On arrival, lighters were placed alongside, loaded in the first place with ammunition, and were towed by naval launches to buoys close in shore. The lighters were then hauled ashore by ropes. Heavy firing was in progress and most of the shrapnel were falling in the water, but the Ordnance parties got through with only a few minor casualties.

It was intended to station these vessels off the two beaches until such time as regular depots could be formed ashore. This proved impossible as the ships were under fire and because the constant shifting of cargo as stores were issued was a responsibility their masters would not face. The *Umsinga* threatened to turn turtle. At Anzac it was only possible to dump ashore such stores as were needed on the spur of the moment. At Helles, where the intensity of the fire was at that time much less, more ample arrangements were possible. Both vessels then sailed for Mudros.

The next idea was to replenish Helles and Anzac by

storeships from Alexandria, where the base for Ordnance supplies was installed. This plan broke down owing to the time taken to trans-ship cargo on to small craft and get it landed on open beaches. The ship was forced to return with much of its contents intact.

It was then decided to employ one of the Islands of the Ægean Sea as an intermediate point of supply from which Gallipoli could be reached by small craft; and Mudros Bay, forty miles from the Peninsula, was selected as the most suitable spot on account of its spacious land-locked harbour. Its shores, however, were shallow and shelving and to build piers and wharves alongside which ocean-going vessels could berth would have been a lengthy and costly business.

With everyone and everything sea-borne this would not much matter and, until after the failure at Suvla, our headquarter staff was very confident. It hoped that we should soon drive the Turks from their trenches when it would be a great advantage to have the main stock of munitions, equipment and clothing afloat all ready to be landed at any point on the Dardanelles or on beyond. The *Umsinga* was therefore kept as a depot ship to feed the beaches by means of ferry-boats plying to and fro.

As more troops and stores began to arrive it became clear that the *Umsinga* was far too small; and, early in July, s.s. *Minnetonka* was chartered instead, the *Umsinga* becoming her ammunition tender. The *Minnetonka*, of 12,000 tons, had been built for the Atlantic trade to carry cattle and a certain number of passengers and was perhaps as suitable a vessel as could be found. She had no well decks and her fore-deck was flush without superstructures.

Nevertheless, for a force that was expanding so greatly and as everything began to assume a more permanent character under the influence of trench warfare, it is impossible to imagine anything more utterly ill-suited for an Ordnance depot than a floating ark. Time and again was the impossibility of running an efficient service from on board ship represented and the creation of a

depot on shore urged. Only in the late autumn were the arguments at last listened to and a proposal made to form a depot on the shore of Kondia Bay next door to Mudros ; and almost immediately after we were considering the abandonment of the whole undertaking.

The *Minnetonka* had not only to furnish everything for Gallipoli. In the course of time large hospitals came into being on Lemnos with rest and reinforcement camps, etc. These likewise had to be provided for through the medium of two small depots on shore, Mudros East and West ; while a third depot was formed on the Island of Imbros where G.H.Q. and its surroundings had their being. There were also calls from the navy to be met from time to time. For instance, 700 survivors of H.M.S. *Triumph* were clothed when she was torpedoed.

With the lower decks of the *Minnetonka* divided into offices, group areas, workshops, armoury, etc., and the upper deck occupied by what was awaiting removal, space was far too cramped to allow of stores being held in any great quantity or laid out conveniently. To get at anything meant plunging into the badly lit bowels of the vessel whose derricks, intended for loading or discharge of cargo in bulk, were ill-adapted for collecting with speed parcels of every sort and kind from all over the interior.

It was utterly impossible to trans-ship into the *Minnetonka* all the bulky stores from out of the cargo vessels that arrived from day to day with supplies for such a large expedition. These boats either tied up alongside the *Minnetonka* or else anchored in the bay while parties were sent off to them at any hour of the day or night to dig out what was most wanted.

Major Man, who was for several months Ordnance officer of the depot ship during the autumn, when the strength of the force had reached its maximum, graphically describes the situation :

“ I remember one day in October when there were well over a hundred steamers anchored in the bay, a dozen of which held stores, ammunition and clothing. We were desperately hard pressed for machine guns which

were being telegraphed for from the front. The bills of lading told us that there were machine guns on board two or three different ships, but it would take weeks to get plans of the holds and find out exactly where they were stowed. Our parties therefore would board a fully loaded 4000-ton tramp steamer and unload on to its deck hundreds of tons of cargo to find machine guns or whatever it might be. After a cargo had been overhauled in this way two or three times one can imagine its hopeless state of confusion.

“Our next great difficulty was due to the service between Mudros and Gallipoli being so uncertain. Stores were carried on the small ferry boats and motor barges (Beetles) which took the troops to and fro. There were all too few of these, often they were too crowded to take everything we had ready, and the service was liable to interruption in bad weather.

“Seldom could we make any definite arrangements in advance. At 6 p.m. we would be told by the naval transport officer that such and such a craft would call at 6 a.m. and lie alongside the *Minnetonka* for 30 minutes to load stores for Helles. All hands would set to and get on deck what was available on outstanding demands from Helles. At 10 p.m. the N.T.O. might send a message to say the boat was to go to Anzac instead of Helles. What had been laid out would be pushed aside and a fresh lot got ready. Then, when at 5 a.m. (instead of 6 a.m.) the ferry came alongside, her skipper would perhaps report that he could only stay ten minutes as he had to push off immediately for Suvla.

“There was no time to clear the deck before a notification would arrive of some fresh departure. Before the end of the year the fore-deck was actually covered to a depth of from six to eight feet with stores which had been laid out for issue but could not be taken and which were so overlaid by later batches that they were never recovered for use and totally wasted.

“The opportunities for theft by Greek and other working parties and by soldiers and sailors were unlimited. After a time convoy-men accompanied consignments and



matters improved a bit. But the unfortunate corporal or private found it very hard to protect articles strewn on the deck of a boat crowded with troops sleeping, sitting and standing, who had no respect for Government property.

“To keep accurate check was impossible and it is small wonder that, when the accounts of the *Minnetonka* were eventually squared up, deficiencies such as 70 Vickers guns and half a million pairs of socks came to light.

“I regard my five months on the *Minnetonka* as a nightmare. We worked as a rule for seventeen or eighteen hours in the twenty-four. The men were cooped up for weeks or even months on board and four of them went mad from overwork and worry.”

It is small wonder that Man says a lesson burnt into his brain is never again to use a floating depot to supply a large force. Should this method ever have to be resorted to on a small scale, he notes the following points as of main importance.

Owing to the necessity of being able to get out promptly any individual package, the shafts leading down to the holds and a wide space round them on each deck must be kept absolutely clear. This of course at once lessens by half the capacity of the ship.

Each derrick should be provided with its donkey-engine and should be capable of lifting and lowering a sling straight over the side or vice versa. If stores have to be first lowered on the upper deck and then lifted over the side by a fresh tackle the waste of time is enormous.

Flush decks are a great help. Well decks cause great delay.

It is essential to possess not only the bill of lading of any ship sent out with a reinforcement of stores but also a detailed plan of the vessel showing the contents of each compartment in her holds.

Working for long hours in the bowels of a ship is unhealthy and gives rise to severe mental fatigue. It is

therefore very important to arrange for organized recreation. In the absence of anything better, half an hour with a football stuffed with paper can be indulged in on any deck. Pushing this about with the feet results in a general scrimmage which helps to sweat the irritability out of everyone.

The peculiarity of this theatre, from a supply point of view, is that the lines of communication lay on the high seas. At Gallipoli itself the situation was for some time looked on as so transient that no attempt was made to build up any definite supply organization. Brigadier General Jackson, as Director of Ordnance service, spent most of his time at Alexandria organizing the base which later on became his sole charge while his deputy, Colonel P. A. Bainbridge, was at Imbros, the headquarters of the expedition and not at Mudros, the supply centre.

Only in July, when General Altham arrived as I.G.C., bringing with him from the Southern Command in England his A.D.O.S., Perry, who subsequently became D.O.S. to the force, were efforts made to put matters on a more regular footing. Altham was of opinion that the beaches should be regarded as the railheads of the force and that, as such, they should come under his charge. But to this Corps Commanders objected, claiming that everything landed in their areas was inalienably at their disposal. Indeed seeing that every establishment on shore was practically within the battle area, it would have been impossible for an I.G.C. to control them efficiently from a distant island.

But though Altham did not carry his point, it was due to him that a more systematic organization was built up. An A.D.O.S. was appointed to each zone to co-ordinate, under its commander, all Ordnance work in the area and see that such stores as arrived were distributed to the best advantage among the troops. The beach dumps were converted into depots, organized on the plan of lines of communication establishments. Each was placed definitely in charge of an Ordnance officer, and ledgers were opened so that, in the event of an

advance, the depot could be left behind properly provided for. Better arrangements were also made for combing out salvage from the trenches and sending it to Mudros.

At Helles, as has been said, it had been possible to form a fairly respectably depot from the outset, but at Anzac the position was for long much more difficult.

Moreover, until the end, establishments on Gallipoli were without most of those refinements usually associated with the term Ordnance depot. A rough notebook and a good memory were probably always more valuable than the official accounts which, owing to losses during the evacuation, were perhaps fortunately never called to audit. Stocks were confined to a few items, and when they showed signs of running dry, or if anything extra was needed, a telegram or rough list would be sent to Mudros. Then, after an uncertain period, what was wanted would arrive and be issued through the medium of D.A.D.O.S. either by hand or Indian mule cart, practically the only form of land transport. At other times an Ordnance representative would be sent to the *Minnetonka* to see what useful spoil he could bring back.

All the customary checks were to a large extent waived, both in dealings between the *Minnetonka* and the Ordnance at Gallipoli, and between the latter and the troops. There was no place of safety on the Peninsula for a large establishment and no option but to live a hand-to-mouth existence.

The shortage of munitions has been mentioned. Far more machine guns could have been profitably employed and, until the base at Alexandria was able to mobilize the resources of Egypt, there was a great scarcity of trench mortars, bombs, grenades, sand-bags and all those things wanted in such quantities during trench warfare. There was nothing beyond the ordinary divisional artillery, the largest piece being a 60-pr. ; and the equipment of tools and appliances to keep the guns in working order was poor. Later on the supply of ammunition improved and small reserves were built up. But by then the

Turk had more ammunition and one of the most serious problems was how to store high explosive shell in safety.

When the war broke out Australia was in the throes of forming its own Ordnance department and had been lent the services of Major Austin A.O.D. to assist. Austin sailed for Egypt in December 1914 as D.A.D.O.S. of the 1st Australian Division, having to form his own staff out of untrained men who nevertheless quickly adapted themselves to new circumstances, were as keen as mustard and splendid workers.

Tuckett (an Australian and afterwards Major Tuckett, M.C., M.M.), who was to have accompanied him to Anzac, was ill and had to be left behind at Alexandria, whence he smuggled himself to Gallipoli as a stowaway as soon as he was better. Thus Austin was the only Ordnance representative with the first landing at Anzac. Here he took charge of the reserve of small arm ammunition, occupying himself in getting it up the ridge, and established himself on the beach among the dead and wounded near the small pier at Hell Spit under an Ordnance pennant which, riddled with bullets, now lies in the Australian war museum.

The guns were next got ashore with their ammunition, picks and shovels, etc., salvage began to accumulate and the *Anglo-Indian* arrived. A site for an Ordnance dump was then allotted at Brighton Beach where the A.S.C. supply dump was being formed. Here the Turks gave us twenty-four hours to build a zareba of great-coats and then opened fire from a 4.7 (Beachy Bill) at Gaba Tepe, which dominated the position. In ten seconds, great-coats, picks, shovels, etc., and A.S.C. supplies were dancing skywards. Under cover of darkness what remained was moved to the other end of the beach with the aid of a borrowed cart and mules. Here there was rather better cover, though the site was sniped by sharpshooters and enfiladed by "Anafarta Annie" as well as Beachy Bill. Though shelled practically every day, however, a great wall of clothing gave some protection.

Some Indian troops landed whose only Ordnance


representative was a warrant officer, blown to pieces by a shell the day he arrived. These Austin tacitly took under his wing and, as A.D.O.S. Anzac Corps, he became responsible for all Ordnance services in this sector.

Gradually some degree of order was evolved. Store-tents were pitched, an office was formed and a rough shanty erected as a workshop. Here the dump remained until October when rising tides threatened to wash it away. The landing at Suvla had enabled us to extend our ground along the shore and a fresh dump, the fourth, was then formed beyond the northern margin of the cove. This was more sheltered, there was more room to expand and altogether better arrangements were possible with well constructed trenches and dug-outs as refuge during bombardments. Here also a large cave was discovered in the cliffs capable of holding a good quantity of ammunition.


At Anzac our position was but three-quarters of a mile deep, but at Helles the hills debouched further from the shore. The main Turkish entrenchments were on the slopes of Achi Baba (throughout the immediate but unattained objective) which crowned the southern extremity of the Peninsula, and we were able to penetrate several miles inland. On the other hand there was some dead ground under the cliffs at Anzac whereas at Helles hardly any point was safe or even sheltered.

Major Howell Jones accompanied the 29th Division as D.A.D.O.S. to Helles, where the Naval Division also landed with French troops on our right flank. On the following day the *Umsinga* discharged ammunition and a dump was formed at Lancashire Landing, which, though in full view of the guns on Achi Baba, was at least concealed from the Turkish forts on the Asiatic coast. Later on a pier was built, but it was more or less destroyed by every gale.

The Naval Division had its own dump at first. Later on this was merged with the army dump except for purely naval equipment; and eventually all the troops in this sector were formed into the 8th Corps of which Howell



S.S. MINNETONKA AND SATELLITES



ORDNANCE DEPOT, HELLES





Jones became A.D.O.S., having charge of all Ordnance work at Helles.

Captain Gatt of the Royal Malta Artillery was appointed Ordnance officer of the depot which had its small workshop. Deep narrow trenches were built outside the store-tents, offices and living quarters, and by a rigid system of whistles everyone could go to ground in an extremely short space of time. The advantage of this was incalculable later on when the enemy had more ammunition and Lancashire Landing was often shelled continuously night and day.

Owing to the serious shortage of grenades, Major Teale of the Naval Engineers and some men were attached to the Ordnance to run a bomb factory. Luckily there were plenty of detonators and a quantity of N.C.T., and a careful collection of jam-tins and other receptacle enabled a very flourishing factory to be established, capable of turning out large numbers of grenades.

Up to the middle of August ammunition was kept in an old fort near the lighthouse and in dumps on the shore. But the loss of several of these dumps, combined with the near approach of winter, made it advisable to look out for something better. Teale, who was a mining expert, was then employed on tunnelling to make an underground magazine with the aid of miners from various units. Eventually a very fine magazine, provided with a tramway, was burrowed out 70 feet underground, capable of holding in security the 2500 tons which had accumulated by the close of the campaign.

At Suvla, where Lieutenant Colonel Blunt was A.D.O.S. until relieved in October by Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton, we did not land till August. There was much less time to build up anything and arrangements were even more primitive.

The Ordnance headquarters were in a little sandy cove, some 120 yards wide, bounded on each side by steep faces. Beyond was a small plain which only stretched a few hundred yards before spurs and valleys began. The depot consisted of five store-tents, and the dug-



outs used for living and offices were built out of boxes of live ammunition with tarpaulin roofs covered by sandbags. Gun ammunition was stacked in the open covered by bushes. In addition D.A.D.O.S.s had their small dumps, competing for what they could get from this central source.

Hamilton tells a pitiful tale of an early bout of bad weather. "One Friday afternoon we had a bad thunderstorm with a deluge of rain lasting some hours, then gradually, as the rain ceased, the temperature dropped and the wind increased. By the early hours of Saturday morning it was blowing a blizzard with an icy blast. It was bad enough for us in our indifferent shelter, but it meant disaster to the troops in the trenches taken unawares, some sleeping with little on except shirts and overcoats. The first we knew of the state of affairs was the arrival of a continuous line of stragglers returning to the beach in the most pitiable state of exhaustion. The store-tents were emptied, straw was placed in them, and all available stretchers were fetched. Rum obtained from the A.S.C. and boiling water were used to succour the worst cases, but several men died from exposure. Then came the difficulties of dealing with the stragglers who continued to arrive throughout the whole of the next day. Two or three tables were placed on the beach, the bales of clothing were opened, and as the men filed past the necessary articles were issued to each. I think I am right in saying that, roughly speaking, 8000 men were evacuated as a result of this blizzard." Actually the number was more like 12,000.

If for no other reason the Corps did at least earn the gratitude of the troops for having an ample and early supply of good warm clothing landed on Gallipoli. Not often could it experience such a feeling of satisfaction, and for the Ordnance it was indeed a blessing that the wants of the troops were comparatively simple. There were few guns and only of light natures, no complicated types of ammunition, neither side made use of gas, there were no wagons and harness or saddlery to speak of, no great network of intercommunications; a complete

absence of a host of adjuncts such as were to be met with in France.

Suvla, the last point occupied, was the first where evacuation started late in November. Each evening as dusk set in, the troops detailed to embark arrived on the beach with all their equipment. They then quietly boarded the boats ready to take them off to the waiting ships and slipped away in the dark, while the fleet shelled the Turkish lines. Guns, ammunition, stores and clothing were got away simultaneously over a period of five weeks. Everything having been removed in safety, Hamilton with the last men of the Ordnance embarked on the final day, shortly before Christmas.

Early in December the process was extended to Anzac where the operation was carried out in a much less leisurely manner. As soon as the news became known to a chosen few, stocks which were being carefully nursed were freely issued, and every opportunity was taken to send back to Mudros whatever was possible. But it was quickly realized that time would not admit of saving everything, and no bones were made about dumping goods in the sea or smashing them up and emptying drums of oil over clothing. It was, however, strictly forbidden to light bonfires or blow up explosives as this would indicate to the foe what was in the wind. Only when the last of the troops were safely at sea on the 22nd December was what remained of the dump, which by then contained nothing of much military value, blown to glory by the guns of the fleet on the following day.

Not until then was any move made at Helles, where only ten days' notice was given in which to carry out the evacuation. As these crept by the position became very tense with so few left in face of the whole force of the foe. But the Turks made no move and everything went off according to plan. With such a short space of time in which to embark the troops it was not possible to save much else. To avoid sacrificing human lives the magazine and most of the dump had to be abandoned,

though a certain quantity of stores was got away in the boats among the troops.

As usual the Ordnance were among the last to quit the scene. Howell Jones and Teale stayed to fire a mine so fuzed that the A.S.C. supply dump would go up five minutes after zero hour and the magazine ten minutes later. Teale got away by the last boat waiting on the beach in plenty of time and the arrangement worked to perfection. The A.S.C. dump was seen to light up and before it had attracted the attention of the Turks the magazine blew up. Inspection from a man-of-war two days later showed that the destruction had been complete. That part of the dump over the magazine was completely obliterated and elsewhere the fires were still smouldering. For his bravery in extinguishing a burning limber full of ammunition twenty-four hours earlier Captain Gatt was awarded the Military Cross.

By the 10th January, 1916, the whole of the Corps had assembled at Mudros where twenty-four store-ships were needed to take everything back to Alexandria. Although it had been impossible to save all Ordnance stores it was at least a satisfaction to know that none of military value had fallen into the enemy's hands.

Everyone was heartily thankful when they reached Egypt at the close of this nine months' arduous campaign. The fighting had been desperate and our losses very heavy without anything to show in return. The climate was treacherous—hot in summer, bitter in winter. Accommodation, whether in camp or hospital, was poor and comforts were lacking. There were no facilities for recreation, at Gallipoli bathing was even risky.

A combination of adverse circumstances made it impossible to organize a really efficient Ordnance service ; and the Ordnance officer was rarely able to go to sleep with an easy conscience feeling that he had left undone none of those things that he ought to have done. Nothing is more disheartening than to toil day after day and never earn the reward of seeing one's labours bring forth good fruit ; and it is therefore the more creditable to find that there was never any friction between the Ordnance at

Gallipoli and Mudros. Each seems to have realized his neighbour's special difficulties and all worked harmoniously together. Although conditions of life were naturally much easier for the A.O.C. than for those in the trenches, in no theatre did the Ordnance share so fully all the hardships of the campaign. In the cemeteries of Gallipoli are the graves of several of the Corps killed in action.