

Chapter Seven

SEED-TIME OF TOTALITARIAN NATIONALISM

I. PLANTERS AND CULTIVATORS

TREITSCHKE wrote in 1884 that the older generation whose catchword had been liberalism was giving way to a new generation of lusty singers of *Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles*.¹ He was quite right, and a shining example himself of this very transition. In his youth Treitschke had been a pronounced Liberal, and the nationalism which then enthralled him was the kind that appealed almost universally to liberal intellectuals—the kind which postulated an atomized Europe of self-conscious nationalities, each one, whether large or small, romantically prizing its distinctive language and historic traditions, peacefully attaining to political independence and constitutional government, and, of course, not denying to others the right of national self-determination it claimed for itself. Such liberal nationalism had been at least implicit in Prussian “regeneration” and Italian “risorgimento,” in revolutionary movements of 1830 and 1848, in the patriotic activities not only of Stein and Mazzini, but of Palmerston and Gladstone in Britain, Guizot and Thiers in France, Daniel O’Connell among the Irish and Ján Kollár among the Slavs, Francis Palacký in Bohemia and Baron Eötvös in Hungary, Ljudevit Gaj, the apostle of Yugoslav unity and freedom, and Émile Laveleye, the Belgian sociologist; and it had been an ostensible object of Napoleon III’s foreign policy.

But the fruitage of liberal nationalism proved to be war rather than peace; and the generation of intellectuals who grew up during the series of nationalist wars from 1859 to 1878 naturally associated the outcome with current material progress and also with the newly discovered and widely advertised “scientific” principle of “the struggle for existence and survival of the fittest.” The result was at

¹ “Die ersten Versuche deutscher Kolonialpolitik,” in *Zehn Jahre deutscher Kämpfe*, 3rd ed. (Berlin, 1896).

once an intensification of nationalism and a change in its character. Divested of romantic trappings of altruism and cosmopolitanism, it was rendered nakedly "realist" and unblushingly self-centered. No longer modest or pacific, it grew blatant and bellicose; and with pride of success substituted for mere aspiration, it took on an imperialistic complexion. For a nation which by force of arms had demonstrated its fitness to survive must be superior to others, and entitled, in so far as it could, to dominate them. This type of nationalism was obviously not liberal. It represented, indeed, a central feature of that complex of forces which by the 1880's was swinging Europe away from earlier liberal moorings.

The change was particularly marked in Germany, where the Prussian army and Bismarck's *Realpolitik* had recently achieved most gloriously what the speeches and resolutions of '48 had notoriously failed to achieve—national consolidation, and with it Germany's hegemony on the Continent. Treitschke registered and forwarded the change by his pamphlets during the Franco-Prussian War, by his lyrical *History*, by the lectures on politics he delivered at Berlin throughout the '80's and '90's. Only great and powerful states ought to exist, he reiterated; small states cannot protect their subjects against invasion and hence cannot engender among them any real patriotism or national pride. With great national states the worst sin and the most contemptible is feebleness; "it is the political sin against the Holy Ghost." In the new age the national state must be the "power state"; its "highest moral duty is to increase its power." It must extend its functions to the totality of human interests and activities. It must provide through universal education "a training in the active love of the Fatherland." It must nationalize all minorities under its sway by penetrating them with "the same speech and culture," and incidentally by treating Catholics as "deficient in true Germanism" and Jews as "an element of decomposition." The power state must be safeguarded against individualism, party strife, and parliamentary inefficiency.²

Treitschke professed to be a National Liberal, but his liberalism after 1870 was merely a vermiform appendix to his functioning

² See especially *Die Politik*, I, *passim*; *History* (Eng. trans., New York, 1915-1919), I, 6, 46, 329, and IV, 112, 117; and "Zum Gedächtnis des grossen Krieges" (1895) in *Ausgewählte Schriften* (Leipzig, 1915), 325, 335.

nationalism, and this was scarcely distinguishable from that of his Conservative colleague at the University of Berlin, Adolf Wagner, who punctuated constant campaigning in behalf of economic nationalism with forays against Jews, Catholics, Poles, Frenchmen, and any other group, domestic or foreign, that he deemed dangerous to Germany's unity and might. Nor should one overlook the complementary role of that other Wagner—Richard—who, looking back from the vantage point of 1871 upon his own youthful participation in the revolution of 1848, declared it “un-German” and went on to explain that there was no German word for democracy and that the thing itself was a “Franco-Judaic” invention. The musical genius republished in 1869, with sharpened barbs, his early diatribe against the Jews; and in 1876 he crowned Germany's new imperial nationalism with his *Ring der Nibelungen*, a new sort of aesthetic nationalism resoundingly resurrecting the demigods of pre-Christian Teutonic Valhalla.

Three other significant contributors to totalitarian nationalism were camp followers of the victorious German armies of 1870: an army chaplain, Adolf Stöcker (the name Adolf recurs through the later nationalist drama like a Greek chorus); an army surgeon, Ernst Hasse; and an ambulance driver, Friedrich Nietzsche. The first specialized in “national socialism,” combating Jews and Marxians and comparing “the majesty of war” with “the majesty of God”;³ and the second, in national imperialism, becoming head of the Pan-German League in 1894. The third was not much of a nationalist himself, not even an anti-Semite, but his “philosophy of the will” and his “contempt of pity” provided an exhaustless arsenal for the younger generation of militant patriots and imperialists. “As the smaller surrenders himself to the greater,” said Nietzsche, “so the greater must surrender himself to the will to power and stake life upon the issue. It is the mission of the greatest to run risk and danger—to cast dice with death.”⁴

In Austria the talented Georg von Schönerer called upon his fellow Germans in the '80's to mobilize against Jews and other “alien” peoples of the Hapsburg Empire, and to prepare for their

³ *Christlich-Soziale Reden und Aufsätze* (Bielefeld, 1885), p. 286.

⁴ *Also sprach Zarathustra* (1883), 11.

own reception into a Greater Germany by cutting loose from the Roman Catholic Church and adopting a German—and heroic—“racial Christianity.” It is not without interest that in the region of Austria most affected by Schönerer’s “Los von Rom” movement, was born in 1889 a certain Adolf Hitler, who developed in boyhood a passionate fondness for Wagner’s music and Stöcker’s demagoguery and was punished at school for singing instead of the courtly *Kaiserlied* the provocative *Deutschland über Alles*.

Much the same nationalist fever which military victories brought on in Germany, was superinduced in France by the military defeat of 1870-1871. French patriots, whether of the “Right” or the “Left,” would not accept the disastrous encounter of that “terrible year” as any conclusive denial of their country’s right to survive as a great power with all its old-time prestige and “civilizing mission.” The disaster had been fortuitous and must be repaired as quickly as possible. On the one hand, Taine, with aristocratic leanings, blamed it upon the individualism and democracy which eighteenth-century Enlightenment and Revolution, reinforced by a maddening romanticism, had foisted upon the nation; and in the brilliant volumes of his *Origines de la France contemporaine*, half history and half tract, which he put forth from 1871 to 1893, he mordantly diagnosed the ills and by implication prescribed the remedies—a return to monarchy, aristocracy, and the traditions of the old regime, and a “realistic” recognition of the “scientific” fact that the ordinary man is a primeval savage, a gorilla, who must be forcibly subdued.

On the other hand, Paul Déroulède, of Jacobin background, blamed the disaster of 1870 on the timidity of Napoleon III and the insufficiency of patriotic passion among the masses, and consecrated his life to the arousing of national spirit and the preaching of a war of revenge against Germany. He penned hundreds of stirring soldier songs. He inspired the formation in 1882 of a “League of Patriots”—including Gambetta, Victor Hugo, Henri Martin, Sadi-Carnot, and Felix Faure—and long presided over it. He lectured up and down the land, distributed myriads of patriotic pamphlets, sponsored rifle clubs among the youth, organized annual national fêtes at Paris about the image of Jeanne d’Arc and the veiled statue of Strasbourg. Unable to persuade Gambetta or other

Republican politicians to go to war with Germany. Déroulède gradually reached the conclusion that the Third Republic was as cowardly as the Second Empire had been and that it should be supplanted by a military dictatorship. "I have found my man," he said in 1883; "his name is Boulanger."⁵ But the Boulangist movement, to which he pinned his hopes and for which he zealously labored, collapsed in 1889. He then joined the anti-Semitic forces which the Dreyfus case arrayed, and when they were about to be routed he made a forlorn attempt in 1899 to execute a *coup d'état* himself against the Republic.

A young physician, Dr. Gustave Le Bon, had attended French troops in the war of 1870. After the war he turned to "scientific" research in chemistry, physiology, and anthropology, and presently blossomed forth in innumerable articles and tomes as an "authority" on "crowd psychology."⁶ He was a credulous as well as an indefatigable fellow, but his solemn coxsureness, buttressed by constant obeisance to Darwinian biology, made his worst nonsense pass muster as sound science and assured him a wide circle of devout disciples. There were, it seemed, four distinct races of mankind in an ascending scale of cultural and intellectual talents: (1) "primitive" Fuegians and Australians; (2) "inferior" Negroes; (3) "average" Chinese, Japanese, and Semites; and (4) "superior" Indo-Europeans. The last, it appeared, were perpetually in danger of succumbing to "mob psychology," which was something dreadful, and the only way in which they could preserve their superiority was essentially the Tainesque way of opposing democracy and building up an elite of brains and military prowess.

A nationalist by-product of the Franco-Prussian War was Maurice Barrès. He was only eight years of age when German troops took possession of his native village in Lorraine, but what the precocious boy then saw left an indelible impression upon the man, as he

⁵ Jérôme and Jean Tharaud, *La vie et la mort de Déroulède* (Paris, 1914), 42.

⁶ His most publicized work was *Psychologie des foules* (Paris, 1895), which reached a 31st edition in 1925; its English version, entitled *The Crowd*, appeared in 1899. His "scientific" reputation was founded on an earlier work, crowned by the Academy of Science and the Anthropological Society: *Recherches anatomiques et mathématiques sur les variations de volume du crâne et sur les relations avec l'intelligence*, 8 vols. (Paris, 1879). Among the host of Le Bon's other works are *L'Homme et les sociétés* (1881); *Les Premières civilisations* (1889); *La Psychologie du socialisme* (1898); *La Psychologie de l'éducation* (1907); *La Psychologie politique* (1910); *La Psychologie des révolutions* (1912).

recorded thirteen years later: "We who look back to the dark year in the vague mist of our childhood feel that the honor of *la Patrie* is embodied in the marching ranks of a regiment; all the military fanfares carry us back to the conquered soil; the waving of the flags seems to us a distant signal to the exiles; our fists clench; and we have only to make ourselves provocative agents."⁷ Such an agent Barrès certainly made himself; and the tonic he dispensed was nicely compounded of ingredients furnished by Taine, Déroulède, Boulanger, the anti-Semitic Drumont, and Nietzsche, all flavored with Barrès's own "lyrical exaltation." The "national egotism" which he celebrated in his trilogy, *Le Roman de l'énergie nationale* (1897-1903), and in his collection of essays, *Scènes et doctrines du nationalisme* (1902), was not only an ultimate expression of the Generation of Materialism but also a fitting prelude to the succeeding generation of "Action Française" and World War, and an unwitting salutation to the Mussolinis and Hitlers still to come.

It must not be imagined that the sowers of totalitarian nationalism were all anti-Semites. Some Jews were effective planters—for example, Émile Durkheim, who started out to be a rabbi and ended up as a world-famous sociologist. He taught that the national state, the *patrie*, is a "psychic being," that of all "societies"—family, class, church, *etc.*—it is the most basic and by right the most powerful, and that, as its function is the supreme one of directing and giving harmony to the ideal "corporative society," so its members owe it supreme allegiance and the highest public worship.

In Russia the militantly racial and imperialistic nationalism known as Slavophilism received marked impetus from Danilevski, to whose *Russia and Europe* (1871) reference has already been made;⁸ and in the heat of the Turkish War of 1877-1878 and especially after the accession of Alexander III in 1881 it was widely propagated by Russian intellectuals and exerted no little influence upon the Emperor's key administrators, Plehve and Pobédonostsev. As outlined by the gifted Aksakov brothers and filled in by Michael Katkov, the ablest Russian journalist of the '80's, Slavophilism

⁷ *Les Taches d'encre*, Nov. 5, 1884, cited by Victor Giraud, *Maurice Barrès* (Paris, 1922), 33.

⁸ See above, p. 13.

posited the superiority of Slavs to other Europeans and the superiority of Russians to other Slavs. Russia was "holy Russia," blessed with "orthodox" Christianity as over against Protestant and Catholic heresies outside, and with a traditional political and social order—Tsar, nobility, and village community, all predominantly agricultural in outlook and hence mutually respectful and quite stable—which was incomparably better than the demagogic democracy and industrial selfishness of western Europe. But Russia, the Slavophiles said, should be altruistic and not keep her blessings to herself. She should liberate the Slavs beyond her frontiers from every alien yoke and guard them from debasement whether by Moslem Turks or by heretical Germans; and if certain Slavs, for instance the Poles, were already so contaminated by the West as to be renegades from true Slavism and antagonistic to Holy Russia, then they must be brought to their senses by forceful blows. Katkov was a strenuous opponent of Polish national aspirations, and at the same time intensely anti-German. He received Paul Déroulède with open arms at Moscow in 1886 and strongly seconded his proposal of a Franco-Russian military alliance against Germany.

All over Europe similar seeds were being sowed. In Norway Björnson fell under the spell of Darwin and Spencer and turned from romantic liberalism to "realism" and militant "activism." In Bohemia Karel Kramář led a "Young Czech" revolt against "Old Czech" moderation and compromise. Among the Poles Roman Dmowski began to agitate for an imperial Poland, a *Polonia magna*, which should properly subject to the "superior" Polish race its "inferior" neighbors—Lithuanians and Letts, White Russians and Ukrainians. In Hungary, Count Tisza signalized his long premiership from 1875 to 1890 by persistent preaching and practice of nationalistic discrimination against the non-Magyars who comprised a half of the country's population.

In Italy, after her debut as a great power, Mazzini, with his tilting at the injustice of one people's mastering another, must have seemed like a Don Quixote to the "realistic" generation of Don Sanchos who followed. Not that these Sanchos were cowardly. Some were very bold, at least in utterance. One group, centering in the faculty of philosophy at the University of Naples and including

Francesco de Sanctis and Bertrando Spaventa, became ardent apostles of the teaching of Hegel, particularly of his ideal of an omnipotent state, and inveighed against the cliques of liberal politicians and machinations of special interests that impaired national unity. The Italian state, said Spaventa, should be strengthened as the German state under Bismarck had been; more than that, it should be "adored." A second group comprised semi-pagan and ultra-patriotic poets and dramatists: Giosuè Carducci, who invoked the ancient spirit of the "great Roman race"; Enrico Corradini, who urged heroic deeds in emulation of Julius Caesar; and Gabriele d'Annunzio, who, like Barrès, dipped into the Nietzschean bath and came out dripping with "national egotism." A third group embraced the statesmen Depretis and Crispi and their parliamentary supporters, nominal "Liberals of the Left," actual proponents of economic nationalism and national imperialism.

In mid-Victorian Britain, Carlyle had been something of an anomaly, and it seemed charitable to ascribe to chronic dyspepsia his choleric ridicule of humanitarianism, denunciation of parliamentary government, advocacy of industrial regimentation along military lines, and apostrophe to "rule by the hero, the man of action who must not hesitate to use force." But the completion of his monumental eulogy of Frederick the Great on the eve of the creation of the Hohenzollern German Empire and his passionate espousal of the German side in the Franco-Prussian War were timely, to say the least; and in the subsequent drift of nationalism (and imperialism) Carlyle was invested with the halo of a major prophet. Froude was his intimate friend and Ruskin a devoted disciple, while other English intellectuals echoed his doctrines. Sir James Stephen returned in 1872 from civil service in India profoundly convinced that civilization could be maintained only by force, and in the next year he published *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, a frontal attack upon the whole liberal position of J. S. Mill. Sir Henry Maine, another veteran of Indian service, brought up supporting artillery in 1886 with his volume on *Popular Government*: civilization, he insisted, was a technical skill held in trust for the many by the few; it was a hardly won entity which force created, habit perpetuated, and patriotic statesmanship guarded. Then in 1896 William Lecky

climaxed his career as an historian of ideas with a two-volume work, *Democracy and Liberty*, the moral of which was that real liberty is for supermen and antithetical to democracy.⁹

Moreover, the Hegelian idealization of the state was transplanted to England, particularly to its intellectual capital of Oxford, by a galaxy of dons—T. H. Green, Edward Caird, Francis H. Bradley. Green, for example, taught that the state is an organic society superior to its component individuals, that it is usually right in whatever it does because it draws on the whole inheritance of past wisdom, and that it should actively intervene to insure the possibility of a “good life” to all its members. The neo-Hegelians in Britain, like their contemporaries in Italy, wished to serve the cause of personal liberty, but practically the method they advocated was conducive less to the continuance of traditional liberalism—and liberal nationalism—than to its underpinning, in domestic and foreign affairs, with props of power politics.

In England, too, “left-wing” Liberals such as Joseph Chamberlain and Sir Charles Dilke were soon joining hands with Tory Democrats like Lord Randolph Churchill and with the old-line Conservative statesman Salisbury to back the racial and imperialistic nationalism so splendidly exemplified by men of action of the stamp of Cecil Rhodes, and so gloriously lauded by the psalmist of the new dispensation, Rudyard Kipling. How happy even Carlyle might have been, and perhaps quite freed from dyspepsia, had he lived into the '90's and witnessed the ousting of liberal “charlatans” by forceful “heroes.”

II. FAVORABLE SOIL AND CLIMATE

Recorded history has usually ignored the myriad sowers of seed fallen by the wayside or on stony ground or among thorns, and remembered only those whose seed “fell on good ground and sprang up and yielded fruit a hundred-fold.” Nationalistic seed was, of course, but one of many kinds of seed which intellectuals strewed broadcast during the thirty years from 1870 to 1900. That it proved remarkably fruitful must be attributed not so much to the particular planters whom we have just named as to the fact

⁹ See B. E. Lippincott, *Victorian Critics of Democracy* (Minneapolis, 1938).

that their particular seed, more than any other, fell on fertile soil in an auspicious climate, although one should not rob the planters of credit due them. They had a knack of choosing seed adaptable to the environment, and they carefully cultivated what they sowed.

Conditions were very favorable from the 1880's onward. By then, certain results of the series of nationalistic wars from 1859 to 1878 were manifest to ordinary Europeans as well as to intellectuals, and influential with them all. To a considerable extent the political map of Europe had been redrawn along lines of nationality. Germans and Italians had acquired national states ranking as great powers; Hungarians had obtained full sovereignty; and the scrambled peoples of southeastern Europe—Greeks, Serbs, Rumanians, Bulgarians—had been largely segregated in newly established or newly confirmed national states. Moreover, large-scale popular participation in the wars which produced this nationalizing of political geography had served to arouse a bellicose national spirit among the masses, not only of the victorious nations (including Russia), but also of the defeated peoples of France and Austria and vicariously of a country like Great Britain whose populace had merely sat on the side lines and watched. There was heightened popular pride in national military accomplishments; heightened popular veneration of national military heroes; heightened popular expectation that national arms would keep what had been gained or recover what had been lost.

Back in the '50's and early '60's there had been some chance that the principle of nationality and the practical establishment of national states might be harmonized with a federative polity guaranteeing a degree of unity and solidarity to Europe as a whole.¹⁰ The chance was lost in the ensuing wars and attendant intensification of national feeling. The dream of a federated Europe dissolved into the reality of a nationally disparate Europe, and in the '80's political separatism of the various national units was buttressed by an economic separatism, involving the repudiation of international free trade and the adoption of tariff protection and other adjuncts of economic nationalism. Both political and economic separatism

¹⁰ This chance for a federative polity is the central theme of the late Professor Robert Binkley's companion volume in the present series, *Realism and Nationalism, 1852-1871* (New York, 1935).

were inspired, in the main, by nationalist sentiment, and this in turn was greatly quickened by political and economic rivalries in which the several national states consequently engaged.

It cannot be too strongly stressed that nationalism was now popular and commonplace. In earlier days it had been a special concern of particular groups of intellectuals, and its propagation by means of learned societies and heavy tomes and fugitive articles had been uphill work among a skeptical aristocracy and an indifferent peasantry. Now, however, classes and masses alike were readily responsive to nationalist propaganda, and marvelously effective instruments were available for it—the new national school systems, the new cheap popular journalism, the new democratic procedure and “pressure politics.” Conditions favoring the formation and multiplication of chambers of commerce and trade-unions, co-operative societies and agrarian leagues, also favored the spawning of national organizations with ultra-patriotic objectives: army leagues and navy leagues, national defense societies, colonial societies, societies of war veterans and of sons and daughters of veterans, societies for the nationalizing of dissident minorities. In Great Britain the Primrose League (1883) soon counted its adherents by the hundreds of thousands. In France the League of Patriots (1882) secured a numerous following. In Germany the Colonial Society, starting with 200 members in 1882, had 25,000 in 1900; the Pan-German League, originating in 1890, numbered 22,000 fifteen years later; the anti-Polish “Society of the Eastern Marches” (1894) speedily enrolled 30,000 members; the Navy League (1898) enlisted half a million within two years.

Conservatives and “reactionaries,” who in Metternichean times had been almost as chary of “nationalism” as of “revolution,” were now in the van of every ultra-patriotic movement—economic nationalism, imperialism, etc.—and by the 1880’s they had an unusually large and loyal clientele. Liberals (with the capital letter) might be dwindling a bit in number but not in patriotic fervor, and many of them—National Liberals in Germany, Liberal Unionists in Britain, the majority of Radicals in France and Italy—were approximating in this respect the attitude of contemporary Conservatives. Apparently they had to do so to retain popular support.

Some pacifistic intellectuals continued to distinguish between patriotism and nationalism and to criticize the latter's jingoist tendency, but the general public was now apt to regard them as incorrigible idealists, tiresome if not dangerous. The growing Marxian parties, to be sure, had the reputation of being anti-patriotic, and their "theoreticians" and parliamentarians certainly waged a wordy campaign against standing armies, protective tariffs, imperial enterprises, and other conspicuous features of the newer political and economic nationalism. Yet the bark of Marxian dogs was worse than their bite. The noise came from "leaders," the great majority of whom were not real "proletarians," but bourgeois intellectuals with a heritage of earlier liberal idealism and humanitarianism. The "followers" comprised such a small segment of any nation prior to the 1890's that they couldn't have inflicted very serious wounds if they had been minded to bite. Probably, if the expressed attitude of trade-unionists is any index, the Socialist rank and file were not minded to bite at all and not lacking in patriotism. At any rate, the Marxian parties made their most spectacular gains—though still remaining minority parties—just when "Reformist" leaders in the late '90's were eschewing talk of class warfare and criticism of nationalist policies. The Fabians, Shaw and Wells included, frankly defended British imperialism in South Africa "in the interest of civilization" and applauded the conquest of the Boer Republics.

Whatever Marxians might say or do, the large majority of ordinary people, rural and urban, voted in democratic elections of the '80's and '90's for political groups pledged to the pursuit of nationalist ends. It was naturally so, for the voting masses, like leading politicians and intellectuals, were profoundly affected by the climate—the *Zeitgeist*—of those decades, and the climate was extremely favorable to nationalism.

Functions of the state—now normally the national state—were being rapidly expanded to foster technological progress, to multiply public works and creature comforts, to cope with a wide latitude of economic and social problems issuing from the latest stage of industrialization, to elaborate and maintain vast systems of public education, to carry the advance of medical science into the big

realm of public health. More and more, therefore, the national state was becoming, in the eyes of its citizens, a fairy godmother, the dispenser or expected dispenser of all good things. No wonder that Hegel's dithyrambic exaltation of the state assumed new and vital significance.

Furthermore, the extraordinary mobility and urbanization of population served to create during those decades an extraordinary number of *déracinés*, as Barrès called them, that is, persons uprooted from ancestral soil and local allegiance. Experiencing grave economic insecurity and psychological maladjustment, these were very susceptible to demagogic propaganda, socialist or nationalist or both; and in any event, with the exception of a few who turned anarchist, they proved a help rather than a hindrance to the growth of *étatisme*, the enlargement and centralization of state functions, which led more or less inevitably to the adoption of nationalistic policies.

To the same end operated the contemporaneous loosening of the hold of Christian faith and practice upon a sizable portion of Europe's population. Thereby a kind of religious and moral void was created for relatively large numbers, who promptly though unconsciously sought to fill it with a new faith, a new object of worship, a new cult. Some found the desired substitute in "science," others in Marxian socialism (which was as much a religion as a system of economics), still others—doubtless the majority—in nationalism. Almost all of them, however, put national state in place of church as the cement of human society and as the intermediary between man and his salvation. On the other hand, professed and practicing Christians, being now on the defensive in most European countries, felt obliged, if they were not to suffer still greater losses, to prove themselves invaluable to their national states and to outdo everybody else in protestations of national patriotism, especially when such pagans as Barrès and d'Annunzio pointed proudly and at times wistfully to the "beauty" of Christianity and claimed it as a traditional glory of the particular nationalism they inculcated. In this way, many sincere Christians, along with militant anti-Christians, were acclimatized to the ultra-patriotism of the Materialist Generation.

Finally, let us emphasize, this same generation as a whole was acclimatized to certain "scientific" conceptions, or at least to certain "scientific" slogans, which were of inestimable utility not only in stimulating the intellectual sowers of totalitarian nationalism but also in enrooting it among the masses. One, borrowed from biology, was "the struggle for existence and survival of the fittest." Another, taken from physics, was "the supreme reality of matter and force." Others, derived from physiological psychology, were "man's animal mind" and "man's fighting instincts." Still others, stemming from sociology, were "herd instinct," "crowd psychology," "consciousness of kind," "social solidarity." It was the currency of such phrases and their implications which made the competitive national militarism, imperialism, and navalism of the period seem natural and scientific, and which expedited the association of all these phenomena with a "realistic" nationalism whose characteristic tone was forcefulness. In fact, any doctrine of forcefulness, by whomsoever preached or for whatsoever purpose, was likely sooner or later to be integrated with nationalism. This was true of Nietzsche's "forceful superman" and "will to power." Even Marx's forceful "proletariat" and "class conflict" had a common denominator with the "forceful nation" and "international conflict."

III. RACIALISM AND ANTI-SEMITISM

The newer nationalism was "forceful." Also it was characteristically "racial."

Of course, all sorts of earlier nationalists had talked much about "race," but their talk had usually been loose and "literary" and without pretense to scientific exactitude. Ever since Schlegel delivered the dictum that there were as many races as there were languages, reference to "German race," "French race," "Celtic race," "Slavic race," etc., had been *à la mode* in writing and conversation. All this, however, was a manner of speaking, a merely conventional use of "race" as a synonym for "nationality."

A change came with the vogue of social Darwinism after the national struggles of the '60's and '70's. Obviously the "fittest" nations "survived." But what made a nation "fittest"? Social scientists, becoming obsessed with the transcendent importance of heredity,

jumped to the conclusion that it must be the one whose biological racial stock was best. The problem of finding out what the different human species were and which was best, seemed simple and soluble in either of two ways. You could classify races, superior and inferior, according to mental traits and then discover which one a man belonged to by observing his behavior and measuring his intelligence. Or you could classify them according to physical features. It appeared axiomatic that Germans, now being clearly a very fit people, must belong to a superior race. Hence anyone who displayed "German" qualities of boldness, energy, and bravery must belong to that race; and conversely, anyone who, like the prevalent physical type of German, was tall, blond, blue-eyed, and dolichocephalic, must possess superior qualities of courage and intellect.

The fitting of men into races according to their behavior was the special concern of a swarm of "social psychologists," of whom Gustave Le Bon was the most verbose and one of the most influential. On the other hand, hundreds of anatomists and anthropologists devoted themselves with scientific fervor to measuring physiological differences among men in respect of stature, shape of skull, color of hair, eyes, and complexion, and deducing therefrom different races (with correspondingly different qualities).¹¹ One of the most persistent and instructive of these, one who beguilingly styled himself an "anthropo-sociologist," was the Frenchman Vacher de Lapouge. He found three "racial species" of "homo sapiens" in Europe and tagged them, in appropriate zoological manner, with Latinized names: (1) *Homo Europaeus*, tall, blond, long-headed, blue-eyed, and also adventurous, energetic, domineering, idealistic, creative, distinctly superior, and Protestant; (2) *Homo Alpinus*, short, stocky, dark, round-headed, full-bearded, broad-nosed, and also cautious, slow, and agricultural; and (3) *Homo Mediterraneus*, short, slim, dark, long-headed, and also less creative and morally inferior, cowardly, shifty, fond of show and bright colors, sadistic, and Catholic. Lapouge likewise satisfied himself by a curious com-

¹¹ As early as 1842 A. A. Retzius, a Swede, had put forth a system of classifying human types according to head form and facial angle and had formulated concepts of dolichocephaly and brachycephaly, of prognathism and orthognathism. Extensive application and development of his "system" occurred after 1871.

parative study of cephalic indices of Frenchmen he examined in the flesh and of Frenchmen he exhumed from their graves that each Germanic invasion of France had resulted in a measurable improvement of French stock. Unfortunately, according to him, there was in contemporary France a growing scarcity of tall dolichocephalic blonds, which betokened progressive national degeneration; the supermen were being submerged by democratic Alpines and Mediterraneans.¹²

It is hardly necessary to point out the inconsistencies, the highly dubious assumptions, and the faulty techniques in this sort of racial "science."¹³ Most of its devotees during the '80's and '90's simply assumed, like Darwin, the inheritance of acquired characteristics; and so subjective were the methods they generally employed that no two of them reached the same conclusions as to what were the different races of mankind or what were their distinguishing marks. Yet if one contradicted another with a zeal and constancy befitting earnest searchers after truth, it only confirmed the conviction of all that there must be something fundamental in the whole business—that race can, even if it doesn't immediately, explain everything.

Scientific contributors to racialism were legion in the last decades of the nineteenth century.¹⁴ Later on, of course, a goodly number of

¹² See his articles in the *Revue d'Anthropologie* for 1887-1889, his *L'Arven, son rôle social* (Paris, 1889), and his essay on "The Fundamental Principles of Anthropology," *Journal of Political Economy* (Chicago, 1897-1898).

¹³ It has repeatedly been done, most devastatingly by F. H. Hankins, *Racial Basis of Civilization* (New York, 1926); Jacques Barzun, *Race, a Study in Modern Superstition* (New York, 1937); L. L. Snyder, *Race, a History of Modern Ethnic Theories* (New York, 1939); and Ruth Benedict, *Race* (New York, 1940).

¹⁴ Among authors of memorable treatises on the subject were L. A. J. Quetelet, *Anthropométrie* (Brussels, 1871); P. P. Broca, *Instructions craniologiques et craniométriques* (Paris, 1875); Ludwik Gumplowicz, *Rasse und Staat* (Vienna, 1875) and *Der Rassenkampf* (Innsbruck, 1883); J. L. A. Quatrefages, *L'espèce humaine* (Paris, 1877, Eng. trans., New York, 1879); Paul Topinard, *Éléments d'anthropologie générale* (Paris, 1885); John Beddoe, *The Races of Britain* (Bristol, 1885) and *Anthropological History of Europe* (Paisley, 1893); D. G. Brinton, *Races and Peoples* (New York, 1890); Otto Ammon, *Die natürliche Auslese beim Menschen* (Jena, 1893) and *Die Gesellschaftsordnung und ihre natürlichen Grundlagen* (Jena, 1895; 3rd ed. 1900); Rudolfo Livi, *Anthropometria militare*, 2 vols. (Rome, 1896-1905); Joseph Deniker, *Les races de l'Europe*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1899-1908) and *Les races et les peuples de la terre* (Paris, 1900; Eng. trans., London, 1900); Gustaf Retzius and C. M. Fürst, *Anthropologia suecica* (Stockholm, 1902); Ludwig Woltmann, *Politische Anthropologie* (Eisenach, 1903); C. H. Stratz, *Naturgeschichte der Menschen* (Stuttgart, 1904). Other names would include Cailhier, Collignon, Durand de Gros, and Muffang in France; Brandt, Haeckel, Hansen, von Hölder, Schemann, Virchow, and Weissner in Germany; Schimmer and Weisbach in Austria; Steensby in Denmark; Anutchin in Russia; Chalumeau in Switzerland; Houzé in Belgium; Lévassour and Olérix in Spain; Calora, Lombroso, Nicolucci, Reseri, Riccardi, and Sergi in Italy; Galton, Huxley, and A. R. Wallace in England; Ripley in the United States.

anthropologists and other social scientists, impressed by Weismann's argument against the inheritance of acquired characteristics and by new biological conceptions resulting from the application of Mendelian principles, evinced a healthy skepticism about the rather naïve racialism of the Generation of Materialism. But so far as pseudo-scientific publicists and popularizers were concerned (and their number was still more legion), the harm was already done. These had so effectively implanted racialism in the minds of multitudes and so fructified it with nationalist passion and prejudice that henceforth it had a life and popularity of its own quite unaffected by the doubts of scholars or the findings of scientific investigators. Ironically enough, a "realistic" generation prepared the way for the triumph of racial fancies over racial facts.

One of the most successfully propagated offshoots of racialism was the Aryan myth. For some time previously, philologists had used the word "Aryan" (or "Indo-European") to denote the group of related languages including Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Celtic, Slavic, German; and students of history and comparative law had contended that institutions and customs common to nations speaking Aryan tongues must have originated with a single primitive "Aryan" people. But now appeared the racialists, identifying this linguistic and cultural people with the tall, blond, long-headed race. Inasmuch as Germans were credited with being wholly or predominantly of this type, and especially as they superlatively displayed in 1870-1871 the valor imputed to it, then Germans must be, so to speak, the standard Aryans physically and spiritually—the purest, noblest, strongest, most culture-bearing of all peoples of the world. Which was very flattering to German patriots and "scientifically" confirmatory of their own suspicions. Small wonder that they plumped *en masse* for the new racialism. As Adolf Stöcker exuberantly expressed it: "German blood flows in every German body, and the soul is in the blood. When one meets a German brother and not merely a brother from common humanity, there is a certain reaction that does not take place if the brother is not German. Peoples can be compared to birds; there are different species."¹⁵

¹⁵ Dietrich von Oertzen, *Adolf Stöcker, Lebensbild und Zeitgeschichte* (Schwerin, 1912), pp. 260-61.

Into the service of German Aryanism was pressed a nice old French aristocrat, the Comte de Gobineau. His *Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races* had attracted little attention when it originally appeared in four erudite volumes in 1853-54, and it did not ascribe racial superiority to any nation as a whole, certainly not to the German. Rather, the Count had sought to explain a superiority he posited for himself and fellow French aristocrats over the mass of Frenchmen on the ground that the former represented pure Aryan stock while the latter were degenerate products of racial intermixture; and it was only after the decisive political defeat of patrician Royalists by plebeian Republicans in the '70's that disappointed French nationalists with aristocratic sympathies were properly disposed to find consolation in the pages of Gobineau. In 1884, when racialism was everywhere becoming fashionable, a new two-volume edition of his *Essay* was published at Paris. It sold much better than the original.

But while Gobineau had only a class following in France, he soon obtained a popular one in Germany. Here the whole nation was presumably Aryan, and endowed with all the fine and noble qualities he so liberally attributed to his own ancestors. Germans in general could applaud his pronouncements that European history began with the German migrations and that these produced the high civilization which is the outward manifestation of the superior innate tendencies of an Aryan. Richard Wagner acclaimed Gobineau as a master mind and great prophet. Presently a "Gobineau Museum" was opened at Strasbourg. In 1894 a "Gobineau Vereinigung" was founded at Freiburg. In 1899 a disciple, the self-Teutonized Houston Stewart Chamberlain, brought out the famed *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, surpassing the master in laudation of the Germanic, Teutonic, Nordic, Aryan race (it was all one now). By pursuing, too, what he termed "rational anthropology," a "new science" based on "intuition born of ceaseless observation," Chamberlain arrived at a position far in advance of Gobineau's. It was that anyone who has thought or acted like a German, equally with anyone who looks like one, must belong to that superior race, and that consequently such "Germans" as Columbus, Dante, and St. Paul are proof of German cultural supremacy. This was racial

imperialism *in excelsis*. But it was popular. Chamberlain's book sold like hot cakes.

Meanwhile English (and American) publicists were recalling that "Anglo-Saxons" belonged to the superior Teutonic race. No less an authority than Gobineau had pointed to England, rather than to Germany, as the modern country where the "great race" survived with least adulteration. To be sure, Englishmen had not recently displayed in Europe the race's valor, as Germans had so sensationally done. But what about their adventurous spirit on the seas and throughout the huge British Empire overseas? Seeley in his *Expansion of England* proclaimed the Empire to be the very embodiment of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority, and in stirring prose called the English race to action to maintain its rich heritage. To him and likewise to the entire succeeding generation of British imperialists, the *motif* in all of England's greatness—political, commercial, industrial, and moral, no less than naval and colonial—was "the Anglo-Saxon race." And what easier explanation could be put forth of the rapidly growing strength and expansionist ambition of the United States? "If I read not amiss," declared a Congregationalist clergyman of New England in 1885, "this powerful race will move down upon Mexico, down upon Central and South America, out upon the islands on the sea, over upon Africa and beyond. And can anyone doubt that the result of this competition of races will be the 'survival of the fittest'?"¹⁶ John Fiske, with more truth than he was aware of, gravely pronounced "the revolution in theory concerning the Aryans" to be as "remarkable as the revolution in chemical theory which some years ago introduced the New Chemistry."¹⁷

There were other nationalist offshoots of the new racialism. Patriotic publicists among Latins and Slavs resented the alleged superiority of Teutons and Anglo-Saxons, and either put in counter-claims for "Mediterranean" and "Alpine" races,¹⁸ or magnified the Aryan element in their respective nations and urged its strengthening. In any case they could all pride themselves and their nations

¹⁶ Josiah Strong, *Our Country, its Possible Future and its Present Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1891), 175.

¹⁷ *The Discovery of America* (Boston, 1892), I, vii.

¹⁸ The Italian anthropologist Giuseppe Sergi published a sympathetic account of the "Mediterranean race" in 1885.

on belonging to the "white" race, which was patently superior to the blacks of Africa, the yellows of Asia, the browns of Malaysia and Oceania, and duty-bound therefore to conquer and rule these inferior breeds in the interest of "the higher civilization." Racialism was a kind of vitamin in the national imperialism of the age.

It also, within Europe, gave new vigor and direction to anti-Jewish sentiment. Dislike of Jews was, of course, nothing new, and in some respects was understandable. They were everywhere a minority who, even after their "emancipation," preserved a good deal of clannishness and a good many traditions and customs different from the majority's. Christians disliked their religious recalcitrance; farmers, their urban-mindedness; Conservatives, their flocking with Liberals or Marxians. But all this dislike was more or less latent until the widespread Conservative and intensely nationalist reaction of the early '80's and the rise of racialism. Then it was crystallized and rationalized as "anti-Semitism." The Jews, it was averred, because ancient ones had spoken a Semitic language, must all belong to a Semitic race which couldn't help but transmit physical and mental traits different from the Aryan and irreconcilable with it. Hence there was no hope of changing Jewish habits and every reason for safeguarding Aryan nations against the degrading influence of Semitic minorities. As Adolf Stöcker said, "The Jews are a nation within the nation, a state within the state, a race in the midst of another race. All other immigrants are finally assimilated in the nation where they live, but not the Jews. Their unbroken Semitism and their rigid ritual system and enmity to Christianity stand in direct contrast to the Germanic spirit."¹⁹

Occasionally an anti-Semite, like the crotchety German biblical scholar Paul de Lagarde, made light of the racial argument and appealed to nationalistic exclusiveness and intolerance. Lagarde maintained that "Germany must be full of German men and German ways, as full of itself as an egg; then it will have no room for Palestine."²⁰ He would absorb Protestants and Catholics into a "national German Christianity," and Jews who resisted absorption

¹⁹ Dietrich von Oertzen, *op cit.*, p. 151.

²⁰ Anna de Lagarde, *Paul de Lagarde* (Göttingen, 1894), p. 140. See also Lagarde's *Deutsche Schriften*, 4th ed. (Göttingen, 1903), and *Juden und Indogermanen* (1887).

he would expel altogether from the country. If they were suffered to remain, their "internationalism" and their "control of money and the press" would spell disaster for Germany.

Of all Jew-baiters of the era, the Frenchman Édouard Drumont was the most inveterate and vituperative. Beginning with his two-volume *La France juive* (1886) and continuing through a long series of similar books²¹ and in the columns of the newspaper, *La Libre Parole*, which he founded in 1892, Drumont's constant cry was against the "Semites" and their mental and physical traits—he even charged them with emitting a peculiar and most objectionable "odor." According to him, they caused all the ills which afflicted contemporary France. Though a minority, their shrewdness and trickery and pushing qualities enabled them to get a strangle hold on the wealth, the press, and the government of France and thus to dominate the nation. Their greed and dishonesty were responsible for the impoverishment of peasants and workingmen; and their hatred of Christianity, for anti-clerical and irreligious legislation. Their cowardice made the Third Republic cowardly, and their internationalism and devotion to their kinsmen in Germany led them to honeycomb the French army with treason and unfit it for the task of recovering Alsace-Lorraine. The immediate remedy was forceful expulsion of Jews from France. Ultimately the European states might together deal the Jews "a big and simultaneous blow."²²

However preposterous in themselves were such rantings as Drumont's, especially when directed at the whole Jewish population, they were accepted, in a time of intensifying nationalism and of much theorizing about race, as substantially true, not only by unbalanced agitators but by a surprising number of pseudo-intellectuals and by sizable groups among the masses. Stöcker, with the aid of Adolf Wagner, organized an expressly anti-Semitic party in Germany in 1887; it polled 47,500 votes in 1890, and 285,000 in 1898. In Austria the Nationalist party which Schönerer gathered

²¹ *La France juive devant l'opinion* (1886); *La Fin d'un monde, étude psychologique et sociale* (1888); *La dernière bataille* (1890); *Le Testament d'un Anti-Semite* (1891); *De l'or, de la boue, du sang* (1896); *Les Juifs contre la France, une Nouvelle Pologne* (1899); *Les Juifs et l'affaire Dreyfus* (1899).

²² *La France juive*, I, 184.

about him in the '80's was anti-Semitic, and in the '90's the Christian Socialist party under Karl Lueger's leadership became so.²⁹

In France two events in the early '90's served to revive and extend the motley Nationalist coalition which had waxed and waned with the personal fortunes of General Boulanger and to give it a definitely anti-Semitic complexion. One was the exposure of large-scale bribery of Republican ministers and members of parliament (chiefly to cover up shady transactions of the Panama Canal Company) by unscrupulous Jews—the banker Baron Jacques de Reinach and the blackmailer Cornelius Herz. The other was the conviction by court-martial of a Jewish army officer, Captain Alfred Dreyfus, on a charge of selling military secrets to Germany and Italy. Here, apparently, was double substantiation of Drumont's allegations. All sorts of disaffected Frenchmen joined in the hue and cry: nationalists of the Radical stamp of Déroulède or of the traditionalist bent of Barrès; Royalists; Bonapartists; ultra-patriotic army officers, clergymen, and laymen; a not inconsiderable element among shopkeepers and workingmen. For several years anti-Semitism was the spearhead of a popular movement seriously threatening the replacement of the Third French Republic by some form of nationalist dictatorship.

Of the financial scandals associated with Reinach and Herz, no exculpation was possible. But they were pushed into the background by accumulating (and eventually substantiated) doubts about the guilt of Dreyfus and the integrity of the evidence on which he had been convicted. In 1898 the novelist Zola publicly accused anti-Semitic army officers of having forged the evidence and the anti-Semitic press of having prompted and exploited the injustice for political purposes; and the next year the "anti-Dreyfusards" found themselves confronted with an equally determined and numerically superior bloc of "Dreyfusard" Republicans and Socialists, which at once began the rehabilitation of the Jewish captain.

In general the anti-Semitic agitation of the '80's and '90's, though noisy, proved politically ineffectual. While widely fostering popular prejudice and social discrimination against Jews, it led to no legal restrictions upon them in France, Germany, Austria-Hungary,

²⁹ Lueger repudiated "racial" anti-Semitism.

or elsewhere in western and central Europe. Only in eastern Europe, specifically in Russia and Rumania, did it produce discriminatory legislation. In Rumania, where peasant antipathy to Jewish traders and moneylenders was deep-seated, and where national sentiment had recently been outraged by the provision in the Treaty of Berlin (1878) requiring the country, as a condition of its independence, to accord "equal rights" to Jews, the government practically nullified this treaty obligation and permitted only a very few of the quarter million Jewish residents to vote or hold office. In Russia the Tsar Alexander III, responding to earnest pleas of Slavophiles, to counsels of his chief advisers in church and state, and to public clamor, issued a series of ukases against Jews. In 1882 he forbade them to acquire landed property. Then, to keep them out of the learned professions, he restricted their admission to universities and secondary schools, at first fixing a "quota" of ten per cent, and later reducing it to three per cent. In 1890 he obliged those who resided in the interior of Russia to move to the western provinces—the so-called Jewish Pale—where they were forbidden to own or lease land and were subjected to close police surveillance. What was still worse, many government officials, taking their cue from the attitude of the Tsar, gave free rein to anti-Semitic incitements to mob violence and tolerated if they did not direct anti-Jewish pogroms, attended by plundering and burning and in some instances by massacre. From pogroms as well as from repressive legislation Russian and Polish Jews suffered grievously; and despite efforts of the Tsar's government to make them stay, some 300,000 left the Empire in the single year 1891. It was the start of the high tide of Jewish migration to the United States.

One should not overlook what was perhaps the most fateful of all the consequences of the era's anti-Semitism—the consequence for the Jews themselves. Suffering from imputations against their "racial" character, they became acutely race conscious and in a sense exemplars of racialism; at least they tended to sink religious and cultural differences in an assumed ethnic unity. Suffering, too, from nationalist taunts that they were "aliens" and could not be good citizens of countries where they lived, they tended, in defense or as compensation, to develop a Jewish nationalism. In 1896 an Hun-


garian Jew, Theodore Herzl, came forward with principles and a program for just such nationalism: Zionism, he called it. The Jews, he asserted, were really, after all, a distinctive nationality, with a language, a culture, and historical traditions peculiar to themselves, and as such they were entitled to an independent national state of their own, preferably in Palestine. The next year the first general congress of Zionists was held at Basel, and soon the movement enlisted an enthusiastic following among Jews in many lands. Zionism was a result of anti-Semitism. In turn it aggravated anti-Semitism and that totalitarian nationalism of which racialism was a conspicuous mark.

IV. THE NATIONALIZING OF MINORITIES

Jews were but one of many European minorities to experience in the generation after 1871 the tightening strictures of an exclusive and intolerant nationalism, and indeed they experienced them less universally and gallingly than did others. For while anti-Jewish agitation was practically nonexistent in Great Britain, the Low Countries, Scandinavia, Iberia, and Italy, and productive of no legal disabilities elsewhere in western or central Europe, nationalistic agitation against other minorities was rife all over Europe and legislatively fruitful in most countries.

These minorities, in some instances, were religious and Christian. Especially were Catholics accused of being a state within the state and qualifying their loyalty to the nation by undue deference to a foreign potentate; and wherever they were a feared or despised minority, as in the German and Russian Empires, they were visited with a *Kulturkampf* or outright repression. Moreover, the anti-clerical campaigns and enactments in traditionally Catholic countries, such as Italy and France, had nationalist as well as other motivation. And the vigorous profession of Catholicism by the Irish and Polish peoples evidenced to the nationalistic non-Catholic majority in Great Britain, no less than in Germany and Russia, that those peoples were inferior and must be held in tutelage.

Marxian socialism aroused the special ire of patriots, not only property-owning ones, but all those who saw in its internationalism and in its arraying of class against class a menace to national



solidarity and a serious obstacle to the attainment of national ends. In Germany a drastic law against Socialist propaganda was spread upon the statute books in 1878, and there and elsewhere the civil administration and the police were ever on the alert to keep the Socialist minority in check.

Yet neither religious nor Marxian groups—not even professional pacifists—fell foul of intensifying nationalism so universally and so continuously as did ethnic minorities. Pacifists were scattered individuals, too few to be feared; they were usually credited with good intentions, and for their lack of realism they were pitied more than blamed. In most countries, too, anti-Catholic movements lost driving force with the decline of the sectarian Liberalism which had promoted them and with the consequent reaction in the '80's toward conservatism; and with the retirement of Bismarck in 1890 even the German anti-Socialist legislation was allowed to lapse. Not so, however, the efforts to mold subject nationalities to the image and likeness of dominant ones. These efforts, begun somewhat unwittingly by Liberals, were continued with conscious purpose by Conservatives; and in general they commanded wide popular support.

The period, it must be borne in mind, was one of transition and novel adjustment for the European state system in respect of nationalism. To the "national" states already existing in western Europe, there had just been a forceful addition of similar states in the central and southeastern portions of the Continent—Italy, Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Serbia, Bulgaria—which was an obvious sign, at least to Liberals, that real progress was being made toward the complete reshaping of Europe's political geography along frontiers of language and nationality. Nevertheless, none of the so-called national states was strictly national; that is, none embraced, or was confined to, a single nationality. Many German-speaking people were still outside the German Empire, and within it were Poles, Danes, and French-speaking Lorrainers. Italy lacked important "irredentas," and so too did every one of the Balkan states. Hungary included Magyars, but a larger total of non-Magyars. Belgium was bilingual, and Switzerland trilingual. Spain comprised Catalans and Basques as well as Castilians, and France, a

variety of "submerged" and "forgotten" peoples; while England was part of the "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland."

Moreover, while the principle of nationality was newly vital and effectual in Europe, it was conditioned almost everywhere by surviving habits and attitudes of the earlier age of dynastic empires; and in eastern and east-central Europe still flourished the extensive polyglot domains of Tsar, Sultan, and Hapsburg Emperor. The first of these approximated to a "national state" in that the majority of its total population was compactly Great Russian, but in the second the dominant Turks were a minority, and in the third, though Austrian and Sudeten Germans tried to maintain a traditional dominance, there was nationalist chaos.

This halting between a partially and an entirely nationalized Europe occurred just when "the state" was being lavishly exalted and its functions vastly expanded. It occurred likewise just when doctrines and examples of forcefulness, racialism, and colonial imperialism were convincing "successful" and dominant nationalities that they were "superior" and in duty bound to curb any agitation of "inferior" peoples for separate statehood and to keep these under the higher civilizing influence of the existing "national state." In other words, *raison d'état* compromised the working out of the principle of nationality; "national self-determination" gave way to a "determination by superior races"; and nationalism became imperialistic not only overseas but within Europe.

Though of varying intensity in different countries, the phenomenon was ubiquitous. In Scandinavia the Swedish regime merely declined to make any concessions to Norwegian separatism. In Spain, under the restored monarchy, both Conservative and Liberal statesmen combated autonomous movements of Catalans and Basques. The Third French Republic was adamant against any revival of "regionalism" or the public use of any "patois." The half of Belgium's population which spoke French strove to "gallitize" the half that spoke Flemish. In the Balkans, in a manner *sui generis*, bands of Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian nationalists, frequently with the connivance of their respective governments, perpetrated rapine and murder upon Macedonian peasants who happened to espouse the wrong nationalist cause.

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Englishmen who profusely sympathized with "oppressed" peoples on the Continent and warmly upheld their right of national self-determination could perceive slight justification for the exercise of any such right in Ireland. The Irish were an inferior "Celtic" race,²⁴ Catholic, volatile, improvident, quarrelsome, whose violent outbreaks, as in the Fenian outrages of the late '60's and the Phoenix Park murders of the early '80's, had to be repressed with a strong arm. They were obviously unfit to govern themselves, and what a blow it would be to the British Empire—and the future of civilization—if some foreign power should intervene in Ireland and establish there a naval and military base! Besides, Ireland had in Ulster a decent and "progressive" Protestant minority which was faithful to Britain and the empire and which must not be "betrayed" into the hands of a superstitious, backward, and disloyal peasant people. If England showed the Irish that she "meant business," they would come to respect her and, like the Scotch and Welsh, prefer the material advantages she could give them to the siren songs of nationalist agitators.

Gladstone, it is true, threw some agrarian and ecclesiastical sops to the Irish, but he repeatedly resorted to "coercion," and any idea of granting them even a modicum of "home rule" he flatly rejected until 1886, when, by a strange balancing of political forces in the British parliament, he found himself dependent on Parnell's Irish Nationalists. His conversion was unavailing, however. A large fraction of his own party, including such Radicals as John Bright and Joseph Chamberlain, deserted him and with the Conservatives and Imperialists threw out his Home Rule Bill. He tried again in 1893, and again failed. In turn, the Conservatives and Liberal Unionists threw sops to the Irish—some bigger sops, in the form of Land Purchase Acts and a Local Government Act, than the Grand Old Man of Liberalism had thrown—but, backed by unmistakable majority sentiment throughout Great Britain, they would not truckle to "Irish nationalism."

In the very same year in which Britain denied "home rule" to

²⁴ Later, H. G. Wells was sure that a "hairy folk," a "short dark Iberian race," "pre-Celtic," "pre-Aryan," and "pre-Nordic" survived in Ireland and accounted in large part for its "backwardness" and "primitivism." *Outline of History*, new ed., 2 vols. in 1 (New York, 1927), pp. 266, 281, 1015.

the Irish (1886), German Conservatives and National Liberals put through the Prussian parliament a resolution calling upon the government to speed up the "Germanization" of the three million Poles in Posen and West Prussia (the later "Corridor"). In reply, Bismarck set forth a dual policy: Poles serving in the army or civil service "would be given an opportunity to avail themselves of the advantages of German civilization by being posted in German provinces far from their own homes"; and Polish land would be bought up and distributed among German farmers pledged "to remain German and, above all, to marry German wives." The parliament immediately appropriated a hundred million marks for land purchase, and the next year the government forbade further teaching of the Polish language in any part of Prussia. The retirement of Bismarck in 1890 halted anti-Polish legislation, though only temporarily. Agitation in behalf of it was soon stimulated and magnified by the efforts of three fiery German nationalists—Hansemann, Kennemann, and Tiedemann—and the "Society of the Eastern Marches" (or "HKT Society") which they founded in 1894. Bismarck's anti-Polish measures proved but a foretaste of those sponsored and applied by Bülow after 1900.

"Germanization" was also directed, in the '80's, against Danes in Schleswig and against French influence in Alsace-Lorraine. The latter provinces remained under practically military rule, and the conciliatory efforts of the German governor from 1879 to 1885, Field Marshal von Manteuffel, were exceptional. Under his successor, Prince Hohenlohe (later chancellor of the empire), French was finally and completely banished from the schools and all "autonomist" protests were silenced.

"Russification" was a kindred process. Its goal, as formulated and popularized by Slavophiles like Katkov and Aksakov, and actually pursued by ministers such as Dmitri Tolstoy, Plehve, and Pobédonostsev, was "one law (the Russian Tsar's), one language (the Great Russian), and one religion (the Russian Orthodox)." It began, in an important way, as an aftermath of the crushing of the Polish insurrection of 1863, and reached an advanced stage under Alexander III in the '80's. Every semblance of an autonomous Poland was obliterated; and in what had once been their

country Poles were excluded from public office, obliged to use Russian in schools and law courts, and forbidden to sell land to anyone except a Russian. In White Russia and Lithuania, the population, chiefly Catholic, was coerced into employing the services of the Orthodox Church to legitimize marriages and children. In the Ukraine, the Little Russian language was treated as a "dialect" and prohibited in printing, reciting, or singing. In the Baltic provinces, Russian was prescribed as the official tongue; the consent of Orthodox authorities was required for the construction of any Protestant church building; local law courts were suppressed; and German place names were changed to Russian. The harsh anti-Jewish ukases of the time were part of the same "Russification"; so, too, was the persecution of numerous sects of Dissenters from the Russian Orthodox Church; and so also were milder measures taken against Georgians, Armenians, and still other dissident peoples within the Russian Empire. Even the Finns, whose separate state and liberal constitution had long been solemnly guaranteed and usually respected by Russian Tsars, were not proof against the new Russification. A manifesto of 1890 incorporated their postal system with the Russian, and in 1899 the Tsar Nicholas II virtually annulled the Finnish constitution and made the Grand-Duchy a Russian satrapy.

In the Austrian half of the Hapsburg Empire, German Nationalists, abetted curiously enough by centralizing Liberals and by Jews (who felt more at ease with urban Germans than with rural Slavs), championed the maintenance of traditional German hegemony and the repression of subject nationalities. But both Christian Socialists and Marxian Social Democrats were critical of repressive policies, and the subject peoples were too numerous and well-organized to admit of the adoption or execution of such policies. In the trying circumstances, the imperial government at Vienna steered a middle course throughout the '80's and '90's between the Scylla of "home rule" for the various peoples and the Charybdis of "Germanization." The lodestar of the course was not the newer nationalism but the much older imperialism, and its attendant lights were the Emperor, the Church, the army, the still cosmopolitan bureaucracy and nobility—and the Austrian Poles.

For these last, by a stroke of irony, were very grateful to Vienna for the free hand given them to "Polonize" the Ruthenians (Ukrainians) in Galicia.

On the other side, the Hungarian half of the Hapsburg Empire, while almost as heterogeneous as the Austrian, was subjected by its historically ruling element to a drastic "Magyarization." This outcome had appeared unlikely for a brief time just after the settlement of 1867 between Hungary and Austria. In a moment of magnanimity in 1868, Deák and Baron Eötvös conceded "home rule" to Croatia, and put through parliament a "Nationality Act" guaranteeing to every ethnic group its own language, schools, ecclesiastical institutions, and "equal membership in the Hungarian nation." But Eötvös's death in 1871 and Deák's in 1876 brought to power a new generation of Magyar nationalists who forgot all about "equal rights" and devoted themselves to "assimilating" the other peoples to a Magyarized (and therefore presumably Greater) Hungary. Under the leadership of three or four noble families,²⁵ and with the backing of high finance, the Hungarian Jewry, and a vociferously demagogic press, they dominated the unreformed Hungarian parliament and monopolized the kingdom's administration and judiciary. Through these agencies they nullified the Nationality Act and steadily extended the compulsory use of the Magyar language to elementary schools (1879), secondary schools (1883), and kindergartens (1891), and to all public services. They likewise abridged the autonomy previously accorded to Croatia and imposed upon its unhappy population for twenty years after 1883 the despotic governorship of Count Khuen Hedervary with his ill-famed policy of "horsewhip and oats." Throughout the Hungarian state—among Serbs, Slovaks, Germans, and Rumanians—"Magyar cultural associations" were fostered, village and family names were Magyarized, and judicial persecution was visited upon opponents and critics of the process.

V. THE "PAN" MOVEMENTS

Among offspring of the romantic indiscretions of philology and anthropology when the nineteenth century was young, were certain

²⁵ The Tiszas, Andrásyis, Apponyis, and Károlyis.

"pan" movements which "realistic" nationalists of the century's closing decades adopted and fostered. The most notable, perhaps, was Pan-Slavism. Its first apostles had been scholars and poets, chiefly in the Hapsburg Empire,²⁶ who regarded the different Slavic tongues as dialects of one common language and the different Slavic peoples as tribes of a single nation, and who sang in verse or lyrical prose the past glories of Slavdom and its abiding mission. One of the foremost, the Slovak poet and Lutheran clergyman, Ján Kollár, in a series of passionate sonnets, *Daughter of Slava*, had apostrophized the colossal statue he would make of the various branches of Slavs—from Russia the head, from Poland the breast, from Bohemia the arms, from Serbia the legs—and before which he would have all Europe kneel down. For, whereas the Germanic and Latin peoples were declining and their day in world history was waning or gone, the Slavs in their uncorrupted innocence were the coming heroes of history, provided only that they felt and acted upon their essential unity.

They didn't so act. Instead, each of the Slavic peoples proceeded forthwith to develop its own particularistic nationalism, so that by the time the first Pan-Slavic Congress met at Prague in 1848 the expressed aim of the movement was not unity but mutual assistance, and by the time the second Congress assembled at Moscow in 1867 this "mutual assistance" was being exploited by Russian nationalists for imperialistic purposes. The Russian historian, Michael Pogodin; the Russian army officer, General Rostislav Fadeyev; the Russian scientist, Nicholas Danilevski: these were now the mentors of Pan-Slavism, and they infused it with racialism and the dogma of Russia's special "mission."²⁷ Inside Russia they joined with the mystical Slavophiles to promote the Russification of Poles, Ukrainians, and other subject nationalities, Slavic as well as non-Slavic, while outside they invoked the blood brotherhood of Russians with

²⁶ Such as the Czechs Josef Dobrovský, Josef Jungmann, Karel Havlíček, and František Palacký, the Slovak Josef Šafařík, the Slovene František Prešeren, the Croatian Ljudevit Gaj. See F. E. Artz, *Reaction and Revolution, 1814-1832* (New York, 1934), pp. 241-5.

²⁷ This Russian Pan-Slavism received classic formulation in Pogodin's *Historico-Critical Essays* [*Istoriko-Kriticheskie Otriubi*], 2 vols (Moscow, 1846-1867); in Fadeyev's *Opinion on the Eastern Question* (1869), Eng. trans. by T. Mitchell, 2nd ed. (London, 1876); and in Danilevski's *Russland und Europa* (1871), Germ. trans. by K. Nötzel (Stuttgart, 1920).

Bulgarians and Serbs, or with Czechs and Croatians, as justification for Russian belligerence against the Ottoman Empire or for Russian machinations against the Hapsburg Empire. Although the Tsar's government was inclined to frown on Pan-Slavism as an incitement to revolutionary disturbance and a handicap to international *Realpolitik*, it was not above utilizing it whenever the opportunity seemed favorable; and it was the Pan-Slavist Russian ambassador at Constantinople, Count Ignatiev, who engineered the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and the construction of what he hoped would be a Bulgarian state dependent upon the Russian Empire.

Polish nationalists, for good and sufficient reasons, did not take to Russian Pan-Slavism. On the contrary, many followed Roman Dmowski in cherishing a Pan-Polish ideal and claiming for the future resurrected Poland, with utter disregard of ethnographic factors and national sentiments, the imperial Poland of the historic Jagiello dynasty—a vast territory stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea and including Lithuania, White Russia, and all of the Ukraine. Moreover, both Serb and Croatian nationalists were so antagonized by the favoritism the Tsar showed Bulgaria in 1878 that they long remained critical of Russian Pan-Slavism and devoted themselves to projecting some form of Pan-Yugoslavism. Even the Bulgarians ungratefully displayed less zeal for Pan-Slavism than for Bulgarian nationalism. Only the younger generation of Czech nationalists—Masaryk, Beneš, etc.—were warmly sympathetic with Russian dominance of Pan-Slavism, and only because they perceived in it the most hopeful agency for disintegrating the Hapsburg Empire and enabling them to establish an independent—and possibly imperial—Bohemia. They staged an impressive Pan-Slavic demonstration at Prague in 1898, the centenary of Palacký's birth and the fiftieth anniversary of the first Pan-Slavic Congress.

Yet, despite internal dissensions and radical differences of opinion about its political objectives, Pan-Slavism of the 1890's, in a cultural and sentimental way, was a widespread and fairly popular movement, begetting unions of Slavic journalists, congresses of Slavic students, federations of Slavic athletic clubs (*sokols*). Furthermore,

non-Slavs were now acutely aware of it and of its being backed and fronted by Imperial Russia; and on neighboring Germans, Magyars, and Turks it had the effect of a first-class bogey: they exaggerated its coherence and strength and readily supported counter-offensives, such as Pan-Germanism, Magyarization, or eventually a terribly entitled "Turkification."

A fine rejoinder to Pan-Slavism should have been "Pan-Teutonism," uniting all peoples with Teutonic languages (and presumably of Teutonic race)—Germans, Englishmen, Americans, Netherlanders, Scandinavians. It was actually bruited now and then by individual scholars and publicists, and such expansive statesmen as Cecil Rhodes, Joseph Chamberlain, and Theodore Roosevelt occasionally talked, as did certain German pundits, about blood being thicker than water and Teutons having a common (and of course superior) "mission." Rhodes was, indeed, so faithful a Pan-Teutonist that the scholarships he munificently endowed at Oxford were to be open alike to Germans, Americans, and British Colonials. Yet "Pan-Teutonism" never really grew up. It was smothered in its youth by the lusty nationalism of the several Teutonic great powers, and its assets were divided, somewhat unevenly, between Pan-Germanism and Pan-Anglo-Saxonism.

Pan-Germanism was to Pan-Teutonism what *Klein Deutsch* had once been to *Gross Deutsch*—something less extensive but something more practical and compact. It simply ruled out Britain, Scandinavia, and the United States and concentrated on the unity and high mission—linguistic, cultural, racial, and (it was hoped) political—of *German*-speaking people, whether they lived in Germany or Austria-Hungary, Switzerland or the Baltic regions, or overseas. To be sure, Netherlandish being but a German "dialect," Pan-Germanism might properly encompass Holland and most of Belgium. The movement, a very real one, centered in the Pan-German League²⁸ which Carl Peters founded in 1890 "for the promotion of overseas German national interests" and which was reorganized in 1891 with these broadened objects: "to arouse patriotic self-consciousness at home and to oppose vigorously any devel-

²⁸ The original name was "Allgemeiner deutscher Verband." The more popular "Alldeutscher Verband" was officially adopted in 1894.

opment of the German people along unpatriotic lines; to support and aid German endeavors in all lands where members of the German people must struggle to retain their individuality, and the union of all Germans on the earth for the furthering of these aims; to promote an energetic German policy of might in Europe and oversea; above all, to carry forward the German colonial movement to tangible results." From 1894, when Hasse assumed its presidency, the League thrived. By 1900 it had 173 branches in Germany and 28 outside, some hundred salaried agents, a dozen spokesmen in the Reichstag, and a total membership, active and associate, of close to 100,000. It held congresses and demonstrations, published a journal and much other propagandist literature, and co-operated closely with a large number of more specialized nationalist organizations: a "General German School Association" (to maintain German schools in foreign countries); a "General German Language Association" (to purify the language of foreign words and phrases); Navy League; etc.

Pan-Germanism, like Pan-Slavism, was taken more seriously abroad than at home. The German government and the bulk of the German press usually belittled it and frequently chided its spokesmen and agents, although on occasion the government was glad to utilize whatever popular favor its clamors elicited for colonial measures and army and navy bills. Probably, too, the Pan-German League and its allies implanted the seed of intensive imperialistic "Germanism" more deeply and widely than was imagined at the time by German critics. There can be no doubt, however, that the agitation complicated German foreign relations after 1890 and aroused increasing resentment abroad.

Pan-Anglo-Saxonism was less definite and much less effectual. Except for a brief spell of mutual admiration between the United States and Great Britain at the end of the '90's, when the story spread that their fleets had squared off for possible joint action against Germany's in Manila Bay, the movement, if there was one at all, was confined to a few intellectuals and a slightly larger number of social snobs. Anglo-Saxonism was too intimate a part of English nationalism to be shared, and America had too many non-Anglo-Saxons.

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A "Pan-Latinism" had been cultivated by Napoleon III, but at best it had been a tender plant, and after the French *débâcle* at Sedan and Italy's seizure of Rome in 1870 it shriveled and died. French nationalists could only denounce the ingratitude of Latin sisters—Italy, Rumania, and Spain—who one by one gravitated toward Teutonic Germany, and seek comfort for France in the arms of Slavic Russia. Pan-Slavism might be a bugbear to everybody else, but by Rambaud and Leroy-Beaulieu, Déroulède and Hanotaux, it was hymned as a fit companion goddess to pure Gallic Latinity.

"Pan" was easily fastened to a bewildering variety of real or imaginary movements of the period. The effort of the United States to draw Latin American countries closer to it commercially and politically, was dubbed Pan-Americanism. A few philological scholars, finding some affinities among the Finnish, Magyar, and Turkish languages, manufactured a corresponding Pan-Turanianism. And a generation that got into the habit of being alarmed—without too serious consequences—felt thrills of alarm when they were told in the late '90's that Pan-Islam threatened Europe and that Pan-Mongolians (the "yellow race") were about to threaten it.

Yet however unreal and insignificant most of these pan-movements were, they indicated a startling new trend in popular thinking. At least in the case of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism, the coupling of nationalism with linguistics and race on a large scale helped immeasurably to render nationalism imperialistic and to feed the forceful ambitiousness of great powers.

VI. AGITATION AMONG SUBMERGED NATIONALITIES

"In regions where half-animal men are living, let us establish schools, let us construct a railway, and tolerate a printing-press. Twenty years later national feeling will be born. After two generations it will explode if you try to suppress it. In this manner the national question is born out of the very nature of civilization."²⁹

When the sympathetic Laveleye made this analysis and prediction, nationalist agitation had been going on in Europe for well-

²⁹ Émile de Laveleye, cited by Oscar Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Empire* (Chicago, 1929), p. 251.

nigh a century, not only among major peoples (French, British, German, Italian, Russian), for whom it served to create or consolidate first-class "national states," but also among lesser peoples who still remained in political and social subjection to others, and who, being preponderantly agricultural and hence "backward," were apt to be described by a progressive Liberal sociologist as "half-animal men." Since at least the 1820's and 1830's there had been hardly one of these latter peoples anywhere in Europe that had not had in its midst a galaxy of romantic intellectuals, resurrecting its folk speech, folk ballads, folk customs and costumes, celebrating in epic verse or ponderous tome its more or less mythical past, and founding little societies and schools, theaters and publishing houses, to spread its cult among the "masses." Railway construction (and wood-pulp paper) merely expedited the popular propaganda already under way.

Nationalist agitation among "subject" or "submerged" peoples had almost invariably been directed, in first instance, toward cultural, rather than political, ends; and unless and until it turned to politics, disturbing public "order" and evoking legislative action in an existent state, little or no attention was paid to it by Europe at large. Among Bulgarians, for example, nationalist agitation had been rife for some time before 1870, but few persons in western Europe knew anything about it—or who the Bulgarians were—until the heralded disorders and massacres of 1875 and the resulting Russo-Turkish War. Likewise, Europe enriched its previous scanty knowledge of Catalans and Basques and their autonomist demands during the Spanish commotions of the early '70's.

The haziest notions endured still longer about a people variously referred to as Little Russian or Ukrainian or Ruthenian. In the middle '80's one learned from the public press that the Tsar was "Russifying" the Ukraine; and later, in 1908, one was startled to read of the assassination of the Polish governor of Galicia, Count Potocki, by a "Ruthenian" student. One recognized that nationalism was at work among "Ukrainians" and "Ruthenians," though one was not sure yet whether they were a single people, or two—or maybe three.

In fact, developing nationalist activity thrust quite a variety of

hitherto neglected peoples into the European limelight during the three decades after 1871. Russifying decrees of the Tsar's government publicized (and accentuated) the nationalism of Lithuanians and Finns, and more vaguely that of other Baltic peoples as well as of Little Russians and White Russians. Within the Grand Duchy of Finland, political pressure of the Finnish-speaking peasants induced the Swedish-speaking governmental class to concede statutory equality of Finnish with Swedish in the law courts (1883), in the administration (1886), and in the university (1894). In Norway, also, a particularistic nationalism came to the fore with the increasing influence of the peasantry on the local parliament. For the Norwegian peasants, resentful of Swedish "aristocracy," backed those politicians who were most insistent on Norway's "rights" under the political Union with Sweden, just as they backed patriotic professors who were trying to break cultural ties with Denmark by substituting, as the country's literary language, an artificial synthesis of indigenous rural dialects (the *landsmaal*) for the Danish speech of the cities (the *riksmaal*). The Norwegian parliament recognized the "equality" of *landsmaal* with *riksmaal* in 1885, and successively admitted the former to teacher-training institutions (1890), elementary schools (1892), secondary schools (1896), and university (1899). By this time a loudly vocal element of Norwegian nationalists was punctuating denunciation of the Swedish Union with demands on Denmark for the "return" of the Faroe Islands, Iceland, and Greenland, and even with protests against Britain's retention of the Hebrides and Orkneys.

A Provençal nationalism of a purely literary and cultural sort had been inaugurated by Frédéric Mistral and six fellow poets with their founding of the Félibrige Society back in 1854. In 1876, the society, now much enlarged, elaborated its organization and propaganda for a "Provençal revival" throughout the French regions of Provence, Languedoc, and Aquitaine and the Spanish province of Catalonia. Then in 1892 a group of its members, headed by Frédéric Amouretti and Charles Maurras, formally put forth a demand for Provençal autonomy within a federalized France, with which demand immediately concurred representatives of other recently born "regionalisms"—Breton, Corsican, and Basque. The

persons involved were not numerous and their prime loyalty was unquestionably to France, but inasmuch as they were mainly Royalist in politics and Catholic in religion, they were denounced by centralizing and anti-clerical Republicans as an insidious element of "reaction."

In Belgium Flemish nationalism passed in the '70's from intellectuals to the compact masses of the northern and western districts; and, entering politics in the '80's, it helped to discomfit the Liberals, whose chief strength was among the French-speaking Walloons, and to put the Catholic party in power. In 1889 an act of parliament prescribed the use of Flemish in legal cases involving a defendant of that nationality; and another act, in 1898, made Flemish, equally with French, an official language of Belgium. Beginning in 1887 there were monster Flemish demonstrations every July 11, the anniversary of French defeat in the medieval "Battle of the Golden Spurs"; and in 1895 the writer August Vermeylen, a disciple of Hegel and Max Stirner, initiated a left-wing "Activist" movement by his attack on "Belgian tyranny." "All young and fighting forces," he wrote, "wrench themselves free from oppression, disregard law in so far as possible, and turn their backs on parliaments and democracies."³⁰ Two years later a Flemish teacher at Ypres, in collaboration with a group of Dutch intellectuals, founded a Pan-Netherlandish League³¹ to emphasize and safeguard "the essential oneness of Netherlandish language and race" in Flanders, the Dutch Netherlands, French Artois, and South Africa.

One striking feature of the period's nationalist agitation, obviously, was that it affected and widely publicized a number of European peoples that had not previously been supposed to have national self-consciousness or political aspirations. Another of its features, even more startling, was its quickened *tempo* and fiercer manifestation among subject peoples already generally known to be nationalist (at least culturally)—Poles, Czechs, Irish, etc. Nationalism of these peoples was magnified by their desire to emulate

³⁰ *Kritiek der vlaamsche Beweging*, 2nd ed. (Bussum, 1905), p. 48. Vermeylen later disclaimed these doctrines. See the preface to this second edition.

³¹ This "Algemeen Nederlandsch Verbond" enrolled, among others, the distinguished Dutch historian, J. P. Blok, and the Transvaal President, "Oom" Paul Kruger.

the recent successes of Germans, Italians, Magyars, and Balkan peoples, and then quickly aggravated and embittered by their being treated as inferiors and made the object of Germanization, Russification, or other repressive measures. Besides, they could now utilize the new popular journalism and in most countries the new democratic franchise (and constitutional guarantees of freedom of press, speech, and association) to give their grievances unprecedented airing and to create extraordinary difficulties for their "oppressors." From the '80's it was clear that nationalism among these peoples was not an affair of intellectuals or a class but that it represented a real mass movement.

Irish nationalism entered a new phase at this time. In 1879 the magnetic Charles Stewart Parnell, Anglo-Irish Protestant whose almost fanatical hatred of England he seems to have imbibed from his American mother, was drawing the Catholic Irish electorate into his newly formed "Nationalist Party" and collecting funds for it from Irish settlers and sympathizers in the United States, with the result that four-fifths of all the Irish members of the British parliament soon constituted a solid Nationalist phalanx in support of his demand for a separate Irish parliament. Also in 1879, Michael Davitt, ex-peasant, ex-Fenian, and professional agitator, launched a "Land League," which speedily enlisted the bulk of Irish peasants in the cause of national agrarian reform. Neither Land League nor Nationalist parliamentarians employed conventional methods of the kid-glove kind. While the one incited to acts of physical violence against objectionable landlords or treated their land agents as it treated unobliging Captain Boycott, the other raised fracas at Westminster by heckling speakers, obstructing parliamentary business, and hurling inkstands. Gladstone, having failed to quiet the agitation by the sedative of a Land Act, resorted anew to coercion, putting Ireland under martial law and jailing Parnell, Davitt, and several of their lieutenants. But coercion was a failure, too; it brought so many reprisals that only the stationing of the whole British army in Ireland could have coped with them. Finally, in 1886, Gladstone accepted Parnell's terms and agreed to sponsor Irish "home rule." Sponsor it he actually did that very year, and

again in 1893; but both of his bills the British parliament threw out.

In the '90's Irish nationalism was in a transitional stage. The Nationalist Party was weakened by the failure of the home rule bills, and still more by internal dissensions following Parnell's disgrace and death; and the Irish Land Purchase Acts which the Conservatives enacted stole much of the thunder of the Land League. In the same decade, however, developments below the surface were shaping new and more radical ends for Irish nationalism. In 1893 Douglas Hyde inaugurated the "Gaelic League" for the preservation and extension of the native Irish language. In 1894 Sir Horace Plunkett founded the "Agricultural Organization Society" to promote co-operative enterprise and material well-being among the Irish farmers. In 1899, most momentous of all, there returned from the diamond mines in South Africa an obscure young man, Arthur Griffith by name, with an idea that Ireland, like Hungary, should not beg home rule or anything else of a "foreign" parliament, but rely on herself and her own powers of passive resistance to achieve full statehood. It was the conception of Sinn Fein.

Czech nationalism ran a course similar to Irish. Though Bohemia had the form of local self-government in a surviving semi-feudal diet, this body possessed few powers, and it had long been dominated by the province's German minority (the so-called Sude-tens), who collaborated most zealously after 1867 with fellow German nationalists in the Reichsrat at Vienna to maintain German ascendancy throughout the Austrian dominions. Opposition of the Czech majority in Bohemia (and Moravia) was intensified thereby; and as a mark of special resentment against the withholding from them of the national autonomy accorded to Hungary, their elected deputies absented themselves from the Reichsrat during the period of centralizing Liberal ministries from 1867 to 1879. With the succession of Count Taaffe's more sympathetic Conservative ministry in the latter year, the Czech deputies took their seats at Vienna. They comprised two nationalist groups: the "Old Czechs," led by Palacký's aging and conciliatory son-in-law, von Rieger; and the "Young Czechs," followers of the more youthful

and radical Dr. Karel Kramář. Between them, they obtained some favors. Alongside the German university at Prague was established in 1882 a new Czech university. In 1883 the Czechs were enabled to secure a majority in the Bohemian diet, and in 1886 local officials were obliged to use the Czech as well as the German language in the transaction of business.

Nevertheless, what the Czechs most desired—the restoration of a fully autonomous Bohemia—they were denied. The result was the electoral defeat of the moderate “Old Czechs” and the adoption by the reinforced “Young Czechs” of the disorderly methods of contemporary Irish Nationalists. Indeed, the Austrian Reichsrat fared worse than the British parliament, for Czech obstructionists were ably seconded by deputies of numerous other disgruntled nationalities—Slovenes, Italians, Croats, Ruthenians, Rumanians.³² The Austrian government retaliated in 1893 by placing Prague under martial law and suspending jury trial and freedom of the press in Czech territories. For two years this forceful repression continued, followed then by an ominous lull in Bohemia and new but unavailing protestations of friendliness at Vienna. Kramář was already advising the Czechs to expect deliverance by Russia, and Professor Masaryk was preaching a still more radical “realist” nationalism which should overspread Slovaks as well as Czechs and build, by war if necessary, a free and united Czechoslovakia.

The subject nationalities of Hungary were less in the limelight during the period, mainly because the Hungarian electoral laws prevented them from using the parliament at Budapest, as the Czechs used the parliament at Vienna, to advertise their grievances and demands. This is not to say, however, that they acquiesced in the Magyarization which was inflicted upon them and which was far more repressive than anything felt by the Czechs. On the contrary the masses of Croatian, Serb, Slovak, and Rumanian peasantry were now more determined than ever to hold to their respective national traditions and “rights” and more ready to accept the leader-

³² In the Reichsrat elected in 1897, for example, were 63 Czechs, 16 Slovenes, 19 Italians, 13 Croats, 11 Ruthenians, and 6 Rumanians—a total of 128 “dissident nationalists,” as over against 126 German Liberals, 89 German Conservatives, 68 Poles, and 14 Social Democrats. The franchise in Austria, it should be recalled, was still not democratic. When it became so, after 1900, it greatly enlarged the dissident representation and thereby rendered parliamentary government practically impossible.

ship of extremists. Incidentally it may be remarked that their intensifying nationalism had a sharp note of anti-Semitism in it, a reaction against the support which Hungarian Jewry gave to Magyarization.

Poles, distributed among three powerful states, were in a peculiarly difficult position. None of them was without the dream of a gloriously resurrected and reunited Polish state, but they differed as to how it might be realized. One group—rapidly diminishing—looked to Russia or Pan-Slavism to perform the miracle; another, to the Germanic Central Powers; while a third, skeptical about the early appearance of any messiah, urged self-reliance, a stimulated solidarity among Russian, Prussian, and Austrian Poles, and a vigorous campaign looking to the defense of common national culture and the securing of provincial autonomy.

From practical necessity, Polish nationalism actually developed along the lines of this last program. In Prussian Posen it concentrated on opposing and countering, alike in parliament and in the countryside, the "Germanizing" efforts and enactments of the time. In "Congress Poland" it reacted bitterly—about all it could do against the severer "Russification." In Austria, the Poles were happier. Here, where the imperial government wanted their help as a counterpoise to the hostility of other minorities, they escaped all cultural repression and virtually dominated the entire province of Galicia. Here, too, Polish nationalists from Posen or Warsaw were free to congregate with those of Cracow or Lemberg, and by speech and press to stimulate ever more militant Polish nationalism across the borders.

Laveleye proved a good prophet with his prediction about the nationalism of submerged peoples, that "after two generations it will explode if you try to suppress it." It did explode just about forty years after the start of Russification, Magyarization, Germanization, and other large-scale attempts at repression and coercion. As one looks back upon the nationalist agitation of subject peoples in the 1870's and 1880's, one is likely to be struck by the modesty of its demands and the patience with which, even under increasing provocation, it awaited their fulfillment. The "home rule" for which the Irish Nationalists asked in 1879 was such a

slight boon, and they asked for nothing else for so long! The Czechs of that time had no wish to smash the Hapsburg Empire; they and the Croatians, and even more the Serbs, Slovenes, Slovaks, and Rumanians, thought in terms of a federalized empire under which they would cherish their particular cultures and practice national "home rule"; and, with an optimism perhaps infectious in the Danube basin, they long clung to that thought in the face of Austrian rebuffs and Magyar assaults. Even the Poles were long-suffering, and might eventually have been content with mere dreaming if they had been interfered with as little by Russia and Prussia as by Austria.

But this is idle speculation. Nationalism of great, "successful" peoples was too strong and proud, too saturated with racialism and imperialism and a sense of "historic mission," to remain tolerant of lesser, submerged peoples. And these, taking their cue from their "betters," presently gave indications that they might become equally intolerant if they ever got the chance. Only tiny Switzerland, perched high above the rest of Europe, offered practical demonstration of how, through sane federalism and real liberty, diverse nationalities could live together in amity and evince a common patriotism. Although no great power paid serious attention to the Swiss demonstration, Switzerland remained at peace when later the world was at war, and Switzerland outlasted the empires of Hapsburg, Hohenzollern, and Tsar.